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TRUTH &C 




THE WAR 

1 BY E-D -MOREL V 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/truthwar01more 




Copyright by] 



THE ^UTH07l 



[J. Russell & Sons 



Truth and the War 



■ 



By 

E. D. MOREL 

Author of "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" ("Morocco in 
Diplomacy") (The National Labour Press) ; "Nigeria : 
its Peoples and its Problems" (Smith, Elder & Co.); 
"Red Rubber: the Story of the Rubber Slave Trade flourish- 
ing on the Congo in the year of grace 1907" (T. Fisher 
Unwin) ; "King Leopold's Rule in Africa " (Heinemann) ; 
"Affairs of West Africa " (Heinemann) ; The British Case 
in French Congo" (Heinemann), etc., etc. 



yU 



LONDON : 

AT THE NATIONAL LABOUR PRESS LTD 
1916 



PUBLICATIONS BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
BOORS 

Nigeria: Its Peoples and its Problems 

London: Smith Elder & Co.: Two Editions, 1911-12 

"There have been few travellers, indeed, who have given us so accurate a 
picture of the great African region, or who have discussed the problems 
arising from it with so much sound sense and sympathy." — The Nation. 

"A fascinating book." — Public Opinion. 

Red Rubber: The Story of the %ubber Sla^e Trade 
in the Congo 

T. Fisher Unwin: Five Editions, 1906-08 

"If there are any who are not yet believers in the reality of the Congo 
Government's misdeeds, Mr. Morel's new book may be recommended as 
a certain means of conviction. To the author, more than to any man 
alive, is due the ventilation of this crime against civilisation. He has 
fought a long uphill battle against apathy, misrepresentation, and the 
power of an unscrupulous purse. And he has been successful. He has 
made Congo Reform a part of the sworn creed of many of our chief 
public men." — The Spectator. 

King Leopold's Rule in Africa 

London: Heinemann, 1904 

"An amazing book to be written in the dawn of the Twentieth Century 
of the Christian era." — Morning Post. 

Great Britain and the Congo 

London: Smith Elder & Co., 1905 

The British Case in French Congo 

London: Heinemann, 1903 

Affairs of West Africa 

London: Heinemann, 1902 

French Edition: "Problemes de 1'Ouest Africain" 

Translated by A. Duchene, Chief of the Staff of the African Department of the 
French Colonial Office. 

Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, 1 9 1 5 

London: The National Labour Press, 1/-; Three Large 
Editions 

"The most tremendous indictgagnt of the methods of secret diplomacy 
ever written." — Bradford pimeir. 

"Mr. Morel may claim truly that he foresaw the war and warned us 
against it." — The Forward. 

(First published in 191 2 under the title of "Morocco in 
Diplomacy" and containing in an Annexe a complete 
collection of official documents relating to Morocco from 
the Madrid Convention of 1880 to the Franco-German 
Agreement of November, 191 1: Smith Elder & Co., 6/-) 






TO MY SONS 

THIS VOLUME IS 

DEDICATED 

IN THE HOPE THAT THEY MAY HELP TO FREE HUMANITY 
FROM THE CURSE OF MILITARISM AND WAR. 



INTRODUCTION 

By Philip Snowden, M.P. 

<C/ B S RUTH," it has been said, "is the first casualty of 
A war." When hostilities break out the one object 
of each belligerent nation is victory. "All is fair in war," 
and to secure and maintain national unity in support of 
the war every means are taken by the respective Govern- 
ments to suppress criticism which, however honest and 
true, may be thought by them to be calculated to create a 
doubt as to the wholly disinterested and blameless position 
of their own country. It becomes a most unpatriotic act 
to continue to hold and to express opinions about the 
foreign policy of the statesmen of one's own country, 
which have been held and proclaimed for years before the 
war by large bodies of men and women, and which were 
then regarded as perfectly reasonable and useful criticism. 
This suppression of the truth during a war is justified 
as being in the interests of one's own country. The test 
of a person's patriotism is willingness to subscribe to the 
declaration "My country, right or wrong." Patriotism 
within the limits of morality is a noble sentiment. But, 
as John Bright said in one of his finest passages, "the 
moral law was not written for individuals only, but for 
nations, and for nations as great as we are." When 
patriotism leads men and nations to ignore facts, and to 
refuse to hear or acknowledge the truth, it becomes a sin, 
for which the penalty will certainly sooner or later have to 
be paid. Lord Hugh Cecil recently wrote, "Mankind has 
suffered the prodigious evils the war has brought upon us 
mainly because human beings in general, and especially 
Germans, have come to love their countries more than 
they ought to do — more than they love God and His laws." 



INTRODUCTION 

There have been a few people in all the belligerent 
countries who have refused to forswear the principles they 
have held and proclaimed in times of peace, and who, 
when their prophecies have been fulfilled, have refused to 
deny that they ever made them. If there has been in the 
past foreign policy of this country, as well as in the 
foreign policies of other nations, something wrong, which 
has contributed to the present war, then it will be fatal for 
the future peace of Europe not to admit that truth. If 
another war is to be averted, there will have to be a 
thorough searching out of all the causes of this war, with 
the object of removing them. If a perverted patriotism 
is to be allowed to blind the people of any country to the 
mistakes or sins of their own Governments, then the 
likelihood of a permanent peace is very remote. 

Among the men who have kept the impartial and 
judicial mind during these awful days since August, 1914, 
none has rendered greater service to the future of peace 
and internationalism than the writer of this volume. I 
do not expect that his attitude can be generally approved 
now, nor the value of his work appreciated. But Time 
will do justice to both. There is a certain type of very 
limited mental development which has not learnt that there 
are more numerals than two. If a word of criticism of 
the policy of one's own country is put forward, such 
persons immediately jump to the conclusion that the critic 
is the friend of every other nation, and that the object of 
his criticism is to condemn his own country and to defend 
all others. Criticism of the policy of statesmen is the 
highest patriotism, for it is aimed at removing those 
mistakes which detract from the reputation of our own 
country abroad and the well-being of our own people at 
home. 

That is the spirit in which this book has been written. 
It has been written, not in the interests of the enemy, but 
in the interests of Great Britain. At a time when the 
public mind was calm and so free from passion as to be 
able to take an impartial view of international policy and 



INTRODUCTION 

problems, the writer's past work for oppressed peoples, 
and his great knowledge of and authority on international 
questions, would have secured for him a wide and respect- 
ful hearing. I write these few words of introduction to 
beseech for the book such a reception in these troublous 
times. The matters with which it deals are of tremendous, 
of the most vital importance. Without a popular know- 
ledge of these facts it will be impossible for the people 
of this country to take an intelligent part in the settlement 
of the war. 

We do not ask for the endorsement of all that is said 
in this volume. Let the statements stand upon their 
merits. Many parts of the book have already been before 
the public for some time. So far as I know, the facts 
have never been challenged. But where there are such 
tremendous issues involved, it is surely in the interests of 
truth that there should be full and free discussion, and that 
every side of the question should be stated and discussed. 
It is only by such full and frank discussion that we can 
hope to obtain a settlement after this war which will be 
permanent, because it is based upon Truth. 



IX 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

During the past twelve months I have been one of the 
best-abused men in the British Isles. Not even my friend 
and colleague, Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, has had to 
endure such malignant misrepresentation. No dishonour 
too profound, no motive too base, but has been attributed 
to me. 

My offence is a double one. It is that I have partici- 
pated in a movement which seeks to influence public 
opinion in favour of the kind of settlement calculated to 
produce a lasting peace, and not a typical patched-up 
peace, solving none of the national problems peculiar to 
each belligerent State, in their relations with one another, 
such as diplomacy has given us in the past. It is that in 
my personal capacity I have sought, both before and 
since the war, to be fair to our present enemies, and, in 
the interest of my country, to point out that the sole 
responsibility for the war cannot, in justice, be wholly 
imputed to them. To both counts I plead guilty without 
any sort of reservation. I have deliberately so acted, and 
I shall continue deliberately to so act. 

My critics have delved into my family history, and 
doubtless disappointed at finding no trace of German 
influence, either through consanguinity or associations of 
any sort, kind, or description whatsoever, they have dis- 
covered, to their own satisfaction, some stigma in the 
circumstance that I was born of a French father and of 
an English mother, and that twenty years ago I dropped 
the second portion of a double-barrelled family name, 
retaining the first — a circumstance of no earthly concern 
to anyone but myself and my relatives. Both these facts, 
neither of the least public importance, had been publicly 
accessible for many years. 1 I might add this. It is pre- 
cisely because I am, in part, of French descent, 2 and have 
in consequence very deep natural sympathy with the 

1 Vide "Who's Who." 

2 My father died when I was an infant, and I was educated 
in England. 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

French people, that I have criticised for some years the 
tendency of the powerful influences at work in France, in 
Russia, and in Britain, to strengthen the bellicose and 
reactionary influences in French political life and pro- 
portionately to weaken the elements which, in the former 
country, were endeavouring- to establish friendly relations 
with Germany. For I believed implicitly in the truth 
enunciated seventeen years ago by the great Russian 
student Bloch, 1 that owing in part to her peculiar economic 
position, but especially to her stagnant population, France, 
above all Powers, should avoid entanglement in a great 
war. I believed with Bloch, that for France a great war 
under modern conditions, involving the loss of the flower 
of her youth, would mean " not merely national danger, 
but absolute ruin." And believing this, I thought that 
the party in France which was seeking to reach a per- 
1 manent accommodation with Germany, was the party which 
had the truest interests of France at heart. 1 thought 
that the party in Russia which was palpably using France 
for its own ends, both financially and politically, consti- 
tuted a real danger to the French people. I shared in 
that respect the views of the greatest Russian of his age, 
whose fears that the Franco-Russian Alliance would be 
"a great injury to France" 2 appeared to me only too 
likely to be realised. I thought that the influences in 
the British diplomatic and journalistic world, which were 
inimical to a permanent improvement in Franco-German 
relations lest France should fall into Germany's " orbit," 
were both cruelly unjust to France, and amazingly short- 
sighted from the point of view of British national interests. 
In short, my belief that British national interests lay in a 
thorough understanding with Germany on the principle 
of live and let live, and in assisting rather than hindering 
a Franco-German rapprochement, was accentuated by the 
conviction, to which I was personally susceptible, that, 
short of such an understanding, France, under the existing 
system of alliances, would be the chief victim of a general 
European war. I ministered to those convictions to the 
best of my ability and opportunity, from 191 1, when I 
was released from my Congo work, until the outbreak of 
war. 

1 "Modern Weapons and Modern War." (Grant Richards.) 

2 Letter to an Italian Press correspondent on the Franco-Russian 
Alliance. Sept. 22, 1901 ("What is Religion?" And other new 
Articles and Letters." By Leo Tolstoy. The Free Age Press, 
Christchurch.) 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

In their anxiety to cast discredit upon me my detrac- 
tors have not even hesitated to attack the bona-fides of 
one of the most generous and at the same time one of 
the most powerful movements, supported by those who 
were most far-seeing and morally conscious among men 
eminent in British public life, which ever inspired the 
people of this country — the agitation against the mis- 
government of the Congo. That in so doing my detractors 
were striking at their own Government, at their own 
Legislature, and at their own country, has not deterred 
them. Their attempts to belittle the deep moral and 
spiritual significance of that movement, and grotesquely 
to distort its aims, would be puerile, were it not so pathetic 
and, in the true sense of the word, unpatriotic. 

When these particular insinuations were first mooted, 
in a paper which, under two successive editors, played an 
active and honourable part in the struggle, I dealt with 
them. The personal charges I have ignored. I am con- 
tent to wait. But as my writings since the war broke out 
have been both misquoted and distorted, I have collected 
and presented them in this volume. I believe they embody 
a number of facts and inferences which sooner or later 
the public of this country will realise to have been the 
expression of the truth, and to have been submitted with 
honesty of purpose. The articles and speeches are here 
reproduced as they were written or uttered, with none but 
trifling verbal alterations, and they are reproduced in their 
sequence. A few new chapters have been added. 

In this Personal Foreword I wish to indicate as clearly 
as I am able, the mental processes which have led me to 
view in a different light to that in which the majority of 
my countrymen at present regard them, alike the catas- 
trophe which has overwhelmed civilisation, and the reme- 
dies which need to be applied if civilisation is to be spared 
the prolongation of the war until Europe crumbles into 
ruin, or a repetition of it at no distant date. I am not 
prompted to do so by egotism, but by the feeling that I 
owe something of the sort alike to old friends and ac- 
quaintances, some of whom condemn or misapprehend my 
present actions, and to new friends and acquaintances who 
honour me with their confidence. 



From the year 1899 to the outbreak of the war, my 
life was almost wholly absorbed in journalistic, literary, 
and other work relating to the affairs of Africa. Of that 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

work, records exist in my own published writings, and in 
the writings of others in this country and abroad. From 
early in 1912 until the outbreak of the war, I was partly 
engaged at the Colonial Office in connection with the West 
African Lands Commission, presided over by Sir Kenelm 
Digby, and of which I was appointed a member by Mr. 
Lewis Harcourt, then Colonial Secretary, together with 
Sir Walter Napier, Sir Frederick Hodgson, Sir William 
Taylor, Mr. Joshua Wedgwood, M.P., and others. 

A considerable portion of the period referred to was 
devoted to the unravelling and the remedying of the great- 
est crime perpetrated upon the African race since the days 
of the oversea slave trade. I refer to the maladministra- 
tion by the late Leopold II. of the "Congo Free State"; 
the exposure of that so-called State's misdeeds, and its 
final removal from the map of Africa. In the course of 
that task, which I did not initiate, 1 but with which I 
became prominently identified as Honorary Secretary of 
the Congo Reform Association, 2 I was brought into close 
contact with the methods of international diplomacy, and 
with the proceedings of diplomats. The full story of the 
liberation of the Congo — a region as large as Europe 
minus Russia — from the grip of one of the most atrocious 
systems of slavery the world has ever known, which re- 
duced its population by some twelve millions in a quarter 
of a century, and converted vast areas into absolute 
desert, has yet to be written. I was engaged in writing 
it when the war broke out. If it is ever written, the 
struggle will be seen to have resolved itself into a kind of 
duel, not only with Leopold II. , himself the astutest of all 
contemporary diplomatists, but with the European diplo- 
matic machine itself. For the true conditions of the Congo 
were known, or became in due course known, to every 
Chancellory in Europe. In diplomatic circles there was 
neither ignorance of nor dispute about the facts. The 
diplomatic machine itself, however, could not be induced 



1 The late Sir Charles Dilke and the late Mr. R .H. Foxbourne, 
Secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, ' were the originators. 

2 The first President was Earl Beauchamp, the second Lord 
Monkswell. The Association was created in 1904 and dissolved in 
1913. Among those who, in the course of the Association's nine 
years' existence, served upon its Executive Committee were the 
following : — Mr. Alfred Emmott (now Lord Emmott of Oldham), the 
Bishops of Winchester and Liverpool, Dr. Scott Lidgett and Dr. 
Clifford, Sir George White, Sir Gilbert Parker, Mr. J. Ramsay 
Macdonald, Mr. T. L. Gilmour, etc. 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

for many years to move. But for the constantly growing 
pressure of public opinion here, in Belgium, in the United 
States, and to some extent in Italy, which impelled certain 
definite steps involving certain definite results, these in 
turn producing other developments, the machine would 
never have moved at all. It is to the credit of British 
diplomacy that it did move — but it did so only as a result 
of public pressure. And public pressure alone kept it 
moving, slowly, with prolonged delays and frequent 
vacillations. 

The experience of pursuing a specific aim and steering 
a single course in season and out of season for eleven 
years on end through the tortuosities of diplomatic 
shuffling, of removing one obstacle only to find another in 
its place, of personal intercourse with diplomatists here 
and elsewhere, with journalists in their councils and 
obedient to their will, with permanent officials, Ministers, 
and politicians, and with the flotsam and jetsam which 
crowd the diplomatic corridors — this experience gave me 
an insight into the workings of what is called "Diplo- 
macy," granted, I think, to few men outside the ring, 
and not to all within it. 

The experience taught me many things. I had sup- 
posed that once the facts officially established as the result 
of popular demand, the "scrap of paper" upon which the 
great Powers had inscribed their solemn vow to safeguard 
the rights and liberties of the Congo peoples, would be 
honoured in full by some at least of the signatories. But 
I was not long in discovering that the acknowledged 
truth was not to be the determining factor in the solution 
of the problem, which, I observed, did not depend upon 
the plighted troth of Governments or upon the proven 
martyrdom of millions of men, women, and children, but 
upon the ambitions, intrigues, jealousies, fears and sus- 
picions of rival diplomatists. I found that the destruc- 
tion of human life in Africa, even on a scale so unprece- 
dented, was used merely as a counter upon the diplomatic 
chess-board of Europe, that the appeal to humanity „ 
justice, and common sense was regarded intrinsically as 
valueless, and that joint action to redeem Europe's honour 
was paralysed by considerations remote from the issue at 
staKe. 

It was given me to see behind the veil, and to realise 
how utterly at the mercy of a Bureaucracy working in 
darkness and in secrecy, were the peoples, not of Africa 
only, but of Europe; a Bureaucracy rooted in obsolete 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

traditions, badly informed, out of touch with and 
supremely indifferent to the human pulse, cynically and 
openly contemptuous of moral conduct, deeming the finest 
of arts the art successfully to lie, living in a world walled 
round by narrow prejudices, and absorbed in the prosecu- 
tion of rivalries for the attainment of objects bearing not 
the remotest relation to the well-being or fundamental 
needs of the masses, whose destinies that Bureaucracy 
held in the hollow of its hands. , 

Such was my apprenticeship in the sphere of inter- 
national diplomacy. I am fain to confess that when in 
September, 1914, I read, with the rest of the world, the 
famous phrase of the German Chancellor about the "scrap 
of paper," it struck me then, and it strikes me now, less 
on the score of its immorality than on the score of its 
honesty. It is the one statement, perhaps, in the whole 
official collection of despatches to which the word "honest" 
is completely applicable ; the professional diplomatist in 
the crisis of the hour and under the stress of poignant 
emotion, proclaiming the dishonesty of diplomacy, not of 
German diplomacy alone but of "Diplomacy" itself, which 
in no land, under no Government, at no period, has 
honoured its written word when its own arbitrary inter- 
pretation of what constitutes the "national interest" has 
seemed to counsel repudiation. 

But this impression which I here record must not be 
misunderstood. German diplomacy has been as immoral, 
as short-sighted, as treacherous as any other. And it has 
added to those defects, habitual to Diplomacy itself, a 
brutality of manifestation peculiarly its own, combined 
with an almost phenomenal incapacity to understand, still 
less to appreciate, the psychology of the nations with 
whom it has had to deal. But to each people belongs the 
task of purging its own Augean stables. To denounce 
the mote in a neighbour's eye is cheap enough, but it is 
apt, not only to prevent your detecting the mote in your 
own, but to induce the belief that no mote exists. That 
is the malady from which every belligerent nation is now 
suffering, and paying for in blood and tears. 



The Congo Reform Association, having accomplished 
its labours with the completion of the reforms promised by 
the Belgian Government after the substitution of Belgian 
national control over the Congo for the personal despotism 
of King Leopold, voluntarily dissolved in 1913. Shortly 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

after my return, in the spring of 191 1, from visiting our 
great African protectorate of Nigeria ; Britain, France, and 
Germany were suddenly plunged into the second crisis 
over Morocco, 1 and for several weeks they stood on the 
brink of war. It was a case of another violated inter- 
national treaty, another "scrap of paper," and, like the 
Congo one, dedicated by the signatory Governments to 
"Almighty God." But the circumstances differed. The 
Congo International Treaty was violated by the chief 
party to it at the expense of all the other parties, and at 
the expense of the natives. But as none of the other 
parties concerned had material interests to serve in the 
Congo, as the only real victims were the natives, the other 
parties had collectively abstained from dealing with the 
offender. In the Morocco International Treaty four Euro- 
pean Powers were directly interested. Three of them — 
France, England, and Spain — had pushed cynicism to the 
length of concluding a secret pact providing for the political 
and economic partition of Morocco, which made their sig- 
natures at the foot of an international treaty proclaiming 
the independence and integrity of Morocco a more than 
usually dishonest farce. They had concealed this pact, not 
only from the fourth interested party — Germany — but from 
their own Parliaments and peoples. When, therefore, 
Germany intervened, public opinion in France and Eng- 
land, ignoring the true facts and cleverly played upon by 
the officially inspired Press, quite honestly regarded 
German action as wantonly provocative and designed to 
force a war, or at least to break up the "Entente" — so- 
called. 2 

A painstaking investigation of the whole diplomatic 
history of Morocco revealed a record of treachery and 
deceit towards the British and French peoples, towards 
Morocco and the rest of the world, by the French and 
British Foreign Offices, with few parallels even in the annals 
of diplomacy. The individual diplomatists concerned were 
doubtless in their private lives the most estimable and 
upright of men. But, as Mr. Arthur Ponsonby somewhere 
puts it, the mischief is that the detestable system of 
intrigue and secrecy in which diplomatists live, move, and 
have their official being is such that it sets up wholly false 
ethical values, and imposes a standard of morals which 

1 The first had occurred in 1905-06. 

2 Public opinion in Spain was incensed against France and not 
against Germany, for reasons set forth in my book, 

[?] xvii 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

would not be tolerated for a moment among decent men 
in social life. It seems to be a case of the impeccable 
Dr. Jekyll becoming- the objectionable Mr. Hyde when he 
has breathed for a certain time the atmosphere prevailing 1 
in the Foreign Offices of Europe. It is possible in that 
atmosphere for men honest in their social relations, to 
betray the honour of their country and the cause of inter- 
national justice ; to draw up secret instruments, which if 
made public would be repudiated by the peoples, and to 
sacrifice the interests of the peoples by involving them in 
liabilities affecting their future and the future of their 
children in the most vital fashion, and to deny, when 
questioned, that they have done so. 

The investigation also conveyed the certainty, at any 
rate to the investigator, that after the words that had been 
uttered and the facts that had transpired, a European war 
in the near future, a war which would involve the British 
people, was virtually inevitable unless certain things 
occurred. The only possible way to save the situation, so 
it seemed to me, was by making the true facts known to 
the British public, in the hope that the publication of them 
might lead to a revulsion of feeling, and to a clearer com- 
prehension of the German case ; and thereby provoking 
a full and frank discussion in Parliament as to the real 
character of our official relations with France, and, there- 
fore, contingently with Russia, to whose Government 
official France was bound in a military and political 
alliance. 

To these ends I laboured entirely single-handed, and 
obeying no outside inspiration, and following a series of 
articles in British and French magazines and newspapers, 
I published, four months after France and Germany had 
reached an agreement on the matter immediately under 
dispute, my book, "Morocco and Diplomacy." 1 Its dedica- 
tion 2 indicatedsthe purpose of the book, and in writing it I 
believed that I was performing a useful and patriotic, if 
somewhat painful task. My objects were not misjudged at 

1 Smith, Elder & Co., 1912. Since re-issued as "Ten Years of 
Secret Diplomacy." (National Labour Press, is.) 

2 "To those who believe the establishment of friendlier 
relations between Britain and Germany to be essential to the 
prosperity and welfare of the British and German peoples, and to 
the maintenance of the world's peace, and to those who are 
persuaded that the acceptance of national liabilities towards foreign 
Powers by secret commitments withheld from the British people, 
is both a menace to the security of the State and a betrayal of 
the national trust, this volume is respectfully dedicated." 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

the time, even by those who disagreed with the deductions 
I drew from the marshalling of facts, which to this day 
remain absolutely unchallenged. The bulk of the news- 
paper comment was wholly favourable — with the excep- 
tion, of course, of the organs which had played the most 
prominent part in misleading the public. It is noteworthy 
that none of the latter attempted to dispute the accuracy 
of the facts presented. 

Various intimations reached me that the book had not 
been without value in affecting influential opinion, and it 
may have contributed to the attempts to reach a modus 
vivendi, which afterwards took place. But Parliament did 
not respond. The matter was allowed to lapse. The 
original errors and falsities took root, and to this day are 
continually repeated. There was no public opinion suffi- 
ciently organised and in earnest outside Parliament, still 
less within it. The crisis had brought England as well 
as France and Germany, to the very edge of the preci- 
pice. In France a Yellow Book was issued, and an 
exhaustive debate, lasting several days, took place both in 
the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate. In England a 
timid request for papers was curtly refused, and nothing 
in the nature of Parliamentary discussion was ever at- 
tempted. It is a satisfaction to me, albeit a somewhat 
melancholy one, that since the war broke out, a consider- 
able demand for my book has arisen, and that every 
diligent searcher after truth has either recognised the 
accuracy of my analysis of the facts, or, at least, has 
admitted its value. In "The Policy of the Entente : 1904- 
14, " ] the Hon. Bertrand Russell, when treating of 
Morocco, remarks of my book that : "Any new account 
not designed simply to whitewash the English and French 
Governments can only repeat what is to be found" in it, 
"even when, like what follows, it is derived entirely from 
other sources." Mr. Charles W. Hay ward endorses it 
unreservedly in his volume, "What is Diplomacy?" 2 
His condemnation of Anglo-French diplomacy is couched 
in more vigorous language than my own. He concludes 
that the crisis of 191 1 was "infamously provoked," and 
that in the dispute "the honour is entirely Germany's." 
Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson does not believe that "any in- 
structed and impartial student will accept what appears to 
be the current English view, that the attitude of Germany 

1 The National Labour Press : is. 

2 Grant Richards Ltd. : 2s. 6d. 

xix 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without 
excuse, and that the other Powers were acting throughout 
justly, honestly, and straightforwardly." 1 Mr. George 
Armstrong's 2 censure is more direct. Prefacing it by the 
statement that, "despite the elaborate investigations and 
expositions of Mr. E. D. Morel, knowledge of this extra- 
ordinary chapter in our diplomatic history is far from 
general," and adding that the "publications of the British, 
French, and Belgian Foreign Offices" have "completely 
confirmee the accuracy" of my statements, he scathingly 
denounces the action of our Foreign Office, and concludes 
by asking : — 

"Could a more damning illustration be imagined of the 
possibilities of secret diplomacy as an agent for the em- 
broilment of the nations in quarrels in which they have 
no interest?" 

Mr. G. P. Gooch 3 permits me to quote as his considered 
opinion that my "critical examination of European diplo- 
macy in Morocco deserves the most careful study ; it is 
not only one of the few cardinal works on our recent 
foreign policy,^ but it supplies several important links in 
the chain of events which led up to the war." 

And although there are some intellectuals, posing as 
historians, who continue studiously to ignore, since they 
cannot refute, my contribution to this international 
tragedy, which was to become one of the chief com- 
bustibles in the great conflagration, I am satisfied that its 
endorsement in the works referred to is but the prelude to 
a wider recognition that what I wrote was true both in 
substance and in fact, and that in writing it I could have 
had no motive other than that of serving the interests of 
the British people, of the French people, and of inter- 
national concord. 

It has since transpired that at the very time I was 
engaged in making the investigation which resulted in the 
appearance of "Morocco in Diplomacy," the Belgian 
diplomatic representatives in Berlin, London, and Paris 
were expressing to their Government, 4 precisely the same 

1 "The European Anarchy." (George Allen & Unwin : 2s. 6d.) 

2 "Our Ultimate Aim in the War." (George Allen & Unwin: 
zs. 6d.) 

3 Author of "History of Our Time," "History and Historians 
in the Nineteenth Century," and many other historical works. 

4 First published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, and 
afterwards by E. S. Mittler & Sons, Berlin. An English edition, 
"Belgium and the European Crisis," has been published by the 
same firm. That a Spanish edition has been published is apparent 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

views in regard to the character of Anglo-French diplo- 
macy in this matter as I had been led to form ; that they 
were consumed by the same fears as I was in respect to the 
outcome, and that they had come to the same conclusions 
as I had, reluctantly, and by the sheer weight of evidence 
arrived at. And their despatches, be it noted, were 
written while the events examined and summarised by me 
were in process of accomplishment. I think it may be 
safely asserted that never have the statements of an 
author dealing with a complicated and intricate inter- 
national problem, and without reference to any sources of 
information not publicly accessible, received, in that 
author's lifetime, such startling and unexpected corrobora- 
tion from contemporary diplomatic documents. 

That was my second intervention in public affairs, as 
affected by and concerned with international diplomacy 
lne motive which inspired both was the same In the 
case of the Congo I sought, with the help of others, to 
emancipate an enslaved race, by ascertaining and publish- 
ing the facts and by forcing them upon' the attention of 
my countrymen and the world. I also caressed the hope 
that it the international conscience could be sufficiently 
aroused to bring the intriguing Governments into line on 
this primarily human issue, in which the honour of all the 
great nations (Russia excepted) was closely involved ■ the 
co-operation thus secured might lead to something-' like 
agreement between the Governments for an inter- 
national treatment of problems, both administrative 
economic, and political, connected with the future of 
African and Asiatic territories. I felt that if this could be 
accomplished, the interests of the native races would 
receive greater consideration, and that the chance of 
critical disputes arising between the European Govern- 

h™ * T.?"' artide *2 - the Cambridge Magazine, and editions 
have doubtless, appeared in every European language. Beyond a 
brief reference to these documents in The Timet when Thev first 
Daolrs Th" reference . theret ° has been suppressed in ourneis 
K"v? u^ 7 , ex 1S tence is unknown to the great mass of 
<<Nri f pU ? 1C V but - lo "g extracts hav e been published ?n the 
Notes from the Foreign Press," issued by Mrs. Buxton Thev 

Ye'ars oTsecrS S ^ Int f? d " Ction to t^third edition of ™2 
call fo? their n, 7 T aCy ' ^ * Urged that Parliament should 
call tor their production as a State-paper. Copious extracts are 

&^n.^!S5w*~ 8 10 them in this volume > -~ 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

merits would be diminished, seeing that, with one excep- 
tion, all the serious European crises of the previous two 
decades had originated in quarrels over the disposal, or 
exploitation, of areas in Africa and Asia. The first of 
these objects was finally attained. The hope that the 
dangers and the disgrace resulting from the Congo experi- 
ment might lead the Powers seriously to envisage the 
possibility of a common policy in Asia and Africa was not, 
unhappily, realised. 

In the case of Morocco, the demonstration I sought 
generally to make was the helplessness of the peoples of 
Europe in the face of a secretive and immoral diplomacy, 
which might at any moment produce a situation leading 
to the wholesale massacre of multitudes. In the present 
volume I submit a series of facts and arguments designed 
to show that sole responsibility for the war is imputable 
to no one country, but to the egotism, ambitions, and 
stupidity of the ruling classes in all countries, and to a 
common system of international intercourse between 
States, which makes it impossible for the peoples, who 
neither desire nor make war, to prevent that egotism and 
those ambitions from plunging them into fratricidal and 
insensate strife. Between the enslavement and exploita- 
tion of African peoples at the hands of an evil King and his 
bodyguard of financial vampires, and the enslavement and 
exploitation of European peoples for whom the issues of 
life and death have become, by an abuse of power, the sport 
of a handful of public officials, whom no tolerable system 
of government should invest with such authority, there is 
a difference, not of principle, but only of manifestation and 
setting. I assisted in overthrowing the worst example 
of the former which has occurred in the last 120 years. I 
hope to assist, in however small a way, in swelling the 
stream of public purpose which will sweep away the latter. 
My standpoint in both cases is identical. The Leopoldian 
rule in the Congo was an odious and wicked wrong perpe- 
trated upon a section of the human race. The present war 
is an abominable outrage upon the whole human race. 

And if I am told that in issuing a collection of studies 
which establish that all the rights are not on one side 
and all the wrongs on the other, but that responsibility 
for this terrible war is much more universal than popular 
opinion in any of the belligerent countries is yet prepared 
to admit, I am injuring the "national cause," my reply 
is this : — 



PERSONAL FOREWORD 

The only cause I recognise as ''national" will be helped 
and not injured by this, or any other effort similarly 
inspired. That cause is the welfare of the mass of the 
British people, who support the fabric of the British Com- 
monwealth ; the millions who are suffering and dying on 
land and on the sea; the millions who labour and suffer in 
the factory, the workshop, the slum ; the men and boys in 
the trenches ; the women who wait and watch with strain- 
ing hearts ; the children, and the unborn. Their claim to 
happiness, their claim to relief, their claim to a tolerable 
future, is the only claim that appeals to me in the national 
sense. And associated with them, in common rights and 
in common wrongs, are those, who, in other lands, also 
suffer and perish — victims one and all of the meaningless 
phrase, the empty pomp, the poisonous boast of war; 
victims one and all of the barbarous Statecraft, the per- 
verted religion, the selfish exploitation of caste, and creed, 
and vested interest. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Dedication v 

Introduction by Philip Snowden, M.P vii 

Personal Foreword xi 

PART I. 

CHAPTER 

I. The Outbreak of the War i 

II. Belgian Neutrality and European Military 

Strategy 14 

III. Was Germany Wholly Responsible? 28 

IV. Denials and Avowals 35 

V. "What will ye do in the end thereof?" 42 

VI. France and Germany Before the War 47 

VII. The "Pro-German" Taunt 52 

VIII. Militarism and the Beast of the Apocalypse 60 

IX. The Morocco Intrigue 71 

X. European Militarism, 1905-14 91 

XI. Germany's Position Before the War Judged by 

Frenchmen 97 

XII. Secret Diplomacy 104 

XIII. An Appeal to President Wilson 114 

XIV. Is Truth or is Fiction the Greater National 

Interest? 126 

XV. Russia's Military Preparations 138 

XVI. Russia and the French Three Years' Military 

Service Law 148 

XVII. European Navalism 156 

XVIII. The Spectre of Fear 161 



CONTENTS 
PART II. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

XIX. The Union of Democratic Control 169 

XX. A Plea for Sanity of Thought 183 

XXI. The Interests of Belgium 189 

XXII. What is the Object of the War? 196 

XXIII. Reactionaries in Germany and Britain 202 

XXIV. The Penal Policy 207 

XXV. Hate as a Creed «... 215 

XXVI. "The Trade War" 2.22 

XXVII. German Competition 228 

XXVIII. Our National and Imperial Problem 235 

XXIX. The Alleged "Conflict of Ideals" 242 

XXX. Germany's Human and Economic Problem 249 

XXXI. The Eternal International Irritant 255 

XXXII. The Way Out •• 261 

XXXIII. The Betrayal of the Nation, 1906-11 273 

XXXIV. The Betrayal of the Nation, 1912-14 286 

XXXV. The Two Roads 3 01 

Epilogue •'•■•■ 3 1( > 

I ndex 3 2 ' 



PART I 



CHAPTER I. 
The Outbreak of the War 1 

You cannot afford to disinterest yourselves from foreign affairs. You 
cannot afford to remain indifferent to the mechanical organisation 
by which that branch of your national affairs is conducted. The last 
20 years have seen a steady democratisation of our great public 
departments. But the Foreign Office has remained outside that ten- 
dency. It continues to be managed under a close Caste-System. 
Wealth and aristocratic connections are still considered, the first 
always, the second almost always, the indispensable attributes to a 
diplomatic career. It is a career closed to men of brains, education, 
and intelligence who do not possess those attributes. . . It is my 
profound conviction that one of the paramount interests of the people 
of this country, and of the people of Germany, is that the friction 
which has unhappily existed for some years between them should be 
replaced by an honourable understanding. — Extract from the Author's 
" Adoption " address to the General Council of the Birkenhead 
Liberal Association, November S, igi2. 

What is the policy of Great Britain supposing the forces against 
Peace prevail? . . . We have not been assured that, come what 
may, Great Britain is no party to this dispute and will not allow her- 
self to be dragged into it. In the light of the events which took 
place last year, when this country found itself within measurable 
distance of war with Germany in connection with the Franco-Ger- 
man dispute over Morocco, we are warranted in asking that such 
an assurance should be given to us. We are, I submit, warranted 
in asking that we may be authoritatively assured that if the war 
parties on the Continent succeed in dragging the statesmen of 
Europe into a desolating conflict, Great Britain stands absolutely 
free from any entanglement with any Continental Power. — The 
Author, speaking at Birkenhead on the Balkan crisis, December 3, 

1Q12. 

One of the greatest difficulties will be seen on consideration to be 
that of reconciling Colonial participation in British foreign policy, 
with a more considerable measure of public control over foreign policy 
at home. It is increasingly a matter of legitimate complaint that 
the foreign policy of this country is decided outside the nation's know- 
ledge, or its will, and that the power of the House of Commons 
adequately to discuss or criticise foreign policy has sunk almost to 
microscopic proportions. A growing body of thought resents the 
perfunctory and occasional manner in which the country is permitted 
a rare glimpse into the aims and methods of our foreign policy. This 
body of thought is disposed to question the compatibility between 
democratic institutions, and the conclusion, without the cognisance 
of the House of Commons, of treaties and conventions with foreign 

x Being a letter written to the Executive of the Birkenhead Liberal 
Association, published in full in the Birkenhead papers of October 
14, 1914. The letter was afterwards, in response to numerous re- 
quests, reproduced in pamphlet form. 



2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Powers, which, under certain circumstances, may involve the nation 
in war. This feeling has been immensely strengthened by the know- 
ledge, which has since become accessible, that the official explana- 
tion of our attitude in the Franco-German dispute -over Morocco 
last summer twelvemonth, will not now stand the test of reasoned 
debate in any public assembly. If it be reasonable that the 
Dominions should be consulted in foreign policy, as the natural sequel 
to their participation in the defence of the Empire, then, a fortiori, is 
it reasonable that the British people should be consulted and kept 
informed through the elected representatives of the nation. — The 
Author, speaking on " Democracy and Empire," at the Liverpool 
Reform Club, as Jhe guest of the New Century Society, January 
14, 1Q13. 

Now one would think that a nation, faced with these facts which 
are not in dispute, would bend its whole energies upon evolving effec- 
tive machinery to stop this dry-rot in the national building. And 
here I come to the point which I should wish, if you will allow me, 
to impress upon you. Under present circumstances we cannot evolve 
that machinery, and we never shall evolve it until we realise the 
absurd insufficiency of our existing institutions. We have 45 millions 
of people in these islands, and we are trying with one Parliament to 
do for them what one Parliament would be utterly incapable of accom- 
plishing even if it had nothing else to think about than the domestic 
needs of these people. . . But this is only half the picture. This 
Parliament is the Imperial Parliament as well as the domestic Par- 
liament. It is directly responsible, with the Government of India, 
for the welfare of 300 millions of people. It is directly responsible, 
with the Egyptian Government, for 14 millions of Egyptians and 
Sudanese. It is wholly responsible for 43 millions of coloured peoples 
in the Crown Colonies and Protectorates. Then this Parliament is 
also supposed to be responsible for the conduct and character of our 
relations with foreign Powers, and for the great defensive Services, 
the Navy and Army, which exist to protect not these shores alone, 
but the Empire. . . If you will let your mind dwell upon this situa- 
tion for a moment you cannot but realise that we are attempting 
the impossible, and that if we go on with the attempt much longer 
there will come a point when the over-weighted machine must break 
down. There will come a point when any Government, I do not 
care what Party it represents, will find the task of Government im- 
possible ; and when, if you have in power a statesman of the type 
of Palmerston or Disraeli, or the pale prototype or either, he will 
plunge you, or try to plunge you, into a great war as the only way 
of escape from an intolerable situation. — The Author, speaking on 
" Our Social Conditions," at Birkenhead, December 12, 1913. 

October 5, 1914. 

I AM in receipt of your letter of the 2nd inst., in 
which you intimate, in effect, that my prospective 
candidature is no longer acceptable to the Liberals of 
Birkenhead. Your letter is couched in the courteous and 
generous terms which the uniform kindness I have 
received from yourselves would have led me to expect. 

I would wish to preface my remarks on the wider issue 
by saying that I detest as heartily as anyone can do the 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 3 

odious and immoral doctrines preached by the politico- 
militarist school of Prussia, and inculcated by the philo- 
sophy of Nietzsche and Treitschke which have contributed, 
exactly to what degree it is difficult to say, but largely 
there can be no doubt, to the armed tension of Europe ; 
that I condemn as vigorously as anyone can do the blunder- 
ing brutality of German diplomatic methods ; that I abhor 
as intensely as anyone can do the violation of Belgian 
territory and the ruthless treatment meted out tjo the 
Belgian civilian population and to certain Belgian towns 
by the German armies. Were every counter allegation, 
precedently and subsequently brought against the Belgian 
civil population by Germany, true, it would not lessen Ger- 
many's responsibility one iota. Nor is Germany's moral 
responsibility by one fraction lowered because the Russian 
troops are alleged to be perpetrating wholesale excesses in 
East Prussia. These monstrosities are the accompani- 
ment of all wars. Perpetrated in Belgium they reach to 
a high pinnacle of shame because Belgian neutrality was 
guaranteed by international treaty, above all because Bel- 
gium was innocent of any provocative act whatever; 1 and I 

1 The German Government has since published a number of 
official documents discovered in the Brussels archives, on the strength 
of which it seeks to establish that the Belgian Government had com- 
mitted itself to the Entente long before the war, and had com- 
promised Belgium's neutrality. Even if these documents did prove 
the German contention, they would not justify Germany's invasion 
of Belgium, since they were admittedly discovered months after that 
invasion took place. The utmost that they can be held to prove is 
that the Belgian Government feared a request from the German 
Government for a passage through Belgium of the German armies 
in the event of a general European war ; that certain consultations 
took place between the Belgian and British military authorities in 
that connection, and that the British General Staff had taken pre- 
cautions to secure all the topographical and other information 
required in view of the contingency of the Entente armies operating 
in Belgian territory with or without the active co-operation of the 
Belgian army. Whether a neutral Power, potentially threatened, 
commits a technical breach of its neutrality^ by consulting with certain 
Powers from among the guarantors of its neutrality, is a matter for 
the international jurist. That Belgium, seeing herself drifting into 
a position of national peril by the increasing tension of the European 
situation, would have been well advised to make a public appeal to 
all the guaranteeing Powers years ago is undoubted. And if 
Belgian foreign policy had been effectually controlled by the Belgian 
democracy, one may assume that such an appeal would have been 
made. It is equally clear that if any of the Great Powers, who were 
not only aware of Belgium's peril, but were contributors towards it, 
had been sincerely desirous of shielding their protegde from the con- 
sequences of their own rivalries, diplomacy would have raised the 
whole question of Belgium de novo, as it was raised by Gladstone 



4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

am wholly in accord with the view that future conditions 
of peace should include heavy compensation to Belg-ium 
for the material damage inflicted upon her and for the 
wrongs which she has suffered. I favour this the more 
since, as I shall presently show, I believe that the British 
Government is also heavily in Belgium's debt; a debt 
which the issue of loans and hospitality to refugees do 
not liquidate. 

These sentiments, however, cannot blind me to the 
facts that Germany is not peculiar in possessing a politico- 
militarist school whose influence is pestilential ; that we 
heard of Machiavelli before we heard of Nietzsche; that a 
German Association comprising some 300 of the intellec- 
tual elite of Germany published last year a scathing 
onslaught upon Bernhardt ( 1 ), who himself complains in 
his preface that his book is necessary because his views 
are not shared by the mass of his countrymen ; that the 
sanctity of international law has been flouted by every 

and Granville in 1870. But Germany has no ground of complaint 
on the score of any technical violation of Belgian neutrality, which 
may, or may not, be involved in the Anglo-Belgian military con- 
versations preceding the war ; seeing that down to the very last 
moment Germany's official representatives continued to assure the 
Belgian Government that Belgian neutrality would be respected by 
German}^. The documents which Germany has unearthed, then, 
while they do strengthen the conviction that Belgium has been, 
fundamentally, a victim to the "balance of power," cannot be 
regarded as palliating in any way whatsoever Germany's action. 
They emphasise, however, that the British Foreign Office was fully 
cognisant of what the situation of Belgium would be in the event of 
a general European war, and that the British military authorities 
were concerning themselves with the matter, as it was their manifest 
duty to do, from the time — 1906 — when the military consultations 
between the British and French General Staffs were authorised by a 
section of the British Cabinet without the knowledge of the Cabinet 
as a whole. These documents accentuate, therefore, the moral 
responsibility of the Entente Powers towards Belgium, and should 
be borne in mind by the reader when perusing Chapters I., II., 
XXXIII., XXXIV., 'and XXXV. of this volume. It is generally 
understood that facsimiles of these documents have been widely dis- 
tributed throughout the world. The American edition bears the 
imprint : "The International Monthly." .Inc. 1123 Broadway, New 
York. These documents are quite distinct from the reports of the 
Belgian diplomatists in foreign capitals, referred to in Chapters IX. 
and XV. 

1 Der deutsche chauvinismus. By Professor Otfried Nippold on 
behalf of the V eroffentlichungen des verbandes fur Internationale 
verstandigung. (Stuttgart : Druck von W. Kohlhammer : 1913). It 
is a collection of the utterances of the chief German Jingoes with 
appropriate comments, 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 5 

Government in turn whenever it considered its vital inter- 
ests affected ; that the last decade alone has witnessed a 
perfect epidemic of Treaty breaking, and finally, that 
despite its bragging- and sabre-rattling, its offensive 
diplomatic procedure and the unpleasant claim of its ruler 
to co-partnership with the Almighty, Germany is, in point 
of fact, the only great European Power which, during the 
last forty years, has not indulged in the pastime of war, 
apart from the guerilla campaign against a Hottentot 
tribe in South-West Africa. I conclude from this that 
neither the German people nor yet their Government, have 
a monopoly of immorality, treachery, violence, and general 
wickedness; that to encourage the state of mind which 
fosters this notion is to render a dis-service and not a 
service to our people, between whom and the German 
people, I, for my part, deem it not unpatriotic to hope for 
reconciliation and co-operation in happier days ; is to 
impair the judgment and distort the vision of our people 
who require no such stimulus to do their duty whatever it 
may be ; and is to excite a temper calculated to encourage 
a repetition of the errors and a perpetuation of the systems 
which have occasioned this cataclysm. Nor do I believe 
that militarism, Prussian or other, can be destroyed by 
militarism; or that particular constitutions can be imposed 
upon a people from outside ; or that the idea that a nation 
of eighty millions can be dismembered and reduced to a 
position of permanent political inferiority is other than a 
delusion. I should not find it possible to support a policy 
which proclaimed these aims to be its own and which was 
unprepared, after the defeat of the enemy and after the 
fear of invasion had passed away, to sacrifice innumerable 
lives in the attempt to secure them. If these opinions 
conflict with true Liberalism, then it is evident that I have, 
somehow, missed what I conceived the spirit of Liberalism 
to be. 

The real point of divergence between us, I gather, is 
concerned rather with the past than with the future. It 
is a matter of sincere grief to me that divergence should 
exist on what I regard as a matter of principle and one of 
immense import to the democracy of this country. On 
this point I must be forgiven for speaking quite plainly. I 
hold that no Government, certainly no Liberal Govern- 
ment, is entitled to undertake obligations towards foreign 
Powers involving the use, in certain contingencies, of the 
armed forces of the Crown, without consulting Parliament. 

(3) 



6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

And I submit that when a Government, be it Liberal 
or Conservative, having- contracted such liabilities with- 
out consulting Parliament, repeatedly states in Parliament 
that it has not done so, and only confesses that it has on 
the very eve of war, a situation arises whose implications 
are really fundamental, because they go to the very root of 
our public life and of our national institutions. It is a 
situation which is not affected by the necessity of vigor- 
ously prosecutjng a war once entered upon — on that all 
are agreed. Nor is it affected by the views which may 
be generally held as to the causes, the origin, or the 
expediency of this war ; nor yet by the ultimate results 
which may ensue from the war. It is far simpler and 
more direct. I content myself with saying that I am un- 
able to accommodate myself to that situation, and on no 
consideration whatever could I remain silent on such an 
issue. 

I may, perhaps, be allowed to recall to you that my 
opinions as to the injustice and danger to the democracy 
of an autocratic and secret foreign policy have never been 
concealed from the Birkenhead electorate. I have fre- 
quently adverted to the subject in my speeches, and I have 
never had reason to suppose that my statements were 
disapproved by my audiences, or that they were incom- 
patible with that general exposition of Liberal principles 
by me to which you are good enough to make generous 
allusion in your letter. My public attitude on that grave 
and urgent problem had, moreover, preceded my adoption 
as prospective Liberal candidate for Birkenhead. My 
public contributions to the secret transactions between the 
British and French Foreign Departments which had 
characterized the Morocco imbroglio were known in 
Birkenhead before my adoption, and my views on the 
whole subject of secret diplomacy had been stated beyond 
possibility of misconception. 

Now, despite the belief, confirmed by official utterances, 
that the era of secret engagements towards France had 
finally disappeared with the French acquisition of 
Morocco, ,rumours arose last year, 1 and again in the 
opening months of this year, 2 that our Foreign Office 
had secretly committed us to render assistance to France 
in the event of a European War. As France was herself 
committed to Russia, this, if true, implied the additional 

1 1913- 
2 i 9 i 4 . 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 7 

and equally grave objection that our Foreign Policy would 
thereby become influenced by that of Russia, towards 
which Power the Foreign Policy of France had become 
manifestly subservient. The prospect was the more alarm- 
ing in view of what had happened and was happening in 
Persia. Rumour did not point to the conclusion of a 
Treaty, but, as one of the several questions put to the 
Prime Minister defined it, to the giving of : 

.... assurances which in the contingency of a great 
European War would involve heavy military obligations 
on this country. ... an obligation arising owing to an 
assurance given by the Ministry in the course of diplo- 
matic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out 
of this country to operate in Europe. 

These questions will be found in Hansard 1913, vol. I., 
cols. 42-43; vol.. 1., cols. 1316-7; 1914, voJ. Ixi., col. 
1499; vol. lxiii. , cols. 457-8. The replies were categori- 
cal. On March nth, 1913, the Prime Minister denied 
that such obligations had been contracted or such assur- 
ances given. A fortnight later the Prime Minister repeated 
the denial in detail. On April 28 of this year the Foreign 
Secretary declared that the position had not altered. On 
June 11 he assured the House that the Prime Minister's 
statement " remains as true to-day as it was a year ago." 
These definite affirmations, although treated scoffingly 
enough in a great Tory newspaper, assumed, not without 
presumptive evidence, to be in the closest touch with 
certain influential permanent officials in the Foreign 
Office, seemed to dispose once and for all of the truth of 
the rumours in question to which I had personally lent 
credence. 1 

On August 3 last, when the tramp of armed legions 
had begun to shake the plains of Europe, the Foreign 
Secretary revealed to the House of Commons, amid shouts 
of approval from the Tory benches, that he had contracted 
liabilities towards France as far back as 1906; that they 

1 The secret transactions with France are dealt with in Chapters 
XXXIII. and XXXIV. The following publications may also be 
referred to: "The Candid Review," May, August and November, 
1915 ; "The Policy of the Entente," by the Hon. Bertrand Russell 
(National Labour Press, 1916, is.); "Belgium and the Scrap of 
Paper," by H. N. Brailsford (National Labour Press, 1915, id.); 
"What is Diplomacy?" by Charles Hay ward (Grant Richards Ltd., 
1916, 2S. 6d.); "The European Anarchy," by G. Lowes Dickinson 
(George Allen and Unwin, 2s. 6d.) ; "La guerre qui vient," by 
Francis Delaisi (Paris, 8 rue Saint Joseph, 1911, 25 centimes), etc. 



8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

had been renewed on divers occasions since, and that the 
final seal had been placed upon them on the previous day, 
August 2. These liabilities had taken the form of (a) 
authorizing- a plan of military operations on the Contin- 
ent of Europe between the British and French General 
Staffs, (b) authorizing an arrangement between the 
Admiralty and the French Naval Authorities involving a 
strategic disposition of the French Fleet favourably 
affecting our naval position in the Mediterranean, but 
leaving the French northern and western coastline unde- 
fended, (c) undertaking to attack the German Fleet if 
the German Fleet made a descent upon the French coasts 
or interfered with French shipping. 

It came, therefore, to this. While negative assurances 
were given to the House of Commons, positive acts 
diametrically opposed to these assurances had been con- 
certed by the War Office and the Admiralty with the 
authority of the Foreign Office. All the obligations of an 
open alliance had been incurred, but incurred by the most 
dangerous and subtle of methods ; incurred in such a 
way as to leave the Cabinet free to deny the existence of 
any formal parchment recording them, and free to repre- 
sent its policy at home and abroad as one of contractual 
detachment from the rival Continental groups. When, in 
the early days of August, the situation into which the 
Government as a whole had drifted, became for the first 
time clearly apparent to the Cabinet, two of its members 
found themselves unable to concur in what they regarded 
as a breach of faith to themselves and to the nation. 1 
Their standpoint, in a very differing degree of setting and 
circumstance, is my own. To-morrow it will, I venture to 
predict, be the standpoint of the Democracy of .this 
country. For while the policy of contracting obligations 
of this kind towards Continental Powers may or may not 
be wise, a system which allows of so terrific \ responsi- 
bility being assumed by a section of the Cabinet behind 
the back of Parliament is not a system which Democracy 
can tolerate with safety to itself. And a system which 
permits of responsible Ministers rising in Parliament to 
deny that which has been planned, prepared, and executed 
is not a system to which I, as a believer in the principle 

1 The Right Hon. John Burns and Lord Mcrley. Mr. Charles 
Trevelyan, a junior member of the Government, also resigned. Other 
members of the Cabinet also resigned, but reconsidered their position 
when Belgium was invaded : Vide Chapter XXXIV. 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 9 

of government by the people for the people, can give my 
allegiance. The overwhelming significance of the avowals 
of August 3 are to-day obscured amidst the passions 
aroused by the war. But they constitute a challenge to 
the basic principles of popular government, and Democ- 
racy cannot remain indifferent to that challeng-e. It must 
take it up. If Liberalism is not behind it when it does 
so Liberalism will disappear from our political life. 

It is possible that public opinion would have supported 
a case for a military and naval understanding with France, 
frankly placed before Parliament, on the basis of a Minis- 
terial survey of the international situation. But in my 
judgment it is quite certain that the support would have 
been limited to sanctioning the defence of France if wan- 
tonly attacked by Germany on an issue affecting those 
two countries alone. There would have been a refusal 
to sanction the extension of our liabilities to contingencies 
arising out of France's relations with Russia, the one 
Power which had nothing to lose and everything to gam 
from a general European War. In that way would the 
European situation, so far as the Western Powers were 
concerned, have been saved. A really Liberal Foreign 
Policy, untrammelled by secret obligations, would have 
bent all its energies, during the years which followed the 
Morocco crisis of 191 1, in an effort to secure that the 
impending clash (the portents were writ large upon 
the horizon) between Slav and Teuton in the 
Balkans should not fling Western Europe into the abyss. 
Our Foreign Policy was not free to take that course. It 
has been fettered by a naval and military understanding 
which bound us to the side, not of France alone, but to 
that of Russia, whose general mobilization order of July 
31 was the precipitating cause of the war. These fetters 
they were which effectually strangled the Foreign Secre- 
tary's strenuous efforts to preserve the peace of Europe 
during the crisis. He was tied to France, and through 
France to Russia. France is at war because of her con- 
tract with Russia. We, who deem ourselves at war 
because of the outrage upon Belgium, are at war for 
precisely the same reason as the French. 

The one good thing which might have evolved from 
the evil thing which our entanglement itself was, would 
have been a frank avowal of its existence in the early days 



,o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

of the crisis. One of the most pregnant passages in the 
White Book is that in which the Russian Foreign Minis- 
ter holds this language to our Ambassador : 

"He (M. Sazanoff) did not believe that Germany really 
wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we 
took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would 
be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would 
flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war." 
(No. 17.) 

The Minister added, in reply to a remark by our Ambassa- 
dor, that : 

"unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could 
count upon our neutrality." 

The fact that we had sacrificed our neutrality in 
advance by commitments secret and unsanctioned, but in- 
volving the honour of individual Ministers, was the fatal 
handicap to a serious attempt to deal with the Belgian 
issue, both in the years which preceded and in the opening 
days of the crisis. This, and this alone, is the explanation 
of the extraordinary manner in which the Belgian issue 
was handled. What was the position of Belgium in the 
event of a European conflagration involving the Western 
Powers? It was a position of exitreme precariousness 
despite the international neutrality guarantee of 1839, re- 
newed in 1870 for one year only. It was a position which 
the actual division of Europe into two rival groups ren- 
dered, indeed, almost desperate. For nothing was more 
certain than that if the embers, which these rivalries pro- 
moted, ever burst forth into stupendous fire, treaties and 
conventions, along with constitutions, frontiers, and even 
dynasties would be swallowed up in the flames. That, were 
this conflagration to eventuate, it would be on the Belgian 
plains that the future destinies of Europe would be 
decided, was the view of every strategist of repute in 
every country. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
experts have always omitted from their calculations the 
counter-balancing effect of a timely and explicit declara- 
tion of British policy. Experts upon international military 
strategy are not concerned with the moralities, but with 
the manner in which the great killing machines which 
Democracy tolerates and feeds to its own undoing, will be 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR n 

V:': i . 

1 " . ~ ' 

set in motion when potentates and diplomatists fall out 
and the pressure of the war captains becomes irresistible. 
And the experts were all but unanimous in concluding that 
in the event of a general European War waged on the 
basis of the existing divisions in Europe — i.e., an Austro- 
German combination on the one side and a Franco- 
Russian combination on the other — Germany, to stand any 
chance of victory, must strike instantly at France, and 
could only hope to strike successfully by striking through 
Belgium owing to the impossibility of forcing the defences 
of the French frontier. All this was notorious. Equally 
notorious was the fact that Germany was perfecting her 
military railways and making other strategic preparations 
on the Belgian frontier to be ready for the eventuality. 
The facts have been published again and again. Mr. 
Churchill told us on September 21 last (at Liverpool) that 
he had known them for three years, and, of course, he 
spoke for his colleagues ; for those of them, at least, whose 
business it is to be informed on these matters. 

The position of Belgium, then, was such as imperiously 
necessitated a clear and unambiguous attitude on the part 
of those responsible for directing the Foreign Policy of 
Great Britain. The mere existence of the old neutrality 
treaty was obviously insufficient to safeguard Belgium's 
position since, as Mr. Churchill has told us, the Govern- 
ment was aware that Germany would thrust aside that 
treaty if, on the outbreak of a European War she were 
faced with a Russo^-French combination, a combination 
which, in view of the experts, would ensure her defeat 
unless she could disable France rapidly by an advance 
through Belgium. 

Confronted with these circumstances it was a duty owed 
by the British Government to its own people, to Belgium, 
and to the world, to intimate in clear language to all 
whom it might concern, its firm intention of using the 
whole might of the Empire against any Power whose 
strategic military exigencies might tempt its rulers, in 
the event of a general European War, to violate the 
neutrality of Belgium. It was the one influence which, 
had it been timely exercised — for example, at any moment 
within the last two years when our relations with Ger- 
many were recovering from the Moroccan trouble — could 
have prevented the situation on the Belgian-German fron- 
tier from developing to the danger point. There are 



i2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

precedents for such warnings conveyed in friendly terms 
in time of peace. If the warning - had been disregarded 
and German preparations on the Belgian frontier had 
persisted, our course was clear. If it had been regarded 
we should have had an admirable opportunity of removing 
from Germany — under circumstances permitting of the 
practicability of the course, not at a moment when an 
acute crisis had reached breaking point — the latent fear 
that England might encourage a Russo-French aggres- 
sion upon her; and thus played the disinterested r61e of 
Peace-maker among the nations. Even if such a declara- 
tion had been made in the opening days of the crisis it 
might still have had a potent effect, because Germany 
believed at that moment that we should remain neutral. 

But such an attitude was only possible to a Foreign 
Policy which, apart from the Belgian issue, was unfettered 
by commitments to either European group ; or to a 
Foreign Policy which had sought and received national 
sanction to an alliance with France, but an alliance limited 
to the defence of legitimate French interests, an alliance 
unaffected by Russian aims and actions in the Balkans, 
an alliance designed to save France from being sacrificed 
to a Slav-Teuton quarrel, and in saving France, saving 
Belgium, and confining the theatre of potential war to 
Eastern and Central Europe. 

Such an attitude, unhappily, was not possible, because 
our neutrality had been bartered away. Hence it came 
about that as on the general issue, so on the Belgian issue, 
we maintained a doubtful attitude until the position had 
become hopelessly compromised, and until the opportunity 
of saving Belgium was lost. Although, as Mr. Churchill 
had said, we had been aware of Belgium's peril for three 
years, a glance at the White Book will show that the 
Belgian question was never raised at all until July 31 last. 
On that day we asked Germany, whom for three years we 
had been aware would not respect Belgian neutrality in 
the event of a war with Russia and France, whether she 
would respect it ! We asked France the same question, 
although the French plan of campaign had been concerted 
with the British General Staff ! And even on that day — 
the day upon which war became irrevocable through the 
issue of a general mobilization order for all the Russian 
armies — the Belgian issue was not presented as a question 
of vital British national policy; it might not be a 
"decisive" but merely an "important" factor in deter- 



THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR 13 

mining our action. (No. 119.) A day later yet — August 1 
— it was intimated that the British official attitude on the 
Belgian issue would depend upon "public feeling." (No. 

The blood of our gallant sons is poured out to-day as 
the immediate consequence of the outrage committed upon 
Belgium. But the time will come when the country will 
ask of those in authority this question : "What did you 
do to prevent that outrage?" For my part I put that 
question now, and I find the answer in an autocratic and 
secret foreign policy to which I have been consistently 
opposed, and which I intend to help in rooting out of our 
national life. 

I believe I am doing a greater service to those who 
suffer from its effects and with whom I had hoped to be 
associated later on in the accomplishment of that purpose, 
by speaking now than by remaining silent, even at the 
price of forfeiting your and their good-will. I cannot play 
the hypocrite among you. 

At any rate, that is the message which seems to come 
to me from those dreadful fields of senseless carnage 
where millions expiate the sins, the faults, and follies of 
the few. 



CHAPTER II. 

Belgian Neutrality and European Military 
Strategy 1 

Three years ago he gave some attention to the military aspects of the 
problem, and he was quite sure that Germany would violate the 
neutrality of Belgium. All her plans were made in cold blood to do 
that. — Mr. Churchill at Liverpool, September 21, 1914. 

German preparations for invading France had been made years 
ago. They always intended to go through Belgium. — Mr. Bonar Law 
at Belfast, September 2Q, 1914. 

The German Staff had for years made no secret of this intention 
(going through Belgium), and French military critics had accepted 
it as a truism. — Nelson's "History of the War," by Mr. John Buchan 
(Thomas Nelson and Sons). 

I HAVE been asked by various correspondents for 
further information in corroboration of the assertion con- 
tained in my letter that military experts were agreed upon 
the necessity for Germany — from the standpoint of military 
strategy — to seek a passage through Belgian territory in 
order to attack France in the hypothesis of a general 
European war, and that the German preparations in view 
of that eventuality were notorious. Mr. Churchill's 
avowal really dispenses me from pursuing the matter, 
for in effect it is an avowal that the German intentions and 
preparations were known to the British War Office, as, 
of course, they were; and to every War Office, for that 
matter, in Europe. But, as my correspondents do not 
appear wholly satisfied, I append these notes, which make 
no pretence to being exhaustive. 

The military situation of Germany in the hypothesis 
of a general European war has been frequently and 
minutely discussed and depicted, as have the measures 
taken by her strategists to cope with it, by eminent sol- 
diers in many lands, from General Langlois (French) to 
General Nogi (Japanese). The German plans, their 
character and nature and their inevitability (from 

1 Originally published as an Appendix to the pamphlet containing 
the Author's letter of resignation to the Birkenhead Liberal Associa- 
tion (vide Chapter I). 

14 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 15 

the military standpoint) have been very fully 
described and explained by British students of 
war and by British publicists in touch with 
authoritative military opinion. The best known of 
these writing's, perhaps, are those of Colonel Repington, 
the military writer on the Times, whose reputation is 
international, and whose alleged close association with 
high military circles in this country has been the subject of 
Parliamentary observation; and of Mr. Hilaire Belloc. 
Mr. Belloc's article in the London Magazine of May, 
1 91 2, is almost a military classic. The columns of the 
Times have abounded in allusions to this subject. The 
issues of that paper for January 23 and 30 and February 
20, 191 1, and December 3, 1912, as also the Fortnightly 
Review for August, 191 1, and the Morning Post (which 
has many Service connections) of January 12, 191 1, may 
be consulted with advantage. The Belgian papers, the 
French military journals of that year and the ensuing 
one, and the Belgian Parliamentary debates can also be 
referred to; and amongst the published works of military 
writers, Colonel Boucher's L'Allemagne en pdril — a signi- 
ficant title — published early this year in Paris and Nancy. 
But the material is too abundant even to summarise here. 

Broadly speaking, these writings and utterances dis- 
play a unanimity in estimating the situation and its implica- 
tions, and in regarding a German demand for a right of 
way through Belgium as being axiomatic in the event of 
a general European war. Nor is there any occasion for 
surprise in the fact. An explanatory resume may, how- 
ever, serve the process of clarification. 

Throughout the nineteenth century the danger of 
a violation of Belgian neutrality arose from French neces- 
sities, strategically considered, of course; these notes are 
merely concerned with the strategical side of the question. 
In point of fact, the neutralisation of Belgium arose from 
the aggressive tendencies of French policy of that time. 
In 1870 Napoleon III. and his generals are supposed to 
have made all arrangements for a French invasion of Bel- 
gium, which the publication that year of the famous draft- 
treaty drawn up in 1866 by Benedetti, the French Am- 
bassador at Berlin, and Lord Granville's ensuing act in 
requiring both France and Prussia to pledge themselves 
anew in regard to Belgian neutrality, nipped in the bud. 1 

1 Vide inter alia: "The Life of Lord Granville," by Lord 
Edmond Fitzmaurice ; "Life of Gladstone," by Lord Morley ; 
"Modern Europe," by Alison Phillips, etc. 



1 6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Down to the opening years of the present twentieth 
century, German strategy, in the hypothesis of another war 
with France, would appear to have been based upon a 
concentrated offensive through Alsace-Lorraine, whose 
annexation as the result of the war of 1870 was, by the 
way, insisted upon by the German military chiefs from 
the point of view of strategic defence, it being through 
those provinces that the French invasions of Germany in 
previous times had usually been directed. 

But a series of new developments were destined gradu- 
ally to transform the entire military outlook as between 
Germany and France and to revolutionise the strategic 
plans both of the German and of the French General Staffs. 
These determining influences have been at once political 
and military. The Franco-Russian Alliance, the lessons 
of the Russo-Japanese war, the formidable character of 
the French defences on the Franco-German frontier, the 
perfecting of modern gun-fire, the immense increase in 
military effectives, and the need of greater space for their 
deployment, are the principal factors, all inter-connected, 
which caused these changes. 

By general consent, military opinion had reached the 
following conclusions. The French lines inside the French 
frontier where it faces the German, had become virtually 
impassable by an attacking army, however strong, under 
modern conditions of warfare, which involves the deploy- 
ment of immense forces — greater than at any period in 
the world's history — and which gives to the defence, 
owing to the destructive character, long range, and invisi- 
bility of modern gunfire, a great superiority over the 
attack. Between Verdun and Luneville and between 
Epinal and Belfort — i.e., along almost the entire length 
of the French lines — there was hardly a spot not com- 
manded by the fire of heavy guns. The area presents 
serious natural obstacles, and these had been enormously 
aggravated by an uninterrupted series of batteries, forts, 
and entrenched positions. Three narrow gaps did exist : 
the Belfort gap, the Luneville-Neufchateau gap, and the 
Stenay gap, north of Verdun. But, by common admission, 
they were impracticable as avenues of invasion. I need 
not go into technical details : they have been set forth at 
considerable length by a number of expert writers. As 
Colonel Repington has pointed out (191 1), the difficulties 
were such as to "almost preclude the notion that the 
German strategist will be content to run his head against 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 17 

a French line of battle in the three narrow trouees left 
open to a German invasion." 

The problem, then, which faced the German Govern- 
ment and the German General Staff, as portrayed by a 
mass of authoritative military opinion, may now be briefly 
examined in the light of the historical events of the past 
twenty years. A general European war waged on the 
basis of the existing divisions of Europe meant that Ger- 
many would have to face a Franco-Russian combination 
of very great numerical superiority. The vulnerability of 
the German military position in such circumstances was 
Bismarck's haunting obsession, and his policy was cease- 
lessly directed to prevent their occurrence. The brilliant 
course of studies which Sir Charles Dilke published in the 
Fortnightly Review in 1887, and which caused a great 
flutter in the diplomatic dovecotes, did much to enlighten 
British public opinion on the subject, and the British 
Government of the day fully appreciated it. In 
the light of actual events it is, indeed, both 
curious and instructive to peruse the English 
papers of that period, which was one of great 
tension. They indicate an appreciation of the anxieties 
bulking so largely in the minds of German statesmen, and 
a realisation of what the German position would become 
if a Franco-Russian alliance were consummated. [In 
recent years — i.e., since the actual consummation of that 
alliance — all this has been entirely banished from con- 
sideration and public discussion, owing to the changed 
character of Anglo-German relations. But the problem 
itself did not change with the changed character of those 
relations.] Thus we find the Standard (February 17, 
1887), whose then relations with the Foreign Office were 
believed to be close, declaring : — 

"Russia can afford to wait. So can France. Ger- 
many cannot. Germany must see to its own safety, and 
Prince Bismarck cannot reasonably be expected to pass his 
declining days impotently watching the silent conspiracy, 
for the silent growth of the power of France and the 
power of Russia against the Fatherland." 

Curiously enough, the German Chancellor used almost 
identical language in the Reichstag in 191 4. "France 
could wait, but we not. A French inroad on our flank in 
the Lower Rhine could have been fatal to us. So we were 



18 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

forced to set aside the just protests of the Luxemburg 
and Belgian Governments." 1 

Bismarck's success in staving off the danger was not 
perpetuated by those who came after him. A Franco- 
Russian military alliance was born. Thenceforth the 
situation of Germany became one of permanent and un- 
questionable peril. The consciousness of that peril became 
the dominant factor in the considerations of German states- 
men, and under its influence "Prussian militarism" be- 
came, in the opinion of all Germans, much as many of 
them might detest its manifestations, the one bulwark of 
the nation against the dangers which encompassed it. 
Writing in 191 1, Colonel Repington remarked: "The 
possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of 
German strategists, and considering the pace at which 
Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the 
nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away." An 
admission of that kind from a military writer of unques- 
tioned authority, who has never troubled to conceal his 
anti-German sentiments, speaks for itself. To it may be 
added the conclusions of Colonel Boucher in his work, 
Germany in Peril, already alluded to. After pointing out 
that Germany could not attack France except through 
Belgium, and could not attack Russia without having 
France "on her back," he concludes: "Germany is, in 
a word, condemned to stifle on her own soil from her 
surplus production, from her surplus population, and from 
the very hugeness of her power." A prospect, it will be 
concluded, not altogether pleasing for the party concerned. 

From the date of the conclusion of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, German strategy could have but one intelligible 
object — to prepare for an immediate offensive against 
France in the hope of striking a rapid and overwhelming 
blow at the Western foe before the Russian avalanche had 
time to gather the full force of its momentum. Any other 
policy on the part of the German military chiefs would, 
in the opinion of the experts — and no particular knowledge 
of military stategy is required to demonstrate its obvious- 
ness — have been suicidal from the military point of view 

1 It is interesting to recall that within a fortnight of the out- 
break of war a general offensive in Lorraine and Alsace was initiated 
by the French on a large scale. After seizing the passes of the 
Vosges, they took successively Dannemarie, Thann, Mulhouse, and 
Saarburg, and overran Upper Alsace almost to the Rhine. They 
were then defeated with heavy loss and under circumstances which 
have not yet transpired. 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 19 

in the hypothesis of a general European war. The German 
General Staff bent its energies, therefore, upon securing 
the mechanical means for that accomplishment. This neces- 
sitated raising the military machine — especially in regard to 
rapidity of mobilisation and in the construction of strategic 
railways — to the highest possible pitch of efficiency. But 
the factors already alluded to, arising from the develop- 
ments of the past decade, had added immeasurably to the 
difficulties of the German General Staff and to the military 
danger of the German situation in the hypothesis of a 
general European war. At a period which may be said 
roughly to date back seven years, or possibly a year or 
two earlier, Germany, owing to these developments, found 
herself, militarily speaking, compelled to realise that her 
armies could not force the French lines inside the French 
frontier; in other words, that a German blow at France 
by way of the Franco-German frontier was impracticable. 
Germany's strategic necessities (i.e., an immediate offen- 
sive against France) remaining, of course, unaffected by 
this realisation, her General Staff had to work out a plan 
for an offensive against France from other bases. What 
were the other possible bases? They were Switzerland, 
Belgium, and Luxemburg. Switzerland was out of the 
question for obvious reasons. There remained Belgium 
and Luxemburg. An offensive against France was, 
thenceforth, possible only through Luxemburg and Bel- 
gium. Failing that, German strategy, in the event of a 
general European war on the existing basis of international 
relationships, would have to abandon all idea of an offensive 
against France, and content itself with standing on the 
defensive to await the French onslaught. Germany's 
alternative was thus either to give up all idea of striking 
a decisive blow at France before Russia had time to con- 
centrate her masses and set them in motion, or to obtain 
a passage through neutral territory, peacefully if possible, 
by force if necessary. In adopting the former attitude she 
would have laid herself open to a French invasion through 
Alsace-Lorraine, a difficult feat, but not, in expert opinion, 
an impracticable one, such as a German forcing of the 
French lines had become. She would also have laid her- 
self open to a possible invasion through Belgian and 
Luxemburg territory, and in view of French records in 
the past, Germany's rulers and her General Staff held, 
not unreasonably perhaps, that they would be criminal to 
run that risk. Rightly or wrongly, the German Govern- 



2o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

ment and the German military chiefs concluded that Ger- 
many could not forego an immediate offensive against 
France in the hypothesis of a general European war, with- 
out endangering the national existence of their country. 

Let me here remark once again that I am engaged in 
describing the military situation of Germany in Europe 
from 1906 onwards, as known to the Military Depart- 
ments of all the European Governments, our own included ; 
and as depicted for us by authoritative military opinion 
in Europe, including auhoritative British military 
opinion. I am not discussing the moralities of the matter 
at all. My views as to the moral side of the invasion of 
Belgium are given in my letter. 1 But those who suppose 
that British policy in regard to the passage through Bel- 
gium of German or French armies has always been the 
fixed quantity it is now represented as being, would do well 
to refresh their memories by perusing the literature of 
1887, when France and Germany were on the eve of war 
over the Schnaebele incident, i.e., before the conclusion 
of the Franco-Russian Alliance and before the other 
material factors touched upon in these notes had, in com- 
bination, rendered a German offensive against France over 
the Franco-German frontier — even then extremely hazard- 
ous — virtually impossible. A study of the writings of that 
time will show that "scraps of paper" are regarded with 
very different eyes, according to circumstances, by those 
whose purpose it is to influence public opinion either in 
one direction or in another. I cannot find, in referring to 
contemporary writings, that the suggestion of a possible 
demand by Germany, or France, of a right of way through 
Belgium should be treated by Great Britain, if such a 
demand arose, otherwise than from the point of view of 
British interests, and it was argued by many at that time 
that British interests would be met by guarantees of a 
restoration of the status quo at the conclusion of the war. 
British official opinion of those days was probably inter- 
preted in the famous letter signed by "Diplomaticus," 
which appeared in the Standard of February 4, 1887, and 
which received strong editorial support. Its thesis, that 
it would be "madness" for Great Britain to oppose a 
passage of German troops through Belgium, was, generally 
speaking, endorsed. The Pall Mall Gazette went even 
further. After pointing out that considerable importance 
was likely to be attached to this thesis, "owing to its 
1 Vide Chapter I. 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 21 

being understood that the Standard is at present the 
Governmental and Salisburian organ," the Pall Mall 
Gazette went on to argue that the treaties of 1831 and 
1839 did not impose upon Great Britain any "obligation" 
as regards Belgian neutrality. It editorial of February 4, 
1887, concludes an analytical examination of those treaties 
as follows : — 

"There is, therefore, no English guarantee to Belgium. 
It is possible, perhaps, to 'construct' such a guarantee; 
but the case may be summed up as follows : (1) England 
is under no guarantee whatever except such as is 
common to Austria, France, Russia, and Germany; and 
(2) that guarantee is not specifically of the neutrality of 
Belgium at all; and (3) is given not to Belgium, but to 
the Netherlands." 

The Spectator of February 5, 1887, remarked : "The 
probability is that we shall insist on her (Belgium) not be- 
coming the theatre of war, but shall not bar — as, indeed, 
we cannot bar — the traversing of her soil." 1 

I resume, with apologies for this digression. When 
once the German strategists had become fully persuaded 
that an offensive against France via the Franco-German 
frontier had become impracticable, the situation was 
accepted, and the German General Staff turned its whole 
attention to working out a plan for an offensive against 
France via Belgium and Luxemburg, i.e., on the line of 
advance Aix-la-Chapelle — Treves. I do not suppose that 
the German General Staff invited the military attaches 
of the various Powers, or the foreign newspaper repre- 
sentatives, to examine on the spot the actual steps which 
were being taken. But, apart from that, there appears 
to have been no particular secrecy about the German 
preparations. How in the nature of things could secrecy 

1 Palmerston, who signed the 1839 treaty, appeared to attach but 
mediocre importance to it. Replying to Disraeli on June 8, 1855, 
about the proposed neutralisation of the Danubian principalities, he 
said : "There certainly are instances in Europe of such propositions, 
and it has been agreed by treaty that Belgium and Switzerland should 
be declared neutral ; but I am not disposed to attach very much 
importance to such engagements, for the history of the world shows 
that when a quarrel arises and a nation makes war, and thinks it 
advantageous to traverse with its army such neutral territory, the 
declarations of neutrality are not apt to be very religiously respected." 
(Quoted by Brailsford in his "Belgium and the Scrap of Paper.") 
The quotation may be commended to those who argue that 
Germany's exclusion from the comity of nations is both possible and 
desirable after the war. 

(4) 



22 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

have been secured? The matter was openly debated — in 
diplomatic terms, of course — in the Belgian Chamber at 
the end of 1912, when the Belgian Minister of War made a 
notable statement, and the Belgian Press teemed with 
articles on the whole subject both in 191 1 and 1912, much 
difference of opinion manifesting itself. Indeed, during 
the course of the struggle in England to obtain humane 
treatment for the natives of the Congo and the observance 
by King Leopold and the Belgian Government of the 
clauses of the Berlin and Brussels Acts, it was a constant 
practice on the part of the apologists of Leopoldianism 
in England to allege that the British reform movement 
was to be deprecated because it would "drive Belgium into 
the arms of Germany." 

To talk about Germany's "secret preparations" in this 
respect is picturesque, and helps to keep up the idea of 
Machiavellism about German policy which it is considered 
desirable to maintain. But in point of actual fact, 
although German diplomacy was, throughout, dishonest, 
as diplomacy always is, Germany's preparations on the 
Belgian frontier became in due course as notorious as the 
object of them had precedently become. The strategists 
and military writers knew all about them in substance, 
and their knowledge could only have been acquired through 
the usual military and secret service channels. Moreover, 
German military writers themselves do not appear to have 
been in the least concerned to disguise the facts. For 
example, General Van Faulkenhausen, in his Der Grosse 
Krieg der Zelztzeit (quoted in the Times, 191 1), assumed, 
as a matter of course, that Belgian territory would be 
violated in the event of a general European war. Military 
writers, British and others, told us that when Germany 
perceived she must revolutionise her whole military plans, 
she forthwith began a great work of strategic railway con- 
struction, flanking the whole front Aix-la-Chapelle — 
Treves, linking up these new lines with the main lines 
and military centres at Mainz, Cologne, Bonn, and 
Coblentz. They told us, as far back as 191 1, that the 
detraining platforms at Metz had been gradually trebled, 
and that between Aix-la-Chapelle and Trois Vierges a fresh 
base of concentration for an army was in course of pre- 
paration; that, in addition to these railways, "double 
lined and metalled for heavy traffic," sidings had been 
provided at all the stations and at suitable points between 
them; that between Montjoie and St. Vith landing spaces 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 23 

sufficient for over 120,000 men had been provided; that 
small stations (such as Munster, Rotgen, Montjoie, etc., 
etc.), with no traffic at all, had been provided with plat- 
forms, "some of which extended over half a mile." They 
told us of entrenched camps in proximity to the Belgian 
frontier, of the accumulation of trucks, stores, and so on 
and so forth. 

A word has now to be said about French policy and 
strategy on the hypothesis of a general European war. It 
has been recently suggested in various quarters that if 
Germany had not attacked France, France would not have 
attacked Germany. But this can only be in the nature of 
an after-thought. Had there been even a question of 
France's remaining neutral if Russia became involved with 
Germany, no general war would have taken place, Belgium 
would not now be the theatre for the contending armies of 
four Powers, and Britain would not be lamenting the death 
of thousands of her gallant sons. That the German 
Government did not desire war with France, the White 
Book and the accessory documents in combination 
definitely establish. When, on August 1, there seemed a 
chance that the British Government might be disposed to 
attempt to use its good offices with a view to securing 
French neutrality in the event of a Russo-German conflict, 
the rulers of Germany instantly responded. The German 
Ambassador in London wired the Chancellor that he had 
told Sir Edward Grey he (the Ambassador) thought Ger- 
many would agree. The Chancellor wired back confirm- 
ing. The Kaiser wired to King George to the same effect 
(vide documents h, i, j, in Price's The Diplomatic History 
of the War). The hope turned out to have been due to a 
misunderstanding between Sir Edward Grey and the Ger- 
man Ambassador in the course of a telephonic conversation 
(vide Sir Edward Grey's statement in the House on 
August 28). 

The language used by the French Ambassador at 
Petrograd to Sir George Buchanan, the British 
Ambassador, on July 24 (No. 6 White Book), and by 
M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to Sir 
Edward Grey on July 30 (No. 105 White Book), are 
explicit in the sense that the French Government had no 
intention of remaining neutral. So much for that. 

As to French strategy. Since the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, French military writers have been divided in their 
views as to the strategy to be followed by the French 



24 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

armies in the event of a general European war. Two of 
the most recent French military works are those by Lieut. - 
Colonel A. Grouard and by Colonel Arthur Boucher respec- 
tively. 1 Lieut. -Colonel Grouard, while admitting that 
upon the outbreak of such a war France would probably 
be invaded before her preparations were complete, argues, 
nevertheless, that the offensive should be taken "as rapidly 
as possible," and that the efforts of the French should be 
directed against Southern Alsace, with Thionville as main 
objective. No attempt should be made to cross the Rhine 
until the French armies held the complete mastery of the 
left bank of that river. The capture of Thionville would 
be followed by an attack upon Germersheim, and with the 
capture of the latter place, the interests of France would be 
to secure terms of peace based upon the restoration of 
Alsace-Lorraine. Colonel Boucher (author of two previous 
and well-known works, The Offensive against Germany 
and France Victorious in the War of To-Morrow) also 
believes in making all preparations for a rapid counter- 
offensive. "If by the eleventh day Germany has not 
crossed our frontier, it is we who will cross hers by taking 
the direct offensive." Both authors appear to regard it 
as a matter of course that France will intervene in a Russo- 
German war. Colonel Boucher is particularly emphatic. 
He points out — with a veracity which some British writers 
have failed to imitate — that Germany's new military lav/ 
of 1913 was "to guard against the Slav danger." Ger- 
many, he says, "does not doubt that France, remaining 
immutably faithful to her treaties, would support her ally 
with all her strength, choosing, however, the most favour- 
able moment to intervene. ..." 

With the penetrating logic and philosophy peculiar to 
the French mind, Colonel Boucher has given what is, per- 
haps, the truest picture of the conditions which prevailed 
in Europe at the dawn of the year of grace 1914. The 
passage is worth reproducing in full : — 

"Strange is the situation in which France finds her- 
self ! It is regret at having lost her two fine provinces of 
Alsace and Lorraine, which have remained so piously 
attached to us; it is our unshakable determination to 
succeed in wresting them from the domination of their 
invaders and our hope to see once again the Tricolour 

1 La guerre e'ventuelle (Paris, Librairie Chapelot, 1913) and 
L' Allemagne en piril, op. cit. 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 25 

waving from their public buildings; it is, therefore, a 
question of sentiment which is, above all, the cause of our 
hostility towards Germany, and this hostility compels 
us to undertake in the Triple Entente, covered by 
France and Russia, the protection of the vital 
interests of our allies and friends. For if we are 
victorious, Europe is for ever delivered from German 
domination; simultaneously Slavism has hurled 
Germanism to earth; Russia becomes completely free to 
consolidate her immense Empire by increasing it. If we 
are victorious, England remains the mistress of the seas; 
her fleet has no longer anything to fear from that of 
Germany; her trade is sheltered from competition. In 
order to resist attacks which threaten her on all sides, 
Germany is compelled to develop her military power to the 
supreme point, and, in the ultimate resort, this power 
becomes concentrated against us. ..." 

Enough has now, I think, been said to answer the 
query raised by my correspondents. But in order to link 
up the strategic situation of Germany in the reader's mind 
with the international position as established by the exist- 
ing divisions of Europe, and thus to clarify the whole 
story, it may be useful to recapitulate the leading points. 
Point I. The Franco-Russian Alliance was the product of 
various causes. A discussion of them would be out of 
place here. The alliance has been alternately represented 
to the British public as defensive and offensive, according 
to the tendencies prevailing in governing circles at the 
moment. It has been regarded in Germany as a permanent 
menace, and as tilting the so-called "balance of power" 
heavily against her. From the moment of its conclusion 
Germany's military position became, in strict fact, what- 
ever it may have been in motive, a defensive attitude 
against vastly superior potential forces. 1 Point II '. If that 
alliance — the exact terms of which have not been published 
— implied French aid to Russia in the event of a Teuton- 
Slav conflict over the Balkans and over the position of 
Austro-Hung-ary (as we see by the White Book that it 
did), then an immediate offensive by Germany against 
France was axiomatic, and was known so to be by every 
Government in Europe. Point HI. The only feasible line, 
strategically speaking, of German advance against France 
lay, in the opinion of experts, through Belgium and 

1 Vide Mr. Llovd George's speeches in 1908 and 1914 — Chapters 
X. and XXXIII. 



2b TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Luxemburg., Point IV. The German General Staff was 
known to have made all preparations for that eventuality, 
and a request by Germany to Belgium for a right of way 
was as certain in 191 4 as it was probable in 1887. These, 
for the past decade, have been the fixed and positive factors 
of the European situation in the hypothesis of war — 
eliminating the factor of British policy towards that 
eventuality and in the causes which might bring it about. 
The uncertain factor in the European situation has been the 
attitude of the Liberal Cabinet, and the more closely the 
effects of that attitude are studied through a restored 
faculty of critical judgment in the minds of the British 
people, the more certainly will that attitude be condemned. 
It made extension of the war to the western area inevitable. 
For, on the one hand, our diplomacy, secretly pledged to 
France (and, therefore, to Russia, without, be it noted, 
even a knowledge of the exact text of the French and 
Russian Alliance !), refused to declare itself, despite the 
repeated requests of the French and Russian Governments. 
And, on the other, our diplomacy, thus secretly pledged, 
was prevented from playing cards on the table with Ger- 
many in the matter of Belgium, which was the key to the 
situation, as these notes prove. Not only did our diplo- 
macy fail to raise the Belgian issue with Germany until 
the very last moment, and then only in a manner lacking 
both in definiteness and precision, although it was aware 
that Belgium would be involved as a matter of course if 
war broke out; but when our diplomacy did eventually raise 
that issue it declined to say that Great Britain would 
remain neutral even if Belgian neutrality were not violated, 
and even if Germany, as the result of a victorious war, 
refrained from availing herself of her victory in order to 
secure any of the French Colonial possessions (No. 123), 1 

1 The inquiry was made by the German Ambassador on August 1, 
1914. Sir E. Grey afterwards stated, in effect, that the German 
Ambassador's inquiries were made on his own personal initiative and 
lacked official authority. (August 27.) This incident remains one of 
the unexplained mysteries of the negotiations. Why was the con- 
versation recorded and subsequently published in the White Book- 
where it stands out as one of the really crucial documents — if it had 
been merely informal? Is it usual for an Ambassador to make 
pregnant proposals off his own bat? Considerable care is taken in 
connection with several documents in the White Book to differentiate 
between a personal communication and an official communication ; 
for instance, in No. 3 it is recorded that the Austrian Ambassador 
"explained privately," and in No. 10 we are told that the German 
Ambassador "asked me privately." Why, then, does the interview 



BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE WAR 27 

and it made no effort whatsoever to secure the neutrality 
of France in a Russo-German quarrel. If British diplo- 
matic policy, nominally in the hands of Sir Edward Grey, 
but really in the hands of the permanent officials, was a 
peace policy, it failed through sheer incapacity and incom- 
petence. If it was a war policy, its success is its 
condemnation. 

of August 1 — as published in No. 123 — contain no indication to the 
effect that the Ambassador was merely speaking in his personal 
capacity? It is, moreover, apparent from the German Ambassador's 
telegram to his Government (dated 8.30 p.m., August 1, vide 
Price, p. 411) that he had been acting on "instructions," and the 
general character of his inquiries — as recorded in No. 1.23 — cannot 
be said to have been in disaccord with the tone of the telegrams the 
Kaiser and the German Minister for Foreign Affairs were even then 
despatching from Berlin. It would have been a simple matter, one 
would have thought, if Sir E. Grey was doubtful about the German 
Ambassador's authority, to have ascertained by wire whether the 
Ambassador was speaking for himself or for his Government. It 
would have constituted at least an attempt to save Belgium and 
England's entry into the war 



CHAPTER III. 
Was Germany wholly responsible? 1 

It is clear that the closer the stud}' of the negotiations which led up 
to the world disaster are studied, the more impossible it is to put 
the blame entirely upon the shoulders of any one European State ; 
and the more the evidence is sifted, the stronger becomes the con- 
viction that the responsibility for the failure of diplomacy to save 
the civilisation of Europe must be laid at the door of all the 
European Chancelleries without distinction. — "The Diplomatic 
History of the War," by M . Philips Price (George Allen and Unwin : 
second edition). 

THERE is a disposition to regard the discussion of 
the immediate origin of the war as out of place. 
But hardly a day passes without some eminent author or 
historian contributing his quota to the subject, the con- 
clusion being invariably that Germany and Germany alone 
was to blame. To hazard a doubt as to the accuracy of 
some of the facts put forward in support of this conclusion 
is denounced as unpatriotic. But is it unpatriotic to hope 
for an eventual reconciliation beween the British and 
German peoples ? The British and German peoples hold with 
unquestionable sincerity that each is wholly in the right. It 
might or might not be desirable to withhold discussion 
until the combatants on either side — for the most part as 
innocent of the causes which flung them into the death- 
grapple as the unborn babe — were mercifully released 
from their present occupation. That must be a matter 
of opinion. But in actual fact, non-combatant diplomatists 
and publicists on both sides decline to do so, and their 
main object appears to be to pile fresh fuel on to the flames 
of hatred. Under the circumstances it cannot be wrong 
to ask for enlightenment on a point of very considerable 
importance, and which remains — for many of us at least — 
wrapped in doubt and obscurity. 

May I indicate it? Until the other day most people 
who have really studied the available evidence would, I 
imagine, have agreed in fixing the main responsibility for 

1 The Labour Leader, October 8, 1914. 

28 



WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 29 

the immediate origin of the war upon Austria's intem- 
perance in dealing- with Servia, upon Germany's inability 
or unwillingness to hold Austria back, and upon Russia's 
sudden orders for a general mobilisation after the Austro- 
Russian "conversations," momentarily broken off, had 
been resumed. 

But with the appearance of Sir M. de Bunsen's 
despatch, issued as a special White Paper (Cd. 7596), we 
are virtually asked to revise that view and to conclude 
that Austria was Germany's catspaw, and that Germany 
rushed into war, compelling Austria to follow, when Aus- 
tria had, in effect, given way to Russia's demands. I am 
unaware that a single newspaper in this country has read 
anything but this in Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch. 

The more that despatch is studied, however, the more 
difficult does it become for some of us to reconcile its 
tenour with contemporary documents. For example, in 
discussing the actions of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment, Sir M. de Bunsen remarks : — 

"Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and 
declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian 
mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by 
completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again 
responded with results which have passed into history." 
(p. 2.) 

The first sentence agrees with the White Book (Cd. 
7467). But if "completing her own mobilisation" means, 
as I assume it to mean, general mobilisation, then the 
inference here is that the Austrian general mobilisation 
preceded the Russian. But Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch in 
the White Book announcing the Austrian general mobilisa- 
tion is dated August 1 (No. 127), and Russia gave orders 
for a general mobilisation in the night of July 30, and 
announced it in the morning of July 31 (Nos. 11 2-1 13). 1 
Which is right? Obviously the date is of capital im- 
portance. 2 

Sir M. de Bunsen further states : 

"Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg 
and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute 

1 Mr. Stephen Graham was in a village as far away from St. 
Petersburg as the Mongolian frontier, and the telegram to mobilize 
came through at 4 a.m. on July 31. (Vide: Times, September 11, 
1914, and Price "The Diplomatic History of the War." 

2 Mr. Philips Price has since called attention also to this grave 
discrepancy in the second edition of his valuable work. 



30 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between 
Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on July 31 by 
means of her double ultimatum to St. Petersburg and 
Paris." (p. 3.) 

What is singular in the above passage is the omission 
of the Russian general mobilisation order, which was, 
admittedly, the immediate cause of the German ultimatum. 
Can any useful purpose be served by sliding over what 
Germany alleges to have been the determining factor in 
her action, viz., the Russian general mobilisation? 

Again, if Austria was as anxious to come to terms as 
Sir M. de Bunsen states, how is it that Sir G. Buchanan, 
in reporting the general Russian mobilisation order, should 
have given as its compelling cause, a : 

"... report received from Russian Ambassador in 
Vienna to the effect that Austria is determined not to yield 
to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops 
against Russia as well as against Servia. " (No. 113.) 

In fine, Sir M. de Bunsen reports the Russian Am- 
bassador at Vienna to be "working hard for peace" (p. 3) 
and as conducting negotiations in the most hopeful spirit 
of compromise, at the very moment when, according to 
Sir M. de Bunsen 's colleague at St. Petersburg, this same 
Russian Ambassador is telegraphing his Government that 
Austria is utterly irreconcilable ! These things do not 
hang together. What is the explanation? 

Again, how are we to explain Sir M. de Bunsen's main 
implication, viz., a Germany determined to drag Austria 
into war, together with his casual treatment of the Russian 
general mobilisation, with the despatches from his 
colleagues, at Berlin and St. Petersburg, which do not 
harmonise in the least with his? To mention but one 
instance. Sir G. Buchanan seems to have been under no 
illusion as to the probable consequences of a general 
Russian mobilisation. He told M. Sazanoff as early as 
July 25 :— 

"... that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be 
content with mere mobilisation or give time to Russia to 
carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once." 
(No. 17.) 

And if justice in controversy is permissible in a state of 
war, it is but the barest justice to Germany's statesmen to 



WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 31 

recall that they never concealed what the consequences of 
a Russian general mobilisation would be from the British 
Ambassador, as the White Book bears witness. A Russian 
general mobilisation, therefore, meant war (whether 
Germany was justified in regarding it as tantamount to a 
declaration of war is another matter). It meant war in the 
opinion of the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. But 
the event is barely referred to in Sir M. de Bunsen's 
subsequent presentation of the siuation preceding the out- 
break, and v/hen he does refer to it the reference is accom- 
panied by a confusion of dates which seems to affect his 
presentation in a very vital manner. 1 

I pass over the charges of secret mobilising brought 
against Germany by Russia and against Russia by Ger- 
many, because it is not yet possible to compare their 
respective accuracy. But numerous quotations might be 
given from the White Book, did space allow, which con- 
flict squarely with Sir M. de Bunsen's implications, or with 
the implications which have been read into his despatch — 

1 There is an impartial and exhaustive analysis in "The Diplomatic 
History of the War" (supra) of the official and unofficial evidence as to 
the respective dates of mobilization by the various belligerent Govern- 
ments. From this analysis — the accuracy of which has not, so far 
as I know, been disputed — it is possible to obtain a clear idea of the 
actual facts. In reading the summary which follows, the reader 
must bear in mind that Germany's capacity to give rapid effect to a 
mobilization order was greater than that of any of the other 
belligerents. On the other hand, the attempts which have been made 
to represent Germany's fears of Russia, and the panic which swept 
over Berlin when news of the general Russian mobilization was 
received on July 31, as "pro-German" concoctions, because Russian 
mobilizing powers were necessarily slower than Germany's, must be 
accepted with caution. As a matter of fact, within five days of the 
outbreak of war, two powerful Russian armies had invaded East 
Prussia. They defeated the Germans at Gumbinnen, invested 
Koenigsberg, and occupied Tilsit. Before the end of August, Petro- 
grad was wild with joy, and ,£20,000 had been raised to present to 
the first Russian soldier who entered Berlin. 

July 25 — Austria mobilizes against Serbia (i.e, partial mobiliza- 
tion). 

July 28 — Russia mobilizes against Austria (i.e., partial mobiliza- 
tion). 

July 30 (in the night) — Russia issues a general mobilization 
order (i.e., against Germany and Austria). 

July 31 — Germany proclaims a state of martial law. 

July 31 (midnight) — Germany summarily demands a demobiliza- 
tion of the Russian army within 12 hours, in default of which 
Germany will mobilize. 

July 31 (at the earliest; the British White Book gives August 1) 
— Austria orders a general mobilization (i.e., against Russia). 

August 1 (afternoon) — Germany issues a general mobilization 
order. 



32 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

whichever may be preferred. Apart from the White Book, 
documents exist which strengthen the doubts raised by a 
study of Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch. For example, the 
Times' Berlin correspondent, who can hardly be suspected 
of German sympathies, reported on July 27 (Times, July 
28) :— 

"Germany is certainly and no doubt sincerely working; 
for peace. ' ' 

And the Times, commenting thereon, declared : — 

"If this be the case, as we trust and believe it to be, 
peace ought, with a little further exertion, to be secured." 

Again, the former Berlin correspondent of the New 
Statesman, writing from London, in the issue of that 
periodical dated August 25, states : — 

"Now that war is come I can commit an indiscretion 
and recount an incident over which before my lips were 
sealed. There was some agitation in the reactionary Press 
for the suppression of the Socialist peace meetings on the 
ground that they weakened the policy of the country. On 
the morning of the day on which the meetings were held 
an important official of the Social Democratic Party was 
summoned to the office of the Imperial Minister of the 
Interior and there informed that not only had the Govern- 
ment no intention of forbidding the peace meetings, but 
that all precautions would be taken against their dis- 
turbance, and that the Government hoped that the 
Socialists would continue their agitation with the utmost 
energy. And this they did up to the moment when martial 
law was declared and further action was useless." 

The accuracy of that statement has since been con- 
firmed in a letter which has reached Mr. Ramsay Mac- 
donald from Sweden from one of the German Socialist 
leaders. On August 1 the Westminster Gazette published 
from its correspondent in Berlin, Mr. Crozier Long, the 
text of a despatch to the German Ambassador at Vienna, 
communicated to Mr. Long by the German Government, 
and reading as follows : — 

"Berlin, July 30, 1914. — The report of Count Pour- 
tales [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] does not 
harmonise with the account which your Excellency has 
given of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment. Apparently there is a misunderstanding, which I 



WAS GERMANY WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE? 33 

beg you to clear up. We cannot expect Austria-Hungary 
to negotiate with Servia, with which she is in a state of 
war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. 
Petersburg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed 
ready to fufil our duty. As an ally we must, however, 
refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration through 
Austria-Hungary not respecting our advice. Your 
Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold with all 
emphasis, and great seriousness. — Bethmann-Hollweg. " 

Are we to conclude that the Times was misinformed; 
the German Socialists (but to what purpose, if so?) pur- 
posely misled, and the telegram of July 30 communicated 
to Mr. Crozier Long a forgery? It may well be, but I 
am not aware that it has been so stated — still less proved. 
The telegram bears out the repeated assurances given to 
Sir E. Goschen by the German Chancellor as to the efforts 
the German Government was making to hang upon Aus- 
tria-Hungary's coat-tails, and although those efforts may 
not have been as energetic as they might and should, and 
although they were handicapped by the German Govern- 
ment's original and fatal miscalculation as to Russia's 
intentions if Austria pushed her quarrel with Servia to the 
uttermost, Sir Edward Grey certainly believed in their 
genuine character. Otherwise, he would hardly have tele- 
graphed as he did to the British Ambassador at Berlin on 
July 29 :— 

"If he [the German Chancellor] can induce Austria to 
satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come 
into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude 
to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe." 
(No. 77.) 

Finally, can Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch be recon- 
ciled with, for example, the repeated statements of Austro- 
Hungarian statesmen that the underlying issues of the 
quarrel with Servia involved the very existence of the 
Dual Monarchy; with such despatches as Nos. 18, 76, and 
95, in the latter of which Sir M. de Bunsen himself tele- 
graphed (July) :— 

"The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the 
German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed to speak 
severely to the Austro-Hungarian Government against 
acting in a manner calculated to provoke European war." 



34 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

And with No. 97, in which Sir G. Buchanan reports that 
in the course of an interview with M. Sazonoff, the German 
Ambassador "completely broke down on seeing that war 
was inevitable." According to Sir M. de Bunsen's later 
interpretation of the position, that German representative 
should have rejoiced. 

My object in writing is simply to ask whether a further 
consideration of accessible data may not cause a modifica- 
tion of the judgment occasioned by Sir M. de Bunsen's 
despatch. For my part, I believe strongly that it is never 
impossible to appeal to the British sense of fair-play, what- 
ever the circumstances of the moment may be, and even 
the horrors of his appalling catastrophe will not leave such 
enduring bitterness behind them as a charge of calculated 
perfidy, if that charge is unjust and untrue. I do not say 
that it is. But there are many others besides myself who 
cannot reconcile the implications of that despatch with 
other contemporary documents. We are all aware of 
Germany's blunders and Germany's faults. But this 
charge suggests a perfidiousness which, in the absence of 
conclusively-corroborative evidence and in the face of 
contradictory evidence, is not credible as now presented. 



CHAPTER IV. 
Denials and Avowals 1 



In the debate on the Address on March 10, 1913, Lord Hugh 
Cecil said : The right hon. gentleman and his colleague are generally 
believed — I speak with the utmost diffidence in regard to allegations 
which may not be well founded — to have entered into an arrange- 
ment, or, to speak more accurately, to have given assurances, which 
in the contingency of a great European war would involve heavy 
military obligations on this country. We do not suspect the Prime 
Minister or the Foreign Secretary of pursuing anything but a pacific 
foreign policy, and we are far from saying that their policy is in any 
way an aggressive one ; but certainly we believe, if the stories current 
are true, the policy, if it is not to be regarded as an aggressive one, 
is adventurous. 

The Prime Minister : Will the noble lord define a little more 
definitely what he means? 

Lord H. Cecil : I am only anxious not to use words w_hich will 
convey anything but perfectly fair criticism in a matter of this sort, 
and any ambiguity in what I have said is due to the fact that I do 
not wish to go beyond the necessities of the case. 

The Prime Minister : I do not complain. 

Lord H. Cecil : There is a very general belief that this country 
is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation 
arising owing to an assurance given by the Ministry in the course 
of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of 
this country to operate in Europe. This is the general belief. 
It would be very presumptuous of anyone who has not access to all 
the facts in the possession of the Government. . . . 

The Prime Minister : I ought to say that it is not true. 

Lord H. Cecil : I am very glad to have elicited that explanation. 
(Hansard, 1913. Vol. L., cols. 42, 43.) 

On March 24, 1913, Sir William Byles asked the Prime Minister : 
Whether he will say if this country is under any, and, if so, what 
obligation to France to send an armed force in certain contingencies 
to operate in Europe ; and if so, what are the limits of our agree- 
ments, whether by assurance or treaty, with the French nation. 

Mr. King asked the Prime Minister : (1) Whether the foreign 
policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any 
treaties, agreements, or obligations under which British military 
forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on 
the Continent and join there in military operations ; and (2) whether, 
in 1905, 1908, or 191 1, this country spontaneously offered to France 
the assistance of the British army, to be landed on the Continent to 
support France in the event of European hostilities? 

1 The Labour Leader, December 3, 1914. Written in reply to 
an attack upon the Author by Professor Conway. 

35 



36 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

The Prime Minister : As has been repeatedly stated, this country 
is not under any obligation not public and known to Parliament 
which compels it to take part in any war. In other words, if war 
arises between European Powers there are no unpublished agree- 
ments which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Govern- 
ment or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should 
participate in a war. The use that would be made of the naval 
and military forces if the Government and Parliament decided to 
take part in a war is, for obvious reasons, not a matter about which 
public statements can be made beforehand. 

— (Hansard, 1913. Vol. L., cols. 1316-7.) 

On April 28, 1914, Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs : Whether he is aware that demands have recently 
been put forward for a further military understanding between the 
Powers of the Triple Entente with a view to concerted action on the 
Continent in case of certain eventualities, and whether the policy of 
this country still remains one of freedom from all obligations to 
engage in military operations on the Continent? 

Sir E. Grey : The answer to the first part of the question is 
in the negative, and as regards the latter part the position now 
remains the same as stated by the Prime Minister in answer to a 
question in this House on March 24, 1913. 

— (Hansard, 1914. Vol. LXI., col. 1499-) 

On June 11, 1914, Mr. King asked the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs whether any naval agreement had been recently 
entered into between Russia and Great Britain ; and whether any 
negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken 
place or are now taking place between Russia and Great Britain? 

Sir William Byles asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs whether he can make any statement with regard to an alleged 
naval agreement between Great Britain and Russia ; how far such 
an agreement would affect our relations with Germany ; and will he 
lay papers? 

Sir Edward Grey : The hon. member for North Somerset asked a 
similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the 
hon. member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the 
same day as he has again done to-day. The Prime Minister then 
replied that, if war arose between European Powers, there were no 
unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom 
of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great 
Britain should participate in a war. The answer covers both 
the questions on the Paper. It remains as true to-day as it was 
a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any 
Power that would make the statement less true. No such negotia- 
tions are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far 
as I can judge. But if any agreement were to be concluded that 
made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's 
statement of last year which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, 
to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament. 

—(Hansard. Vol. LXIII., cols. 457-8.) 

PROFESSOR CONWAY charges me with mis- 
representing "plain facts." He finds the proof 
of this in a passage of my letter of resignation 
to the Birkenhead Liberal Association, which the 
Labour Leader reproduced. In the particular 



DENIALS AND AVOWALS 37 

passage which he quotes I had endeavoured to 
summarise in "plain," i.e., in non-diplomatic language, 
the revelations, uttered in diplomatic language, by the 
Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on August 3. 
I gather Professor Conway's main argument to be that 
the Anglo-French military and naval "conversations," 
authorised by the Foreign Secretary and by some of his 
colleagues, had no substantial bearing upon the formation 
of British foreign policy, because, in authorising them, the 
Foreign Secretary had expressly reserved the ultimate 
freedom of the Government and of the House of Com- 
mons to endorse them or otherwise. The fact that the 
Foreign Secretary declined to take the final plunge until 
August 2, although pressed to do so by the French Ambas- 
sador, appears to Professor Conway to convey additional 
evidence of his contention. Indeed, your correspondent 
goes so far as to say : — 

"... Down to August 2 it was entirely open to the 
House of Commons to decide as it liked the whole policy 
to be pursued in relation to the crisis." 

Let us, then, examine once again, since Professor Con- 
way will have it so (although for my part, it appears to me 
not wholly desirable at this moment), the "plain facts" 
which I have so "wantonly" misrepresented. And let us 
examine them in such a way that the plain man, who is 
neither professor nor diplomatist, may root them in his 
mind once and for all. 

The House of Commons, and through the House of 
Commons, the country, was solemnly assured on four 
occasions, twice in 1913, and twice in 1914, that our 
foreign policy was entirely free from any sort or kind of 
secret obligation towards a Continental Power calculated 
to involve the blood of its manhood being squandered on 
the plains of Europe, if the various Governments of the 
Continent found it impossible at a given moment to control 
their tempers and their appetites. Similar assurances were 
given by other members of the Cabinet. At least I pre- 
sume so, judging from my own personal experience. Mr. 
Runciman, President of the Board of Agriculture, sitting 
by my side and speaking on behalf of my candidature at 
Birkenhead on April 14, 191 3, denied "in the most 
categorical way" (to use his own words) the existence of a 
"secret understanding with any foreign Power." At the 
conclusion of his speech, a speech mainly devoted to 
denouncing Conscription and "inevitable wars," which he 

(5) 



38 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

described as wars "in which we are involved owing to 
some understanding with other Powers," I expressed 
my relief to have heard his declaration. 

I pause here to ask, and to suggest that my readers 
should ask themselves why were the questions which 
elicited these assurances put to Ministers in the House? 
Why did Mr. Runciman make that "categorical" state- 
ment at Birkenhead ? It was because there were a certain 
number of men inside and outside the House of Commons 
who had reason to believe that there did exist an 
unavowed military and naval understanding authorised 
by the British and French Foreign Offices, and that that 
understanding was the dominating factor in British 
foreign policy. In my own case — for Mr. Runciman's 
declaration was the result of precedent public statements 
made by me — a study of French newspapers and maga- 
zines, together with information received from French 
correspondents, coupled with a pretty complete know- 
ledge of the undersides of the Moroccan affair of 1912, 
had convinced me that the secret diplomacy of the two 
Foreign Offices, which had almost precipitated the two 
peoples into war in 191 1, had not ceased with the French 
acquisition of Morocco (in violation of "a scrap of paper" 
called the Algeciras Act), but was persisting ; and that 
the existence of a secret military and naval understanding 
was looked upon in French military circles as a fact — not 
to say a "plain fact." 

To resume. From March 10, 191 3, the date of the 
Prime Minister's first denial of a military understanding 
with France, to June 28, when the heir to the Austrian 
throne was murdered at Sarajevo, the position of Great 
Britain in the hypothesis of a European war, so far as 
the House knew it, was one of complete freedom from any 
entanglement with France. And that, too, was Great 
Britain's position so far as the House knew it, from June 
28 until the afternoon of August 3. Between July 20, 
when the crisis, according to the White Book, may be said 
to have begun, and August 3, not the slightest intimation 
was conveyed to the House that the position of Great 
Britain in the hypothesis of a European war was other 
than it had precedently been described as being — the latest 
declaration to that effect dated a fortnight before the 
Sarajevo crime. To argue, therefore, as Professor Conway 
argues, that under these circumstances, it was "entirely 
open" to the House down to August 2, to "decide 



DENIALS AND AVOWALS 39 

the whole policy to be pursued in relation to the crisis," 
appears to me — I don't wish to be impolite — just nonsense. 

On August 3 the Foreign Secretary delivered an im- 
passioned plea in favour of British intervention on behalf 
of France. He revealed the "conversations." He revealed 
the strategic concentration of the French Fleet in the 
Mediterranean as being due to our "friendship" with 
France. He drew a heartrending picture of battered anl 
bombarded French coasts, defenceless because of that 
Mediterranean concentration. He avowed that he had on 
the previous day undertaken that the British Navy would 
intervene if France's potential enemy, Germany, indulged 
in such battering and bombardment, and he wound up by 
declaring, in effect, that in his opinion the honour of the 
country was engaged. 

Those are the "plain facts" and no casuistry will get 
over them or under them. 

Let us now examine the setting in which these plain 
facts are placed. What was the psychological atmosphere 
on that fateful 3rd of August? A state of war already 
existed in Europe. In England the public mind was 
excited and on edge. For days the war-Press, headed by 
the Times, had been steadily flogging up bellicosity. The 
Tory Party in the House was solid for British interven- 
tion; so, too, had become a section of the Liberals. In 
what condition was the House of Commons to exercise 
a discriminating judgment, when the statesman responsible 
for the conduct of the country's foreign relations, and en- 
joying a greater personal influence over the House of 
Commons than any of his contemporaries, made the 
oratorical effort of his life under circumstances favourable 
to the case he urged? But, apart from that, it was, in 
any event, too late. The House of Commons was pre- 
sented, in every practical sense, with accomplished facts. 
It could only have rejected the appeal on behalf of France 
by rejecting the Minister who made it, and the Cabinet. 
What House of Commons could have done so — even had 
this particular House wanted to do so, which it did not — 
in the face of a national emergency so momentous ? 

Again, of what conceivable value were the reserves 
attached to these authorised military and naval conversa- 
tions? "Conversations" is a diplomatic formula. Between 
diplomatists "conversations" signify discussion, negotia- 
tion — talk, in short, which may have its sequel in acts, 
but which may not. " Conversations" between military 



4 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

men belonging to different countries, who have to work 
out in a country which is foreign to one of the parties 
practical details relating to the movement of large bodies 
of troops, are acts involving further acts, setting in train 
complicated and delicate machinery in a hundred different 
centres. When two Governments authorise their 
Military and Naval Staffs to "converse" as to eventual 
military and naval action against a common potential 
foe, they set in motion the entire mechanism of their fight- 
ing services. A relationship of a particularly intimate 
character is thereby set up which reacts, and is bound to 
react in an infinity of direct and indirect ways, upon the 
policy of the two Governments. Mutual obligations — 
in a material, if not in an official sense — are incurred. The 
Governments which authorise such "conversations" have 
taken a definite step which they can only retrace at the 
expense of turning friendly relations into unfriendly ones. 
If such "conversations" merely consisted in academic and 
periodical debates over hypothetical strategic movements, 
round a map-strewn table, one might at a stretch regard 
them as innocuous. But when they consist, as they do 
and must consist, of a careful survey of the actual field 
of potential operations ; of the selection of points for con- 
centration and defence ; of the selection of ports for dis- 
embarkation; of the settlement of a multitude of plans, 
interlinked one with the other, vitally affecing the disposi- 
tion of both armies — their binding character is apparent. 
These particular "conversations" meant the elabora- 
tion of an entire plan of campaign, replete in every detail, 
affecting the disembarkation and transport over rail and 
road of an expeditionary force of 165,000 men — or what- 
ever the exact number may have been — with the enormous 
quantities of cannon, horses, motors, waggons, stores, 
and all the impedimenta of a modern army. And as with 
the military, so with the naval "conversations." You 
may speak of an understanding whereby France concen- 
trated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left her western 
and northern coast-line undefended, in order to leave us 
freer to concentrate in the North Sea, as a "conversation" 
of no binding force until authorised by Parliament. But 
it is the sort of "conversation" which decides the destinies 
of nations, and, when carried on in secret, leaves the 
nations concerned entirely helpless to control the outcome. 
The secret "conversations," begun in 1906 and thence- 
forth persisted in, constituted, morally speaking, a pledge 



DENIALS AND AVOWALS 41 

given to France by the most powerful personalities in the 
British Liberal Ministry, to join with France in the event 
of war between France and her only potential foe, Ger- 
many. Materially speaking, they constituted an Anglo- 
French military and naval alliance. I can understand the 
argument which says that it was right to give that pledge. 
I can even understand the argument that it was right, 
having given that pledge, to deny to the House of Com- 
mons that it had been given. But I do not understand 
the argument which says that the moral obligation and the 
material fact alike meant nothing, until at the eleventh 
hour the House of Commons became aware of both, and 
endorsed them. 

Whatever may have been the combination of circum- 
stances and ideas which militated against the irrevocable 
plunge being taken until August 2, it cannot affect the 
"plain facts." No carefully-edited and summarised pre- 
sentment of diplomatic conversations can affect those 
"plain facts" in the remotest degree. At first, the motives 
for refusing to make the declaration demanded by both 
France and Russia from the beginning were probably 
mixed. Towards the culmination of the crisis, they were 
probably due to the fierce struggle going on in the 
Cabinet between the pro-War party and the anti-War 
party, which, no doubt, our children will be greatly bene- 
fited by knowing. The irrevocable step could, obviously, 
not have been taken until the bulk of the Cabinet was 
agreed to support it, and until a stage in the course of 
outside events had been reached, when the House of 
Commons was in the psychological condition to endorse it. 



CHAPTER V. 
"What will ye do in the end thereof?" 1 

"The prophets prophesy falsely and the priests bear rule by 
their means, and My people love to have it so, and what will ye 
do in the end thereof?" 1 

IN the end thereof — what will ye do in the end thereof? 
For some of us this question clamours with our 
awakened conscience in the morning - , obtrudes itself into 
our daily tasks, and haunts us as we seek our rest. 

What shall mark the close of this colossal tragedy 
which has plunged all Europe into mourning, and the 
consequences of which, even the immediate and visible 
consequences, our imagination can hardly grasp, so 
catastrophic are they for millions of us, for our civilisation, 
our hopes, our faiths? 

This tragedy was precipitated in a panic of mutual 
fears. But its seeds were sown in a futile and wicked 
Statecraft which, in every land, has held up before the 
peoples the foulest of idols — material security resting upon 
bayonets. 

Will that Statecraft be shattered with the realisation 
of its criminal imbecility? Will that idol be overthrown 
now that it has been stripped of its gaudy coverings and 
stands revealed to us in all its hideous nakedness? Will 
the peoples begin to understand that their real enemies 
are not their neighbours against whom they hurl shot and 
shell; but that their real enemies are those same groups 
of men who, in every land, by faults of temper, by inces- 
sant secret plots and counter-plots, by the cult of a false 
philosophy, and by the maintenance of an impossible 
system of official intercourse, hound the peoples to mutual 
destruction? 

Or, when the prophets and the high-priests have 
decreed the cessation of the slaughter, shall we, in sheer 
exhaustion and nausea, in utter weariness of body, mind, 
and spirit, suffer ourselves to be led back into the old 

1 Speech at a public meeting held in the Friends' Meeting House, 
Manchester, December 17, 1914. 

42 



IN THE END THEREOF— 43 

paths, to worship at the old shrines, to renew allegiance to 
the old traditions? 

Upon the answer to those questions the salvation of 
humanity depends. And it rests with the peoples what 
the answer shall be. ■ 

Amongst the masses who listened to the toscin of war 
reverberating throughout Europe in the closing days of 
July, there was singularly little hatred — at first. But 
war is the perfected mechanism of hate, and the blood- 
fumes are potent. Hate ; hate and fear reign supreme in 
the council chambers of the nations to-day. Among the 
plains and valleys of Europe, littered with the piteous 
evidence of human carnage and human error, among those 
who actually fight the battles decreed by others, hate is 
swallowed up in the awfulness of experience, in a loathing 
of horrors unsurpassed. It is not among the brave men 
who sway backwards and forwards in this Titanic and 
inconstant struggle, from the marshes of Flanders to the 
plains of Poland, that hate sits enthroned. For these men, 
despite the wall of fire and steel which separates them, 
are linked together in a catholicity of suffering. They 
kill and maim a foe they mostly do not see, just as, in 
happier times, they sow and reap, and labour at the desk 
and in the mill ; in response to what they regard as a 
mysterious and inexorable law. It is not from them, 
perishing by shot and shell, by festering wounds, by 
exposure and bitter cold, it is not from them, assuredly, 
that protests would arise if the Christian rulers of the 
Twentieth Century, approximating in compassion certain 
generals of antiquity, were to call a truce, the while they 
composed their differences; or, even from no higher 
motive than a sense of burning shame that the bloody 
arbitrament they have provoked should be prosecuted 
during the celebration of the advent of the Prince of 
Peace. 

No ! It is not on the battlefield, but in the council 
chambers of the nations where the directing wills preside 
of those whose collective wisdom and forbearance, whose 
collective understanding and tolerance, whose collective 
conception of the God they profess to worship, have 
brought humanity to this pass. Here, indeed, is the spirit 
of hate, a potent influence. 

It finds expression, on either side, in the talk of 
"crushing," of annihilation, of reducing the foe to ever- 
lasting impotence. 



44 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

That way madness lies. If hate is to be the last word 
in this unholy business ; if hate is to be the dominating 
inspiration of the terms of settlement, then the settlement 
will be no settlement, the peace will be no peace. 

A few years, it may be a decade or two, and once 
again will the peasant be called from the plough, the 
artisan from the workshop, the clerk from his desk. Once 
again will the prophets cry from the council chambers their 
devilish appeal. " If ye would secure peace, prepare for 
war! " Once again will the high-priests in every land 
convert their pulpits into Pagan shrines and trample under 
foot the Christ. 

But will the people "love to have it so" — again? Do 
they "love to have it so" to-day? I do not believe it. 
The people acquiesce. They do not love. How can they 
love the pestilence which sweeps from their lives the most 
precious gifts of life, which plunges them into the storms 
of grief, smites them with the paralysis of desolation, 
drives them into poverty and misery? 

Did the people, the masses of the people, on either 
side desire this war? Would the atmosphere which made 
war possible have been produced but for the poison dis- 
tilled, month by month, year by year, into their minds 
by the professional non-combatant libertines of the pen ; 
but for the insanity of the monstrous expansion of arma- 
ments, bleeding white the peoples for their own ultimate 
destruction, which was all that the genius of statesmen 
could evolve in response to increasing manifestations, 
everywhere, in favour of a peaceful settlement of inter- 
national disputes? The toiling millions in our great cities, 
the peasants and labourers of the countryside, whose 
capacities, in vast majority, are concentrated upon securing 
the wherewithal to feed and clothe and house themselves, 
and upon catching such stray beams of sunlight as may 
haply come their way — what part or lot have they in 
checking or controlling, or even understanding the forces 
which hurl them into the abyss of war, changing the grey- 
ness of their lives to the blackest darkness? 

That fatal Sunday of August 2 found me in a small 
Continental town. Its irregular, ill-paved streets were 
full of men and women and children, mostly weeping; 
though the younger children only wondered. At every door 
stood little groups of people with faces drawn and pitiful. 
Reservists uttering their last farewells, putting gently 
aside encircling arms, taking the last pledge from quiver- 



IN THE END THEREOF— 45 

ing lips. Above all, permeating- all, a consciousness of 
some invisible, irresistible presence, inhuman, pitiless ; 
some monstrous, unseen hand stretched out, tearing - son 
from mother, husband from wife, father from children. 
And one realised with an icy chill at one's heart that the 
inevitable had really happened ; that because one of the 
great ones of the earth had fallen beneath the hand of the 
assassin in a far-distant country, because the other great 
ones of the earth had quarrelled as the result of that 
crime, because the rulers of Christian Europe had for 
years been squandering the substance of their peoples 
in piling up weapons destructive of human life until all 
Europe was one vast arsenal, and had planned and 
schemed against one another through their appointed 
agents; that because of such things, these humble folk in 
this small town in which I moved were stricken down, 
their lives rent and shattered. 

Twenty-four hours later I passed through the empty 
House of Commons, a short hour before those fateful 
words were to be spoken — wisely or unwisely, I argue not 
to-night — which have already resulted in the loss of 
thousands of British lives, in sorrow crossing the thresh- 
hold of tens of thousands of British homes. And, here 
again, the hand of death seemed to hover, outstretched, 
menacing, prophetic in the dim recesses of the silent 
Chamber. Outside — you will remember it was Bank 
Holiday, black Monday our posterity will call it — a crowd 
filled the streets, interested but uncomprehending, laugh- 
ing, joking, chatting, gazing at the buildings which, 
doubtless, some of them were seeing for the first time, 
thoroughly enjoying themselves, while, a few yards aivay, 
their destinies hung in the balance. 

No. It is not true. The mass of the people do not 
"love to have it so." 

Kept in ignorance until the quarrels of their governors 
have passed the limits of adjustment, they are stung to 
fear, lashed into fury, flogged into hatred by the potent 
machinery existing for this purpose. 

Against such a combination they are helpless. 

And what have we done in the past, you and I, who, 
compared with them, have leisure for constructive thought 
and constructive action, what have we done to stand 
between their helplessness and the forces making for war? 
What are we doing to-day to stand between their help- 
lessness and the forces, now so strongly in the ascendant, 



46 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

making for a perpetuation of the evils which generate 
war? 

To-night we pray. But when we leave this hall, what 
then? What of the morrow and the to-morrows? We 
may construct some tiny oasis in this desert of human 
suffering. We may alleviate some private grief. We 
may remove some trifling effect of this immense disaster. 

But what are we prepared to do, what are we prepared 
to sacrifice, to make a return of such disaster impossible? 
To save the next generation from what this generation 
has not been spared ? To save the people from their help- 
lessness? To make them understand that they have the 
power to help themselves if they will but exercise it? 
What part are we prepared to play in the greatest work 
which lies open to human endeavour in the world to-day ? 

Let us pray for sound judgment. Let us pray for 
courage to denounce and expose what may be faulty and 
wrong and in need of reform in our own records and pro- 
cedure. It is cheap to denounce the shortcomings of 
others. Let us pray to be delivered from unctuous 
rectitude, from cant and hypocrisy, from smug self- 
righteousness and self-satisfaction. 

Let us so labour and strive for humanity in this, 
humanity's dark hour, that, if not we ourselves, then our 
sons, building upon the foundations we have laid, shall, 
despite the prophets, contribute in giving to the world a 
variant from the old despairing message, a variant which 
shall contribute a new message, a new message of assured 
hope, pointing to a certain goal. 

And that message shall be this : " The prophets may 
prophesy falsely, but the priests heed them not, and the 
people reject their teaching, and the end thereof shall be 
peace among the children of men." 

So be it. 



CHAPTER VI. 
France and Germany before the War 1 

With the Triple Alliance the German felt safe for a long while. 
There was a time when the German deemed himself, thanks to it, 
in perfect security. . . . He does not feel nearly so safe now. Facing 
the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alliance has come into 
existence, then the Triple Entente. The encircling manoeuvres of 
Delcasse" took place. All this has got on his nerves. And let us not 
forget that he is profoundly convinced that he — the German — can 
remain secure and pacific, but that the Frenchman on the other hand 
becomes aggressive as soon as he feels himself secure. . . Hitherto 
we have desired two contradictory things : on the one hand to keep 
the peace. . . On the other we have never consented to admit, 
even to ourselves, much less to declare publicly that we accept 
the Treaty of Frankfurt or the territorial statu quo. We accepted 
and indirectly recognised the accomplished fact in signing an alliance 
which implied it. But at the same time we hailed that alliance as 
making the Revanche certain. . . The Germans conclude that 
France desires the Revanche, and that prudence alones prevents us 
from saying so right out. They feel that we are on the watch, ready 
to profit from the opportunity which ensures us the victory. I 
ask every honest Frenchman, are they wrong? Would you in your 
inmost soul assert that they are wrong? — "Faites un roi sinon faites 
la paix," by Marcel Sembat. (Paris, Eugene Figuiere et cie. 12th 
edition, 1913.) 

Thus, we see, when the time comes, and it may come soon, when 
Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism, the friendship of 
Russia can save us if we are fully determined to fulfil all our duties 
towards her. Germany does not doubt that France, remaining 
immutably attached to her treaties, would support her ally with all 
her strength, choosing, however, the most favourable moment for 
intervention. — (L'Allemagne en peril," by Colonel Arthur Boucher, 
1914 ; op. cit.) 

SLOWLY, but surely, the international conditions 
existing- before the war are revealed, and their 
connection with the great catastrophe becomes clear to the 
dullest understanding. 

How often have we heard and read the phrase "Ger- 
many's unprovoked attack upon France "? How per- 
sistent has been the attempt to suggest that France would 
not have dreamed of a military offensive against Germany 
if the German Government had not initiated the offensive 
against her ! 

1 The Labour Leader, March 11, 1915. 
47 



4 8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

What is the story incessantly dinned into the ears of 
our people? Is not this a fair summarised version of it? 

"Germany has been preparing for this war for forty 
years, waiting for the psychological moment to declare 
it. In the opening days of August the moment came. 
With a cynicism which has never been equalled she im- 
mediately rushed upon France. What had France done 
to her? Nothing. Did the French desire war? They 
were the most peaceable people in Europe. Could Germany 
have had any other motive for this monstrous act of 
aggression than sheer greed of conquest? She had plotted 
for decades to strike at France successfully, and when 
the time seemed to her ripe she made her onslaught with- 
out the ghost of an excuse." 

And do not innumerable Frenchmen hold the same 
view — the view that France would have remained neutral 
if Germany had left France alone and confined her atten- 
tion to Russia? Did not my good friend Peaix-Seailles 
endeavour to sustain that thesis in the last issue of the 
Socialist Review? 

Well, what remains of it now, after Sir Edward Grey's 
reply to Mr. Jowett's second question? Sir Edward Grey 
informed Mr. Jowett that although His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment did not know the terms of the Franco-Russian 
Alliance, they did know : — 

"that the French Government could not contemplate an 
attitude of neutrality in the event of Russia being attacked 
by Germany as well as by Austria." 

Let us then in common decency consign the untruth 
of a France wantonly attacked by Germany with no excuse 
to the lethal chamber, where, in company with so many 
others, it can find oblivion. 

Germany attacked France because, if she had not done 
so, France would have attacked her. That is the truth. 
Does it exonerate Germany for her share in building up 
the system which has led to eighteen millions of men being 
whirled into mutual destruction because one man was 
shot in the streets of a Bosnian town? Assuredly not. 
But then, neither does it absolve other Governments from 
their share in that abomination. Does it exonerate Ger- 
many from launching her legions at France through 
Belgian territory, after having first asked for a peaceful 
passage, which, apparently, we did not officially regard as 
especially diabolical in 1887? Assuredly not. But then 



FRANCE AND GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR 49 

neither does it exonerate the diplomatists of other countries 
who have since told us that they were thoroughly aware 
that Belgium would fall a victim to the European group 
system in the event of a war between the two groups, and 
who did not stir a finger to save her from that fate. 

What this categorical statement of Sir Edward Grey's 
does, however, bring home to all that have ears to hear 
and eyes to see is the absurdity of attempting any longer 
to describe the extension of a Balkan squabble to the 
West of Europe — involving the Belgian, British, and 
French peoples in the calamity of war — as the outcome of 
German determination to subjugate Europe. 

And what it does further suggest is the absurdity of 
imagining that the "crushing" of Germany, if by that 
phrase is meant the attempted "dismemberment" or 
national extinction of Germany, is calculated to eliminate 
the diplomatic cult of the "Balance of Power," which is 
now clearly seen to be the snag upon which European 
civilisation has split. 

What Sir Edward Grey's reply to Mr. Jowett does 
demonstrate beyond all question is that the German 
Government and the German people (for, apparently, they 
speak with one voice) are expressing their real conviction 
when they state that they, too, are fighting for their 
national existence; that they are just as sincere in their 
belief as other Governments and peoples may be, that this 
war is, for them, a defensive and not an offensive one. 

That the German Government would have performed 
an act of the highest political wisdom in maintaining a 
strict military defensive on the Franco-German frontier, 
and thereby refrained from perpetrating the grave immo- 
rality of an invasion of Belgium is my belief. But was such 
an act, under such circumstances, humanly possible? It 
would not have saved Germany from a French attack, nor 
from British attack if Germany had ventured to use her 
Fleet against the French, for on August 2 Sir Edward 
Grey gave the French Ambassador the assurance that if 
the German Fleet attacked French coasts or shipping the 
British Fleet would intervene. 

The German Government was thus faced with this 
situation : (a) That of maintaining a military defensive 
against France (for all the military experts were in agree- 
ment that an invasion of France via the Franco-German 
frontier was a virtual impossibility), thus throwing to the 
winds the entire strategic plans of its military advisers ; 
(b) That of foregoing the use of its navy. 



50 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Does anyone believe that any Government in such cir- 
cumstances would, or could, have consented to such a 
course? How could it have faced the agitation led by the 
heads of its fighting Services ; an agitation which would 
have been based upon the cry that Germany, confronted 
with two powerful antagonists, was being betrayed at 
the supreme hour of peril by its rulers? Is it exhibiting 
bias, or pro-Germanism, or anti-patriotism, or any of the 
other 'isms, to describe Germany's position and France's 
position at the height of the crisis as having been, in effect 
and respectively this : — 

Germany : Compelled to a military defensive, fatal to 
the national security in the opinion of its military advisers, 
(a) owing to the invulnerability of the French frontier ; (b) 
owing to Belgian neutrality : Compelled to abandon any 
idea of using her Fleet against France owing to the British 
threat. 

France : (a) Free to adopt a military offensive or 
defensive; to choose the psychological moment when 
Russian pressure had paved the way for a French assault 
upon the German lines, against which the entire French 
military strength would have been massed; (b) Free to 
dispose of her Fleet as she listed; to use it against German 
shipping; to use it against Germany's ally in the Adriatic 
— with complete immunity, owing to British support. 

I continue to think that the German Government would 
have been wiser from the point of view of its own 
interests in facing these odds and in running these risks, 
because, had it done so, French public opinion and British 
public opinion would have split in two, neutral opinion 
would have been strongly on Germany's side, and I doubt 
whether the French and British Foreign Offices could 
have sustained their respective parts. 

Even setting aside, for the sake of argument merely, 
the influence of fear, which, as we know, swept through 
Berlin when the news of the Russian general mobilisation 
arrived, I ask once more : Could the German Government, 
or any Government, have had the courage or, indeed, the 
power, to have taken such a line under such circumstances ? 

I am not concerned with defending the German 
Government; its many precedent diplomatic follies and the 
aggressive language of its militarists were largely respon- 
sible for the situation in which it found itself in the opening 
days of August. All I am concerned with is to picture to 
myself, and to try to induce others to picture to them- 



FRANCE AND GERMANY BEFORE THE WAR 51 

selves, what that situation at that moment was, and what 
were the alternatives with which the German Government 
was faced. 

And my object in doing - so is to suggest two things, 
which, if they came to be believed by the public of this 
country, would necessarily affect the public view as to the 
extent of German culpability, and would strengthen 
opinion in favour — as Professor Pigou put it the other 
day — of an honourable and not a penal settlement ; and 
this, in turn, would be calculated to save innumerable 
lives. 

My suggestions, then, are these : First, that the in- 
creasing light which is being thrown on the pre-war situa- 
tion must strengthen conviction in all minds capable of 
rational thought that the genesis of this war is to be 
sought, not in original sin grafted on the German 
Government or nation, but in a universal reign of fear, 
produced by the imbecilities of international diplomacy, 
ostensibly pursuing an ideal of "Balance" which is as 
unexplainable as it is unattainable, and doing so by means 
of a militarism which, from being the handmaiden, has 
become the master of the diplomatists themselves. 

Secondly, that this increasing light must strengthen the 
conviction of all whom the blood-lust does not blind, that 
humanity can advance not one single step nearer the goal 
of its emancipation from the errors of the past by the 
massacre of another million or two of human beings. 



CHAPTER VII. 
The "pro-German" Taunt 1 

The speech of my noble friend, with all the authority of the name 
he bears and with all the weight of his own character and position 
in the country, will be read with delight by all the partisans of 
Russia throughout Europe ; and at the same time not without 
regret by those who are allied to us in opposing that Power. I say 
that my noble friend has, as far as in him lies, this night rendered 
signal service to the Emperor of Russia by aiding him in this war 
with the Allies. He has done his utmost to encourage the Emperor 
of Russia to resist a compliance with those demands which England, 
France, and Austria consider just. — (Lord Clarendon on Earl Grey's 
peace speech in the Lords' debate of May 25, 1855). 

If he — Lord Malmesbury — might be permitted to speak of the 
right hon. gentleman as an abstraction, he would say that no 
longer ago than the preceding night he dreamed he heard a man, 
whom all his admirers said was the greatest orator of the day, 
address an august assembly in a tone and manner, with a force 
of words, with a colouring of expression, and, he might add, with 
a distortion of facts, which were worthy of any Russian Minister, 
and which would have gained such Minister even' Cross of St. 
Andrew that the Russian Government has to bestow. When he 
awoke in the morning after his dream, he felt so humiliated as an 
Englishman that he would not believe what he had heard, until he 
read it first in the morning newspapers — (Lord Malmesbury, refer- 
ring in the Lords' debate of May 25, 1855, to Gladstone's peace speech 
in the Commons.) 

LET us face quite frankly this charge of being "pro- 
German" (or, as Mr. Perris puts it in his letter to you, 
of endeavouring "to excuse the ways of the Prussian 
Junker") which is levelled at anyone who attempts to 
re-establish a sense of perspective in the public mind in 
regard to this war; whether the charge be conveyed in 
the form adopted by the anonymous gentlemen of the 
"anti-German League" who write from Southampton or 
in the "more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger" form of Mr. Perris, 
whose interesting little volume, "Our Foreign Policy and 
Sir Edward Grey's Failure," stands on my bookshelves. 
I dissent altogether from the view that it is in the hig-hest 

1 The Labour Leader, March 25, 1915. Written in connection 
with an attack upon the Author by Mr. G. H. Perris. 

52 



THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 53 

degree injudicious to pen a line or to say a word which 
suggests that Germany is not the sole responsible author 
of the war. 

I dissent for three reasons, all of which appear to me 
closely concerned with the interests of the British people 
and not at all with the interests of the "Prussian Junker." 
First, because it is not true that Germany is the sole 
responsible author of this war, although her governing 
classes possess a considerable measure of responsibility 
for it. The interests of the British people are not 
permanently served by the propagation of an untruth, 
however popular it may be at the moment. Secondly, 
because the more deeply rooted becomes the belief that 
Germany is the sole responsible author of this war, initiated 
by her in order to "subjugate Europe," the more will 
public opinion gravitate towards the "unconditional 
surrender" policy; and that policy means an indefinite 
prolongation of the war and, consequently, an immense 
additional loss of life. And this appals me very much, 
whereas the charge of being "pro-German" does rot appal 
me in the least. Thirdly, because the policy of "uncon- 
ditional surrender" is a policy which means a bad settle- 
ment; a settlement which would settle nothing, even if 
it could be enforced, which would pave the way for fresh 
convulsions, and which, both in its external and internal 
implications, would, in the ultimate resort, bring disaster 
upon the British Commonwealth. It is not, therefore, to 
serve the interests of the "Prussian Junker," but to serve 
the interests of the British people that some of us feel 
constrained to urge upon our countrymen that the enemy 
is not the monster of popular caricature. Apparently there 
are men in Germany who are acting precisely as we are : 
who are reacting, as we are endeavouring to do, against 
the doctrine of blind hate of Britain. Their efforts are 
lauded in our patriotic Press. Ours are denounced as 
"pro-German." 

I wonder whether those who abjure us to tread as 
delicately as any Agag lest we be called "pro-German" 
and, therefore, run the risk of impairing what little 
influence we may possess, realise the illogicality of their 
advice? If Germany is the sole responsible author of the 
war, and started it in order to "subjugate Europe," why 
in the world are we bothering our heads about secret 
diplomacy and democratic control of foreign policy; about 
the "Balance of Power/' the study of international 



54 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

relations, the private armament interest and so forth? 
Does not the fact that a growing multitude in these Islands 
is troubling itself about these things prove conclusively 
that many of us do not believe that responsibility for the 
war is solely attributable to the "Prussian Junker," but 
that it is attributable to a universal system of statecraft 
conducted behind the back of the peoples, rooted in a false 
philosophy, and reposing upon the universal fallacy that 
national security is obtainable only through gigantic 
armament? Very well. Why, then, having attained this 
degree of sanity, should we shrink from the next step; 
from examining how Germany's position, as well as the 
position of other Powers, was affected by that universal 
system both before and during the crisis' of last July? 
Why should we shrink from trying, as Marcel Sembat puts 
it in his famous book, to place ourselves in the "skin of 
a German"? Shall we ever be in a position to contribute 
towards the buildfng up of a happier, saner, Europe if, 
while working not only for general reforms, but for 
British reforms and, thereby, implicitly admitting that both 
are required, we keep up the pretence that Germany is the 
sole villain of the piece? The two things are incompatible. 
You cannot at the one and the same time (i.e., if your 
argument is a stage towards effective action) maintain (a) 
that the ruling classes of Europe, including those of your 
own country, are partners in responsibility for this System 
which you desire to overthrow, and (b) that the governing 
classes of all Europe were lambs and Germany alone the 
ravening wolf; that all, save the rulers of Germany, had 
but one desire, to live in harmony and preserve the peace 
of the world. 

Now if Germany was not the sole responsible author 
of the war she must have a case, and if we wish to construct 
for the future we must understand that case. If it is in 
the interest of the British people that Germany should be 
crushed and pulverised, dismembered, reduced to 
impotence nationally and economically — all of which 
courses are daily being recommended and all of which 
may be comprised in the policy of "unconditional 
surrender"; then, of course, it is no use trying to under- 
stand what Germany's position was in the "Balance" 
prior to the outbreak of war, what were her national 
necessities, what her fears. Let us, clothed in the mantle 
of our own impeccability, turn a blind eye to all but her 
visible faults and punish her for those faults to the utter- 



THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 55 

most. But is it? I contend that it can never be to the 
interest of any civilised people that another civilised 
people should be so treated, whatever may be the faults 
that the rulers of the latter have committed. In the case 
of Britain and Germany, I contend that, apart from moral 
considerations, it would be national insanity were such a 
policy to receive national endorsement. 

I imagine there are a great many people at present 
who, for the satisfaction of grinding Germany to powder, 
are prepared to contemplate with relative equanimity Japan 
forcing a defensive and offensive alliance upon China 
which would leave her mistress of China's external and 
internal policy, as the preliminary step to converting 
China's fabulous millions of human material into a vast 
host equipped with all the modern engines of human 
destruction, the secret of whose manufacture has been 
obligingly furnished to the Japanese by the Anglo-German 
armament ring. I imagine there are a great many people 
at present who, provided Germany may be stamped flat, 
are prepared cheerfully to acquiesce in a settlement which 
would find Russia with the whole of Poland as a Russian 
satrapy, Danzig a Russian port, Russia installed at 
Constantinople, from thence dictating the destinies of the 
Levant, commanding all the overland routes to India; a 
Russia possessed of an army of ten million men, partly 
equipped with British, and largely with French, money, 
and with a powerful fleet in the Black Sea built by British 
firms. But that there are such people is no valid reason 
why we should all be required to qualify for a lunatic 
asylum. 

When our Foreign Office revived the "Balance of 
Power," so far as England was concerned, it threw in its 
lot unconditionally (the characteristic of our foreign 
policy during the past decade has been the wholesale 
surrender of national assets without adequate com- 
pensating advantages) with Russia and France against 
the central European Powers; above all, when it invited 
the Japanese to join in the struggles of Europe, our 
Foreign Office successfully manoeuvred the British people 
within the portals of the aforesaid asylum. But that is no 
reason why the British people should persist in remaining 
permanent inmates of that building. If they do not wish 
to be so they must resolutely make up their minds to 
examine the German case with honesty and fairness; 
realise that it cannot be disposed of by military defeat; 



56 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

realise, too, that the river of blood which now separates 
the two peoples must be bridged. 

What was Germany's position in the "Balance of 
Power" system before the war? It was this. She had 
an alliance with Austria and with Italy. But it had long 
been notorious (except, apparently, to Mr. Perris) that 
Italy's interest in the triplice had become purely formal. 
It had decayed with the modification of the causes which 
originated it, and with Delcasse's pledge of a free hand in 
Tripoli, latterly taken advantage of. Facing her were 
Russia and France. Far from being in a condition to 
dictate to Europe, she was strategically very vulnerable; 
and, with an unfriendly Britain, the "Balance," instead 
of being in her favour, was tilted against her. In the 
last ten years the military and naval expenditure of France 
and Russia in combination has largely exceeded the 
military and naval expenditure of Germany and Austria 
in combination. The naval question had embittered Anglo- 
German relations. British official policy became pro- 
nouncedly hostile over the Morocco affair — no conceivable 
British interest or compensating advantage being thereby 
secured : that by the way. Thereafter British official 
policy, although outwardly the relations of the two 
Governments had improved, was a doubtful element in 
Germany's calculations. I am not here discussing the 
extent to which the policy of Germany's rulers were 
responsible for the dangerous position in which she found 
herself; whether she was justified in building a fleet or 
not. I am simply stating what that position was. The 
element in the situation dominating all others was the 
growing Russian menace. In the two years preceding the 
war it had become acute, and Germany's fears were 
genuine. Our mentors in the Press affect to ridicule that 
feeling, forgetting that for the best part of half a century 
British foreign policy was wholly inspired by fear of 
Russia — although, unlike the Germans, we have never had 
the felicity of Russia as a next-door neighbour. If we 
could feel fear of Russia because of India, why not 
Germany because of Germany ? Germany's fears were well 
founded. The Pan-Slavists and the Grand Ducal Party 
had triumphed over the Peace Party (it was largely, almost 
entirely, an affair of warring personalities and personal 
grudges prevailing in the diplomatic world), including the 
elements in the Imperial household favourable to peace. I 
have no space to set out the story here, but it has been 



THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 57 

a commonplace in the Chancelleries since the spring of 
1 91 2 that the War Party in Russia had gained the 
ascendancy and that a collision with Austria, and 
consequently with Germany, to whom the annihilation of 
Austria would have been the death warrant, was merely 
a matter of time. 

From that period onwards the whole question has 
been : Would the three eagles tear and rend one another 
alone, or would the Western Powers be dragged in ? The 
key to the situation was France — nationally pacific in the 
main, governmentally under the heel of Russia, and 
clinging to the "revanche." Could France be induced, 
like Italy, 1 to stand aside in a quarrel not her own, or 
would the French Government — which has never disclosed 
the terms of its treaty with Russia to the French people 
— be involved? If the former, then there would be no 
German attack upon France or, a fortiori, upon Belgium. 
If the latter, Germany would strike first at the foe whose 
rapidity of mobilisation more nearly approximated to her 
own. These were commonplaces before the war. Why 
affect ignorance of them now? 

. And this brings me to Mr. Perris' letter. What is the 
use of Mr. Perris telling me that I am defending a 
"preventive war" ? A "preventive war" is a mere phrase. 
You might just as well apply it to official Britain's policy 
as to official Germany's policy in the catastrophe which 
has overwhelmed Europe. What is official Britain waging 
but a preventive war : a "Balance of Power" war as the 
Times keeps on reminding us at intervals — speaking, of 
course, for the Foreign Office? What is a "Balance of 
Power" war but a "preventive" war? What I said in my 
article was that France would have attacked Germany if 
Germany, thanks to her more rapid mobilisation and her 
more efficient preparations, had not taken the initiative. 
But that is no "dogmatic" assertion of my own. France 
made it clear from the first that she would not remain 
neutral. (I have set out the official quotations in detail 
before and may be excused from doing so again.) Sir 
Edward Grey confirmed the fact in his reply to Mr. Jowett 
the other day. What does a country do when it is not 
neutral? It joins in the fray, choosing, if it is allowed to 
do so, the psychological moment best suited to its 
interests. France was not allowed to choose that moment, 
and no one ever supposed she would be. Mr. Perris seems 
1 Italy had not then come in. 



58 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

to think that the "aggressor" in a war is necessarily the 
party who fires the first shot. But this is by no means the 
case, and the history of many wars disprove it. Was 
Japan the "aggressor" in her war with Russia because 
she opened the ball before even declaring war? Again, it 
is not I who am talking "solemn nonsense" when I state 
that the German Staff was convinced that a military 
defensive in a general European war — i.e., a war which 
found Germany faced with Russia on one side and France 
on the other — would have been fatal to German national 
security. I merely state a fact — the fact that that was 
the opinion of the German Staff : that their whole strategy 
was founded on that belief. I am not qualified to criticise 
that opinion from a military point of view; but such an 
authority as Colonel Repington — from what I have read 
of his writings — does not appear to have thought that it 
was "nonsense." 

To conclude. I was concerned to show that Sir E. 
Grey's reply to Mr. Jowett provided the final proof that 
France did not intend to remain neutral in a Russo- 
German war : in other words, that France would have 
intervened on behalf of Russia when the moment was ripe 
in the judgment of her military advisers. I endeavoured to 
make it clear that, such being the case, the fact of Germany 
having initiated the military offensive instead of waiting 
for the military offensive to be taken against her, was not 
evidence of a desire on Germany's part to "subjugate 
Europe," and could not honestly be described as 
constituting a "wanton aggression" upon France, but was 
the axiomatic outcome of Germany's position in the 
"Balance." 

I might, of course, have added a great deal more on 
that point. I might have added that when the still 
unexplained mystery of the misunderstood telephone 
conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German 
Ambassador occurred, as the result of which the latter 
imagined that the British Government proposed using its 
good offices to press neutrality upon France, the rulers of 
Germany clutched at the opportunity of leaving France 
alone, as a strong swimmer in a current clutches at a 
friendly log, the Kaiser immediately telegraphing to King 
George, and the Chancellor to the German Ambassador, 
that the western progress of their military machine would 
be stayed if Britain guaranteed French neutrality. Was 
that action reconcilable with a plot to "subjugate Europe" ? 



THE "PRO-GERMAN" TAUNT 59 

The authenticity of these telegrams has never been 
questioned to my knowledge. Their text is to be found in 
Price's "Diplomatic History of the War." 

Let me repeat, then, once again, that my object in 
calling attention to these things is the object stated in 
the earlier part of this article, and no other. I have no 
friends among "Prussian Junkers." I have not, like a 
number of men prominent in British public life have done, 
dined at the Kaiser's table or hobnobbed with the Kaiser 
at teaparties or reviews. I have not even a financial 
interest in the armament ring. What I do possess is a 
profound conviction that an ultimate reconciliation 
between Britain and Germany is essential to the future 
peace of the world, and to the truest interests of this 
country. 

Ministering to that conviction, I intend to do my little 
best to urge the necessity for the exercise of common sense 
and common fairness on this side, if that result is to be 
attained. 



CHAPTER VIII. 
Militarism and the Beast of the Apocalypse* 

I HAVE said that to attribute the sole responsibility for 
this war to Germany was to perpetrate an injustice and 
an untruth. I have also said that the French Government 
was resolved not to remain neutral in the event of a Russo- 
German war. I contended that such being the case the 
German military offensive against France last August could 
not honestly be described as wanton aggression, and 
furnished no evidence per se of a desire on Germany's part, 
"to sujugate Europe." I also explained that in my 
judgment the truth ought to be insisted upon, not in the 
interests of "Prussian Junkers," but in the interests of the 
British people; and I gave the reasons which led me to 
form that judgment. 

Since then two Ministerial utterances bearing upon the 
subject have been made; one by Sir Edward Grey, 2 the 
other by Lord Haldane. 8 In both statements Germany's 
sole responsibility for the war has been reiterated. In par- 
ticular her antecedent military preparations have been 
pointed to as something peculiar and special to Germany 
and as providing conclusive proof of premeditation. We 
have had presented to us once again the familiar picture of 
the ravening wolf of German militarism, set in the midst 
of a flock of meek pacifist sheep — the other European 
Powers. It is only the psychology of a state of war which 
permits of such statements passing muster for an instant. 
Of the intelligent people — as distinct from the people who 
allow others to do their thinking for them — who accept 
these statements, I make bold to say that a considerable 
number hypnotise themselves into believing them because 
they wish to believe them. But the danger is that the 
constant beating of this particular drum will strengthen all 
the elements in British civilian life which, inspired by 
the anger and grief resultant from the loss of loved ones 

i The Labour Leader, April 15, 1915. 

2 March 22, 1915. 

8 Daily Chronicle, April 1, 1915. 

60 



MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 61 

in the field, by blind sentiments of revenge, and by policy, 
are pressing for the infliction of such terms upon Germany 
as the price of peace, as would defeat the very ends 
proclaimed to be those of the Government when it joined in 
the war; prepare the way for fresh convulsions and 
perpetuate the armaments of Europe. That is why an 
effort must be made to deal with these statements. 

Not only has Germany been making formidable pre- 
parations for war for a considerable time past, but she 
has made them with that meticulous thoroughness which 
the Germans import into all their activities. This is not 
in itself a proof of premeditation. It is a proof of 
efficiency. German militarism is militarism carried to the 
highest point of efficiency. It does not differentiate 
otherwise from the militarism of other nations. What is 
"militarism"? It is the product of a statecraft rooted in 
a philosophy which regards nations as antagonistic units 
and which imposes upon the peoples the burden of armed 
force. That armed force may be concentrated upon land 
or upon the sea. But whether upon land or upon the sea 
its justification is defended on the ground that to secure 
peace each State must be stronger than its neighbour. As 
German militarism is the most efficiently organised, so it 
is probably the most ruthless, for ruthlessness and efficiency 
in militarism go hand in hand. The more efficient the 
militarism the more ruthless its action, because inter alia 
every fresh invention of man which can be applied to the 
destruction of man will be developed to its utmost capacity 
by the efficient militarist. Our own First Sea Lord has 
recognised very clearly that modern war must be ruthless. 
In an interview accorded in 1910 1 to his friend, the late Mr. 
W. T. Stead, he declared : "The humanising of war ! You 
might as well talk of humanising hell ! ... If I am in 
command when war breaks out I shall issue as my orders : 
'The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is 
imbecility. Hit first, hit hard, and hit anywhere.' " 
Barely a fortnight before the outbreak of this war Sir Percy 
Scott justified from the same point of view the action 
which Germany is now adopting in sinking ships, other 
than ships of war, by means of submarines and mines. 
Discussing the potentiality of a proclamation to that effect 
on the part of a Continental Power at war with an island 
Power, he said : — 

"Such a proclamation would, in my opinion, be 

1 Review of Reviews, February, 1910. 



62 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

perfectly in order, and, once it had been made, if any 
British or neutral ships disregarded it and attempted to 
run the blockade, they could not be held to be engaged in 
the peaceful avocations, referred to by Lord Sydenham, and 
if they were sunk in the attempt, it could not be described 
as a relapse into savagery or piracy in its blackest form." 1 

It was not a German who wrote : — 

"War is the divinely appointed means by which 
environment may be readjusted until ethically fitted and 
best becomes synonymous." 

It was a well-known British military writer, Colonel 
Maude. 2 It was not a German who wrote : — 

"The worst of all errors in war is a mistaken spirit of 
benevolence. ' ' 

It was an equally well-known British military writer, 
Major Stewart Murray. 3 It was not a German who 
wrote : — 

"The proper strategy consists in the first place of inflict- 
ing as terrible blows as possible upon the enemy's army, 
and then in causing the inhabitants so much suffering that 
they must long for peace and force their Government to 
demand it." 

It was a well-known British military critic, Dr. Miller 
Maguire. 4 

"Militarism" is not a German product. It is just as 
much a British product. But in our case it finds, owing 
to geographical position* its chief expression on the sea. 5 
The plain fact of the matter is that a systematic endeavour 
to represent your enemy, whoever he may be, as outside 
the pale of human kind, is an absolute necessity to-day 
for any Government which has involved its people in war. 
It is only by such means that the willingness of millions 
of people who have nothing to gain and everything to lose 
by war can be induced to tolerate war. And so God and 
the humanities are alternately invoked to describe the 
enemy as a fiend among the nations, and fear and hatred 
act as chief recruiting sergeants. 

Germany prepared for this war. She carried her pre- 
parations to the highest maximum of efficiency, and she 

1 Times, July 16, 1914. 

2 "Armaments and Arbitration." 

3 "The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons." 
* Times, July 12, 1900. 

s This was written before Great Britain had also become a 
conscript Power. 



MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 63 

is waging war with the ruthlessness which modern war, 
in the opinion of prominent men of other nations, de- 
mands, All that is self-evident. But that does not in the 
least degree fasten upon Germany sole responsibility for 
the outbreak of war, nor does it in the least degree prove 
that Germany in going to war did so in order to "sub- 
jugate Europe." And this for quite a number of reasons, 
the first of which is palpable to all those whose mental 
condition remains normal. 

It is not only Germany that has been preparing for 
war, but all Europe — France, Russia, Britain. The only 
difference in actual fact between Germany's conduct in the 
past forty years and the conduct of the other Powers men- 
tioned, is that the latter have not only been preparing for 
war, but have waged war, whereas Germany has been 
content with preparation. 1 France has been waging war 
continuously for the past quarter of a century. She has 
conquered Tonquin, Madagascar, Morocco, Tunis, together 
with enormous tracts of country in West and West- 
Central Africa. Russia has waged a great war against 
Japan. The British Government has conquered the South 
African Republics and incorporated them within the 
British Empire. 

And, I repeat, all Europe has been preparing for war. 
The history of the last decade is a history of constantly 
increasing preparation for war on the part of all the 
Powers, coupled with a steadily-growing apprehension at 
these preparations on the part of all the peoples 
concerned. It is often stated that Britain alone was 
unprepared. Britain was not unprepared on the basis 
of the national policy precedently accepted by both parties 
in the State, i.e., a paramount navy and a small expedi- 
tionary force for use on the Continent. The British Navy 
was fully prepared. Mr. Churchill has told us in minute 
detail the extent of our pre-war preparations. 

"The German Army was not more ready for an offen- 
sive war on a gigantic scale than was the British Fleet for 
national defence." 

That the Germans may have regarded their Army in 
the same light as we regard our Navy as an instrument 
of national defence does not, of course, figure in Mr. 
Churchill's presentation. 

1 With the single exception of the guerilla warfare against the 
Hottentots and half-breeds in German S.W. Africa. 



64 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

But, it is said Germany's preparations were made for 
the purpose of provoking war, and the preparations of all 
the other Powers — upon some of which I shall dwell later 
— were made in order to prevent war. How comes it, 
then, that the other Powers have not only prepared but 
waged war, and that Germany has not? How comes it 
that Germany did not wage war upon her neighbours whom 
she desired to subjugate when she could have done so 
with every guarantee of military success ? She could have 
smashed France with ease in 1887, and our official classes, 
judging from statements in such papers as the Standard 
and the Spectator, would have been rather pleased than 
otherwise. 1 It was in the Nineteenth Century for March 
of that year that Professor Edward Dicey wrote : 

"The German Empire, as we know it now, came into 
existence with the Franco-German War. In the course 
of seventeen years it has become very strong and very 
formidable, not only as a military but as a political power. 
That it may become yet more strong and more formidable 
is my heartfelt wish as it must be that of every English- 
man who understands the conditions of our own tenure 
of power, and who realises the dangers to which Europe 
is exposed by the aggrandisement of Russia." 

Germany could have smashed France with equal ease 
when Russia, exhausted by the Japanese War, was in- 
capable of stirring a finger to help her. Germany could 
have smashed France with equal ease when we were 
engaged in annexing the South African Republics. I do 
not know whether it be true that the Kaiser resisted 
suggestions from Russia and France to form a coalition 
against us at that time; but I have met British people 
who believed it, and the statement has been made in print 
in this country more than once. "A friend in need is a 
friend indeed" was the letterpress figuring above a photo- 
graph of the Kaiser in the Daily Mail of November 1 1 , 
1899. Why, if Germany desired to "subjugate Europe" 
did she wait until August, 1914, when her military 
supremacy, as I shall show later on, was less assured than 
at any period during the previous thirty years? How can 
these things be reconciled with the present charge against 
Germany of having bided her time and deliberately pro- 
voked a war when she thought the psychological moment 
had come? They cannot be. 
1 Vide Chapter II. 



MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 65 

The curious thing- is that from the very circles whence 
these charges emanate come assertions which entirely 
dispose of them. Our patriotic Press has conjured up a 
Kaiser on all fours with "Boney," a sinister, implacable 
plotter, who concealed unholy ambitions beneath a 
spurious mask of good-will. They want to send him to St. 
Helena; to try him for murder; to expel his dynasty from 
Europe. But that is not the opinion of Lord Haldane, 
and it is not the opinion of the French either. Lord 
Haldane, in the course of an interview with an American 
journalist, has recently delivered himself of the following 
utterance : 

"In past years I think the Kaiser undoubtedly opposed 
war. But I am afraid his opposition to it gradually 
weakened. He appears to have settled into the war mood 
two years ago. 1 

Of singular interest this statement. Up to two years 
ago, then, the conspiring Kaiser conspired for peace. 
That is said by a British Cabinet Minister who knew the 
Kaiser personally and has eaten of the salt at his table. 
Let us retain the declaration in our minds. Lord Haldane's 
statement is the more interesting for his subsequent 
reference to Document No. 6 of the Yellow Book, in which 
is recorded a conversation said to have taken place between 
the Kaiser, the King of the Belgians, and General Von 
Moltke in the early part of November, 191 3. The 
conversation is reported by the French Ambassador at 
Berlin. The accuracy of its transcription has been denied 
in Germany. We need not attach overmuch importance 
either to the conversation or to the denial; for obviously 
we can check neither the one nor the other. But for the 
sake of argument let us admit that it did take place, and 
that it is truthfully transcribed. The conversation is less 
important than the statement of the French Ambassador, 
who goes quite as far as Lord Haldane, for he speaks of 

"William the Second, whose personal influence has been 
exerted in many critical circumstances in favour of the 
maintenance of peace. . . . " 2 

Like Lord Haldane, the French Ambassador declares 
(on the strength of the conversation he reports) that these 
pacific sentiments had changed. But that is not the only 

1 Daily Chronicle, April i, 1915. 

3 Vide similar French statements in Chapter XI. 



66 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

statement in the Yellow Book corroborative of Lord 
Haldane. We are told in Document 5 that if war did not 
break out in 191 1 over Morocco it was largely because of 
the "pacific desires of the Emperor and the Chancellor." 

Thus far, then, our examination establishes that the 
Beast of the Apocalypse, otherwise the German Emperor 
— and we are told that who says Kaiser says German 
officialdom — was, until quite recently, a powerful factor 
for the preservation of the peace of the world. We are 
told so in the French Government's official publication on 
the war, and by a British Cabinet Minister, with 
exceptional advantages of knowing the truth. What is 
left of the "forty years' preparation" legend? 

But when did the Kaiser abandon that role, and why ? 
These questions remain to be examined. The date is of 
importance. Two years ago, says Lord Haldane. That 
would take us back to April, 19 13. But another document 
in the French Yellow Book suggests an earlier period. 
Annexe I. to Document 1 contains an extract from the 
French military attache in Berlin written (apparently) in the 
early part of 191 2, and describing the effect of the Morocco 
affair upon the mind of Germany. He says : — 

"We discover every day how deep and lasting are the 
sentiments of wounded rancour against us provoked by 
the events of last year." 

The "events of last year" were the events connected 
with the Morocco dispute, when the French Government, 
with the assistance of British officialdom, tore up the Treaty 
of Algeciras, filled Morocco with French troops, and defied 
Germany. The French military attache continues : — 

"The resentment felt in every part of the country is 
the same. . . . The Emperor and the Government yielded ; 
public opinion has neither forgiven them nor us. Public 
opinion does not intend that such a thing shall occur 
again." 

It would seem, then, from the above that the Kaiser's 
"pacifist desires" which contributed so largely to prevent- 
ing war over Morocco were adversely affected by what 
is admitted to have been a widespread national resentment 
at the manner in which Germany considered she had been 
treated over Morocco. And this should be of interest to 
all British people. 

But we may let that pass, for although important 
assuredly, it is not the most important conclusion derivable 



MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 67 

from what precedes. The point of really capital importance 
is this. Throughout the lengthy period during which 
Germany considered herself safe, owing to her military 
strength, Germany was pacific, and the German Emperor's 
influence was exerted in the interests of peace, "in many 
critical circumstances." That is vouched by the French 
Yellow Book and by Lord Haldane, in official statements, 
published and delivered — bear this in mind — while war is 
actually raging. If one desired to cite statements to the 
same effect made by British and French Authorities, before 
the war broke out, one could fill an issue of the Labour 
Leader with comparative ease. It was only when, in the 
opinion (rightly or wrongly) of the rulers of Germany, 
Germany's position in Europe was no longer safe owing 
to the proportionate growth in the striking forces and in 
the disposition of her potential foes, i.e., during the past 
three or four years — that, according to those French and 
British statements, official Germany ceased to be pacific. 

The significance of these conclusions is immense. If 
the French Yellow Book and Lord Haldane are, in this 
particular, recording the truth, the charge of decades of 
premeditation and of a blow struck when it was most likely 
to succeed — timed with that intent — can no longer be 
sustained if we have regard for truth and honesty. But 
that is not all. If Germany was pacific when she deemed 
herself secure, and ceased to be so when she deemed herself 
insecure, this war, so far as Germany's part in it is con- 
cerned, is a war not due to vile and disorderly ambitions, 
but is a war due to fear. 

Let us see what light can be derived from official figures 
and from non-German publications in this regard. 

But before doing so it is essential that we should refer 
once again to the Morocco affair in the light of what has 
transpired since. On February 29, 1912, I penned these 
concluding sentences to the Introduction of my book on 
Morocco : — 

"The Morocco problem is not settled. In one sense 
it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely 
on the horizon during the lifetime of the present 
generation." 

A year has passed since the contents of the above 
chapter appeared, and the interval has seen a continuance 
of the systematic effort to ascribe the "armed peace" of 
Europe solely to Germany's ambitions and to her 



68 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Emperor's Machiavellism. The following Notes may, 
therefore, be usefully added to what precedes. 

I. Europe's universal preparation for war. The 
famous Note to the Powers of August 24, 1898, which will 
always redound to the credit of the Tsar, is the clearest 
avowal of all Europe's folly. 

In proportion — the Imperial circular reads — as the armaments 
of each Power increase, so they less and less fulfil the objects which 
the Governments have set before themselves. Economic crises, due 
in great part to the system of armaments a outrance and the continual 
danger which lies in this accumulation of war-material, are trans- 
forming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden which 
the people have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears 
evident, then, that if this state of things continues, it will inevitably 
lead to the very cataclysm which it is desired to avert, and the horrors 
of which make every thinking being shudder in anticipation. 

But can a solitary human being, knowing anything at 
all of contemporary history, contend that Germany had 
been solely, or even prominently, responsible for the 
condition of affairs lamented by the Tsar in 1898? Which 
were the three Governments that had filled the world with 
the clamour of their disputes in the twenty odd years 
preceding the Tsar's circular, keeping all Europe on tenter- 
hooks and incurring chief responsibility for the enormous 
increase in armaments — the subject of the Imperial 
lamentations? They were the Governments of Britain, 
Russia, and France. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877; 
the acute Anglo-Russian friction arising therefrom in 1878; 
the bitter quarrels between those two Powers resulting from 
Russia's advance into Asia, culminating in the Pendjeh 
affair in 1885; the kidnapping of the Prince of Bulgaria 
by Russian agents in 1886; the Franco-Italian dispute over 
Tunis in 1881 ; Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt, in Siam, 
in West Africa, and on the Nile — these had been the chief 
contributory causes of the "armed peace" and world 
ferment which had converted Europe, even at that period, 
into an arsenal. It is a ridiculous and puerile distortion 
of history to pretend otherwise. As a matter of fact you 
will hardly pick up a volume of European history, or a 
treatise on Germany, written before the war by English 
authors, which does not fully recognise that the creation 
of modern Germany has been one of the most powerful 
factors making for peace in Europe. 

II. Did the Kaiser propose or oppose a European 
coalition against Britain at the time of the Boer war? 
Shortly after the contents of this Chapter had appeared in 
the Labour Leader, I received, in connection with my 



MILITARISM AND THE BEAST 69 

reference to this subject (supra) the following comments 
from a correspondent, who is one of the best informed 
authorities on foreign affairs in this country : — 

In March, 1914, the Novoe Vremya (the organ of the Pan- 
Slavist Party) published an interview with an anonymous Russian 
statesman (who was none other than Count Witte, Russia's famous 
Finance Minister) suggesting that, in the past, a Russo-German 
agreement could easily have been achieved on the basis of a partition 
of the Austrian Empire. The interview was, no doubt, intended as a 
kite, but the Pesther Lloyd (the official organ of the Austrian Govern- 
ment) replied in its issue of March 29, confirming the statement that 
such an agreement had been ventilated between Russia and Germany. 
It then said: "It is true that this coalition between Russia and 
Germany was to be directed against a third Power, but that Power 
was not Austria-Hungary, but England. The inspirer of the scheme 
was Count Lobanoff, the then Russian Foreign Minister, and Count 
Witte, then Minister of Finance, who both worked at the realisation 
of the plan. Prince Lobanoff was a convinced friend of the Dual 
Monarchy, and a passionate enemy of England, against whom it had 
been his life's object to get up a Continental coalition. . . The plan 
broke down against the opposition of Austro-Hungary and Germany, 
who did not want to take part in any action directed against England. 

My correspondent adds an equally interesting item of 
French testimony : — 

"We have also a reference from the French side in M. R^ne" Pinon's 
book, "France and Germany," published in 1913. M. Pinon says: 
'History will inquire how it was that, so short a time after 
Fashoda, Franco-Russian policy was not able to wrest some advan- 
tages from England's embarrassments, and in deciding upon neutrality 
did not succeed in getting a full price for its neutrality. It is 
possible that the explanation must be sought in the contradictions of 
German policy. If Germany had really wished for a rapprochement 
with France and Russia for an active collaboration outside Europe, 
she could have seized the tempting opportunity.' " 

Further light has now been thrown upon this matter 
in a speech delivered last autumn by General Botha. On 
September 3, 191 5, the Daily News published a cable from 
Johannesburg recording a speech by General Botha. No 
contradiction has since appeared so far as I know. The 
speech had reference to an alleged offer from Germany to 
recognise the independence of the ex-Boer republics if the 
South African rebellion proved successful; and General 
Botha's speech was, very naturally and properly, directed 
to an indignant denunciation of the alleged offer. 

But, with the apparent intention of lending further 
point to his denunciation, General Botha made a very 
remarkable statement, so remarkable indeed that the 
Daily News, in publishing the despatch, headed it, "An 
historic refusal of assistance." The essential passage in 
the statement was this : — 

(7,) 



7 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

"At the time of the South African War, other nations 
were prepared to assist the Boers, but they stipulated that 
Germany should do likewise. The Kaiser refused." 

Six weeks after the publication of this utterance, the 
Times, commenting editorially upon M. Delcasse's 
resignation, declared (October 14) that the latter : — 

"with the help of the Tsar, thrust aside German proposals 
for a Continental combination against us during the Boer 
War." 

Where lies the truth — with General Botha or the 
Times, with the Northcliffian Daily Mail in 1899 or with 
the Northcliffian Times in 1915? The day has gone by 
when any serious student of international politics can 
accept the obiter dictum of Printing House Square without 
the most ample reservations. It is otherwise with General 
Botha. No man living is in a better position to know the 
facts. Subject to authoritative contradiction, his state- 
ment stands. 



CHAPTER IX. 
The Morocco Intrigue 

In so grave an hour, so full of peril for all of us, for all our countries, 
I shall not indulge in an elaborate search after responsibilities. We 
have ours, and I claim before history that we (Jaures and the French 
Socialist Party) had foreseen them and announced them. When we 
said that to penetrate into Morocco by violence, by arms, was to 
inaugurate in Europe an era of ambitions, covetousness and conflicts, 
we were denounced as bad Frenchmen ; but it is we who were 
concerned for France. There, alas ! lies our national share of 
responsibility. It acquires precision if you recall that the Bosnian- 
Herzgovinian question is the occasion of the present struggle between 
Austria and Serbia, and that we Frenchmen were not entitled to 
utter, and were unable to utter, the least remonstrance when 
Austria annexed Bosnia-Herzgovina, because we were committed in 
Morocco, and because we desired that our own sin should be forgiven 
us by forgiving, on our part, the sins of others. And so our 
Foreign Minister said to Austria : "You can take Bosnia-Herzgovina, 
provided you let us take Morocco." We hawked our offers of 
penitence from capital to capital, from nation to nation. We said to 
Italy : "You can go to Tripoli, seeing that I am in Morocco. You 
can steal at one end of the street, seeing that I have stolen at the 
other end." — Jean Jaures, speaking at Vaise a fortnight before the 
outbreak of war and his own assassination. 

The clash between the Entente and the Central Empires was 
brought about by a series of steps, some great and some small. 
Some of those steps were taken by one side, some by the other. One 
of the longest steps towards war was taken by the British Govern- 
ment's action during the Agadir crisis, culminating in Mr. Lloyd 
George's diatribe at the Mansion House. — Hon. Bertrand Russell in 
"The Policy of the Entente, 1Q04-14." 

But this long series of duplicities and repudiated undertakings 
naturally embittered Germany against both France and England. 
It is enough to make one despair that humanity will ever evolve far 
enough to deserve — by honest use — its one supreme gift of reason, to 
see how blind animal passion still renders the majority incapable of 
even the elements of justice when considering any opponent's 
position. — Mr. Charles Hayward in "What Is Diplomacy?" 

THE quarrel which arose between Britain and 
Germany in 1905, and again more acutely in 191 1, 
over the affairs of Morocco, will be regarded by future 
generations as one of those episodes in a nation's history 
which leave indelible traces upon its destinies, forging 
links of inter-connected circumstances affecting a remote 

71 



72 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

posterity. By Britons the episode will be remembered in 
time to come with amazement, anger, and shame. 

To the British people, the importance of the episode 
was transcendental, and the persistent attempt by certain, 
not all, British historians and writers in the Press and 
magazines to pass on, even now, to future generations 
the utterly distorted narration of the facts which did duty 
in 191 1 and 1912, is a monstrous perversion of patriotism. 

For the Morocco quarrel marked a turning point in 
British history. It was Morocco which caused the 
initiation of those secret Franco-British naval and military 
"conversations" which, by imperceptible degrees, and 
without the knowledge of the Cabinet, let alone Parlia- 
ment and the nation, committed us to a course of policy 
which immensely increased the dangers of war in Europe, 
and made our participation therein practically inevitable. 1 

It was Morocco which gave a definitely hostile 
character to our relations with Germany. 

It was Morocco which gave the influences in Britain 
favouring a war with Germany their signal opportunity to 
inflame public sentiment against Germany — and to inflame 
it through the withholding of facts essential to knowledge. 

It was Morocco which, as Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has 
truly said, "slammed the doors in the face of the peace- 
makers in Europe." 2 

It was Morocco which inaugurated the veritable 
holocaust of Treaty obligations culminating in the 
invasion of Belgium. No doubt the long immunity 
enjoyed by Leopold II. in breaking the Congo Treaty 
set the first immoral example. But that was the 
case of an individual, and not of a European Government, 
defying the public law of Europe. 

It cannot be too often insisted upon that the violation 
of honourable bonds, which disgraced Europe in the 
decade before the war, and which is now ministering to 
Europe's destruction, began with the attempt of the 
Foreign Offices of France and England to set aside the 
public law of Europe in the matter of Morocco. The 
attempt achieved success by threatening the Power which 
protested with war. 

The violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria 
followed the violation of the Act of Algeciras, and, as in 
the former case, was successfully accomplished by the 

1 Vide Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV. 

2 Foreword to "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" : op. cit. 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 73 

same method. Austria's offence, morally blameworthy, 
was ethically venal by comparison ; for Austria had 
preceded her action by decades of administrative effort in 
the territories she wrongfully annexed, and she accom- 
panied her annexation by substantial monetary com- 
pensation to Turkey ; while all the Moors got were 
bullets. Tripoli followed Bosnia. In the Tripoli case 
the Treaties of Paris and Berlin were both violated. 
After Tripoli, Persia. Finally, Belgium. A veritable 
basketful! of scraps of paper. 



The story of the long Morocco intrigue cannot be fully 
grasped unless it is studied in detail. No summary can 
convey its full implications. The detailed story is given 
in my book. I shall only recall it here in outline. To 
make the story intelligible thus treated, it is necessary 
to indicate the international framework in which the 
intrigue was set up. 

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a number 
of events contributed to make Morocco an object of 
interest to four European Powers. These four Powers 
were Britain, France, Spain, and Germany. Spain, of 
course, had a very long historical connection with 
Morocco. The British interest was commercial and 
strategic. The British strategic interest was concerned 
in preventing any first-class Power from acquiring a footing 
on the Mediterranean coast-line of Morocco, thereby 
neutralising the commanding position of Gibraltar, and 
threatening the ascendancy which Great Britain enjoys 
through possession of the Rock. British policy did not 
aim at securing political rights in Morocco. The French 
interest was of a different character. It was purely 
Imperialistic. The ambitions of the French Imperialists 
in the early part of the period we are discussing were only 
nascent. But they were unmistakable, and from the 
Imperial point of view comprehensible, French 
Imperialism coveted Tunisia on the east and Morocco on 
the West of Algeria, in order to form a great North 
African Empire under the French flag. Spain's interest 
was sentimental. Germany's interest was wholly 
economic. Germany's industrial development was 
beginning. German explorers had visited several parts of 
interior Morocco and seen in it a rich field for trade and 
industrial enterprise. 



74 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

In 1880 these four Powers, and other Powers indirectly 
interested, came to the conclusion that an International 
Conference ought to be convened in the general interest 
of Europe's relations with this semi-barbarous African 
State. The Conference was held at Madrid. The 
Sultan's representatives took part in it and, with their 
concurrence, various resolutions were adopted. The most 
important was that all nations should in future enjoy 
equality of commercial treatment in Morocco — the "most 
favoured nation" clause having been until that moment 
enjoyed by Britain alone. 

During the next two decades — 1880 to 1900 — the 
policy of the four interested Powers preserved the 
character described above. An attempt by Lord 
Salisbury to induce the Moorish Government to bring 
about some much needed reforms met with failure, owing 
to the local opposition of the French official representa- 
tives, supported from Paris. The representatives of the 
German Government, on the other hand, supported the 
British mission. The dream of a French North African 
Empire had, in part, materialised. French control had 
been established in Tunis at the price of a bitter quarrel 
with Italy, which almost led to war, and did lead to Italy 
joining the Teutonic combination — thus was born the 
Triple Alliance. 1 Having absorbed Tunis, French 
Imperialism was busily engaged in seeking for pretexts 
to interfere with Morocco, and a long coterminous frontier 
with Algeria, passing through wild and desert country, 
gave many openings for diplomatic and military inter- 
vention. Germany^ was developing her trade with 
Morocco. Her Consul at Fez had succeeded in negotiat- 
ing a commercial Treaty with the Sultan, and a Moorish 
embassy had been received at Berlin. The German 
Government refused to ratify the Treaty until the 
signatory powers to the Madrid Conference had been 
consulted and had signified their assent thereto. 

The opening years of the new century saw the birth 
of the intrigue. 

■o • 

French foreign policy was then in the hands of M. 
Delcass6 — ambitious, impulsive, a very stormy petrel of 
international politics, violently Anglophobe one moment 
and Germanophobe the next. His personality has been one 

1 Crispi's Memoirs can be usefully consulted in this connection. 
("The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi" : Hodder and Stoughton). 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 75 

of the most disturbing influences in Europe. M. Delcasse 
sought to clear the approaches to Morocco from two 
directions. He made a bargain with Italy, and sought to 
make one with Spain. Baulked of Tunis, Italian 
Imperialism looked towards Tripoli, and was assured that 
France would not oppose an eventual Italian occupation 
of Tripoli, if Italy placed no obstacle in the path of 
France in Morocco. To Spain M. Delcass6 turned with a 
proposal for a Franco-Spanish partition of Morocco. 
The negotiations dragged on for a considerable time, and 
were on the eve of conclusion when, apparently, the 
British Foreign Office heard of them. The upshot was 
that the Spanish Government refused to ratify. 

Meantime, events were pointing to a new re-shuffling 
in the eternal game of beggar-my-neighbour, which 
diplomatists call the "Balance of Power." The prolonged 
friction between Britain and France was to make way for 
accommodation, only to be replaced by an even deadlier 
friction between Britain and Germany. 

In 1904 the British and French Governments agreed 
to compose their differences all over the globe. Not one 
of their differences was worth the bones of a single British 
or French soldier, or the tears of a single British or 
French widow. But one or the other of them had 
repeatedly brought both nations to the very brink of war 
— twice in connection with West Africa, once about Nilotic 
swamps, once over Siam, while the Egyptian squabble was 
of long standing, and the dispute about Newfoundland 
codfish was a hardy perennial. When, therefore, the 
average Englishman and the average Frenchman heard 
that their Governments had at last acquired a modicum of 
common sense, they were genuinely delighted. And the 
simple soul, if cast in a British mould, took rapidly 
enough to the new doctrine, which bade him believe that 
the Frenchman might become a reformed character with- 
out being "rolled in blood and mud." And the simple 
soul, if located in a French frame, was equally pleased to 
think that the perfidiousness of Albion had been over- 
rated. 

Simple souls both. For under cover of an amicable 
settlement the seeds of the mightiest war of all time were 
beingf sown. 



By one of the several published arrangements, the 
French Government agreed to leave us alone in Egypt. 



76 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

In return for this concession the British Government 
recognised that France, owing to the proximity of 
Algeria to Morocco, had special interests in the latter 
country. The reference to Morocco was ambiguously 
worded except in one particular. . Both Governments 
declared they had no intention of altering the "political 
status" of that country. 

That was "diplomacy." 

Shortly afterwards the French and Spanish Govern- 
ments issued a joint Declaration, asserting that they 
remained "firmly attached" to the • integrity and inde- 
pendence of Morocco. 

That, too, was "diplomacy." 



Secret articles were attached to the Anglo-French 
agreement, and a secret convention was attached to the 
Franco-Spanish "Declaration." 

These provided, in effect, for the realisation of the 
ambitions of M. Delcasse and the French Imperialists. 
At last Morocco was within their grasp. France and 
Spain were to divide Morocco between them. One import- 
ant proviso was, however, insisted upon by the British 
Government, in accordance with its traditional strategic 
policy, already described. France was to be excluded from 
the Mediterranean coast-line, which was to fall to Spain. 
This was a fly in the ointment from the French 
Imperialistic point of view, and accounted, no doubt, for 
the fact that M. Delcasse concealed the secret clauses even 
from some of his Cabinet colleagues. Throughout the 
years that followed, French public opinion allowed itself to 
be dragged along by the French Imperialists in the belief 
that France was securing, not "a mutilated Morocco," 
as was later to be realised, but the whole of Morocco. And 
that is not the least of the deceptions practised upon the 
French people by its Foreign Office, with the connivance 
of the British Foreign Office. 

Apart from the territorial rights they had so calmly 
attributed to themselves, the French and Spanish Govern- 
ments had also arranged to share the economic spoils of 
Morocco between them. As Spain had no money, this 
side of the arrangement virtually gave France a lien over 
every enterprise connected with the economic development 
of the country. 

This dishonest triangular robbery at the expense of a 
weak native State, and at the expense of the rest of the 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 77 

world, was, of course, concealed from the Parliaments and 
peoples of Britain, France, and Spain. Spain, indeed, 
was a decoy duck. 

But there was Germany to reckon with. 



The German Government had at first declared that it 
saw nothing inimical to German interests in the Anglo- 
French published agreement. This statement was made 
a few days after the publication of the latter, and six 
months before the completion of its complement, the 
secret convention between France and Spain. When the 
Franco-Spanish "Declaration" was published, Germany, 
already resenting M. Delcasse^s breach of diplomatic 
etiquette in not officially notifying the Anglo-French 
published agreement, saw in this further announcement 
what appeared to be a studied intention to shut her out 
altogether from a say in Moroccan affairs, to which her 
position as a participant of the Madrid Conference, and 
her interests in the country, entitled her. She began to 
suspect the character of the deal. Suspicion changed to 
certainty when Parisian indiscretions hinted at the exist- 
ence of "secret articles" and at Britain's knowledge of 
them; and when M. Delcasse suddenly pitched a veritable 
cargo of reforms at the head of the Sultan, and peremp- 
torily demanded immediate compliance. Thereupon 
the German Government decided to make it clear that 
Germany had no intention of being excluded from the 
field. The Kaiser went to Tangier, and in a speech to 
the Sultan's deputation declared that he looked upon the 
Sultan as an entirely independent Sovereign. At the same 
time the Sultan, doubtless at Germany's suggestion, 
issued a Note to all the signatory Powers of the Madrid 
Convention, suggesting - a further international Confer- 
ence upon the affairs of his country and Europe's connec- 
tion therewith. This the German Government promptly 
accepted. 

The attitude of the German Government was legally 
unassailable. Its argument, as officially put forward, 
may -be paraphrased thus : "The future of Morocco is an 
international matter, not a Franco-British matter. France 
and Britain have come to an agreement amongst them- 
selves about Morocco. But this does not dispose of the 
question so far as we are concerned. Under cover of that 
agreement France is making demands upon the Sultan, 
and making- them in a tone which amounts to the assertion 



7 8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

of a mandate to interfere permanently with the govern- 
ment of Morocco. Such a mandate she can receive only 
from the signatory Powers of the Madrid Convention. 
We have given her no such mandate. Our interests in 
Morocco are important and growing. But even if they 
were not we could not allow ourselves to be elbowed 
roughly out of the way in this fashion. We have a right 
to be consulted about Morocco, and we do not intend to 
be jockeyed out of this right simply because it has suited 
England and France in their own interests to make a deal 
about a country which, in point of fact, belongs to neither 
of them." The man in the street may say : " Why did 
not the German Government avow that it knew all about 
the secret arrangements and denounce them at the bar of 
European public opinion?" The reason is not far to seek. 
Governments do not act in that way. They cannot. Such 
action on the part of the German Government would have 
meant an open breach with France and England, and if 
France and England had declared themselves prepared to 
stand by what they had done, Germany would have had to 
choose between war and an ignominous retreat, although 
she was morally and legally in the right. The first lesson 
of diplomacy is that you must never speak the truth. You 
must proceed by subterfuge. You must pretend you do 
not know, when you know all the time. You must profess 
to believe that the other party is playing straight, and that 
the only difference between you and him is a matter of 
interpretation, whereas you are well aware that he has 
tricked you; so you trick him into believing you do not 
know you have been tricked. All this is of the essence of 
" diplomacy." 



So once again the British people and the French 
people were deceived. The German Government's action 
was denounced by the inspired organs of the British and 
French Foreign Offices as grossly provocative and 
designed to test the solidity of the Anglo-French entente. 
The Times easily out-Heroded Herod. Its personal 
attacks upon the Emperor were particularly violent. 
After refusing to go to the Conference, the British and 
French Governments finally consented. Indeed the 
French Government, having got rid of M. Delcass£, was 
anxious to smooth things over as far as it could. The 
Conference met at Algeciras. It was protracted and 
stormy. In the end it drew up a plan of reforms, con- 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 79 

ferred certain strictly limited police powers upon France 
and Spain, provided for the international capitalisation of 
certain European enterprises in Morocco, and affirmed 
once more the integrity and independence of the Sultan. 



Here was Sir E. Grey's chance. He was not respon- 
sible for the secret arrangements. The Algeciras Act 
might, and should, have inaugurated an entirely new 
chapter. Sir E. Grey could have said to France : 
"The Act of Algeciras makes the secret treaties null and 
void. But you have got a footing. If you play your cards 
tactfully with Germany, she will recognise your Pro- 
tectorate in course of time. Our diplomacy will help you. 
But if you rush matters and proceed as though the 
Algeciras Act did not exist, we shall not support you. It 
is an International Act, which lays down that the Sultan 
of Morocco is independent, and that the integrity of his 
country must be respected. Our signature is at the foot 
of that Act, and we cannot in honour help you to break it. 
But go slowly, carry the Germans with you, and we will do 
our best to make your path an easy one." It would not 
have been a strictly moral course — towards Morocco — 
but it would have been at least infinitely better than the 
course actually adopted. 

Instead, the British Foreign Office chose to regard the 
Algeciras Act as a diplomatic defeat, and plunged deeper 
into the morass. While the Conference was actually being 
held, or immediately after, Sir E. Grey was approached by 
the French Ambassador in London, and consented to the 
initiation of those secret military and naval "conversa- 
tions," which were to have so fatal a sequel. 1 



The result of the intrigue up to this point (1906) had 
been as follows : — 

The British people had been committed, without 
knowing it, to diplomatic support of the secret ambitions 
of the French Foreign Office, in other words to a potential 
French Protectorate over Morocco. 

They were supporting, without knowing it, a dishonest 
Treaty which said one thing and meant another. 

They were committed to supporting the quarrel of their 
Government with Germany, but, owing to essential facts 
being withheld from them, their support was based upon 

1 Vide Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV. 



8o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

a complete misunderstanding and misapprehension of the 
German case. 

Diplomatic support of France was in process of being 
converted, without their knowing it, into a potential 
material support — i.e., the British people were in the 
process of being committed to war with Germany on behalf 
of France. 

Incidentally it may be recalled that five years were to 
pass before the British people became first acquainted — in 
the columns of a couple of Parisian newspapers — with the 
existence of the secret Morocco arrangements, and eight 
years were to pass before they learned that, arising out 
of those secret agreements, they were morally pledged to 
support France in a European war." 



The five years which followed Algeciras witnessed the 
intrigue following the course of its logical development; 
the original lie gathering around in a maze of other lies; 
the secret commitments dragging the country nearer and 
nearer to the abyss; unavowed and unavowable liabilities 
paralyzing our diplomatic action, rendering abortive any 
attempt to straighten out Anglo-German relations, 
deflecting our national policy into all sorts of unnatural 
channels, and poisoning the diplomatic wells of Europe. 

The French Imperialists treated the Algeciras Act like 
waste paper. They proceeded systematically to conquer 
and absorb Morocco, by direct military action and piece- 
meal occupation, by fomenting internal discord, and by 
financial combinations which strangled the revenues of the 
Moorish Government. Every step they took was 
applauded, and every criticism thereon in Germany was 
denounced, by the officially-inspired British Press. Of 
their culminating action, the march upon Fez, Sir E. Grey 
hastened to express his official approval in Parliament. 
During the whole course of these proceedings the French 
Chamber, profoundly uneasy at the turn events were 
taking, registered again and again the determination of 
France to uphold the Algeciras Act. But in the then 
condition of France, with short-lived Cabinet succeeding 
short-lived Cabinet, at intervals of six months or less, and 
with the militarists and Imperialists steadily working to 
the desired end, the Chamber was powerless to stay the 
progress of events, or put on the brake. 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 81 

The German Government was resentful, but embar- 
rassed. It sought steadily to avoid a rupture, and appeared 
to aim at producing a state of affairs, through successful 
bargaining with France in other directions, which would 
have enabled it to prepare the way for acquiescing in a 
French Protectorate, provided the French Government 
would allow it to save its own face with its own public 
opinion and to placate its own Imperialists. This the 
French Government, owing in part to perpetual changes in 
the personnel of Ministers, was either unwilling or unable 
to do. The running comments of a neutral. diplomatist 
present as true a general picture of what was passing in 
Berlin during these years as we are ever likely to get, 
although the specific efforts to reach an accommodation are 
discussed in detail in my book. The following extracts 
are from the despatches of the Belgian Minister at Berlin, 
Baron Greindl : — 

May 6, 1908. — " The most interesting feature of the 
White Book I had the honour of enclosing in my yesterday's 
report is the forebearance with which the German 
Government pretends to ignore the flagrant contradiction 
between the uniformly correct declarations of the French 
Government, and the conquest of Morocco which France 
is carrying on, on the strength of a so-called European 
mandate which no one has given her, and professing to be 
swept along by circumstances which she calls fortuitous, 
but which, in point of fact, she has carefully provoked. . . 
Germany tolerates. She cannot do otherwise. The time 
for diplomatic negotiations has gone by. She can only 
choose between pretending not to see, and war, which the 
Emperor will not have, and which would be condemned by 
German public opinion. 

April 20, 191 1. — "I do not think there is the least 
desire here to play an active part in the Morocco affair. 
Any illusions must have disappeared long ago, if they were 
ever entertained, as to the value of the Act of Algeciras, 
which France signed with the firm intention of never 
observing. But the policy of standing aside does not 
solely depend upon the Imperial Government. It must be 
helped from outside. It is perfectly true that public 
opinion is uneasy. . . The Imperial Government has been 
criticised for its undue toleration towards France in the 

matter of Morocco If the French Government 

really desires to avoid the chance of a conflict, it is that 
Government's turn to manage affairs with sufficient 



82 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

prudence and pretended moderation ; not to force Germany 
to abandon her inaction. 

May 1,1911. — " The anxiety of German public opinion 
is real . . . the Imperial Government has long been 
criticised for shutting its eyes to France's failure to observe 
the Act of Algeciras. . . . What is the significance of 
the semi-official warning conveyed to Paris? Does the 
present Foreign Secretary, who is much more energetic 
than his predecessor, mean to convey that he is not pre- 
pared to tolerate any further French encroachments ? . . . 
Despite the tendency of the semi-official article, the position 
remains a very delicate one. A mistake may force Germany 
to take action. Much, too, depends upon the Press. Some 
French newspapers show much too openly that it is 
intended to make Morocco another Tunisia. The attitude 
of the German papers is, generally speaking, very reserved ; 
but those inspired by the Pan-Germanists put forward 
notions which are most embarrassing to the Imperial 
policy." 

When the intention to occupy Fez was being openly 
discussed by the French Press, the same Belgian diplo- 
matist, and also his colleague in London, the Count de 
Lalaing, wrote expressing their fear that if that event 
should take place, Germany would be compelled to 
intervene, as the violation of the Algeciras Act would then 
be too flagrant and open, to be ignored. 

Baron Greindl writes under date of May 10, 191 1 : — 

"France began by making arrangements with 
England and Spain in 1904 without taking the trouble 
to consult, or even to advise, the other interested Powers. 
Until Germany objected it was openly stated that Morocco 
would become another Tunis. Alongside the public 
arrangement, France signed a secret Treaty with Spain (a 
secret very badly kept) for the partition of Morocco. The 
Act of Algeciras wrought no change in French projects. 
It only compelled France to carry them out more slowly, 
step by step, instead of in a single stride, like the Bardo 
Treaty was extorted from the Bey of Tunis. Since then the 
progressive invasion of Morocco has been methodically 
pursued. ... I remain persuaded that Germany desires 
to avoid entangling herself irremediably in this Moroccan 
affair. But I must repeat what I wrote in my report of 
May 1, that the situation is a delicate one. Indeed it is 
becoming so more and more. If the Imperial Government 
is to justify its inaction in the eyes of German public 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 83 

opinion, it is essential that the French Government should 
not compel the German Government to abandon that 
line. 

June 17, 191 1. — "The Imperial Government maintains, 
therefore, its original standpoint. It is playing the part of 
mere spectator, reserving its liberty of action in the event 
of the essential clauses of the Act of Algeciras, i.e., the 
sovereignty of the Sultan, and the integrity of Morocco 
ceasing to exist owing to French action. There remains 
nothing of either. When will Germany think it advisable 
to say so, and what use will she make of her recovered 
liberty ? I am persuaded that her chief desire is to avoid a 
war which Morocco is not worth, and which France can 
spare Europe by putting into the conquest of Morocco the 
dose of hypocrisy which is necessary in order that public 
opinion in Germany shall not become excited. Everyone 
does not share my opinion ; some of my colleagues are 
astonished at the forbearance of Germany." 



When it became clear that the French army, after 
"relieving" Fez, had no intention of departing therefrom, 
Germany sent a gunboat to Agadir to intimate that she was 
at the end of her patience, and that the Morocco question 
should not be settled without her. Her action, morally 
significant, was materially insignificant. The Panther only 
carried a complement of 125 men. Moreover, Germany's 
action had been preceded by a much more vigorous 
demonstration on the part of Spain, whose Government 
took umbrage at what it deemed the high-handed action 
of the French. Thinking Spain was to be deprived of its 
advantages under the secret convention, the Spanish 
Government sent a large body of troops to occupy the areas 
allotted to Spain under the Treaty. When the little German 
gunboat anchored off Agadir, there were 100,000 French 
and Spanish troops in Morocco, France was in actual 
military occupation of a considerable proportion of the 
country, the authority of the Sultan's Government had 
entirely disappeared, and the Act of Algeciras existed — 
as a memory. 



What followed has passed into history and left an 
indelible mark upon it. Sir E. Grey's attitude was more 
French than the French, more "royalist than the King." 
He professed to see in Germany's action a menace to 



8 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

British interests and, mirabile dictu, a "reopening" of 
the Morocco question ! What the Foreign Office saw in 
Germany's action, of course, was a challenge to the secret 
arrangement with France, now coming to fruition despite 
the Algeciras Act. Sir E. Grey insisted that the British 
Government must be a party to the Franco-German 
negotiations. However, negotiations began between the 
two Governments without the British Government 
becoming a party to them. The Times fulminated 
daily. Suddenly, in the midst of the negotiations, on July 
20, The Times, whose editorials and Paris despatches had 
been characterised by almost incredible violence, announced 
that Germany was making outrageous " demands " upon 
France. It specified those alleged " demands." It 
declared that no British Government would tolerate them, 
even if a French Government were found feeble enough to 
do so ! It pressed for the despatch of warships to Agadir. 
The next day Sir E. Grey sent for the German Ambassador. 
He adopted The Times' tone and The Times' "facts," and 
he hinted that it might be necessary to take steps to protect 
British interests. The German Ambassador angrily pro- 
tested. The same evening Mr. Lloyd George was put up 
by the Foreign Office to make a speech at the Mansion 
House. It virtually amounted to a threat of war, should 
Germany press her "demands." In its editorial next 
morning The Times hailed Mr. Lloyd George as a sort of 
national saviour, emphasised in insulting language the 
significance of the speech, and compared Germany to Dick 
Turpin. Public opinion in all three countries reached fever- 
heat and for a few days war seemed imminent. 

It was avoided by the pacific elements in the French 
Government, headed by M. Caillaux, the French Premier, 
who played much the same part in the crisis as M. Rouvier, 
the then French Premier, played in the 1905 crisis; by the 
German Emperor and by the pacific elements in the German 
Government. Rumour has it that Lord Morley took a 
vigorous line on behalf of peace at British Cabinet Councils. 
Both the German and French Governments encouraged 
and, indeed, invited the Socialists and the Social Demo- 
crats respectively to organise immense peace demonstra- 
tions in Paris and Berlin. 

Meantime the Franco-German negotiations continued 
and reached a solution in November. Germany recognized 
a French Protectorate over Morocco, but bound down 
France to observe the open-door for trade and capital 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 85 

investments in Morocco; received a portion of French 
equatorial Africa and ceded a small section of German 
equatorial Africa by way of exchange. 

The whole story of the intrigue was subsequently 
dragged into the light in a series of debates which took 
place in the French Chamber, and in the Senate. The 
secret treaties were denounced in scathing terms, and the 
duplicity of the policy followed was condemned by some 
of France's most distinguished public men. 

In the course of the debate it transpired that negotia- 
tions covering a wide field of Franco-German colonial 
interests in Africa, had been proceeding for several 
months between the two Governments before the march 
upon Fez. They had not reached a conclusion owing in 
large measure to the constant changes of Cabinet in 
France. It transpired that when the French occupied 
Fez, the German Government had given the French 
Government the clearest warning that it could no longer 
remain passive in view of what Germany regarded as 
the culminating destruction of the Algeciras Act ; and 
had there and then intimated its willingness to treat on 
the basis of a German recognition of a French Pro- 
tectorate, provided that Germany received compensation 
elsewhere, even as Britain, Spain, and Italy had received 
compensation. The French Foreign Minister's state- 
ment to the Chamber completely disposed of the notion 
— which was the basis of all the British Press attacks 
upon Germany, and which even to-day is still repeated 
with astounding ignorance or wilful perversion — that the 
German Government, in sending a gunboat of 1,000 tons 
and 125 men to the most God-forsaken part of the 
Atlantic coastline of Morocco, intended to seize a portion 
of the country itself. 

The French Foreign Minister was equally categorical 
as to the character of the so-called "demands" upon 
France, as reported in The Times of July 20, and so 
precipitately endorsed by Sir E. Grey. There were never 
"demands" in the sense suggested by The Times, and 
the statement of that paper that the "demands" included 
the reversion to Germany of France's right of pre- 
emption over the Belgian Congo was a fabrication. 

In short, the French Foreign Minister's revelations 
disposed of the whole structure erected by Sir E. Grey in 
the House of Commons in November, when justifying his 



86 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

attitude in July. They also disposed of the malevolent 
charges of The Times. Unfortunately, these revelations 
came one month too late to affect the debate in the House 
of Commons. The French Yellow Book, issued at a 
much later stage, showed that the famous Times' 
despatch could only have been based upon a distorted 
account of a confidential conversation which had taken 
place between the German Foreign Secretary and the 
French Ambassador. 



The effect in Germany and in France of the line of action 
pursued by our Foreign Office, and of Mr. Lloyd George's 
speech, was disastrous from the point of view of the 
preservation of European peace. It strengthened the 
hands of the French Imperialists and Jingoes and, 
generally, of all the influences in France belonging to the 
revanche school. It convinced even the most pacific 
German Social Democrats, in the words of Mr. Ramsay 
Macdonald, 1 that "Germany was the victim of an evil 
conspiracy, and that our friendship was merely feigned." 
Upon the German Jingoes it acted like champagne. Upon 
the German governing classes, and upon the German 
Emperor, it had a profound effect, as is admitted in the 
French Yellow Book on the War without its compilers 
realising, apparently, all the significance of their 
admission. If it be true, as the French Yellow Book 
asserts, that from thence onwards the German Emperor 
became convinced that war was inevitable, how many 
of those who accept that view have ever paused to inquire 
into the circumstances which brought about the con- 
viction ? 

It is impossible to doubt, especially when we bear 
in mind the menacing aspect the near Eastern problem 
was then assuming, 2 that from this moment the military 
party in Germany acquired enormous strength, and that 
the military point of view was given additional weight 
in the councils of the Empire. Nor can one affect 
surprise that it should have been so. 

For what was the paramount lesson to be learned 
from this episode? It was that Great Britain was 
prepared to go all lengths in support of France on an 
issue in which French diplomacy — as honourable French- 
men recognised and deplored — had behaved dishonestly ; 
dishonestly to the French people and dishonestly to 

1 Foreword to "Teri Years of Secret Diplomacy" : of. cit, 

2 Vide Chapter XV. 



THE MOROCCO INTRIGUE 87 

Europe ; and had trampled upon an international agree- 
ment in order to secure its own ends. 



German feelings after Agadir can be more readily under- 
stood when we observe the impression which British 
diplomacy, and the utterances of the most powerful 
section of the British Press, made upon the minds of 
neutral diplomatists in the various capitals of Europe. 
We may regard their impressions as ill-founded. We 
cannot disregard the fact that they did form those 
impressions. 

In a despatch, dated Berlin, September 23, 1905, 
Baron Greindl refers to the "astounding efforts made by 
the British Press to prevent a peaceful settlement of the 
Morocco affair. ..." He argues therefrom that British 
public opinion is "prepared to welcome any combination 
Hostile to Germany." 

In a long despatch dated October 24, 1905, M. Leghait, 
the Belgian Minister in Paris, discusses the European 
situation, and that of France in particular, in grave terms. 
He expresses the belief that Britain desires "to avoid a 
conflict," but doubts whether "her selfish aspirations are 
not leading us towards one." Reporting on July 14, 
1906, M. E. van Grootven, Belgian charg£ d'affaires in 
London, states : — 

"Latterly the Foreign Secretary has repeated on 
several occasions to the various ambassadors accredited 
to London, that Great Britain is bound to France in 
regard to Morocco, and that she will fulfil her engage- 
ments to the end, even in the event of a Franco-German 
war, and at whatever cost." 

From Baron Greindl, April 5, 1906 : ; — 

"The British Press did all that it could to prevent the 
Algeciras conference from coming to a head. It has 
shown itself more uncompromising than the French news- 
papers, and has ceaselessly propagated alleged plans of 
German aggression which have never existed. It does 
not seem that the British Ambassador at Algeciras made 
the slightest effort to find a solution which should con- 
ciliate the views of Germany with those of France. It 
was, of course, anticipated that England would uphold 
French policy ; but her engagements in no way prevented 
her from playing the part of moderator." 

From the Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in 
London, June 23, 1906, in reference to the efforts of Lord 



88 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Avebury and others to improve Anglo-German relations : 
"The real effect is virtually nil. The siege of public 
opinion has been carried out. The British Press has so 
overdone the attacks upon the Emperor, his Government, 
and his people that the public remains suspicious." 

Reporting from Paris, on February 10, 1907, M. 
Leghait speaks of his fear that Germany may risk all : 
"to free herself from the grip in which British policy is 
squeezing her." M. Cartier, charge d'affaires, writing 
from London under date of March 28, 1907, talks in 
almost identical language of "British diplomacy, whose 
entire resources tend towards the isolation of Germany. ' ' 

The allusions to the evil consequences of British Press 
attacks upon Germany are numerous in subsequent 
despatches. Writing from London on May 24, 1907, 
the Count de Lalaing particularly censures the Northcliffe 
Press. He accuses it of "warping the spirit of a whole 
people." He adds: — 

"It is evident that official England is secretly pursuing 
a hostile policy which aims at the isolation of Germany 
. . . but there is an obvious danger in thus openly 
embittering public opinion as the aforesaid irresponsible 
Press is doing." 

Baron Greindl, reporting from Berlin on May 30, 1907, 
pays a glowing tribute to the efforts of Sir Frank Lascelles 
(then British Ambassador in Berlin, afterwards playing 
a leading part as Chairman of the Anglo-German Friend- 
ship Society to promote good feeling between the two 
countries) to improve relations, but is sceptical of the 
result. 

It is exasperating and melancholy to read in despatch 
after despatch, year after year, the same conviction 
animating the entire Belgian diplomatic corps as to the 
character of British diplomacy. If the view were confined 
to the Belgian Embassy in Berlin, one could put it down 
to pro-German prejudice. But exactly the same 
impression is seen to prevail at the Belgian Embassies in 
Paris and in London. If these Belgian diplomatists 
were hopelessly wrong in their estimates, then how hope- 
lessly incompetent must our diplomacy have been to 
produce the impression they formed of it. The cumulative 
significance of their judgment cannot be gleaned from 
mere extracts. Extracts do not heighten the adverse 
judgment. They minimise its comprehensiveness. Yet 



THE MORCCO INTRIGUE 89 

in the event of a European war, the Belgians had 
obviously most to fear from Germany. 

Passing to the events of 191 1, we find Baron 
Guillaume, Belgian Minister in Paris, writing on April 29 
of that year, remarking in connection with the confusion 
reigning in many French Government departments over 
Moroccan affairs : — 

"England, which thrust France into the Moroccan 
morass, contemplates her work with satisfaction." 

The Count de Lalaing, writing from London on May 
9, 191 1, thinks, on the other hand, that official quarters 
in England are becoming anxious lest France should 
commit some imprudence which would give Germany 
a pretext for intervention. He refers to the frequent 
visits of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office. 
Reporting on May 22, he testifies to the excellent 
impression made by the visit of the German Emperor and 
Empress, who went about in homely fashion without any 
fuss or pomp. It was short-lived. 

We come to the occupation of Fez, the despatch of 
numerous Spanish troops to Morocco, and the arrival of 
the Panther at Agadir. A despatch from Baron Guillaume, 
dated Paris, July 8, 191 1, serves to explain the attacks 
of the British officially inspired Press upon M. Caillaux, 
the French Premier. After describing the chaos in 
French official circles and explaining that recourse had 
been had to British advice, he says : — 

"I have reason to believe that M. Caillaux has, perhaps 
reached the point of regretting the insistence placed upon 
this step, and the attitude taken up by the British Cabinet. 
There will be much less chance of reaching an under- 
standing with Germany if England takes part in the 
discussion, and I feel confident M. Caillaux and M. de 
Selves 1 regret the complexion which was given to the 
Morocco affair by their predecessors. They were ready 
to retreat if they could do so without humiliation." 

The Count de Lalaing, writing from London under 
date of July 24, calls particular attention to the famous 
article in The Times of July 20, and to Mr. Lloyd George's 
speech. Baron Guillaume sums up the situation as it 
appeared to him from Paris on July 28. He thinks that 
France is against a final rupture. He expresses great 
confidence in the pacific sentiments of the German 

1 French Foreign Minister. 



9 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Emperor, "notwithstanding the rather frequent exuberance 
of some of his actions." He adds : — 

"I feel, speaking generally, less faith in the peaceful 
desires of Great Britain, who does not dislike to see other 
parties devour one another. But in these circumstances 
it would be difficult — I will say impossible — not to inter- 
vene tnanu militari. . . As I thought from the first day, 
the key of the situation is in London. It is only there 
that it can assume gravity." 



The crisis over, the peril escaped, British sentiment 
underwent a notable change. One gathered the 
impression, even in circles to which Cabinet opinion was 
accessible, that in many quarters, and although the full 
facts were not then known, the idea was current that the 
Foreign Office had not been very wisely directed. The 
Haldane mission was doubtless the outcome of this feeling. 
On both sides of the North Sea disinterested and dis- 
tinguished men put out great efforts to heal the breach. 

Why these various efforts failed, and were bound to 
fail, is told in Chapters XXXIII. and XXXIV. 



CHAPTER X. 
European Militarism, 1905-1914 1 

The German Army is vital, not merely to the existence of the 
German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation 
itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which 
possesses armies about as powerful as her own. We forget that, 
while we insist upon a 60 per cent, superiority (so far as our naval 
strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee the 
integrity of our own shores — Germany herself has nothing like that 
superiority over France alone, and she has, of course, in addition to 
reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany has nothing 
which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, therefore, 
become alarmed by recent events, and is spending huge sums of 
money on the expansion of her military resources. — Mr. Lloyd 
George in the "Daily Chronicle," January 1, 19x4. 

IT has been shown that, according to Lord Haldane and 
the French Yellow Book, the German Emperor had 
consistently worked to preserve the peace of Europe until 
within the last three or four years (or, possibly, as Lord 
Haldane opines, the last two), when, according to Lord 
Haldane, his opposition to war "gradually weakened." 
It has been further shown that this official British and 
French testimony to the pacific efforts of the German 
Emperor, coupled with the theory universally held here 
that the national policy of Germany is directed by and 
incarnated in the person of the Emperor, indicates that, 
until three or four years ago, official Germany was pacific. 
The deduction to be drawn from these officially 
promulgated premises is that official Germany's pacific 
policy coincided with the period during which Germany's 
rulers considered Germany's position in Europe to be 
nationally secure, and that the alleged abandonment of 
that policy coincided with the period during which 
Germany's rulers considered that Germany's position in 
Europe was no longer nationally secure. The only 
conclusion possible from these premises is that if, as 
alleged, Germany's official policy ceased to be inspired 
with pacific intentions during the past three or four years, 
the cause thereof was not a desire to "subjugate" Europe 
1 The Labour Leader, April 29, 1915. 
91 



92 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

— which would have been attempted when Germany's 
proportionate strength was greatest — but was inspired by 
fear, fear of being "subjugated." 

I now wish to quote certain figures which, I am inclined 
to think, will support the conclusions above indicated, and 
will throw a curious light upon Sir Edward Grey's 
statement the other day to the effect that : "We now 
know that the German Government had prepared for war 
as only people who plan can prepare." 1 

It will, I suppose, be universally conceded that military 
expenditure is a fair test of military preparedness. The 
postulate we are asked to accept — nay, that we are told 
we have accepted — is that the Teutonic Powers, Germany 
especially, of course, have been preparing and planning 
for a great war against the other European "group," 
to which, under the senseless system of Statecraft shared 
in and praised on numerous occasions by our own 
diplomacy, Europe has been divided. Very well. Let us 
test that statement by the amount of money the Powers 
concerned have spent upon their armies. The issue is a 
square one. 

TABLE I. 

Military Expenditure in the Decade 1905-14. 

Austro- 
Hungary. Germany. France. Russia. 

£ £ £ £ 

234,668,407 448,025,543 347,348,259 495,144,622 

It will be observed that, in the period named, military 
preparedness has been expressed by the Teutonic Powers 
in an expenditure of ^682,693,950, and by France and 
Russia in an expenditure of ^842,492,881. In other 
words, France and Russia in combination have, during the 
past ten years, spent ^159,798,931 more than Austria and 
Germany in preparing for war. 

These figures give furiously to think as they stand. 
But if we sectionalise them and present them in two 
quinquennial periods, i.e., if we show what the military 
expenditure of these four Powers was in the period 1905-9, 
and in the period 1910-14 respectively, the significance of 
these figures will be enhanced. This I will now proceed 
to do. 

1 March 22, 1915. 



EUROPEAN MILITARISM, 1905-1914. 93 

TABLE II. 
Military Expenditure in the Period 1905-9. 

£ 

Austro-Hungary 105,962,783 

Germany 195,647,224 

Total ^301,610,007 

France 150,530,462 

Russia 215,485,152 

Total ^366,015,614 

Military Expenditure in the Period 1910-14. 

Austro-Hungary 128,705,624 

Germany 252,378,319 

Total £381 ,083,943 

France 196,817,797 

Russia 279,659,470 



Total ^476,477,267 

It will be remarked that the first period, 1905-9 — during 
which British and French official authorities declare that 
official Germany's policy was pacific — the military 
expenditure of France and Russia was already considerably 
in excess of that of Germany and her Austrian ally. But 
not so considerable, apparently — other factors being taken 
into consideration — as to cause the rulers of Germany 
serious uneasiness. During the second period, however, 
that excess progressively increased from ^64,405,607, its 
amount at the close of the first period, to ^95,393,3 2 4- 
Put otherwise, France and Russia have spent during the 
past five years ^95,393,324 more than the Teutonic 
Powers in preparing for war, which works out at an 
average of excess just under ^20,000,000 per annum, not 
far short of the entire cost of our own army. During this 
latter period it was that Germany's rulers became really 
alarmed. With what justification we shall perceive when 
we examine the figures in detail. 

In 1908 Russia's military expenditure made a 
tremendous leap forward, rising from ^40,913,653 to 
^'45,227,850, and the same phenomenon was observable 
the next year, when another five million pounds was added, 
the total for 1909 amounting to ^50,416,915. In 1909-10 
the German figures, which had risen from ^37,122,582 in 



94 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

1906-7 to ^42, 719,612 in 1908-9, fell to ^40, 604,764. But 
Russia's rose again that year to ^51, 140,034, despite the 
huge increase in the two former years, and France added, 
for her part, another two and a half million pounds. Next 
year (1910-11) Germany's figures showed another slight 
decrease (^40, 347,037), but Russia maintained and slightly 
exceeded the previous year's (^51,349,332), while France 
added a further two million and a half pounds. The 
position which had been reached in 1912, the year 
preceding Germany's immense increase, when, according 
to Lord Haldane, the German Emperor's opposition to 
war "weakened," was this : Russia and France in 
combination were devoting in that single year ^89,259,671 
to military preparations, while Germany and Austria were 
spending ^67,254,555. In other words, the process of 
yearly increase maintained by the first two named Powers 
had attained such proportions that, in a single year, Russia 
and France were spending ^22,000,000 more than 
Germany and Austria. 

Then it was that fear gripped the vitals of the rulers 
of Germany, and at a single bound the German estimates 
went up from ^42,389,775 to ^"68,434,262. 1 The estimates 
of the four Powers for the catastrophic year of 19 14 stood 
as follows : — 

TABLE IV. 
Military Expenditure in 191 4. 

Austro-Hungary and Germany ^92,865,354 

Russia and France ;£i 14,270,338 

These figures tell their own tale. They reduce to 
absolute absurdity the legend of a Germany arming to the 
teeth in order to overawe her innocent and peaceable 
neighbours. 

Let us, then, summarise the conclusions to be derived 
from these researches. First, what is the premise we are 
asked to accept and upon which we are asked to base our 
whole intellectual approach ? It is that Germany has been 
the sole responsible author of this war, which was under- 
taken by her rulers to "subjugate Europe." And, further, 
that the truth of the premise is to be sought in Germany's 
preparations for war, which preparations were on such a 
scale and of such a character as to furnish unmistakable 
evidence that her rulers deliberately planned and plotted 

1 A very large proportion of this expenditure was ear-marked for 
fortifications, especially in Silesia, evidence of the fear of Russian 
aggression and of the desire to guard against it. 



EUROPEAN MILITARISM, 1905-1914. 95 

this war and launched it upon Europe when, in their 
opinion, the psychological moment had arrived. To 
express any doubt as to the accuracy of the premise is to 
be a "pro-German." But surely we have the right to 
examine the accuracy of the premise ? We are not children 
incapable of reasoning powers. Are we not entitled to 
look into matters for ourselves? What is one test which 
any of us can apply, without any special knowledge or any 
special training, provided we give ourselves the trouble? 
Obviously one of the very first ways of testing the premise 
we are invited to accept is to make an investigation into 
the national expenditure upon armaments — i.e., to say 
upon preparations for war — of Germany and her ally on 
the one part and their potential foes, Russia and France, 
on the other. Well, what do we find as a result of this 
examination ? We find this : — 

Military Expenditure of the Teutonic Powers and of 

the Franco-Russian Combination respectively. 

From 1905 to 1909. 

The Teutonic Powers ^"301,610,007 

The Franco-Russian Combination ... £366,015,614 
From 1910 to 1914. 

The Teutonic Powers .£381,083,943 

The Franco-Russian Combination ... £476,477,267 

Excess of War-Preparation-Expenditure by the 

Franco-Russian Combination over the Teutonic 

Powers in the Decade 1905-14, 

£ 1 59,79&,93i- 

I close this article by recalling that Germany's 

fears, for which these figures supply an eloquent 

explanation, have been understood and, what is more, 

freely and publicly acknowledged, by leading British 

statesmen in the course of the past decade. Here, for 

instance, is another extract from a speech by Mr. Lloyd 

George, delivered at the Queen's Hall on July 28, 1908 : — 

"Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to 

her what our navy is to us — her sole defence against 

invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She 

may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than 

Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers 

who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater 

number of troops than she has. Don't forget that when 

you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and 



96 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

understandings and some sort of mysterious workings 
which appear in the Press, and hints in the Times and 
Daily Mail. . . . Here is Germany, in the middle of 
Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with 
a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose 
we had here a possible combination which would lay us 
open to invasion — suppose Germany and France, or 
Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets 
which, in combination, would be stronger than ours, would 
not we be frightened ? Would we not arm ? Of course we 
should." 

The year 1909 — six months after Mr. Lloyd George's 
speech — opened with France and Russia voting 
^82,411,963 for their combined armies against Germany's 
and Austria's ^54,562,094. But Germany, it seems, is 
the only Power which has been preparing for war, and in 
so comprehensive a manner that her intention to 
"subjugate Europe" is now clearly apparent! And yet, 
according to Lord Haldane and the French Yellow Book, 
official Germany was working for peace in 1909, although 
her potential foes were devoting sums enormously larger 
than she was upon military preparations. 1 

1 In connection with the figures given above, I desire to express 
my indebtedness to Mr. Carl Heath, Secretary of the National Peace 
Council. The figures are extracted from the Budgets of the respec- 
tive Powers, and they can be checked from the International Peace 
Year Book for 1915, published by the National Peace Council. In 
the case of the Austro-Hungarian returns, a sum of eight millions 
sterling has been added for each year under review, to cover the 
expenses of Austria's and of Hungary's "National defence" troops, 
the accounts of which are rendered separately from the expenditure 
upon the Monarchy's "Common Army," i.e., first line troops. 

It has been suggested to me that the Italian figures ought to be 
added to the German and Austrian. I disagree. It would be as 
logical to add the British figures to the French and Russian. As 
already stated, the raison d'itre of Italy's accession to the Teutonic 
Powers disappeared years ago, while in Balkan affairs the antagonism 
of interests between Austria and Italy had been steadily growing. 
But even if the Italian figures were thrown into the scale — 
^141,518,105 in the decade 1905-14 — the expenditure of the Teutonic 
Powers plus that of Italy, would still show a slightly smaller total 
than that of the Franco-Russian combination, which total would, of 
course, be swelled were the British figures to be added to it. Italy's 
intervention on Austria's behalf in any Balkan dispute had of late 
years become unthinkable, as unthinkable as her participation 
in a war against Great Britain. The main point to bear in mind, 
however, is not that the Franco-Russian combination spent enor- 
mously larger sums on military preparations than did the Teutonic 
Powers in the decade preceding the war ; but, in view of that fact, 
the palpable absurdity of the attempt to saddle Germany with a 
responsibility which was collective. 



CHAPTER XL 

Germany's position before the War 
judged by Frenchmen 1 

We who live behind the rampart of the sea know but little (save 
in times of panic) of the fear that besets a State which has no 
natural frontiers. ... Germany accomplished a wonderful work 
in unifying her people (or, rather, Bismarck and his compeers did 
it for her) ; but, even so, she has not escaped from the disadvantages 
of her situation ; by land she is easily assailable on three sides. 
. . — The Political History of Germany. By J. Holland Rose. 
"Germany in the Nineteenth Century." (University Press, Man- 
chester, 1915.) 

For Germany, the presence of France on one frontier and Russia 
on the other creates a crisis that is constant and unchanging. — The 
naval and military situation of the British Isles. By "An Islander" 
(London : John Murray, 1913). 

CONVINCING proof has now been given of the 
absurdity of attributing to Germany the desire of 
"subjugating Europe" in the face of a military expenditure 
by Germany's potential foes in Europe, i.e., the Russo- 
French combination, during the past ten years exceeding 
hers and her ally, Austria, by more than ;£ 150,000,000 
sterling. Mr. Lloyd George's speeches show that six 
years ago, when the proportionate excess of military 
expenditure by Germany's potential foes was not so large 
as it afterwards became, the British Government was fully 
alive to the vulnerability of Germany's position and of 
Germany's fears; and that her largely increased 
expenditure in recent years was natural. I now propose 
to deal with some French testimony on that point. 

One need not refer to any post-bellum statements by 
German public men to appreciate how substantial and how 
well founded was the element of fear — fear for the national 
safety, which has weighed upon the rulers of Germany 
with increasing intensity for the last few years. Surely 
we, who until last year had never crossed swords with the 
German race, cannot fail to be impressed by the testimony 
of military writers belonging to a nation which only forty- 

1 The Labour Leader, May 13, 1915. 

07 



98 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

five years ago was engaged in a life and death struggle 
with Germany, when we find such writers freely admitting 
the perilous position in which Germany stood before the 
war? If they could be honest enough to admit the fact 
immediately before the war, surely it is puerile for us to 
pretend to ignore it now that the war has come ? 

One of the most popular military writers in France is 
Colonel Arthur Boucher. His three books — "France 
Victorious in the War of To-Morrow, " "The Offensive 
Against Germany," and "Germany in Peril," ran to many 
editions. The last was published early last year. Observe 
its title, "Germany in Peril" (" L' ' Allemagne en Peril"). 
Colonel Boucher is imbued with all the military spirit of 
his race. But he is no blind fanatic. He is a generous 
foe. He thinks that Germany should have restored 
Alsace-Lorraine to France. That, in a French officer, is 
natural enough. He looks forward to war with Germany 
on that account; but on that account alone. He is not 
anxious for war in itself. One gathers that he would 
infinitely prefer the "restoration" of Alsace-Lorraine 
without a war. He would like to shake hands with 
Germany and to see Germany entering a Franco-Russian 
alliance. 

"Forming a group so strong that no country, no 
coalition, could think of struggling against it, they (the 
three Powers) could forbid war throughout the world." 

He deems it "monstrous" that the three nations should 
be thinking of war instead of peace. Incidentally, he pays 
the German Emperor a warm tribute as a peacemaker, 
which may be read in conjunction with Lord Haldane's 
declaration and with the contents of the French Yellow 
Book referred to in the last chapter. 

"The German Emperor has given positive proof within 
recent years of his desire to maintain peace. If a number 
of his subjects push for war, a still more considerable 
number bless him as the Sovereign of Peace." 1 

As the title of his book indicates, Colonel Boucher was 
fully alive — as a Frenchman — to Germany's peril, and 

1 Vide also this pasage in Marcel Sembat (op. cit.) : — 

"Conditions are sometimes stronger than the wills of men and 
even of Emperors. Do not let us neglect, that is my advice, that 
precious element of peace, the Imperial will. If the Emperor 
William had been differently inspired, we should have had wrr 
already, and — let us be just — he has allowed some fine opportunities 
of laying us out to go by. If, instead of making a speech at 
Tangier, he had made war, where should we have been? 



GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 99 

the conclusions of his book are wholly directed to telling 
the Germans how foolish they are to retain Alsace- 
Lorraine, and how their obstinacy — as he puts it — in 
doing so is their principal source of danger, seeing that 
France : — 

"is unalterably determined to wrest the people of those 
provinces from the yoke of their invaders and to see the 
French flag floating once more from the summit of their 
public buildings." 

Here are some notable passages from the book : — 

"Germany is threatened to-day on all her frontiers, and 
finds herself in such a position that she can only ensure 
her future and face all her foes by seeking first of all to 
eliminate us from their number by concentrating, from the 
beginning, all her forces against us." 

So much for the "wanton aggression" upon France. 
One can imagine the contempt with which French military 
men must read the diatribes in our "patriotic" newspapers. 

"To be in a position to resist attacks which menace her 
on all sides Germany is compelled to develop her military 
powers to the supreme degree. ... It was to guard 
against the Russian danger that Germany made her 
(Military) law of 1913." 

The latter avowal is particularly noteworthy in view of 
the successful attempt to represent to the British public 
the German military increases of that year as purely 
provocative. But I shall have more to say on that score 
when I come to examine the Russian preparations in 
1912-14. 

Of course, so long as Germany will not give up Alsace 
and Lorraine, our French military authority is well content 
that France should take the utmost advantage of 
Germany's "Russian peril." 

"Thus, we see, when the time comes, and it may come 
soon, when Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism, 
the friendship of Russia can serve us if we are fully 
decided to fulfil all our duties towards her. Germany does 
not doubt that France, remaining immutably attached to 
her treaties, would support her ally with all her strength, 
choosing, however, the most favourable moment for 
intervention/' 

Precisely. Colonel Boucher continues : — 

"If Russia attacks Germany, France becomes mistress 
of the situation. It will be sufficient for France to draw 
her sword at the opportune moment to make it impossible 



ioo TRUTH AND THE WAR 

for Germany to defend the provinces she took from us." 
Indeed, Colonel Boucher is all for a French military 
offensive in the event of a Russo-German war. He argues 
that the French soldier is always at his best in attacking. 
He thinks it bad strategy to wait for the adversary to attack 
you; and his second book, "The Offensive Against 
Germany," is devoted to discussing the ways and means 
of a resolute French military offensive upon the outbreak 
of the war. In this respect he is in full agreement with 
Lieut. -Colonel Grouard, who, in his "The Ultimate War" 
(published in 1913), envisaging a Franco-German war as 
the result of the Franco-Russian alliance, strongly pleads 
lor a French offensive upon the outbreak of war : — 

"In these circumstances the defensive would no longer 
be imposed upon us; on the contrary, we should profit by 
our numerical superiority 1 and take the offensive as rapidly 
as possible." 

Why do our statesmen and "patriotic" newspapers 
persist in holding us up to the world as hypocrites, by 
reiterating that Germany's offensive against France was 
"wanton"? Do tney imagine that such an attitude 
deceives anyone — outside Britain? 

The last quotation from Boucher's book which I will 
give is this : — 

"From whatever aspect Germany's position is studied 
it will be realised that her future is of the darkest, and that 
she has placed herself in the most perilous situation. Now 
of all the factors which contribute towards compromising 
the destinies of this great Power, the chief factor is 
certainly the hostility of France. To what might Germany 
not aspire if she were assured merely of our neutrality ? 

In the French Ambassador's despatch recording the 
alleged conversation between the Kaiser, the King of the 
Belgians, and General Von Moltke, the French 
Ambassador reports — at second hand, of course — that 
"William II. has been brought to think that war with 
France is inevitable, and that it will have to come to it 
one day or other." During the conversation the Emperor 
is described as having "appeared over-wrought and 
irritable." The frank and outspoken writing of our 
French military author would seem to indicate other 
considerations than a desire to "subjugate Europe" for 
this reported attitude of the Emperor's ! Germany could 
have peace — but only by an act which no one but an 
1 I.e., in the immediate theatre of hostilities. 



GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 101 

impulsive Frenchman could imagine to be possible. 
Otherwise, war — France using Russia for her ends as 
Russia was using France; the two lambs on one side, the 
ravening wolf on the other ! Directly Russia was prepared 
to "make an end of Germanism" the French armies would 
be in readiness to fall upon Germany's flank "at the most 
opportune moment." For that moment military and 
Chauvinist France had been longing for forty years — and 
preparing. As Lieut. -Colonel Grouard puts it : — 

"In no army has greater work been accomplished 
during the last thirty years than in the French army. Both 
as regards the improvement of our armament and in 
studying the best conditions for its usage, daily and 
incessant progress has been made in every branch of the 
military art." 

That is true, and if the degree of general efficiency has 
been less than in Germany, it has been due, not to lack 
of interest or inferior capacity for hard work among 
French officers, but to the differences of the national 
temperament; to the superior capacity of German 
organisation, and to the corruption and intrigues of French 
political life and their reaction upon the army, which were 
so startlingly exemplified in the Dreyfus case. 

Colonel Boucher's testimony is, of course, especially 
significant because it is the testimony of a soldier who, 
writing in the very year of the war, tells us with complete 
frankness, first that Germany's position in Europe is one 
of the utmost danger; secondly, that unless Germany will 
restore Alsace-Lorraine to France, France is fully deter- 
mined to assist Russia to the uttermost in "making an 
end of Germanism." What adds to the interest of Colonel 
Boucher's writings is the honesty with which he recognises 
the efforts made by the German Emperor to preserve peace 
and the obvious reluctance with which he himself 
contemplates a further war with Germany. 

A pendant to Colonel Boucher's book is Marcel 
Sembat's. I call it a pendant for this reason — illogical, 
I admit — that the two writers are at the poles in political 
thought and everything else. Sembat's book (it appeared 
in 1 91 3, I believe, and my copy bears the imprint, "twelfth 
edition") is a striking illustration of the best side of the 
French character (that strange medley of contradictions, 
immortalised by de Toqueville), civic courage. No 
Englishman, in similar circumstances, would have dared 
to talk to his countrymen with such directness as did 

(9) 



102 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Sembat to his about Alsace-Lorraine. Instead of tearing 
him to pieces, they read his book. However, what I 
particularly wish to bring - out in connection with Sembat's 
volume is the further light it throws upon the position of 
Germany just before the war, and upon German 
psychology. It is extraordinary that one should be driven 
to bring to the notice of British readers the sanity of a 
distinguished Frenchman in order to counteract the 
insanity of the British newspaper talk of the present day. 
For the nonce Sembat imagines himself a German, and 
thus describes his sentiments : — 

"I experience the sensation of a full national existence 
only since the victory of 1870 and the unity of the Empire. 
Since then I count for something in the universe, and I 
am sheltered. For nothing in the world, you understand ; 
at no price, will I allow my unity to be touched. Directly 
I am told that German unity is threatened I rise, ready to 
sacrifice everything. Am I a Socialist, a Catholic, a 
Liberal, a Conservative, I am there if anyone threatens 
German unity." 

Sembat goes on to show how real in the German mind 
had become the Russian menace. 

"The German obsession of Russia does not correspond 
at all with the hostility, born of their defeat, which many 
Frenchmen entertain for Germany. It originates from 
bitterness of yesterday, and anxiety for to-morrow. . . . 
The German has grown up under the overshadowing threat 
of a formidable avalanche suspended over his head; an 
avalanche always ready to become detached, to roll down 
upon him ; an avalanche of immense savagery, of barbarous 
and brutal multitudes threatening to cover his soil, to 
swallow up his civilisation and his society." 

Sembat remarks that the Russian of his imagination is 
the Russian of Tolstoy, Gorki, Turguenieff; not the 
autocratic Russia commanding its legions of Asiatic 
hordes. But, he adds : — 

"If I fail to understand the Russia which haunts 
Germany I shall be incapable of understanding the effect 
which the Russo-French alliance produces upon the mind 
of the Germans." 

And he drives home the distinction in its practical 
aspects : — 

"And, after all, does not the Tsar possess within his 
dominions all the barbarians of Turkestan and Central 
Asia ? Conquered ? What nonsense ! The day when 



GERMANY'S POSITION BEFORE THE WAR 103 

European Russians, too Liberal-minded or too Socialistic, 
cause the Tsar inconvenience, will he hesitate to lead 
against them his sotnias of Cossacks and Turkomans? 
That day, it will be Asia, the barbarous Orient, which will 
be at the doors of Europe and on the threshold of Germany. 
The Franco-Russian Alliance, and the Triple Entente, 
appear, therefore, to the German as a compact between 
two civilised peoples and barbarism." 

Then Sembat goes on to show how the anxiety of the 
German people with regard to Russia is increasing, how it 
is even outpacing official German anxiety; and, with great 
courage, to show how the contradictory attitude of France 
must increase that anxiety. 

In 1908 Lloyd George, in effect, asked his countrymen 
— those same countrymen who are now told to believe that 
Germany is the sole responsible author of this war, under- 
taken by her "to subjugate Europe," and that the surest 
proof of it is to be sought in her great military 
preparations : — 

"Can't you understand how reasonable are Germany's 
fears? If you were placed as Germany is placed, with 
Russia on one side and France on the other, her enemies in 
the event of a European war, would not you arm, would 
not you build?" 

And he answered his question himself. 
"Of course you would." 

Now, looking back at the record of the past ten years 
we find that Germany armed, and armed heavily, but that 
the Russo-French combination spent 159 million pounds 
sterling more upon its armies than Germany and her ally 
upon theirs' ; and we find French authors of repute, writing 
on the very eve of the war, fully acknowledging, from their 
respective points of view, the naturalness of Germany's 
fears and the dangers of her position. 

We have now cleared the ground for a further 
examination of the causes of Germany's anxiety in regard 
to the "Russian menace," which will lead us to glance at 
the naval expenditure of the Teutonic Powers and of the 
Russo-French combination. 

Meantime, let me reiterate once more that my object 
is to assist in destroying the legend that Germany was 
the sole responsible author of this war, undertaken by 
her to "subjugate Europe." And that my object in 
assisting to destroy this legend is concern, not for the 
Prussian Junker, but for the future interests of the British 
people. 



CHAPTER XII. 
Secret Diplomacy 1 

When a small number of statesmen, conducting the intercourse of 
nations in secrecy, have to confess their inability to preserve good 
relations, it is not an extravagant proposal to suggest that their 
isolated action should be supplemented and reinforced by the 
intelligent and well-informed assistance of the peoples themselves. — 
Arthur Ponsonby, in "Democracy and Diplomacy" (Methuen and 
Co., igi6). 

Wars are made by Governments acting under the influence of 
the governmental theory. And of this fact .... no better example 
could be given than the present war. Before it broke out nobody 
outside governmental and journalistic circles was expecting it. 
Nobody desired it. And though, now that it is being waged, all the 
nations concerned are passionately interested in it, and all believe 
themselves to be fighting in a righteous cause, yet no ordinary 
citizens in the days preceding the outbreak would have maintained 
that there was any good reason for war, and few even knew what 
the reasons alleged were or might have been. Even now the nations 
have quite opposite views as to which Government was responsible. 
We believe it was the German Government ; and with equal convic- 
tion, Germans believe it was the British. But nobody believes it 
was the mass of the people in any nation. The nations who are 
carrying on the war, at the cost of incalculable suffering, would 
never have made it if the decision had rested with them. That is 
the one indisputable fact. How can such a fact occur? How is^ it 
possible for Governments to drag into war peoples who did not desire 
war and who have no quarrel with one another? The immediate 
answer is simple enough. In no country is there any effective con- 
trol by the peoples over foreign policy. That is clear in the case of 
the great military Empires. But it is true also of France and of 
England, where in other respects Government is more or less under 
popular control. The country has no real choice, for it only gets its 
information after the decisive action has been taken. — Mr. G. Lowes 
Dickinson in "The War and the Way Out" (1914). 

I sometimes ask myself whether in the future it will not be 
necessary and, indeed, if it would not be a good thing, that the 
Foreign Secretary should take the House of Commons in the first 
instance, and his countrymen at large in the second, much more 
into his confidence than he has done in the past. We have passed 
in recent years through European crises, the full gravity of which 
was not realised by our people, if realised at all, until after they 
had passed into history. I ask myself, can you conduct democratic 
Government on these principles? — Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 
February 8, 1014. 

1 Speech delivered at Devonshire House, Bishopsgate, May 14, 
104 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 105 

It seems contrary to the fundamental principles of a Parlia- 
mentary Constitution that a nation should be bound by obligations, 
upon the policy or impolicy of which its representatives have had 
no power of pronouncing an opinion, since they have been kept 
in absolute ignorance of their existence. — Lord Courtney of Penwith, 
in "The Working Constitution of the United Kingdom and its 
Outgrowth." (igoi.) 

I am disposed to deny entirely that there can be any treaty for 
which adequate reasons cannot be given to the English people, which 
the English people ought to make. A great deal of the reticence of 
diplomacy had, I think history shows, much better be spoken out. — 
Walter Bagehot, in "The English Constitution." (1872.) 

"Everyone may remark what a hope animates the eyes of any 
circle, when it is reported, or even confidentially asserted, that Sir 
Robert Peel has in his mind privately resolved to go, one day, into 
that stable of King Augeas which appals human hearts, so rich 
is it, high-piled with the droppings of two hundred years ; and, 
Hercules-like, to load a thousand night wagons with it, and turn 
running water into it, and swash and shovel at it, and never 
leave it till the antique pavement and real basis of the matter show 
itself clean again ! . . . To clean out the dead pedantries, 
unveracities, indolent somnolent impotencies, and accumulated dung- 
mountains there, is the beginning of all practical good whatsoever. 
. . . Political reform, if this be not reformed, is naught and a 
mere mockery. . . . Nay, there are men now current in political 
society, men of weight, though also of wit, who have been heard 
to say, 'That there was but one reform for the Foreign Office — to 
set a live coal under it,' and with, of course, a fire brigade which 
could prevent the undue spread of the devouring element into 
neighbouring houses, let that reform it ! In such odour is the 
Foreign Office, too, if it were not that the public, oppressed and 
nearly stifled with a mere infinitude of bad odours, neglects this 
one — in fact, being able nearly always to avoid the street where 
it is, escapes this one, and (except as a passing curse once in 
the quarter or so) as good as forgets the existence of it." — Carlyle 
on the Foreign Office. — "Latter-Day Pamphlets." (1850.) 

WAR is anarchy, and armed peace is anarchy. And 
the true anarchists of our time are not the crazy 
individuals who imagine they can reform society by 
removing the figureheads that strut across its stage. They 
are the so-called statesmen and leaders of the nations who, 
for decades past in every land, have directed man's 
increasing ingenuity in arts and crafts, his inventive genius 
and his triumph over the forces of nature — to preparations 
for his own destruction; who have filled the world with 
the clamour of their insensate boasting whenever some 
new and still more formidable development in the art of 
killing has been perfected in their respective countries; 
who, while prating of their love of peace, have bidden their 
misguided and unhappy peoples to conspire for the more 
efficient slaughter of their neighbours by land and sea, 
beneath the sea and from the skies above; and who appear, 



106 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

even now, incapable of perceiving that if they make not 
haste by a collective effort to arrest and control the 
elements they have unchained, they risk dragging- down 
the civilised world about their ears and of being themselves 
overwhelmed in the ruins. 

We thrill when w T e read of the deeds of patient heroism 
of our men at the front. But we believe, with an intensity 
of conviction that nothing can shake, that they were not 
created to be slain and mutilated in the flower of their 
youth. We do not rejoice with easy and vicarious pride 
as we see them pouring down that valley of misery and 
abomination. We long with an immensity of longing to 
remove them from it. Meanwhile, we labour to ensure 
that the settlement, when it does come, of this war shall 
be of such a kind, and that changes of such a character 
in the official intercourse between Governments shall follow 
this war as will prevent the next and succeeding 
generations from being swallowed up in the abyss of 
desolation which has been dug for the present generation 
by the systems to which the peoples have so long been 
fettered. 

Now there are two main avenues along which we can 
advance for the attainment of the end we have in view. 
It is essential that both should be used simultaneously, 
and that every track which leads into them should be used 
also. For there is no royal road to anv reform. 

These two main avenues I may call the subjective and 
objective : the one — if I may express myself thus 
crudely — approachable through internal consciousness, the 
other through the consideration of external factors. Upon 
some of us will fall naturally the task of attempting to 
create something like a thought-revolution on the subject 
of war; of attempting- to infuse the spiritual forces in our 
midst with constructive strength for the deliverance of 
mankind from the forces of destruction; of attempting to 
inculcate the truth that if war does and can call forth noble 
sentiments — as every cataclysm in human affairs is bound 
to do — it is a false philosophy which teaches that those 
noble sentiments can only be called forth by w r ar, and it is 
a mental confusion which can even momentarily regard the 
calling forth of such sentiments as compensation for the 
odious barbarity of war itself, or for the hypocrisy, the 
lying and falsification, the disappearance of all sense of 
fairness, generosity, and perspective, the almost incredible 
ethical degradation and the moral and spiritual collapse 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 107 

which accompany a state of war. Upon some of us, I say, 
will fall naturally that task — the task of appealing to the 
subjective sense in man. And to none more than the 
Friends who — as a body — in the midst of the universal 
debdcle, keep the light of the spirit burning brightly, and 
keep alive within us the Divine figure, that but for them, 
almost, would be totally eclipsed by the pagan deity which 
casts its sinister shadow over Christian altars in every 
belligerent land. 

Upon others will devolve the task of endeavouring to 
concentrate men's minds on those positive factors in the 
life of States — constitutional, organic, economic — which 
constitute the propelling causes of war : with a view to 
their reform or removal. Amongst those causes none is 
more potent, none more elusive, none more difficult to 
present in such form as will carry comprehension of its 
subtle dangers than secret diplomacy. 

Men at all times have been the patient slaves of words 
and phrases. The word "diplomacy" conjures up some- 
thing mysterious, a sort of official holy of holies, of which 
the ordinary mortal must speak with bated breath. 

And yet all that diplomacy really means, in its practical 
application, is the way in which the particular department 
of Government entrusted with the duty of conducting the 
official relations of the State with other States does its 
work. 

The affairs of a nation, like the affairs of a commercial 
undertaking, are committed to various departments to look 
after. In the case of a nation one department of 
Government pays the national bills — I fear with alacrity if 
it be question of an increase in armaments, with reluctance 
if it be question of improving the housing accommodation 
of the working classes. That by the way. Another deals 
with local administration, another with education, and so 
on. Just so the Foreign Department is charged with the 
regulation of the nation's official intercourse with other 
nations. Pardon my being so elementary, but, indeed, it 
is through slurring over this simple fact that a plain issue 
comes to wear an aspect of mystery and complication. 

In discussing "diplomacy" we must begin by grasping 
the simple fact that what w r e are really discussing is not 
an abtruse science, a complicated chess gambit, a Chinese 
puzzle, or a problem of higher mathematics — although the 
diplomats would like us to think that it is all this rolled 



io8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

into one — but the methods and systems of work of the 
Foreign Department of this nation and of other nations. 

Now, while the management of the Foreign Depart- 
ments of other nations is necessarily interesting and 
important to us, I submit that the management of our own 
is infinitely more interesting and more important to us. 
Our primary interest and our primary duty is, therefore, 
to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with the manner 
in which our own Foreign Department is carried on, what 
its composition is, what powers it possesses or has 
usurped, what facilities we have for checking and 
controlling it. 

The Foreign Department of this nation consists of a 
Foreign Secretary, who is a member of the Government 
of the day — elected on purely domestic issues. His 
responsibility is covered by the principle of Cabinet 
solidarity, a principle for which there is a good deal to be 
said for and against. The Foreign Secretary is assisted 
by forty first-class clerks in the Foreign Office and by 120 
representatives abroad, consisting of ambassadors, 
ministers, councillors, first, second, and third secretaries 
and attaches. Of these 161 gentlemen perhaps twelve at 
the outside are in a position to exercise a decisive influence 
upon the Department's actions. They are the Foreign 
Secretary, the Under-Secretaries at the Foreign Office, and 
the Ambassadors. We may say, therefore, that the 
Foreign Department of this country is managed, and the 
foreign relations of this nation are conducted, in all 
essential respects by twelve gentlemen. 

The next point to consider is this : By whom is the 
work of this Department regulated and directed? By 
Parliament and the nation ? In theory : yes. In practice : 
no. Does the nation collaborate in the Department's 
work and control its decisions? In practice : not at all. 
Has the nation any means of estimating the mental 
processes and material facts by which the decisions of the 
Department are arrived at? The nation has not. Can the 
nation ascertain as a regular course or at a given moment 
what the Department is doing, what action it is contem- 
plating, or has adopted, on any particular problem affecting 
national interest? Not unless the Department is willing 
to impart the information — and it is usually unwilling. Is 
the nation consulted upon the arrangements which the 
Department concludes with foreign States? No. Is 
Parliament enabled to examine and debate the treaties, 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 109 

conventions, or understandings which the Department has 
negotiated with foreign Powers before the Government is 
committed to their adoption ? No. Can the Department 
commit the nation to treaties, conventions, and under- 
standings with foreign States, involving the potential use 
of the armed forces of the Crown, without informing the 
nation, through Parliament, that it has done so? Yes, 
the Department can and does. 

Now consider what this means. The work of the 
Foreign Department affects the nation more vitally than 
does the work of the whole of the other departments of 
the State put together. The Department's proceedings 
determine the extent of, and the expenditure upon, the 
armed forces of the Crown. If the Foreign Department 
has committed the nation, without its knowledge, in 
liabilities towards foreign Powers, and if the extent of, 
and the expenditure upon, the armed forces of the Crown 
do not keep pace with the character of the obligations 
thus incurred, the nation may suddenly find itself con- 
fronted with a position which may lead to irremediable 
disaster. 

The issue with which the Foreign Department deals, 
in the ultimate resort, is the issue of peace and war; and 
the issue of peace and war is the issue of national life and 
death. There is not a home in this country, there is not 
a family, there is not an individual, man, woman, or child, 
whose interests, whose life, whose future are not intimately 
concerned with the character and conduct of our official 
relations with foreign States — i.e., with the conduct of 
our Foreign Department. The evolution of our social 
problems, the improvement in the conditions of masses 
of our population — these things may be arrested and 
jeopardised for years by war, and war or peace are largely 
determined by the conduct of our own Foreign Depart- 
ment. And it is not only the interests of the present 
generation which are at stake; the future of our children 
and of our children's children may be profoundly affected 
by the peculiarities, temperamental and otherwise, the 
outlook, the mode of thought influencing the positive 
actions of the dozen gentlemen who control the Foreign 
Department. 

And yet, by some mental aberration, by some vice of 
national slackness and looseness of thought, this nation, 
which imagines itself to be living under a democratic 
constitution, has allowed its Foreign Department to 



no TRUTH AND THE WAR 

become, in effect, an autocratic institution conducting its 
operations in silence and in secrecy behind the back of the 
nation, and utterly contemptuous of public opinion (except 
when public opinion is too strong for it), which it moulds 
into a condition of receptivity to its decisions through the 
columns of an inspired and, I fear, largely unscrupulous 
popular Press. Moreover, it is a singular fact — to which 
I venture to draw your special attention — that the last 
decade, which has witnessed so remarkable a democratic 
advance in this country, has also witnessed a notable 
accentuation of autocracy in the management of our 
Foreign Department. 

Many factors have contributed to bring about this state 
of affairs. On the pretext of removing the functions and 
the conduct of the Foreign Department from Party contro- 
versy, anything in the nature of real Parliamentary 
discussion on foreign affairs — of such debates on foreign 
policy as characterised the days of our fathers and grand- 
fathers — has virtually disappeared. The hollowness of the 
pretext is apparent directly you test it. First, because 
foreign policy has not, in point of fact, been an issue in 
our elections for many years past; secondly, because such 
rare discussions and criticism of foreign policy as has been 
heard in the House since the present Government took 
office has come either from members of its own party or 
from members of the parties associated with its fortunes; 
thirdly, because the Government in meeting those 
criticisms has been invariably able to rely upon the 
uncritical support of the Opposition. The withdrawal of 
the issues of our foreign policy from so-called party contro- 
versy has, therefore, come to be something quite different 
from what it professes to be. It has come to mean the 
suppression of Parliamentary discussion of any kind, and 
the country has been kept more than ever in the dark as 
to the conduct of its Foreign Department. I doubt if at 
any period in the last one hundred years the country has 
been kept so much in the dark as during the last ten. 

The natural result has been a decay of the sense of 
Parliamentary responsibility for, and Parliamentary 
interest in, foreign policy, and this has had its counterpart 
in the country. In the course of the last ten years 
Parliament has been moved to real and fruitful activity 
only on one particular problem of foreign policy — and that 
entirely because pressure upon individual members of 
Parliament from their constituencies was such that it broke 



SECRET DIPLOMACY in 

down all obstacles and let in a rush of healthy democratic 
air, not only into the lobbies, but even into the musty, 
stuffy atmosphere of Downing Street. On that particular 
problem the nation became fully informed by agencies 
operating outside the official world, and the nation resolved 
that the known and publicly contracted treaty obligations 
of this country should be adhered to, and that a great 
wrong, for the existence of which we were partly 
responsible, should be set right. The nation determined 
that Parliament should discuss the Congo question, and in 
eight years there were seventeen debates upon it in Parlia- 
ment, more time being devoted to that one question than 
to any other single problem of foreign policy for fifty years. 
There is a moral in that episode which we may do well not 
to lose sight of in the work which lies before us in the 
future. There is one other factor which testifies to the 
utterly undemocratic character of our Foreign Depart- 
ment. The Department is run exclusively by members of 
the aristocracy and landed gentry. It is the last strong- 
hold of aristocracy, monopoly, and privilege in the public 
service. How is it that, while the increasing democratisa- 
tion of the public services has marked the rise of 
Democracy in this country, the Foreign Department has 
remained untouched by the process ? It is because British 
Democracy, in its climb to power, has totally neglected 
this branch of the public service; has failed to realise how 
inextricably interwoven is the character, conduct, and 
inspiration of our foreign policy with the ordinary, every- 
day life of the nation; has looked upon foreign policy as 
something occult and outside its ken — and, I may add, has 
been encouraged to do so, especially of recent years, in all 
sorts of ways. British Democracy is paying for that 
mistake to-day, but, as yet, it has no conception of how 
heavy the bill will in any case be, or how stupendous it 
may become. 

I referred a moment ago to the fact that there are 120 
representatives of the Foreign Office abroad. And there 
you have the vice of the whole system. These 120 gentle- 
men, who have many virtues and not a few defects — the 
virtues and the defects of their caste — are not the repre- 
sentatives of the nation in fact, although they are in name. 
They are the representatives of a Department, and the 
proceedings of that Department are withheld from the 
knowledge of the nation and conducted outside the great 
arteries of the national life. Until the nation insists that 



ii2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

the men it sends abroad ostensibly to represent its interests 
are selected by merit and competition, and not by nomina- 
tion and favouritism; that wealth and position shall not 
be the determining factors in their appointment; that they 
shall not be chosen exclusively from the aristocracy, but 
from the best which every class in the community can 
produce; above all, that the Department which they serve 
shall work in the light and not in darkness, the national 
destinies, and the happiness and welfare of every one of us 
— rich and poor, high and lowly — will remain as they are 
to-day, at the mercy of a particular Department in the 
State. 

It will be a long fight and a stern one, because just as at 
one time English monarchs and their political supporters, 
while conceding to the people the right of making laws, 
denied to their representatives the right of controlling the 
administration of those laws, so do there exist among us 
to-day influences, not, indeed, royal influences, but 
influences far more powerful, which are resolved to oppose 
to their utmost capacity any real and effective national 
control over the Department which determines the national 
issues of life and death — which they regard as their own 
special preserve and co-existent with the supreme power 
they wield over the national destinies. 

It will be a long fight and a stern one; and if we do 
not prepare for it now, lay our plans now, organise now, 
not only shall we have no voice in the character of the 
settlement which will close the war, but when the war is 
over we shall be more helpless than before. 

For of this let us be well persuaded : — 

"The substitution — to use the words of the Prime 
Minister — for force, for the class of competing ambitions, 
for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise of 
a real European partnership, based on the recognition of 
equal right and established and enforced by the common 
will." 

that substitution will never come about until the peoples 
have won control over the conduct of their relations with 
other peoples. 

A secret and autocratic diplomacy stands between the 
peoples and the mutual comprehension of each other's 
needs. It is the greatest obstacle to the emancipation of 
the peoples from the shackles of militarism and war. It 



SECRET DIPLOMACY 113 

is the greatest obstacle to the solidarity of the human race. 
The British people have led the way in many of the 
reforms which have powerfully contributed to enlarge the 
boundaries of human freedom. If they have the will they 
can lead the world in the greatest of all reforms which 
lies open to human endeavour to-day. 



CHAPTER XIII. 
An Appeal to President Wilson 1 

THERE have been occasions in the life of peoples 
when the national soul, bewildered and stricken, has 
been saved by a single individual possessing - in himself 
the combination of qualities which enabled him to adopt 
a clear and definite line of conduct, and to give to his 
fellow-countrymen at the psychological moment just that 
inspiration and that lead required by the circumstances. 

There has never been, until to-day, an occasion when 
the international soul, labouring in agony, cried out for 
a man to succour it. 

But that situation has now arisen, and in the two 
hemispheres there is one man, and only one man, who, 
by his character and through the great position he enjoys, 
can save the soul of the peoples and of the Governments 
of Europe. 

That man is President Wilson. 



I write to the sound of the measured tramp of armed 
men. The confused clamour rising from the streets is 
shattered by the roll of drums. The martial setting cannot 
obliterate the haunting melancholy conveyed by the shrill 
whistling of the fifes. It even permeates the sunshine, 
and robs it of its balm. For the message of the fifes is 
the piercing homage to Death. Death is in the very air 
we breathe, we Europeans. Its outstretched wings beat 
against the mansion of the rich and the cottage of the 
lowly. Death on land and on the sea. Death emerging, 
implacable and sinister, from the bowels of the deep. Death 
falling, swift and relentless, from the blue vault of heaven. 
Death in all the hideous and revolting forms with which 
modern man and modern science have equipped it. 

Presently these strong, clean-limbed young fellows, the 
flower of our people, the hope of our future, who a moment 

1 Written in May, 191 5 ; published in the New York Tribune, 
July 4, 1915. 

114 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 115 

ago swung past to the sound of the fifes, will be burrowing 
in the ground like rodents, slaughtering and being 
slaughtered ; covered with vermin ; the festering bodies of 
days-dead men at their feet, in front of them, behind them, 
huddled in shapeless masses, grotesquely stretching rigid 
limbs skyward. The foul smell of burnt and decomposing 
flesh will be in their nostrils by day and by night. Flies 
in myriads will be settling about them, pumping putridity 
into their undressed wounds. They will be foul and mad 
with the blood-lust; their bodies repulsive to them; their 
nerves shattered by the everlasting roar of the hurtling 
shells; their souls blunted and scarred. 

Thus, in a hundred cities of Europe to-day. Tramp, 
tramp, tramp. The march of death to the sound of the 
fife and drum, in the genial sunshine of declining May. 
Thus, too, in the far-flung battle lines. Millions of men 
who had no quarrel until their rulers invented one, living 
like brute-beasts, acting like brute-beasts; fly-blown, 
verminous, stinking with uncleansed wounds; physically, 
mentally, morally thrown back a thousand years. In the 
plains and valleys, on the mountain slopes, multitudes of 
corpses, uncovered by the stoppage of the floods and the 
melting of the snows, fill the air with the germs of disease. 
And that other army grows and grows — the army of the 
widows and the orphans; the army of the bereft and 
destitute, of the broken-hearted, of those for whom life 
henceforth is but a vale of tears. 

And still the rulers will not speak. 

The war has lasted ten months. It is roughly computed 
that three and a half million men — the pick of European 
manhood — have been killed outright and as many more 
permanently disabled. It cannot be said that any one of 
the belligerent States is nearer the accomplishment of the 
professed aims of its rulers when they entered the war, as 
the outcome of this unprecedented human holocaust and 
the colossal wastage of economic resources w r hich has 
accompanied it. But of far greater importance is the 
question : "What are the various belligerent States fighting 
for now? What vital issue to the peoples concerned 
could not now be secured by negotiation?" 

And that is what no Government will state in explicit 
and authoritative terms. No Government will do so, lest, 
if it did, its enemies should imagine that the national 
interests it supposedly represents would suffer. "The 
enemy would conclude that we were weakening" is the 



n6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

parrot cry in every capital. No Government will assume 
the responsibility of uttering a word which would permit 
of the enemy imagining that it is anxious for peace. Yet 
the rulers of every belligerent State must be anxious for 
peace in their hearts; if only because they must begin to 
realise that the edifice of civilisation is tumbling about 
their ears and that dynasties and castes run a considerable 
risk of being buried in the ruins. 

That there is an intense longing for peace among the 
peoples — especially among the working classes and the 
peasantry — cannot be questioned. But as the entire 
machinery at the disposal of the Governments for 
influencing public opinion is engaged in fomenting national 
passions to the highest pitch of intensity, by representing 
the enemy-country as the embodiment of evil and treachery 
and by crediting the enemy-country with the purpose of 
utterly destroying its adversaries, the very longing for 
peace becomes a spur to national fury. Indeed, the 
Governments recognise the popular desire for peace and 
cunningly pander to it. A "lasting peace," they cry, 
"can only be secured by the complete pulverisation of the 
enemy" — whereas they know full well that that would 
mean the indefinite prolongation of the war and its 
renewal at no distant date : for you cannot pulverise a 
people. Here in England the very recruiting placards with 
which our cities and towns are plastered almost invariably 
urge men to join the colours in order to hasten 
the advent of peace. It is everywhere the same, 
in one form or another. The admitted desire of the peoples 
for peace is used to exploit them for prolonging the war. 
The Governments decline even to hint at the terms upon 
which they would be mutually prepared to discuss the basis 
of a possible settlement. And so the slaughter continues 
on an even vaster scale. Yet, some day, the Governments 
will have to discuss or perish. Meantime they are blind 
leaders of the blind; straws upon the elements, they, in 
their folly, have unchained ; incapable of controlling them ; 
knowing not whither they are drifting. 

Every belligerent people — except the Italian — believes 
that it is fighting, and every Government asserts that it is 
fighting, in self-defence, for national existence, for the 
right to preserve its own traditions, its own modes of life, 
its own homesteads. If what the Governments assert be 
true, then each and all of them are suffering from 
hallucination; for assuredly it is in the interest of no 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 117 

single people that its adversaries should lose their national 
existence and be destroyed — since civilised life is built upon 
foundations of human exchange, and the lack of clients 
with whom to exchange would spell national bankruptcy. 
And the truth lies just here. All the belligerent 
Governments are under the spell of an hallucination, the 
hallucination of fear. The driving force of fear, it was, 
which made possible this wicked and suicidal struggle. 
I am not in the majority, with those who maintain that 
the rulers of Germany deliberately planned this war and 
are wholly responsible for it. That they have a large 
measure of responsibility for it is patent. That others 
share responsibility with them can be gainsaid only by such 
as have come under the spell of the hallucination. Fear 
caused this war. Fear is prolonging it. Fear is 
aggravating its natural bestialities. Fear is making every 
chemical laboratory into a chamber for the concoction of 
new and more terrifying modes of human destruction. It 
may yet evolve some substance capable of destroying an 
army corps or of firing a city in a few moments. The end 
might thereby be hastened, it is true. 

The fear of the Governments is communicated to the 
peoples, and millions who are not engaged in killing are 
employed in manufacturing implements to kill. To such 
a pass has come our civilisation. The civilian population 
in every belligerent State is becoming drunken and 
maddened by fear. For it is the support by the civilian 
population of its rulers which prolongs the war. It is 
the civilian population that fears; not the men who fight. 
They do not fear. Neither do they hate with the same 
intensity, because, being inured by their occupation to 
physical bravery, they respect it in their foes. They 
respect, too, the keen competition in brains behind the 
firing lines. And respect chases out hatred. Moreover, 
they know that what the papers print of their adversaries 
are mostly lies; and that sickens them. Every day some 
incident occurs, even in the hours of carnage, that helps 
them to remember that those to whom they are opposed 
are men like themselves, full of courage and resource as 
themselves, obeying orders even as they themselves, 
suffering even as they themselves must suffer. If it rested 
with them the war would not last long. 

From the civilian population this deep, underlying 
fraternity of suffering and a common discipline is hidden. 
Fed every day upon the lowest garbage of sensational 
(10) 



n8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

journalism, its passions stimulated by every imaginable 
device, torn by the cruellest tremors for loved ones in the 
field and rooted in dull revenge under the stress of 
bereavement, the civilian population hates with a hatred 
unKnown to most soldiers. And so in blind fear, in blind 
hate, the peoples stumble forward along the valley of 
abomination and despair, behind their infatuated and 
insensate leaders. 

No force, it would seem, which either the belligerent 
peoples or their Governments can evolve will arrest the 
madness which is destroying civilisation. And yet if it 
be not arrested disaster beyond the imagination of brain 
to grasp will overwhelm Europe. That force must come 
from without, and there is but one man who can wield it — 
President Wilson. 



Rash, impertinent, it may appear for a foreigner to 
write thus of your First Citizen, to raise an unknown voice 
in hearing of the accumulated cares which weigh so heavily 
upon the leading representative of a neutral State — upon 
one who is the living embodiment of your true dignity and 
your true greatness. Yet in countless European hearts 
there beats the hope — the pathetic trust — that in him 
humanity may find its saviour — that there may be granted 
unto him a message from the Cross. I do but express 
feebly enough, what multitudes are thinking, hoping, 
awaiting. Formless, vague is the hope. Nevertheless it 
is very real. Can shape and substance be given to it? 

The belligerent Governments have for decades 
encouraged man's progress in invention, his triumphs over 
nature in the direction of man's destruction; and now they 
have unloosed all the factors of primal savagery armed 
with these terrible powers. They see the work of decades 
crumbling before their eyes. They shudder at the ethical 
degradation; the spiritual collapse which is overwhelming 
society. They recoil with horror at the abyss of economic 
ruin, of disease and want, of social tumult which yawns 
wider at their feet as month follows month, each month 
a catastrophe in itself. 

And yet each fears to be the first to tread the path 
which leads to the international Council Chamber. Each 
bases its resolve to go on to the bitter end. Each 
repudiates every suggestion to state the terms upon which 
it would consent to discuss. None dare take the initiative. 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON ug 

But if they will not speak to one another, would they 
severally refuse to lay their views before your President 
on the understanding that the collective expression of those 
views should be communicated by the President to them 
all in a public dispatch? In so doing they would sacrifice 
none of their "prestige," to which they cling and which 
each deems would be jeopardised if it opened 
communication with the others. Did they respond to that 
invitation, they would not necessarily, thereby, commit 
themselves to acceptance of the President's ultimate 
mediation. But it would be a step on that road ; or at least 
a step toward an armistice. 

The essential is that the peoples in each belligerent 
State should be in a position to know what at this moment 
the Governments are fighting to attain — not in vague, but 
in precise terms. This they cannot now learn because the 
Governments will not tell them, save in rhetoric capable 
of an infinite variety of interpretation. This, through the 
President's initiative, they might ascertain, and they have 
suffered and are suffering so greatly, the future outlook 
for them is so appalling, that it would be incredible if in 
each belligerent State there were not set up, as the result 
of that knowledge, currents of opinion sane enough to 
endorse what was reasonable in the desires of their 
adversaries, and formidable enough to correct what might 
be unreasonable in the demands of their own rulers. 

For example, despite the clamour of our own Jingo 
publicists, literary men and politicians — and do not forget 
on your side that we, too, like you, have such elements 
among us : that we have our class which wishes for its 
own ends to "Prussianise" the nation, and that we, too, 
have our unscrupulous and powerful journalists who 
constitute the mouthpiece of that class, and who are 
prepared, even in the midst of this desperate struggle in 
which we are engaged, to throw mud at any and every 
Minister of the Crown whom they believe to be opposed to 
their policy — despite these "Prussians in our midst," were 
the people of this country to learn through such a 
demarche on the part of your President that Germany was 
prepared to evacuate Belgium and the North of France as 
a result of a compromise which would restore her oversea 
possessions or pave the way for her acquisition by 
negotiation of similar outlets elsewhere; and if they were 
to learn that on the strength of assurances such as Sir 
Edward Grey offered her on July 30 — when the tramp of 



120 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

armed legions was already shaking the plains of Europe — 
that the British Government "would endeavour to promote 
some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party, 
by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile 
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, 
Russia, and ourselves (Britain), jointly or separately"; 
were the British people assured that Germany — on this 
basis — was prepared to discuss a cessation of the strife; 
were the British people assured of this, I believe there 
would arise a popular movement in favour of the conclusion 
of peace strong enough to sweep everything before it. 

I believe that, because, for the British people this was 
a war entered upon on behalf of Belgium; because the 
inspiration which moved tens of thousands of young 
Britishers to offer up their bodies to Moloch, was 
indignation at the violation of Belgium and pity for the 
wrongs inflicted upon her; and because the alternative to 
such a German offer would mean, in any event, the 
continued sacrifice of Belgium, the prolongation of the 
German grip upon her if the Franco-British armies could 
not break the German line, her utter destruction if, 
breaking that line, the Franco-British armies contested, 
as they needs must, every yard of Belgian soil with a 
desperate energy and with annihilating effects for Belgium. 
Indeed, were the interests of Belgium alone at stake, every 
humane man and woman on both sides of the Atlantic 
should ardently wish that her liberation might come by 
negotiation, and not at a price which would leave her one 
"vast ruin and cemetery combined." 

I would even go so far as to express the conviction that 
if the British people became aware through the inter- 
mediary of President Wilson that Germany were willing 
to accept in principle the creation of an International 
Council, upon which both the belligerent and the neutral 
Powers would be represented, and before which the 
Governments would undertake to bring all their disputes 
for adjudication, binding themselves to give publicity to 
the Council's proceedings and to exercise diplomatic, 
economic and in the ultimate restore coercive action in 
support of the Council's decisions; a principle which would 
automatically involve the gradual disappearance of 
militarism and colossal armaments as the dominant 
factors in international politics, and, eventually, the 
internationalisation of land armaments and armies; the 
British people would, if Germany were thus minded, be 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 121 

brought to reconsider that claim to absolute dominion over 
the natural highways of the globe which has been hitherto 
the basis of their foreign policy and the bulwark of their 
national freedom, but which cannot in itself alone continue 
to be so, in any event, for long, in view of the development 
of submarine powers of offence and of airism, the advent 
of which have — although we perceive it not in the fury of 
the combat — totally altered the British national and 
imperial problem. Moreover, it is self-evident that there 
can be no internationalisation of land power, if there be 
none of sea power. 

And is it inconceivable that Germany should be so 
minded? No doubt, if you take the view that Germany 
cynically planned and executed this war for the purpose 
of "subjugating Europe," striking when she thought the 
hour had come; it is inconceivable. But not only will 
posterity reject that legend; when the mists of passion 
have cleared, and when things reassume their true 
perspective, when men of the present generation once 
again see themselves as they really are, they will wonder 
how they came to credit it. That legend will perish, just 
as surely as Germany's crime in her relentless treatment of 
a small people who had done her no wrong and did but 
defend what they had a right to defend, will ring down 
the centuries to the detriment of the German name. 

If you do not take that view, but place yourself, as 
well as a foreigner can with no other sources of information 
than those accessible to all men, "in the skin of a 
German," to use the expression employed by Marcel 
Sembat, the leader of the French Socialists and a member 
of the French War Cabinet, in the famous treatise "Faites 
la Paix : sinon faites un Roi," which he addressed to his 
countrymen a few months before the war, you will discover 
manifold reasons why Germany should be willing to make 
peace on some such terms as those indicated. If fear, as 
I contend, has been at the bottom of the great catastrophe 
— fear common to all the Powers which plunged into the 
war last August — an "arrangement," to which Germany 
would be a party, "by which she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her 
and her allies" by France, Russia, and Great Britain, 
jointly or separately, such an arrangement would remove 
those fears from the future. And if the British Government 
realised the practical impossibility and, from the point of 
view of the British national interest, the undesirability of 



i22 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

excluding Germany from a place in the sun commensurate 
with her legitimate requirements, I cannot conceive that 
a single German possessed of common sense would desire 
the retention of either Belgium or Northern France, and 
I do conceive it likely that tens of thousands of Germans, 
smitten with remorse attendant upon the saner vision 
ensuing from the advent of peace, would eagerly co-operate 
in healing the wounds of that unhappy land. 

For the rest, Germany's supreme interest is peace, and 
when you have said all there is to be said of her national 
faults and of her conduct of the war, the solid fact remains 
that this powerful nation had for forty and four years 
kept the peace when war broke out last August. Attention 
has, of course, been drawn to this many times; but, 
considered in the light of international reconstruction and 
Germany's attitude thereto, it is a fact of cardinal 
importance. No other great Power can boast such a 
record. With the sole exception of the guerilla campaign 
with a Hottentot tribe in South-West Africa and sundry 
skirmishes with primitive tribes in German East Africa, 
against which we can set a dozen far more comprehensive 
campaigns of a similar kind, Germany had kept her sword 
in the scabbard, while her neighbours had been drawing 
theirs and laying about them with great energy. She had 
rattled it loudly and offensively often enough, especially 
when she became nervous at her position in the "balance 
of power," as the man who is apprehensive of his neigh- 
bour's intent puffs out his chest and assumes a fierce 
expression. But she had not drawn it. She could have 
drawn it with every chance of success again and again had 
the desire of her rulers been the "subjugation" of Europe, 
or even of a part of Europe, in the years when her military 
strength was incomparably superior to every possible 
combination against her. She could have drawn it on a 
Balkan issue when Russia, crippled by her war with Japan, 
was helpless; she did no more than support her one real 
ally in Europe in an offence, but a technical one, against 
the sovereignty of the Porte, whose sovereignty, 
guaranteed by all the Powers, has been flouted by each 
in turn with absolute cynicism whenever it suited their 
interests to flout it. Had she desired to crush France she 
could have done so in the 'eighties, when the British official 
world would have been rather pleased than otherwise. She 
could have done so when, embarrassed by the Boer war, 
we were incapable of helping France, even had we wished 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 123 

to do so; or, again, when freed from any danger from 
the Russian side after Mukden. She did not do so. Why ? 
She was proportionately far stronger as a land Power in 
the 'eighties, the 'nineties, and in the first five years of 
the present century than in 1914. For just upon half a 
century Germany had waged no war. Neither had her 
Austrian ally. The personal influence of their rulers had 
been exerted time and again, as eminent politicians and 
writers in the countries of their present foes have borne 
witness, in the cause of peace. Germany's oversea 
possessions had been acquired not by wars of conquest, 
but by treaty arrangements. Her ally had never been 
attracted by the oversea imperialist mirage. During that 
period Russian imperialism had waged a sanguinary war 
with Japan; British imperialism with the Dutch republics 
which had been absorbed in the British Empire; France 
had been indulging in wars of conquest against coloured 
peoples all over the globe, and as a result had annexed an 
area of territory as large as the United States; Italy had 
embarked upon two formidable campaigns, the latter 
of which was the most cynically immoral venture 
of our time. While, her neighbours were fighting, 
Germany was building up a marvellous industrial 
edifice, which had everything to lose by war, and 
a great overseas trade, which was bound to be 
temporarily ruined by war. 

When these facts are borne in mind — and none can 
gainsay them — when it is considered that even Germany's 
enormous expenditure upon armaments during the last ten 
years falls short by hundreds of millions of the 
expenditure of her potential foes under the European 
"balance of power" system — that "foul idol," as 
Bright once called it — and that she has never once 
put forth her great strength, the presumption is 
that, judging from her own past conduct, Germany 
would welcome an honourable peace, and that if this be 
denied her she will drag down the civilised world with 
her in her fall. In her position Britishers would do the 
same. 

Were President Wilson able to lay even the first 
foundations of the future bridge across the gulf of existent 
Anglo-German enmity the end of this awful tragedy would 
be in sight. For Anglo-German enmity has become the 
key of the situation. The Balkan question, and with it 
the problem of Austro-Russian rivalry, is not insoluble on 



!2 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

the basis of a settlement founded upon nationality, of home 
rule within home rule. We owe the origins of this war 
not to the insolubility of Austro-Russian contentions, but 
to the seeds of strife sown by two rival diplomatists — 
Aerenthal 1 and Iswolski 2 — watered by the subsequent 
intrigues of Hartwig 3 and von Tschirsky, 4 just as we owe 
its world-wide extension to the intrigues, ignorances and 
incompatibilities of temper of half a dozen rulers and 
diplomats operating in an atmosphere of mutual fears and 
concealing their manoeuvres from the gaze of their peoples, 
thus giving free rein to the criminal enterprise of a few 
powerful publicists and an internationalised armament 
ring. Neither are the problems of Alsace-Lorraine or of 
Poland insoluble if a solution be sought in the ascertained 
desires of the peoples of those disputed areas, and not on 
the basis of military considerations, which have never 
settled any problem of international politics. The real 
problem which faces the world to-day is none of these. 
Anglo-German enmity is the real problem. 

Neither people can destroy the other, whatever the 
politicians or the papers say. 

Every belligerent Government must make sacrifices for 
peace; must be compelled to do so by its peoples if it will 
not of its own accord. But it is at least probable that 
elements in the ruling classes of all the belligerent 
countries are looking for a golden bridge. And after all 
it is the peoples, not the diplomats who blundered them 
into war or the publicists who hounded them at each 
others' throats, trading on their fears, that are paying 
with blood and tears. 

Once again, then, the essential is that the Peoples 
should mutually and severally be in a position to know 
the nature of the adversary's claim. If the Peoples have 
the right to make war they also have the right to make 
peace. 



It is a great thing to ask of President Wilson that he 
should endeavour to make himself the medium through 
which that knowledge can be acquired. But he is the only 
personal force in this distracted planet to whom we can 

1 Formerly Austrian Foreign Minister. 

2 Formerly Russian Foreign Minister. 

3 Russian Minister at Belgrade. 

4 German Ambassador at Vienna. 



APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON 125 

turn. Supported by the American people, fortified by the 
deep humanities which inspire him and by the wide and 
penetrating grasp of men and things which he possesses 
— if he could bring himself to make this effort he would 
be the saviour of the world, and his name would be blessed 
from generation unto generation. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

Is Truth or is Fiction the greater 
National Interest? 1 

HAVE received a considerable number of letters in 
connection with this series of writing's, and their 
general tenour convinces me that the latter are serving a 
useful purpose. One valued correspondent, however, 
thinks that the ordinary man will conclude that I am 
seeking "not only to defend Germany, but to defend 
Germany at the expense of England." I have greater 
faith in the ordinary man. In my own belief those abstract 
entities known as "Germany" and "England" have had 
little or nothing to do with this war. To defend Germany's 
rulers from the charge of having deliberately brought 
about this war for the sake of world-dominion and to 
"subjugate Europe," is not to defend them from their 
share of responsibility in the catastrophe, or for their 
methods, and it is not to defend Germany at the expense 
of England. It is to defend Germany against a charge 
whose untenability becomes patent when the records and 
the acts of the other great European Powers, in the matter 
of war preparations and the waging of wars, and in the 
matter of a long series of proceedings anterior to the war, 
are examined. And to do that is not to do anything 
detrimental to the British national interest. It is to do 
something which, on the contrary, serves the British 
national interest. It is to do something which, in all 
humility one may claim, is calculated to serve the interests 
of all the peoples of Europe. 

For if it can be demonstrated that this charge against 
Germany is untrue and that Germany had real cause to 
fear aggression, this war is seen to be the outcome, not 
of the inherent wickedness of one particular ruler, or 
group, or nation, but of a system of Statecraft common to 

1 The Labour Leader, May 13, 1915. 
126 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 127 

ail Governments, a system of official intercourse between 
Governments, in which all the peoples have helplessly 
acquiesced and for which all Governments are directly, and 
all peoples indirectly, responsible. And it is only when, 
and if, all Governments and all peoples have realised that 
the truth lies here that these systems can be overthrown 
and the conception of a real union between the nations 
can evolve. So long - as one particular nation is credited 
with special and peculiar vices by the others, so long will 
the others remain blind to the part played by their own 
rulers in producing" the situation out of which the war 
arose, and so long will every practical effort at the 
re-establishment of public law in Europe be doomed to 
death in birth. We must build a new structure and we 
must use new material. We cannot build a new structure 
in Europe without Germany. If, therefore, we do not 
build upon a foundation of truth, the Europe which 
emerges from this war will be even more unstable than 
the Europe produced by the Treaty of Vienna a century 
ago. If, therefore, the attempt to make British people 
visualise the real position of Germany in the system of 
European Statecraft known as the "Balance of Power" as 
it existed in the decade preceding the war, involves running 
counter to certain current public utterances by individuals 
who constitute the British Government for the time being, 
or by individual British publicists, that is merely incidental 
and unavoidable, and is not pursued as an end in itself 
by the writer. 

And now to return to the main purport of these 
articles. For some years previous to the war, Germany's 
chief cause of apprehension lay in the growing ascendency 
in Russia of just those very forces, Jingoism (Pan-Slavism) 
and Militarism, which we are asked to regard as peculiar 
to Germany herself. The recent growth of these forces in 
Russia had been principally attributable to three main 
factors : the shaky position of the governing autocracy, 
driven to seek popularity among the noisy and Jingo 
elements in Russian society, in order to stem the rising 
tide of social discontent and democratic aspirations; the 
restlessness of the fighting services, smarting under the 
blow to their prestige inflicted by the war with Japan; the 
diplomatic defeat sustained by Russia in the quarrel with 
Austria over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in 1908-9, which diplomatic defeat had been finally 
consummated by Germany's uncompromising support of 



i 2 8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

her ally on that occasion. These factors in combination 
had given an immense impetus to the reactionary elements 
in Russia. The fears engendered thereby in Germany were 
shared equally by the mass of the people — it is essential 
to bear this clearly in mind — and by the official classes, 
and under cover of this fear the reactionary elements in 
Germany acquired additional influence, and the General 
Staff additional arrogance and power. The more tense 
became the situation, the more did the German people in 
the mass forget their domestic grievances against the 
harsh officialdom and the undemocratic tendencies 
characteristic of the dominant partner in the Empire — 
Prussia; the more did they rally round the organising 
genius of Prussia as the bulwark of their national liberties 
and the symbol of their national unity. 

The storm clouds on Germany's eastern frontiers 
loomed the heavier owing to the attitude of France, the 
foreign policy of whose rulers had become notoriously 
subservient to the Russian autocracy, and where a 
recrudescence of the Chauvinist military spirit among the 
rising middle-class generation had been specially marked 
— as impartial Frenchmen admit and well-informed 
Frenchmen know — since the Morocco quarrel had revealed 
a disposition on the part of official Britain to give to the 
entente with France the complexion of a virtual offensive 
and defensive alliance. Add to this the strained relations 
with Britain; the naval rivalry; the determination of official 
Britain to look upon the growth of the German navy as 
a cause of offence in itself; the boastings of official 
Germany about the "trident"; the boastings of official 
Britain when the Dreadnought era was ushered in; the 
incessant public bickerings of rival Navy Leagues and of 
the incendiary Press on both sides — and the genuineness 
of Germany's fears can only be denied by those who insist 
upon shutting their eyes and closing their ears to the 
truth. Germany had substantially contributed to creating 
the situation giving rise to her own fears and the fears of 
all Europe. But other Powers had substantially 
contributed, too. To attempt to strike a balance of 
responsibility would be futile. It is sufficient to insist that 
Germany feared; that she had good reasons to fear; that 
the reasonableness of her fears was admitted by our public 
men and by French public men and writers of repute — even 
military writers — and that to sweep all this aside on the 
pretext that Germany suddenly plunged Europe into war 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 129 

of diabolical set purpose and for purely selfish aims, is a 
perversion of the facts of which history offers few 
parallels, and which cannot in the end survive, but which 
will, if we persist in being- slaves to it, lead this nation 
stumbling along an interminable vista of woe into an 
unfathomable pit of disaster. 

Before dealing more specifically with the causes, other 
than those furnished in the statistical and other data 
touched upon in these articles, why the situation in Russia 
should have been a matter of increasing uneasiness in 
Germany, there is one point which it is necessary to touch 
upon, for none is more misunderstood. Comprehension of 
Germany's true position in Europe before the war is 
impossible unless we fix firmly in our minds that a violent 
disruption of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy represented 
for Germany just one of those few really vital dangers 
which — given the existing division of Europe into groups 
— a nation cannot afford to run. From the moment that 
Bismarck's long and successful policy of maintaining 
friendly relations with Russia became seriously impaired 
(the cooling process began in his lifetime and dates from 
Russia's disappointment at the result of the Berlin 
Congress) the preservation of the Dual Monarchy became 
for Germany synonymous with her own preservation. The 
consummation of the Russo-French alliance, which was 
the consequence of the Russo-German breach, bound up 
Germany's fortunes with those of the Dual Monarchy 
absolutely. Thenceforth Austria could not be imperilled 
without Germany being imperilled. A stricken Austro- 
Hungary meant a Germany completely isolated in Europe, 
for to Italy's notorious political fickleness had been added, 
from the practical point of view, her military weakening 
through the bad and mad Tripoli adventure. A glance at 
the map will convey a clearer appreciation of this 
elementary verity than reams of disquisition. Hence the 
internal and external concerns of the Dual Monarchy 
were of capital import to Germany, and Germany's 
intervention in Austria's favour over the Bosnian crisis of 
1908-9, directly Russia's attitude became openly 
threatening,- was natural and inevitable — however brutal 
and crude in its manifestation. 

To assume, as is now currently assumed, that Germany 
had become the virtual dictator of Austro-Hungarian 
policy, is not warranted by the facts as publicly accessible. 
On the contrary, the presumption would seem to be that 



i 3 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

the very obligation under which Germany found herself 
to support the Dual Monarchy compelled her to defend 
her ally's policy regardless of its wisdom. That a self- 
vdlled and dominating personality like Count Tisza, the 
Hungarian Premier, who has played so conspicuous a part 
in the policy of the Dual Monarchy, would submit to a 
Potsdam dictatorship, is absurd on the face of it. Indeed, 
the notion of a meek and placid Austria-Hungary, clay in 
the hands of the potters at the Wilhelmstrasse, argues a 
complete ignorance of the relative situations and 
relationships of the Teutonic Powers, and of the character 
of their respective governing classes. (A perusal of the 
Austrian Red Book in the second edition of Price's 
invaluable "Diplomatic History of the War," and of the 
interesting volume on the Balkans recently issued by the 
Buxton Brothers, should correct the impression.) It has 
only taken root here owing to the clumsy and, so to speak, 
post-prandial attempt to ignore and set aside, and even 
to suppress, the sudden general mobilisation of all the 
Russian armies in the very midst of the resumed Austro- 
Russian discussions in the last days of July, which swept 
Berlin off its feet. The well-informed writer in The Round 
Table for September last is much nearer the truth when 
he says that Germany had "in a sense lost control over 
her ally," and when he speaks of the German Emperor 
having become in a measure "the catspaw of Viennese 
intrigue." The fact is that Germany had axiomatically to 
pay the piper for her ally's mistakes and for those incessant 
fluctuations in her policy which, as in Russia, characterised 
the rise and fall of this or that set of influences — male and 
female — struggling for mastery at the Viennese Court. 
Nationally speaking, Germany's position in the balance 
impelled her to support the one ally left to her in Europe, 
whatever the circumstances, and whether that ally was 
right or wrong, wise or unwise. 

Indeed, the more contemporary documents are 
examined, the more untenable becomes the argument that 
Austro-Hungarian policy has been subservient to German 
direction, and that, in the crisis of 1914, the Kaiser had 
onlvto lift his little finger to ensure obedience to his wishes 
at Vienna. If, for example, that very valuable volume, 
"The Inner History of the Balkan War," written by a 
British officer with peculiar qualifications for the task, be 
studied, 1 it cannot but induce the conviction that Germany 

1 By Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Rankin. (Constable,) 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 131 

had the very greatest difficulty in preventing her ally from 
kicking over the traces at that time — 191 2-13. As the 
author himself puts it, Germany did her best to "hold 
back Austria from a policy of violence." That Austrian 
statesmen, exasperated by the support given to Serbia, 
at least by unofficial Russia, sounded both Germany and 
Italy with a view to securing their support of an Austrian 
declaration of war against Serbia, we know from the 
statement made by Signor Giolitti, on August 9, 1913. 
Curiously enough, that statement has been interpreted 
as a further proof of German plotting. In point of fact, 
it is proof that the Austrian proposal was turned down 
by Germany and Italy together. Signor Giolitti says 
distinctly that Italy joined with the German Government 
to restrain Austria. 

Baron Beyens, then Belgian Minister at Berlin, now 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, has also recorded 
in his recent book that the : — 

"diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse (i.e., Berlin) applied 
itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire 
for intervention at the Ballplatz (i.e., Vienna)." 1 

More significant still is Baron Beyens' despatch to his 
Government on November 30, 191 2, in connection with 
the visit of the Archduke Ferdinand (heir to the Austrian 
throne, afterwards murdered at Sarajevo). The Belgian 
diplomatist writes : — 

"The Archduke stated at Berlin that the Austro- 
Hungarian monarchy had come to an end of the 
concessions it could make to its neighbour. The Emperor 
and his councillors showered upon him, none the less, 
counsels of moderation which William II., when conducting 
his guest to the railway station, summarised in the homely 
language which is habitual to him, and in these expressive 
words : 'Above all, no foolishness !' There is no doubt 
that the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Foreign 
Secretary are passionately pacific." 2 

But the very success achieved by German diplomacy in 
1912-13 militated against similar success in 1914. Counsels 
of moderation had averted a European war then ; but they 

1 "L'allemagne avant la guerre." 

a The Belgian Diplomatic Despatches : op cit, 



i 3 2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

had been followed by an intensification of Austro-Serbian 
friction, by an even graver strain in Austro-Russian 
relations, and in the assassination of Austria's heir and 
the Emperor's personal friend, the Archduke. Moreover, 
the whole situation in Europe had worsened. I am not 
arguing that Germany put all the pressure she might have 
placed upon Austria in July, 1914. I do not know, and 
I do not suppose there is a solitary human being in this 
country who does. But what I do say is that in the very 
nature of the case, it was no longer possible for the 
German Government to assume so emphatic an attitude 
in 1914 as it did in 1912 and 1913; and what I do say is 
that I have, for my part, seen not one scintilla of 
documentary evidence snowing that Germany instigated 
the Dual Monarchy to take up an intransingeant position. 
The attitude of the German Government appears to have 
been that Austria was justified in coercing Serbia; and 
that Russia would not go to extreme lengths in supporting 
Serbia against Austria. When later on the German 
Government perceived that Russia did intend to 
go to all lengths in support of Serbia the German 
Government went as far as it dared go without risking 
to rupture the alliance, in restraining Austria. I am not 
discussing the rights and wrongs of the three Governments 
concerned. I am merely endeavouring to disentangle the 
truth from the coating of prejudice and passion under 
which, for British understanding, it has been concealed. 
Let us imagine a broadly parallel case. 

Supposing that, after years of friction — friction due to 
faults on both sides — between the Indian Government and 
Afghanistan, the Prince of Wales had been murdered in 
the streets of an Indian town close to the Afghan border, 
and supposing the Indian Government, convinced, 
rightly or wrongly, that Afghan agents had inspired the 
crime; British public opinion, it may safely be asserted, 
would have been as convulsed with rage as was public 
opinion in Austria-Hungary after Sarajevo. Would the 
British Government have gone to a Conference under such 
circumstances? And would an ally of Great Britain, 
dependent upon Great Britain for its own security, have 
risked a rupture with Great Britain by insisting that Great 
Britain should do so, especially when the Power, believed 
by both Great Britain and her ally to be morally 
responsible for Afghanistan's general attitude, interfered 
menacingly on Afghanistan's behalf, on the ground that 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 133 

the inhabitants of Afghanistan were of the same race as 
its own subjects? 

Wherever in this volume I am concerned with the 
attempt to make my countrymen take a juster view, in the 
interests of a permanent peace, of German actions and of 
German policy, I have scrupulously refrained from 
reinforcing my arguments by citing German authorities. 
I have invariably relied upon the statements of our own 
authorities, or of authorities in allied and friendly 
countries. But in this particular matter of Germany's 
support to Austria in her quarrel with Serbia after the 
murder of the Archduke, it seems to me impossible to 
leave uncited the despatch of the German Chancellor to 
the German Ambassador at Vienna on July 30, 1914. 
This despatch, or what purported to be a copy of it, was 
shown by the German Foreign Secretary to Mr. Crozier 
Long, the correspondent of the Westminster Gazette, and 
appeared in that paper on August 1. Its genuineness has 
since been vouched for by the German Chancellor in the 
course of one of his speeches in the Reichstag. It reads 
as under : the italics are mine : — 

"The report of Count Pourtales (German Ambassador 
at Petrograd) does not harmonise with the account which 
your Excellency has given of the attitude of the Austro- 
Hungarian Government. Apparently there is a misunder- 
standing, which I beg you to clear up. We cannot 
expect Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia, with 
which she is in a state of war. The refusal, however, to 
exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave 
mistake. We are, indeed, ready to fulfil our duty. As 
an Ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world 
conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our 
advice. Your Excellency will express this to Count 
Berchtold with all emphasis and great seriousness." 

An ally in Germany's position, confronted with 
powerful potential foes on east and west, could hardly 
have gone further. 

July 30 was the crucial day in the whole maze of 
confused negotiations which the Russian general 
mobilisation order [vide Chapter III. and foot-note thereto) 
smashed for good and all. This can be seen at a glance. 
On that day the German Ambassador — in response to a 
suggestion made to him the previous day by Sir Edward 
Grey, and communicated by him to Berlin — informed Sir 

(") 



i 3 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

E. Grey that the German Government would endeavour 
to influence the Austrian Government not to continue its 
operations in Serbia after the occupation of Belgrade and 
its vicinity. (White Book No. 103.) Thereupon the 
German Ambassador telegraphed to Berlin that Sir E. 
Grey would make representations to Russia in that sense, 
and the German Government communicated with Vienna. 
Sir E. Grey wired Petrograd, expressing - the earnest hope 
that if this solution were obtainable it might be possible 
to suspend military preparations on all sides. The 
situation thus appeared to admit of a compromise at the 
last moment, although the fact that Russia had partially 
mobilised — i.e., had mobilised against Austria — was an 
awkward obstacle. 

King George showed himself no less eager to bring his 
royal influence to bear upon this hopeful suggestion. He 
also wired — to Prince Henry — in part as follows : the 
italics are mine : — 

"My Government is doing all that is possible to induce 
Russia and France to stop their military preparations, if 
Austria would content herself with occupying Belgrade and 
the adjacent portions of Serbian territory as a pledge for 
the conclusion of an agreement satisfying her claims, while 
at the same time other countries stop their preparations 
for war. I count upon the great influence of the Emperor 
to obtain from Austria the acceptance of this proposal. 
He will thereby prove that Germany and England are 
working together for the prevention of an international 
calamity. Please assure William that I am doing all that 
lies in my power to do in order to preserve the peace of 
Europe." 

All this, let it be repeated, took place on the morning 
and afternoon of July 30, and we know now that Austria 
accepted the proposal King George and the British 
Government were so anxious she should accept. (No. 50 
Austrian Red Book.) 

But what was Russia's reply to the proposal? Her 
reply was to issue a midnight general mobilisation order 
— i.e, mobilisation against Germany — for she had already 
mobilised against Austria. 

If her Government had waited only twenty-four hours, 
the situation was saved, for, in the nature of things, 
Austria's reply to the proposal could not have become 
known until the 31st. 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 135 

But, as Mr. Phillips Price remarks, the military party 
at Petrograd triumphed on the 30th, and "cut the ground 
from under the feet of the diplomats, by the precipitate 
issuing of mobilisation orders," just as the military party 
triumphed at Berlin on the 31st when Russia's action 
became known. 

Again, on the 31st, a delay of twenty-four hours might 
have saved Europe — and this time the blame was 
Germany's. 

Russia's fatal order for a general mobilisation at 
midnight on the 30th, without even waiting for the 
Austrian reply to the Anglo-German proposals — which 
reply, as we have seen, was an acceptance — at once 
enlarged the area of immediate tension. It produced a 
genuine popular panic in Berlin — all the British and 
American correspondents who were in Berlin at the time 
are agreed on that. That the Russian general 
mobilisation did not necessarily mean that Russia had 
decided upon war, could not weigh against the sentiment 
provoked by the fact that the order had gone forth for a 
general mobilisation of all the Russian armies. It was 
that fact, and the deadly fears conjured up by past 
memories, which governed the entire situation. It was 
that fact which gave the military party in Berlin its chance. 
At 2 p.m. on the 31st "Kreigzustand," the military state 
preceding mobilisation, was proclaimed in Berlin. At 
midnight Berlin issued its fatal summons to Petrograd to 
demobilise in twelve hours. At 5.30 on August 1 the 
g'eneral German mobilisation was announced. At 7 p.m. 
the declaration of war on Russia was handed in. 



Rash and precipitate as it was, the action of Germany 
had not been as rash and precipitate as the British 
Ambassador to Russia had warned the Russian 
Government it would be, as early as July 25, in the event 
of Russian mobilisation. On July 25 Sir George Buchanan 
told the Russian Foreign Minister that in his opinion : "If 
Russia mobilises Germany would not be content with mere 
mobilisation or give Russia time to carry our hers, but 
would probably declare war at once." (White Book 
No. 17.) 

As a matter of fact, the actual declaration of war was 
issued some thirty hours after the general Russian 
mobilisation became known in Berlin. 



136 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Why did the British Ambassador to Russia believe 
that a general Russian mobilisation would lead to an 
immediate German declaration of war? 

It could only have been because he thought that the 
effect of such action on the part of the Russian 
Government would enable the German Military Staff to 
present to the German Government such an overwhelming 
case, based upon military exigencies, as the German 
Government would be incapable of resisting without 
imperilling its position and endangering the throne. 

We have been taught to believe that the case of military 
exigency which the German military authorities did, in 
fact, present, was purely mythical. 

But however we may condemn the German ultimatum 
to Russia, following the Russian general mobilisation, 
events which none can gainsay have proved that there was 
nothing mythical in the German military case. So 
advanced were the Russian preparations on the German 
frontier that on August 3 the Russians attacked Memel; 
on August 5 the Russian covering troops crossed the 
German frontier near Lyck; on August 7 Rennenkampf's 
main army crossed the German frontier at Suwalki, while 
Samsonov, one of the most popular generals in the Russian 
army, with five army corps, was advancing from Mlawa. 
On the 20th the Germans were routed at Gumbinnen after 
a four days' battle; on the 21st they were again heavily 
defeated between Frankenau and Orlau. By the 25th the 
whole of East Prussia up to the Vistula was in Russian 
occupation. 

The alleged results of that occupation were given in 
the Manifesto 1 issued last summer by the National 
Executive of the German Social Democratic Party, which, 
before the war, represented five million German voters, as 
follows : — 

"Four hundred thousand people in East Prussia have 
been forced to flee as refugees; 1,620 civilians have been 
murdered, and 433 wounded; 5,410 male civilians (amongst 
them helpless old men), 2,587 women, and 2,719 children 
have been removed to Russia; 24 towns, 572 villages, and 
236 farms, totalling 36,553 buildings, have been entirely 
or partly destroyed, and about 200,000 homes have been 
entirely or partly plundered and devastated." 

1 Published in the Labour Leader and some other papers, July 8, 
I9I5- 



TRUTH OR FICTION? 137 

It is, of course, impossible to check or verify these 
detailed statements. They may be exaggerated. All one 
can say is that the history of all wars records broadly 
similar results following in the wake of an invading army. 
Belgium, Poland, Galicia, and East Prussia are not 
exceptions to the melancholy rule. 

But the military occurrences in East Prussia which 
followed so rapidly the outbreak of war lend additional 
significance to the warning of the British Ambassador on 
July 25, and place the midnight order for the general 
mobilisation of the Russian armies in its true perspective 
among the events which have brought Europe to its present 
pass. 



CHAPTER XV. 
Russia's Military Preparations 1 

Everybody knows that hitherto our war plans always bore a defensive 
character, but even foreign countries are well aware that the idea of 
defensive tactics has now been abandoned, and that the Russian 
Army will be active. . . . Russian public opinion has a great interest 
in knowing that our country is ready for all eventualities. Si vis 
pacem para helium. Russia, in complete union with her Supreme 
Leader, wants peace, but she is ready. — "Bourse Gazette of Petrograd," 
March 13, 1914, in the course of an article commonly attributed to 
General Sukhomlinoff, then Russian Minister of War. 

The hatred towards Austria, which has accumulated in the heart 
of the Russian nation, has long been seeking an outlet in war, and is 
only being kept back within the limits of the last degree of patience 
by the Russian Government with the utmost difficulty. But there is 
an end to all things. A moment may arrive when even the Russian 
Government will prove impotent to fight down the hatred towards 
Austria-Hungary, which fills the Russian people, and then the 
crossing of the Austrian frontier by the Russian Army will become 
an unavoidable decision. — The "Golos Moskvy," March 12, 1914 — one 
of the most influential of Russian Conservative papers. 

The extension southwards is for Russia an historical, political, 
and economic necessity, and the foreign Power which stands in the 
way to this expansion is eo ipso an enemy Power. ... I say quite 
briefly and precisely : everywhere at every spot throughout the 
Levant, Russia has been, and is still, meeting, in trying to solve her 
most vital problem, the Eastern question, the resistance of Germany, 
acting either alone or as the Ally of Austria. Hence it has become 
quite clear to the Russians that if everything remains as it is, the 
road to Constantinople will have to be carried through Berlin. Even 
Vienna is but of secondary moment. — Dr. Paul Mitrofanoff — a 
Russian professor well known in political circles — in the "Preussische 
jahrbucher," May, 1914. 

In an article published only two months before the war, the 
military correspondent of The Times explained how well founded were 
the German fears of Russian aggression. He explained that Russia 
had raised her peace effectives by 150,000 men, "making a total peace 
strength of about 1,700,000, or approximately double that of 
Germany." He added: "The Russian reply to Germany is next 
door to a mobilization in time of peace, and it quite accounts for 
the embittered outburst of the Cologne Gazette, and for the German 
pot calling the Russian kettle black. . . . There are signs that 
Russia has done with defensive strategy. . . . The increased number 
of guns in the Russian Army Corps, the growing efficiency of the 
Army, and the improvements made or planned in strategic railways 

1 The Labour Leader, June 24, 191 5. 

138 



RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 139 

are, again, matters which cannot be left out of account. These 
things are well calculated to make the Germans anxious." — Times, 
June 3, 1914. 

For Englishmen, this war is primarily a struggle between 
Germany and France. For the Germans it is emphatically a Russo- 
German war. . . . The politics which made the war and the senti- 
ment that supported it had reference exclusively to Russia. ... It is 
for us in this country of the first importance to follow the direction of 
German thought. ... It is not merely a tie of sentiment or kinship 
which unites Germany to Austria. Austria is the flying buttress of 
her own Imperial fabric. Cut the buttress and the fabric itself will 
fall. — Mr. H. N. Brailsford in the "Contemporary Review," 
September, 1914. 

INTO the merits and dements of the Austro-Russian 
quarrel I do not propose to enter. The origin of the 
dispute lay in the personal rivalries and mutual trickeries 
of the Austrian and Russian Foreign Offices which 
culminated in the formal act of annexation by Austria 
(under Aerenthal) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the 
compensating advantage of an agitation in Russia's 
favour, backed by Austria, for the reopening of the 
Dardanelles problem, for which the Russian Foreign 
Office had been prepared to acquiesce in Austria's technical 
breach of the Berlin Treaty. I say "technical," because 
Austria had been in occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for thirty years, and the sovereignty of the Porte in those 
old Turkish provinces had become even more nominal 
than, for instance, in Egypt. A community of interests 
was thenceforth established between Russian diplomacy 
and Serbia. Serbia had grievances against Austria apart 
from the Bosnian annexation, but her essential case was 
— we are prone to forget it — that of a small kingdom 
desirous of becoming a large one at the expense of the 
territory of a powerful neighbour; an ambition which, in 
analogous cases, has been represented to the wider public 
as respectable or as disreputable according to the interests 
furthered or hindered by such ambition. In lending her 
occult influence to the Serbian propaganda aiming at the 
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian State — its 
avowed purpose — and in carrying out to the same end 
elaborate intrigues in Galicia, as to which I recommend 
a perusal of Stepankowsky's pamphlet 1 (it has the great 

1 "The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia" (Henry James Hall and 
Co., 25 South Molton Street, London. Price, 6d.). As to Russia's 
treatment of Poles and Ruthenians alike in the portions of Galicia 
which she has occupied since the war, I suggest a reference to the 
pamphlet entitled "The Resurrection of Poland" (Paris : 71 Rue de 
Rennes. Price, 6d.). 



i 4 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

merit of having- been published a few months before the 
war), Russian Imperialism may be regarded as justified 
by way of reprisals for the Bosnian affair, or it may not. 
That must be a matter of opinion. The fact remains that 
the future of the Dual Monarchy was unquestionably 
involved by these actions of the Russian Government and 
its agents, avowed or unavowed, and, such being the case, 
Germany's position in the "Balance" became vitally 
affected, as already explained. 

There was, however, a peace party at Potsdam and at 
Petrograd. At the end of 1910 a meeting had been 
arranged between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and the 
outcome of it was an agreement settling the vexed Bagdad 
railway question, so far as Russia and Germany were 
concerned. With that one specific cause of Russo-German 
difference removed, it might have been thought that the 
way was clear for an eventual Russo-Austrian 
accommodation through German auspices. But the 
bitterness of the Russo-Austrian quarrel — I repeat, an 
affair, in the main, of personalities moving like sinister 
shadows behind the screen of international politics — did 
not lessen. It became more intense. The formation of a 
Balkan alliance under Russian cegis occasioned much 
alarm in Vienna and disquietude in Berlin. The Serbian 
propaganda against the Dual Monarchy became even more 
virulent. The German military mission to Turkey — not 
the first, and an Englishman was in command of the 
Turkish fleet — caused a furious outcry in the Pan-Slavist 
Press of Russia. A campaign of invective raged in the 
Russian, Austrian, and German Press. These years, 
191 1 -1 2, were booming ones for the international "death 
providers"; the vultures gathered together, visualising 
death and decomposition from afar. 

And now, pursuing our investigations into the cause 
of German fears, let us glance at the war preparations of 
her mighty neighbour, the Colossus which haunted the 
imagination of our own governing classes for fifty years, 
although our homesteads and our civilisation were far 
removed from the shadow of its presence, while Germany 
lived beneath it. And my readers, as they peruse the story, 
will be careful, I trust, to repeat to themselves : "We are 
told that Germany alone made preparations for war; that 
Germany's attitude was alone provocative; that Germany 
alone planned and schemed; that Germany alone, and 
deliberately, set out to fling Europe into the maelstrom 



RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 141 

of war, with the fixed intention of 'subjugating-' her 
neighbours; that German 'militarism' is a disease 
peculiar to Germany; that Germany is and has always 
been the ravening wolf in the sheep-pen of European 
harmony and sweet reasonableness." 

With the opening of 191 3 there came an immense 
increase in the already notable recrudescence of Russian 
military activity, which The Times and other Tory 
newspapers have been good enough to record for us, and 
to record with an appearance of glee, eloquent of their 
own desires. Synchronising with these symptoms across 
her borders, Germany became more and more alarmed and 
disturbed. Writing as far back as 191 1, the famous 
"Military Correspondent" of The Times remarked: — 

"The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare 
of German strategists and, considering the pace at which 
Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, 
the nightmare is not likely to he soon conjured away." 

The underlying note of satisfaction is interesting and 
characteristic. I have already dealt with this "building 
up" as expressed in £ s. d. Its significance is not fully 
translatable by merely quoting figures of expenditure. I 
propose to confine myself largely to The Times. In the 
Russian supplement (March 28) an article, entitled "The 
Russian Army : The New National Spirit," by Lieut. - 
Colonel Arivenko, was given much prominence. In it we 
were told that : — 

"Not only foreign, but even Russian opinion, has but 
a vague idea of the profound changes that have taken 
place in the Russian Army since the war of 1904-5." 

These changes were enumerated. In 1905, service reduced 
from four to two and three-quarter years, securing an 
increase of 200,000 reservists; 1907, "Reserve units" 
transformed; 1907-9, military schools amended and 
enlarged, corps of time-expired non-commissioned officers 
created (20,000); 1910, new equipment with heavy guns 
and new transport, wireless stations, automobiles, aero- 
planes, etc. Arivenko assured us that Russia was pacific, 
but it would be a mistake to suppose that this tendency 
argued an "unpreparedness for war." The "blending of 
the new and the old" had given the Russian Army "a 
strength perhaps greater than it ever had before" : "in 
a possible future conflict it may be hoped that we shall not 



1 42 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

see a repetition of the reverses of 1904-5." A special 
ukase maintained on a war footing the mobilisation of 
half the Russian Army on the Austrian frontier, set up in 
1912. Another confirmed the Compulsory Service Amend- 
ment Act of 1 91 2, providing- that all persons born in the 
last quarter of 1892 should join the colours in 1913 
instead of 1914. — (The Times, April 11.) The Times 
"Military Correspondent" states as a "rumour" 
(August 22) that the Army is to be raised to 41 army 
corps; the artillery is being increased : 

"New formations in the West seem destined to 
strengthen the covering troops at least, if not to advance 
the line of concentration of the main armies, and there 
is talk of seven new cavalry regiments, of improved cadres 
for the reserves, and of a transformation of the strategic 
railway system." 

These measures are given in greater detail in the 
Russian Red Book, to wit : three new army corps, a divi- 
sion of sharpshooters, and two divisions of infantry — to be 
quartered in the Western provinces ; the artillery to be 
increased to 15,000 guns; the regular cavalry to be 
strengthened by the addition of a cavalry division to each 
army corps; the entire system governing the reserves to 
be modified in order to make them "a much more powerful, 
numerous, and serviceable unit." The St. Petersburg 
correspondent states (Times, September 10) : — 

"The degree to which the war strength of the Russian 
Army will be affected by the changes now coming into 
force is not known, but competent observers who put the 
peace footing at 1,400,000 are inclined to name 3,500,000 
men as the greatest possible war strength. That Russia 
has unlimited reserves of untrained men capable of creating 
a still vaster army if necessary is, of course, beyond doubt. 
By general consent the Russian Army has 
never been in better condition. It is well clothed, well 
fed, and while the evidence as to the state of its artillery 
is inconclusive, its musketry training has been greatly 
improved." 

Meantime the military relations between Russia and 
France were close and continuous. The Grand Duke 
Nicholas, who had attended the French manoeuvres in 
1912, telegraphed to General Joffre to represent the French 
Army at the Russian manoeuvres (Times, June 17). 



RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 143 

Alluding to these intimate relations, The Times St. Peters- 
burg- correspondent remarks (September 10) : — 

"It is also clear that, although for many years past 
Staff visits have been interchanged, at no period has there 
been such close co-operation on military matters between 
the two countries or has each army watched so closely 
the development of the other as at present." 

It was — as sundry revelations in the French news- 
papers subsequently established — owing to Russian 
pressure during M. Poincare's visit to Petrograd in 
August, 1912, that the Three Years' Law for the French 
Army had been decided upon in principle^ 1 ) Of course, 
all these Russian and French preparations have been 
represented here as the result of German action. The 
quotation in Chapter XI. from Colonel Boucher's book 
disposes of the fiction. But the real point is — and this 
has been my central argument — that preparations for war 
were being carried on by both rival groups, and not by 
Germany alone. In his speech in the Reichstag on 
April 8, 1 91 3, introducing the new Army Estimates, the 
German Chancellor remarked : — 

"Germany was like no other country . . . wedged 
in between the Slav world and the French." 

Much what Mr. Lloyd George had been impressing 
upon a British audience five years before. He 
continued : — 

"Germany could never compete with Russia, whose 
Emperor could always call out more men than Germany. 
In any war Germany would stake her confidence upon 
the courage and the spirit of the people, but it was 
necessary to give figures to show what extraordinary 
military efforts Germany's neighbours were making. In 
Russia there was a most marvellous economic develop- 
ment of the giant Empire, with its inexhaustible natural 
resources, and an Army reorganisation such as Russia had 
never known, as regarded the excellence of the material, 
the organisation, and the speed of conversion from peace 
to war strength." 

That was symptomatic of German feeling. 
A necessarily brief reference to accessible information 
in 1913 would be incomplete without recalling Colonel 

1 Vide Chapter XVI. 



i 4 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Seely's reply to Mr. Hunt's question in the House on 
June 5. Mr. Hunt asked : — 

"What additions had been made during the last two 
years to the peace strength of the armies of Russia, 
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and France. ? 

The reply was as follows : — 

Russia. 

Additions made 75,000 

Present Peace Establishment ... 1,284,000 
Future : not yet ascertained. 

France. 

Additions proposed 183,715 

Future Peace Establishment ... 741,572 

Germany. 

Additions made 3^,373 

Additions proposed 136,000 

Future Peace Establishment ... 821,964 

AUSTRO-HUNGARY. 

Additions made 58,505 

Present Peace Establishment ... 473,643 
Future : not yet ascertained. 

The figures, as will be seen, are incomplete, but their 
very incompleteness adds eloquence to the totals. Even 
on the strength of these incomplete figures, and taking 
the Russian and Austrian "present" peace establishments 
as the basis of reckoning, we see an enormous numerical 
preponderance of units in favour of the Franco-Russian 
combination as against the Teutonic Powers; in other 
words, we get the same result as when applying the test 
of military expenditure. Thus : — 

Franco-Russian Combination : 2,025,572. 
Teutonic Powers: 1,295,607. 
The fatal year 1914 began with an intensification, if 
possible, of the Russian preparations, accompanied by 
much less reticence in the Russian Press. In March 
Russia answered the question which Colonel Seely had 
been unable to do the previous June (see above), as to her 
"future peace establishment," by extending the period 
of service for recruits and by increasing the annual 



RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 145 

contingent to 130,000, which increased the permament 
peace footing by 500,000 men. On March 12 the Golos 
Moskvy, an influential Conservative organ, wrote : — 

"The hatred towards Austria which has accumulated 
in the hearts of the Russian nation has long been seeking 
an outlet in war, and is only being kept back within the 
limits of the last degree of patience by the Russian 
Government with the utmost difficulty. But there is an 
end to all things. A moment may arrive when even the 
Russian Government will prove impotent to fight down 
the hatred towards Austro-Hungary which fills the 
Russian people, and then the crossing of the Austrian 
frontiers by the Russian Army will become an unavoidable 
decision." 

The Novoe Vremya — the organ of the Pan-Slavists — 
had already stated (March 7) : "The hour is approaching. 
It is necessary to work on the Army from top 
to bottom, day and night." That same month was 
notable for the introduction of a Bill into the Duma 
imposing heavy duties upon imported flour and rye from 
Germany. The incendiary utterances of the Russian 
Press were studiously kept from British readers, and the 
retaliatory utterances of the German Press were given 
the widest publicity, especially in The Times and its 
compeers — thus continuing to foster the impression here 
that the recrimination and intolerance were all on the 
German side (see, for example, The Times of March 5 
and 6). In March came the announcement of the forth- 
coming visits by King George to Paris and by President 
Poincare to Petrograd. On March 12 the St. Petersburg 
correspondent of The Times reports : — 

"According to the newspapers large extraordinary 
military and naval credits have been discussed in a secret 
sitting of the Duma." 

On March 19 we have a further telegram from the 
same source, headed by The Times thus : "Russia's Giant 
Army. Unprecedented Peace Effectives," and con- 
taining the following paragraphs : — 

"I understand that the Duma Committee has agreed 
to the Bill of Indemnity retrospecfively sanctioning the 
prolongation of the service of time-expired men for three 
months after the legal limit. The fourth class, which 



146 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

should have returned home on January 14, is, therefore, 
due to be released on April 14. As the conscripts form- 
ing - the first class have been with the Colours since last 
August and are now able, if necessary, to take the field, 
the Russian Army has now attained an effective numerical 
strength hitherto unprecedented, being not far short of 
1,700,000. . . . There is not the slightest difficulty 
in providing an additional 150,000 conscripts this year." 

A further telegram, on March 29, states : — 

"The Russian Government has drawn up a pro- 
gramme which provides that orders shall be placed for 
330 aeroplanes." 

On April 6 the same correspondent announces the 
"Russian test mobilisation." 

In July President Poincare went to Petrograd. On 
the 19th The Times Petrograd correspondent tele- 
graphed : — 

"Frequent discussion of European problems is a 
necessity of the alliance — no less than naval and military 
preparations. Naturally, it is the progress of the Russian 
Army which most concerns France, but the naval renais- 
sance indicated by the approaching entry into commission 
of the first two of the eight large ships of the Russian 
naval programme is by no means the least interesting 
political event since President Poincare's last visit to 
Russia." 

On July 20 the Novoe Vremya, discussing the merits 
of the Triple Entente, remarked that "its superiority 

ON LAND AND SEA JUSTIFIES MORE ENERGETIC LANGUAGE 
IN THE COUNCILS OF EUROPE. " 

The British Ambassador at Vienna had ascertained on 
July 15 what the character of the Austro-Hungarian Note 
to Serbia would be. 1 He advised the Foreign Office 

1 The following foot-note appeared in the Labour Leader of 
September 30, 1915 : — ■ 

A correspondent, who is a diligent student of the Continental 
Press, draws my attention to a controversy in Die Neue Zeit between 
two prominent "Socialists, David and Kautsky, over this statement. 
As the point raised is of very considerable historic importance, it 
may be well to throw light upon the matter. The passage alluded 
to reads as under, and the italicised sentences are those which have 
occasioned the controversy : — 

The British Ambassador at Vienna had ascertained on 

July 1$ what the character of the Austro-Hungarian Note to 

Servia would be. He 'advised the Foreign Office on July 16. 



RUSSIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS 147 

on July 16. It is reasonable to assume that the Foreign 
Office communicated its information to the British Ambas- 
sador at Petrograd. On July 21 President Poincare and 
tne French Premier and Foreign Minister were in Petro- 
grad, and the decision of the Franco-Russian combination 
was then, no doubt, arrived at. 

I have made it clear, I think, why, from a military 
point of view, Germany had reasons for anxiety for her 
safety, and how the element of fear in her case cannot 
be dismissed as idle fiction. I have written enough from 
that standpoint — and quoted enough — to demonstrate the 
untenability of the popular idea which ascribes sole 
responsibility for this war to Germany. 

It is reasonable to assume that the Foreign Office communicated 
its information to the British Ambassador at Petrograd. On 
July 21, President Poincare - and the French Premier and Foreign 
Minister were in Petrograd, and the decision of the Franco- 
Russian combination was then, no doubt, arrived at. 
This passage is specially emphasised by David in reply to a 
criticism by Kautsky on David's book on the war — a book, by the 
way, which I have not seen. 

In rejoinder, Kautsky impugns the accuracy of my statement 
about the British Ambassador at Vienna. He points out that the 
British White Book opens on July 20, with a despatch dated that 
day from Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador at Berlin, in which 
Sir E. Grey stated that he told the German Ambassador in London 
on that day (July 26) that he "had not heard anything recently" (i.e., 
anything about Vienna's intentions towards Serbia). Kautsky 
naturally concludes — being insufficiently informed — that my state- 
ment as to our Ambassador at Vienna having ascertained the 
character of the impending Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia on 
July 15, and having telegraphed his information to the Foreign Office 
on July 16 is nothing but a "surmise." 

But Kautsky is wrong. I made no surmise. I stated the facts. 
Kautsky has evidently not read the later despatch from the British 
Ambassador at Vienna dated September 1, and published by the 
Foreign Office as a separate publication after the issue of the White 
Book. This later despatch now forms No. 161 of the id. White 
Book. If he will turn to that despatch Kautsky will find the follow., 
ing passage : — 

As for myself, no indication was given me by Count 
Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private 
source that I received on 15th July the forecast of what was 
about to happen, which I telegraphed to you the following day. 
We have it, therefore, on Sir Maurice de Bunsen's own admis- 
sion, that on July 15 he became aware of the impending Note to 
Servia, and that he telegraphed his information to the Foreign 
Office on Tub/ 16. 

How this is to be reconciled with Sir Edward Grey's despatch to 
our Ambassador at Berlin on July 20 it is not my business to inquire. 
Diplomacy is a fearful and wonderful thing, and it is not surprising 
if, in the maze of tergiversations, the parties responsible for editing 
official despatches should sometimes inadvertently contrive to let out 
the truth. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

Russia and the French Three Years' Military 
Service Law 

BEFORE I deal with the naval expenditure of the rival 
European groups, it would seem advisable to refer in 
greater detail to the statement in the previous chapter 
relating to Russia's connection with the revival in 1913 
of the French "Three Years' Law" for military service. 

The situation in which France found herself in the 
opening months of 191 2 was this. The entire nation was 
militarised. By this I mean that every adult male not 
physically unfit was compelled to serve two years in the 
army at a stretch, and so many weeks or days in every 
subsequent year until the age of 45. In this respect the 
situation of France was unique among the Great Powers. 
That is a very important point which is sometimes 
forgotten. 

Now a permanent situation of that kind constitutes a 
terrific burden upon any nation. The fundamental cause 
of it was the retention by the Republican Government of 
la revanche as the foundation for all French foreign policy. 
With the abandonment of that policy the burden would 
fall, but so long as the Republican Government's fixed 
resolution to regain Alsace-Lorraine governed the external 
policy of France, the burden was there. Of late years it 
had reached the intensity above described, owing to the 
growth in the German population, so that while a numerous 
section of German citizens escaped a prolonged term of 
military service, Germany could still maintain an army 
which, on its peace footing, was sufficiently large to compel 
France — given her foreign policy — to levy this tribute on 
all her sons, in order to keep pace with her Eastern 
neighbour. 

And even so, in a decade or two, France's capacity to 
keep pace would automatically disappear through the mere 
factor of population. 

This cruel dilemma it was which had persuaded many 

148 



RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 149 

patriotic Frenchmen that the policy of la revanche must 
in the national interest be given up. They were fortified 
in their view by the marked change which had come over 
public sentiment in the annexed provinces. Forty years 
of increasing material prosperity and inter-marriages had 
wrought a profound modification in popular feeling. But 
for the blundering- brutality and stupidity displayed by the 
German military on several occasions this sentiment would 
have become even more generalised in a territory whose 
inhabitants are, and have always been, mainly of German 
stock. Except in certain localised areas, public opinion 
was verging more and more towards full autonomy within 
the German Empire. 

It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that an actual 
party had come into existence in France with the definite 
purpose of working for a gradual acceptance of the 
inevitable, and a burial of the hatchet. It was, in short, 
a peace party ; but it had no exclusive political complexion. 
Men bitterly opposed to one another on domestic affairs — 
like Jaures and Caillaux — led it in their respective ways. 
The books of Marcel Sembat, 1 Georges Bourdon, 2 and 
others, ministered to it amongst the general public. The 
movement was gaining steadily, despite the formidable 
obstacles it had to contend against on both sides of the 
frontier .... and elsewhere. It is idle, alas ! to deny that 
the British Foreign Office view contemplated any genuine 
accommodation between France and Germany with 
alarm, and during the Morocco crisis of 1911 The Times, 
the Spectator, and other organs which express that view, 
went astonishing lengths in their covert threats to the 
Caillaux Cabinet for its pacific tendencies, while The 
Times' habitual sneers at Jaures — the only great political 
figure whom the Republic has thrown up since Gambetta, 
and unquestionably the most honest and far-seeing of 
French politicians — took on a more acrid note. The 
despatch to The Times, published from Paris on July 20th 
of that year (191 1), and to which it gave editorial support, 
reveals as no accessible contemporary document (except 
the Belgian diplomatic despatches) reveals, the attitude of 
the British diplomatic world towards the prospect of a 
Franco-German reconciliation. 3 

1 Op. cit. 

3 L'Enigme Allemand. 

3 Vide "Ten Years' Secret Diplomacy" : op. cit., and "The Policy 
of the Entente" : op. cit. 

(iz) 



iSo TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Needless to say, such a consummation was as distaste- 
ful to the Pan-Slavist elements in Russian foreign policy 
as it was to The Times and to those whose views The Times 
expressed. 

Such, then, was the position of France when, in the 
spring of 1913, the French Government brought forward 
a proposal to increase the term of military service to three 
years — i.e., to require every adult Frenchman to serve 
three consecutive years in the army. This converted the 
existing burden, already grievous, into an unbearable one, 
and those who opposed it in France did so from the 
intimate conviction that if this burden were imposed, war 
or revolution must ensue. 

How came the French Government to take this step? 

The statement that Russia pressed the French Govern- 
ment to adopt the Three Years' Law was repeatedly made 
by the French Radicals and Socialists during the passionate 
discussions which that measure provoked in France. The 
struggle which raged around it became a trial of strength 
between the peace party in France and the war party; 
between those who were averse to a war with Germany 
and those who were anxious for it; between those who 
objected to France becoming the catspaw of Russia and 
those who were willing to go to any lengths to meet 
Russia's exigencies, in order to bring about an opportunity 
for the revanche. I invite the reader to peruse the columns 
of The Times in this connection. During the whole period 
covered by this desperate struggle between opposing forces 
in France The Times supported the Chauvinistic elements 
in the French nation. 

It not only supported them — that would have been 
natural enough in view of the bitter detestation of Germany 
and her Emperor which inspired those who directed the 
foreign department of The Times. But it supported 
them with a concentrated fury, with a frenzy of zeal, with 
an invective against the other side so great, that the battle 
which was being fought might have been one between 
British political parties rather than French. As in 1905-6, 
when the first Morocco crisis occurred, as in 191 1 during 
the second crisis, so in 1912-13-14 over the Three Years' 
Law, The Times was to all intents and purposes the organ 
of the French extremists. It is absolutely impossible that 
The Times should have steered this course without the 



RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 151 

tacit — to put it no higher — approval of the Foreign Office, 
not necessarily of the Foreign Minister, but assuredly of 
the Department itself and of the British Embassy in Paris. 
The charge made by the French Socialists received a 
"sort of" denial by the French Premier (M. Barthou) in 
the Chamber on July 16, 1913, whereupon several Deputies 
shouted that the Finance Minister had himself admitted 
the truth of it. A curious scene ensued. M. Dumont (the 
Finance Minister) declared that what he had said was, 
that he would accept the Three Years' Law rather than 
expose the French Ambassador at Petrograd "to 
humiliation." This ingenuous explanation evoked the 
natural retort that if the project for the restoration of a 
law which ensured a three years' instead of a two years' 
service with the colours for all Frenchmen was a spon- 
taneous act of the French Government, why should the 
French Ambassador at Petrograd be "humiliated" if the 
French Chamber rejected the project? The charge was 
persisted in and, indeed, maintained after the Bill became 
law, and on June 6, 1914, Le Temps — which plays the part 
in French foreign politics that The Times plays with us — 
found it necessary to insert a denial from its Petrograd 
correspondent. The amusing sequel was, of course, con- 
cealed from public opinion over here. Le Temps was 
compelled to print a denial of the denial by stating in its 
issue of June 8 that the French Ambassador at Petrograd 
(M. Paleologue) had only accepted the post on the explicit 
condition that the Three Years' Law should be maintained 
in its integrity as "being accurately informed of the 
sentiments of the Russian Court and Government, he was 
in a position to inform the French Government that the 
controversies raised in France by the Law were being 
closely followed," and that "if the Law were in the least 
impaired he (M. Paleologue) would be compelled to 
resign." 

Further evidence is not lacking. On August 4, 191 2, 
the foreign affairs writer on the Paris paper, Le Gaulois, 
stated that, "it was by no means impossible that new 
military, as well as naval arrangements, between Russia 
and France might be under consideration, although it was 
unlikely that the public would learn anything about them 
until they were ready for practical execution." This was 
written on the eve of the President's departure for 
Petrograd, and the anticipation proved, so far as the naval 
arrangement was concerned, so remarkably accurate that 



152 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

the conclusion of a Franco-Russian naval convention was 
announced immediately after the President's return. This 
convention, as The Times' Paris correspondent was again 
good enough to inform us, had been "preceded by an 
exchange of views — perhaps I ought to say by arrange- 
ments — between the British and French naval authorities." 
In the case of the military arrangements, the writer in Le 
Gaidois was equally accurate when he prophesied that the 
public would know nothing about them until they were 
ready for practical execution. For the French public was 
allowed to know nothing about them until they became 
embodied in the Three Years' Law. 

When, finally, the Three Years' Law. was brought 
forward, it was vigorously opposed by the redoubtable 
M. Clemenceau, who, in the course of his meteoric career, 
has overturned more French Governments than any other 
living French politician. This was a serious matter, and 
an interview between M. C16menceau and the President 
(M. Poincar£) was, therefore, arranged. The confidential 
conversation which took place leaked out. These things 
invariably do in France. Several French papers 
(L'Humanite and Gil Bias amongst them) published 
detailed accounts of the President's arguments to 
M. Clemenceau. The accounts concurred. Here is 
L'Humanite" 's : — 

"He, M. Poincare - (the President), reminded his visitor 
of the visit he had made to St. Petersburg the preceding 
summer, when he was still Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
He apprised him of the very clear impressions he had 
formed during his sojourn among our Allies. The 
President gave him (M. Clemenceau) to understand that 
grave events are about to take place, that sooner or later 
the question of Austria will undoubtedly be raised and that 
serious international complications woidd not fail to arise. 
. . . Doubts had been expressed (in Petrograd) as to the 
state of preparations in France, whose military situation 
since the Two Years' Law had been far from favourable as 
compared with the situation when the Alliance had been 
concluded. He (the President) had been given to under- 
stand in a friendly way that there was at St. Petersburg 
a Germanophil party which constantly insinuated — not 
without some show of reason — that there was no longer 
any equality between the military strength of Germany 
and France. That is why he (the President) and his 
Ministry had decided to re-introduce the Three Years' 



RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 153 

Law, whose object was to produce abroad the effect desired 
by France's Allies. That was also why M. Delcasse had 
been sent to Russia. In fact, the Franco-Russian Alliance 
was threatened with disruption, because France was not 
sufficiently strong, or, at least, did not appear to be so." 

The accuracy of this account of the Clemenceau- 
Poincare conversation, so pregnant of what lay ahead, was 
never denied. Only five weeks before the war — June 23, 
1914 — M. Justin de Godart, who afterwards became one 
of the Under-Secretaries at the French War Office, wrote 
a vehement article in Le Courrier Eur ope en (Paris), in the 
course of which he said : "I am perfectly convinced that 
we have abandoned our freedom, so far as our military 
organisation is concerned." He went on to say that it 
was an open secret that the President had brought back 
with him from Petrograd two years before, an order, or 
at least a suggestion, that France should re-enact the Three 
Years' Law. We are no longer masters of our defence 
strategy. . . . Our patriotism rebels when we are told 
that the Three Years' service is France's only means of 
protection. Has the Republic really become the slave of 
Russia?" 

This summary would be incomplete without a reference 
to the striking despatches of the Belgian diplomatic repre- 
sentative in Paris (Baron Guillaume) 1 in connection with 
the events summarised in the President's interview with 
M. Clemenceau. Baron Guillaume reports from Paris 
(February 21, 1913) that M. Delcasse's nomination to the 
post of French Ambassador to Russia burst upon Paris 
"like a bombshell." On April 17 the same diplomatist 
reports the "increasingly bellicose and imprudent" 
character of French public opinion. On June 12 he refers 
as follows to the Three Years' Law: — 

"It is, therefore, practically certain that French 
legislation will adopt a measure that the country is unlikely 
to be able to bear for long. The obligations of the new law 
will be so heavy for the population, the expenses it will 
involve will be so exorbitant that the country will soon 
protest, and France will be confronted with this dilemma; 
either an abdication which she could not bear, or speedy 
war. The responsibility of those who have dragged the 
nation into this situation will be heavy. . . . The propa- 

1 Op. cit. 



!54 



TRUTH AND THE WAR 



ganda in favour of the Three Years' Law, which was bound 
to lead to a revival of Chauvinism, has been admirably 
prepared and staged. It paved the way for M. Poincare's 
election to the Presidency. It is being pursued to-day 
without caring for the dangers to which it gives rise. 
Uneasiness is general in the country." 

As the months went on, Baron Guillaume's anxiety 
increased. Writing on January 16, 1914, he reports : — 

"I have already had the honour of informing you that 
it is Messrs. Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand and their 
friends who have invented and pursued the nationalist, 
boastful and jingoistic policy, whose revival we have 
witnessed. It is a danger for Europe — and for Belgium. 
I see in it the greatest peril which threatens the peace of 
Europe to-day. Not that I am entitled to suppose that 
the Government of the Republic is disposed to trouble the 
peace of Europe deliberately — I think rather the contrary 
— but because the attitude which the Barthou party has 
taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of the 
increase of military tendencies in Germany. The bellicose 
follies of the Turks and the Three Years' Law appear to me 
to constitute the only dangers to be feared from the point 
of view of European peace. I feel able to indicate the 
perils which the present military legislation of France have 
created. France, weakened by the decrease in her nativity, 
cannot long support the three years' system of military 
service. The effort is too considerable, financially, and 
as regards personal burdens. France cannot sustain such 
an effort, and what will she do to escape from the position 
in which she will have placed herself?" 

Writing on May 8, 19 14, he says : — 

"It is incontestable that during the past few months 
the French nation has become more Chauvinistic and more 
confident in itself. The same men, instructed and com- 
petent, who, two years ago, showed lively anxiety at the 
mere mention of possible difficulties between France and 
Germany, have changed their tone. They now say they 
are certain of victory. They dwell largely on the progress, 
which is truly very real, accomplished in the army of the 
Republic, and contend that they could at least hold the 
German army in check sufficiently long to enable Russia 
to mobilise, to concentrate her troops and to fling herself 
upon her Western neighbour. One of the most dangerous 



RUSSIA & FRENCH MILITARY SERVICE LAW 155 

elements in the situation is the re-enactment in France of 
the Three Years' Law. It was imposed light-heartedly by 
the militarist party, and the country cannot sustain it. 
Two years from now it will either have to be abrogated or 
war must ensue." 

His final warning is conveyed on June 9 : — 

"The Press campaign of the last few days in favour of 
the Three Years' Law has been one of extreme violence. 
Every possible means has been adopted to influence public 
opinion, and it has even been sought to involve the 
personality of General Joffre. We have witnessed, too, 
the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg taking, 
contrary to all usage, a somewhat dangerous initiative for 
the future of France. Is it true that the St. Petersburg 
Cabinet imposed the adoption, of the Three Years' Law 
upon this country and is pressing to-day with all its weight 
to secure the maintenance of that law? I have not 
succeeded in obtaining light upon this delicate point, but 
it would be the graver, seeing that those who direct the 
destinies of the Empire of the Tsars cannot be ignorant of 
the fact that the effort which is thus demanded of the 
French nation is excessive and cannot long be sustained. 
Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based, 
then, upon the conviction that events are so near that the 
tool it proposes to place in the hands of its ally can be 
used?" 

As Mr. Lowes Dickinson remarks, 1 "what a sinister 
vista is opened up by this passage." He adds : "I have 
no wish to insinuate that the suspicion here expressed was 
justified. It is the suspicion itself that is the point. " Yes, 
but when Mr. Lowes Dickinson wrote that, the French 
evidence summarised above was not at his disposal. Can 
any sane man doubt the real facts after perusing it? 

Surely hypocrisy has reached its apotheosis when, in 
face of this history, The Times, of all papers, remarks 
in its leading article of May 15, 1916 : — 

"Her (Germany's) onslaught upon her neighbours was 
wanton. Nobody thought of attacking her; there was no 
coalition against her; and she knew there was none. 
Relying upon her preparedness and upon the unprepared- 
ness of her neighbours, she suddenly assailed them." 

1 "The European Anarchy" (op. cit.). 



CHAPTER XVII. 



European Navalism 1 

IN June, 1900, Germany issued her famous " Navy Act," 
providing for the reconstruction and a large increase, 
of her naval armament which at that time, for a nation de- 
pendent so greatly upon imported raw material for her in- 
dustries, was relatively insignificant. What, at that 
period, were Germany's potential foes, France and Russia, 
spending on their navies compared with her own expendi- 
ture? It is interesting to recall the figures because the 
relative positions of the rival groups before the "Naval 
Act" have been lost sight of in the increasing virulence 
of the Anglo-German controversy as the execution of the 
German programme proceeded. 

TABLE I. 

Naval Expenditure of France, Russia, and Germany 
in the Five Years 1 897-1 901. 



r ears. 


France. 


Russia. 


Germany. 




£ 


£ 


£ 


1897 .. 


10,444,000 


■ 6,239,000 . 


6,467,000 


1898 .. 


11,716,000 


. 7,089,000 . 


• 5.972,000 


1899 .. 


12,081,000 . 


. 8,652,000 


6,485,000 


1900 


12,511,000 


. 9,962,000 


. 7,472,000 


1901 


13,107,000 . 


• 11,659,000 


9,642,000 



Germany's naval programme was deliberate and open. 
It was adhered to with one exception. An amendment 
publicly issued in 1908 provided that battleships and 
cruisers were to be replaced after 20 years, instead of after 
25 years, as stipulated in the Act. Various attempts were 
made at various times in this country to establish that, side 
by side with her open and avowed programme, Germany 
was pursuing a secret programme of accelerated con- 
struction. These attempts culminated in 1909 in one of 
the most discreditable Parliamentary episodes of recent 

1 The Labour Leader, July 15, 1915. 
156 



EUROPEAN NAVALISM 157 

years; what Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P., editor of the Navy 
League Annual, and in some measure the chief of the "Big 
Navy" men (and, consequently, not suspect of pacifism, 
"little Englandism," or any of the other "isms") described 
as "one of the most portentous pieces of Parliamentarv 
humbug ever practised upon the electorate." I shall nut 
revive it here. Those who wish to re-familiarise them- 
selves with its unsavoury features may be referred to Mr. 
Hirst's volume. 1 But when the history of Anglo-German 
relations during the past decade is impartially written, the 
part which this episode played in embittering those relations 
will be adjudged as it deserves, and the historian will note 
that the gross deception practised upon Parliament 
remained uncensured. It is, however, well to recall these 
words pronounced by Mr. Churchill after the great 
"scare" : — 

"That law (the Navy Act) as fixed by Parliament, has 
not in any way been exceeded, and I gladly bear witness to 
the fact that the statements of the German Ministers about 
it have been strictly borne out by events." 

Following the precedent employed in regard to military 
expenditure, I will now give the figures of naval expenditure 
for the ten years preceding the war on the part of 
Germany and Austria, and of the Franco-Russian com- 
bination respectively. 

TABLE II. 

Total Naval Expenditure in the Decade 1905-14 (15). 

The Teutonic Powers — 

Germany ^185,205, 164 

Austro-Hungary ^50, 692 ,814 

The Franco-Russian Combination — 

France ^"161,72 1 ,387 

Russia £1 44, 246, 5 13 

Total expenditure by the Teutonic Powers ^235,897,978 
Total expenditure by the Franco-Russian 

Combination ^305>967,900 

Thus we find that in these last ten years the naval 
expenditure of France and Russia actually exceeded that 
of Germany and Austria by ^70,069,922. 

The Russian figures must naturally be read in con- 
junction with the fact that the destruction of Russia's most 
powerful ships in the war with Japan (1904-5) necessitated 
fresh construction. No such argument applies, of course, 

"The Six Panics" (Methuen). 



1 <«' 



158 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

to the French Navy, which, after a period of decline, began 
to revive once more. It is surprising to note that in the 
last ten years France alone has spent only ^24,383,777 
less than Germany on her navy ; more than ever surprising 
when one bears in mind that France's naval expenditure 
showed an enormous increase in the second period of the 
decade (i.e., 1910-14), or, in other words, since — as we 
learned last year — British support was virtually assured 
to her in the event of a general European conflagration. 
Moreover, if we take into account the effect of the Japanese 
war upon the Russian naval position, we must also take 
into account the character of Russia's recent naval expendi- 
ture and the interpretation consistently placed upon it by 
the mouthpieces in the British press of the British govern- 
ing class. 

In June, 1912, eight years after the Japanese War, the 
Duma voted a sum of ^43,000,000 for the navy, to be 
spent over a period of five years, but the Russian Year 
Book of 191 4 mentions that five years hence, and perhaps 
"even sooner," a further demand would be made upon the 
Duma for ^78,300,000 more. We must go to the Times 
to get the ever-faithful reflection of the Russian official 
mind and its interpretation by the British official mind. We 
read in the issue of that journal for June 24, 1912 : — 

"But however significant the attitude of the Govern- 
ment on the Navy Bill may appear in respect of internal 
policy, it is vastly more important in respect of foreign 
policy. In his preamble to the Bill, Admiral Grogorovitch 
repeatedly dwelt on the respective relations of Russia and 
Germany as a fundamental reason for the revival of 
Russia's naval power. . . . These statements in them- 
selves suffice to indicate the course to which Russia's 
foreign policy has been irrevocably committed, and for this 
reason the Navy Bill should finally allay all suspicions and 
remove any doubt which may arise, both in this country 
and abroad as to the fidelity of Russia to her alliances and 
agreements. The details of the shipbuilding programme 
itself are, if anything, still more convincing. The type of 
vessel selected for the future battle squadrons shows that 
they are not exclusively intended for operations within the 
narrow waters of the Baltic. All the Dreadnoughts, 
whether building or projected, are to have a large coal 
capacity, which would enable them to operate either in the 
North Sea or in the Mediterranean. . . . Although the 
programme approved by the Duma is to be carried out in 



EUROPEAN NAVALISM 159 

five years its effect cannot fail to make itself felt long before 
that time and to stiffen the foreign policy of this country 
in regard to neighbouring Powers." 

There could hardly have been a more direct threat ! 

In estimating how far the element of fear has been the 
most powerful factor in Germany's military and naval pre- 
parations and in the series of events culminating in this 
war (and my fundamental contention is that mutual fear 
has been at the bottom of the whole tragedy), we are 
bound — in this matter of naval expenditure — to take into 
account the naval expenditure of Great Britain. Obviously, 
Britain's naval preparations could not be left out of the 
German reckoning, since not only the British official case, 
but the British popular case for viewing Germany with 
distrust, suspicion, and alarm, was Germany's determina- 
tion to carry out the provisions of the Naval Act of 1900 
— in other words, to have a strong navy. Moreover, the 
close connection between Russia's increased naval expendi- 
ture and Russian and British foreign policy was becoming 
visible. to the naked eye, let alone to official sources of in- 
formation. The arrangement between Messrs. Vickers, 
Ltd., and the Russian Government was public property. 
The Times announced (June 25, 1913) with visible satis- 
faction that British shipbuilding knowledge and technical 
advice had been secured for Russia's need. We were told 
of special factories, large orders for new guns, and so 
forth. Six months later The Times was again chronicling 
a combination between Vickers, Ltd., and the leading 
banks of St. Petersburg for the establishment of "exten- 
sive gun works" in Russia — this was considered of "great 
importance" to Anglo-Russian relations. A month before 
the tragedy at Sarajevo, we find The Times' St. Petersburg 
correspondent reporting Russia's Foreign Minister (M. 
Sazonoff) as stating in the Duma : — 

"The establishment of a sound friendship between 
France and Great Britain and also between Great Britain 
and Russia had brought Great Britain within the sphere of 
political communion previously existing between Russia 
and France. ..." 

Referring to the discussions concerning the conversion of 
the Triple Entente into a formal Alliance (mooted by Lord 
Esher — a member of the Committee of Imperial Defence — 
in The Times), M. Sazonoff went on to say : — 

"It seems to me a somewhat exaggerated importance 
has been attributed to a mere matter of form. There may 



160 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

be a formal alliance not based on real community of in- 
terests and not supported by the reciprocal sentiments of 
the peoples. On the other hand there may be political com- 
binations of Powers imposed by unity of aims. In the 
latter case friendly co-operation is assured, irrespective of 
the form and scope of the written word. The important 
thing is that we should not stand still." 

What, then, was Britain's naval expenditure in the 
decade 1905-14, the period under review? 

TABLE III. 

British naval expenditure, 1905-14... £^391, 916,47c 1 

We find, then, that in the event of a European war Ger- 
many had to reckon upon meeting on the sea a combina- 
tion of possible foemen — two of them certain, one prob- 
lematical, but having- to be taken into account — who in 
ten years had spent in preparations for a naval war a total 
sum of ^697,884,370, against her own and her Ally's 
expenditure on such preparations in the same period 
amounting to ^235,897,978 : a combination, in other words, 
which had spent' ^461,986,392 more than Germany and 
Austria combined, and ^"512,697,206 more than Germany 
alone on naval equipment — for war. 2 

Say anything you like about Germany and the Germans, 
but can you, in the face of these naval figures and in the 
face of the military figures precedently given and by none 
challenged, continue to say, with due regard to truth and 
honesty, that Germany's preparations for war, compared 
with the preparations of her enemies, were such as to make 
it unquestionable that she was hatching a vast conspiracy 
to subjugate Europe? 

1 Less some 40 millions under Pensioris, Coast-Guard, Reserves, 
and Steamship subsidies, for which no corresponding provision exists 
in the votes of foreign Powers, except France and Italy. (House of 
Commons return, August, 1914.) 

2 The Peace Society — 47 New Bond Street, E.C. — has issued this 
year (1916) a detailed table entitled "The Armed Peace of Europe, 
1914." In this table the "annual cost of the Army and Navy" of 
the Russo-French Combination and the Austro-German combination 
is given as follows : — 

Russia .£105,955,980 Austro-Hungary... £24,992,000 

France 81,065,967 Germany 59.°34.77° 

Total £187,021,947 Total £84,026,770 

According to the same table, Great Britain's expenditure was 
£80,430,000. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
The Spectre of Fear 1 

It is the universal reign of Fear which has caused the system of 
alliances, believed to be a guarantee of peace, but now proved to be 
the cause of world-wide disaster. . . . And this universal Fear has 
at last produced a cataclysm far greater than any of those which it 
was hoped to avert. — Hon. Bertrand Russell in " War the Offspring 
of Fear" (Union of Democratic Control publications: September, 
1914.) 

WOULD suggest, then, that this charge of ' 'pro- 
German be squarely faced. What was, and is, 
the basis of that charge? It is that some of us decline to 
juggle with our reasoning powers to the extent of accept- 
ing as accurate the popular view attributing to Germany 
sole responsibility for this war, undertaken by her with the 
deliberate intention of " subjugating Europe." It is that 
some of us realise how short-sighted is the view which bids 
us keep silent on that issue, because not to keep silent is to 
incur unpopularity. What does unpopularity matter when 
everything that we hold dear, nationally and individually, 
depends, in the ultimate resort, upon the nation seeing 
straight on that issue? 

At the present moment, if we are to judge by the utter- 
ances of several members of the Government, of the Press, 
and of publicists and literary men who have the public 
ear, these charges against Germany are universally 
accepted as axioms, axioms which must govern the national 
war-policy and — never let it be forgotten for one instant — 
the national war-policy is not only a military and naval 
question but a political question. These axioms are held 
to justify and make intelligible the policy, more and more 
loudly proclaimed, that this war must be prosecuted until 
Germany "surrenders unconditionally"; until she pro- 
claims herself ready to submit to any and every humiliation 
the Allies choose to inflict upon her in the hour of complete 
victory. They are held to justify the denunciation of 
"traitorous" applied to any suggestion for mediation by 

1 The Labour Leader, July 22, 1915. 
161 



162 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

neutral Powers to arrest this stupendous slaughter or to 
the acceptance of any possible openings for reasonable dis- 
cussion between the belligerents. From these axioms the 
civilian spirit of hatred and revenge draws its inspiration. 
These axioms are trumpeted on the housetops in order 
to sweep aside all the professions made by our official 
classes upon the outbreak of the war. While they stand 
unchallenged, what really effective and practical counter- 
vailing weapon remains for those who believe that these 
axioms are erected upon false premises, and that the road 
to which their acceptance tends is the road, not to national 
and international salvation, but to national and inter- 
national disaster? 

My object is to shake these axioms from the hold they 
have acquired over the national mind, and to do so not 
by elaborating opinions or indulging in rhetoric, but by 
recalling concrete facts. What are the facts I have en- 
deavoured to recall? They may be classified under three 
main heads : 

I. — Germany's Position in the "Balance." 

In the event of war arising out of Russo-Austrian 
rivalry in the Balkans it was common knowledge that (a) 
France would join Russia against Germany, choosing the 
moment best suited to her interests — if she were allowed 
to choose it; (b) Germany would thus be compelled to fight 
on two fronts; (c) Germany would take the military offen- 
sive against France at once, which her greater powers of 
rapid mobilisation enabled her to do; (d) Germany would 
probably seek to use Belgian territory for the purpose. 

Conclusion: Germany's attack upon France was not 
"wanton" nor "unprovoked," and was no proof in itself 
of a desire to subjugate Europe. It was the inevitable 
opening stage in a general European war waged on the 
existing system of alliances and groups which divided 
Europe into two hostile camps. It had been known and 
proclaimed to be inevitable years before the war broke out. 
Morally indefensible, the occupation of Belgium by the 
German armies was a virtual certainty. 

Belgium was the predestined victim of a general 
European war which should find Britain entangled with 
one or other of the two rival groups. 



THE SPECTRE OF FEAR 163 

II. — Germany's War Preparations. 

(a) Militarism is not an exclusively German product, 
(fo) With the single exception of a guerilla warfare against 
a Hottentot tribe in S.W. Africa, Germany had kept her 
sword in its scabbard for 45 years — with all her militarism ; 
while all her present foes have within that period indulged 
in the pastime of war, and acquired, or endeavoured to 
acquire, extensive over-sea possessions in so doing, (c) 
Germany prepared for war and carried her preparations to 
the highest pitch of efficiency, which has been equally 
characteristic of the industrial and scientific branches of 
her national organisation. (d) On the assumption that 
preparations for war are indicative of a desire and intention 
to go to war, there is no case against Germany which will 
not apply equally to her neighbours. For Germany's 
potential foes had been spending even more — far more — 
than she had in war preparations during the decade im- 
mediately preceding the war — the decade marking the 
gradually increasing tension in Europe, (e) In that period 
the Russo-French combination spent ;£i 59, 798,931 more 
on its armies than the Teutonic Powers spent on theirs, 
and the military effectives of the former largely exceeded 
the military effectives of the latter. (/) In the same period 
the Franco-Russian combination spent ^"70,069,922 more 
than the Teutonic Powers on its navies, while if it be con- 
ceded — and it cannot well be denied — that the possible use 
of the British Fleet against Germany in the event of a 
general European war was envisaged by the rulers of Ger- 
many, the naval expenditure of Germany's potential foes 
exceeded her own expenditure and that of her ally in that 
period by ^"461,986,392. (g) Taking military and naval 
armament together, Germany's potential foes, Russia and 
France, had between them spent on preparations for war, 
in the decade 1905-14, ^229,868,853 more than Germany 
and her ally, and if the factor of Britain's naval strength 
were thrown in the scale, ^621,785,323 more than Ger- 
many and her ally. 

Conclusion: The argument that Germany's war pre- 
parations were directed to the "subjugation" of Europe 
will not bear examination. You do not undertake to "sub- 
jugate" nations, vastly exceeding your own nation in 
numbers, when those nations are spending hundreds of 
millions more than you are spending on preparations for 
war ! The German argument is that the war preparations 



1 6.4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

of Germany's potential foes were directed to the subjuga- 
tion of Germany. In the face of these figures it is at least 
as plausible. The truth is that each "Group" was terrified 
of the other "Group," and that, to quote an old declaration 
of Sir E. Grey : 

"If this tremendous expenditure on armaments goes on 
it must, in the long run, break down civilisation. You are 
having this great burden of force piled up in times of 
peace, and if it goes on increasing by leaps and bounds as 
it has done in the last generation, in time it will become 
intolerable. There are those who think it will lead to war, 
precisely because it is becoming intolerable. I think it is 
much more likely the burden will be dissipated by internal 
revolution — not by nations fighting against each other, but 
by revolt of masses of men against taxation. . . . The 
great nations of the world are in bondage to their armies 
and navies at the present moment — increasing bondage." 
Just so. But it is a little late in the day to tell us now — 
now that, unfortunately, the above prediction has been 
falsified — that the German expenditure has been the sole 
cause of all the mischief, when the expenditure of the 
Triple Entente has vastly exceeded the German. 

III. — Germany's Fears. 

(a) Germany's fears were genuine and natural, and 
were admitted to be so by British and French statesmen 
and military writers long before the outbreak of war. (b) 
They increased proportionately with the relative decrease 
in Germany's military power in relation to that of her 
neighbours. (c) Had Germany's desire been to "sub- 
jugate" Europe she would have struck at France and at 
Russia when her superior armament ensured her the cer- 
tainty of prompt success on several occasions within the 
past twenty years. Had Germany's supreme aim been the 
conquest of the British Empire, she would have disposed 
of France with ease during the Boer War, or have joined 
that Power and Russia in a hostile coalition against us, 
which there is good reason to believe was urged upon her 
at that time. 

Conclusion : The charge against Germany that she has 
been alone responsible for this war and has plunged the 
world in strife to minister to detestable ambitions will be 
ridiculed by the next generation. The war is fundamentally 
the outcome of fears of one another entertained by the 
governing classes in either "Group," fears produced by the 



THE SPECTRE OF FEAR 165 

vicious philosophy which lies at the root of European state- 
craft. That these fears have been able to mature into fate- 
ful consummation is due to the fact that the Governments 
have been wholly uncontrolled by the democracy and have 
carried out their secret rivalries and intrigues behind the 
backs of the peoples, concealing the truth from their Par- 
liaments and surrounding their obscure and unintelligible 
aims in a network of secret manoeuvres. The peoples have 
been helpless to save themselves, because they have been 
lacking in combination, organisation, and effective co- 
operation. 



The question which confronts the democracies is to-day 
a plain one. Are the causes which have produced this war 
to be perpetuated ? If so, the course of the peoples is clear. 
They must continue to take the advice of those who have 
led them to this pass. It is quite easy and simple to do so. 
It requires no mental exercise, no moral courage. It is 
the line of least resistance. The British and French peoples 
must continue to lend ear to those who tell them that Ger- 
many must be "crushed," who demand Germany's "un- 
conditional surrender." And the German people must 
continue to hearken to those who tell them that Britain 
must be "crushed." They must continue to regard those 
who preach this doctrine, at a comfortable distance from 
the bestialities to which it has given rise, as "patriots," 
and those who differ as "traitors." But they must not 
deceive themselves. If they do follow this advice it is the 
young children of to-day who will pay the price of the 
fatuous arrogance and criminal vindictiveness of their 
elders ; for the horror will begin all over again. The course 
must be steered with eyes wide open — with the certainty 
that the "crushing" policy will bleed us all whiter and 
whiter and that the fruit of "victory" on those lines will 
be putrid in the mouth. It is better to be called "pro- 
German" and "traitor" than to bow the knee to that advice. 

And we need not unless Ave will. For there is another 
way ; another policy ; another creed. 



(13 



PART II 



CHAPTER XIX. 
The Union of Democratic Control 1 

I have never been more deeply convinced of anything than I am of 
the urgent necessity of working, and working now, more especially 
when so many are distracted by the turmoil of battle, to prevent my 
fellow-countrymen from being misled, to strive for the attainment of 
great ideals, and to keep my country's honour free from corruption 
by the evil influences of debased and vicious doctrines. — Mr. Arthur 
Ponsonby in a letter to his constituents. 

URING the fatal opening days of last August, when 
the hopes of a generation withered before our eyes 
and civilisation plunged back into barbarism, a small group 
of men met together in the house of one of them. For 
years they had shared a common conviction that Europe's 
statesmen were drifting to a catastrophe which, if it 
eventuated, would overwhelm mankind. In their several 
ways they had endeavoured to rouse public opinion to the 
terrible gravity of the situation ; and they had failed. The 
monster of militarism had mastered the diplomats whose 
tortuous evolutions and mediaeval proceedings had done 
so much to create it. The peoples, dominated by fear and 
panic, neither informed nor consulted, had been whirled — 
after a few short weeks of confused and secret negotiations 
between their rulers — into a maelstrom of passions and 
mutual slaughter. Was anything left for this small group 
of men to do ? Should they confine themselves to the facile 
and popular task of denouncing the enemy and giving such 
assistance as it might be in their power to render to works 
of charity or relief for the victims of the war? Or should 
they attempt to evolve some constructive programme; to 
indicate some definite line of thought, to provide some 
rallying centre for future political action — national in its 
inception, international in its ultimate aims — around which 
men and women holding, it might be, divers and even 
contradictory views as to the origins of the war, could, 
nevertheless, gather, restore their shattered faiths, and 
strive to lay the foundations of a more enduring edifice? 
1 Published in the Contemporary Review, July, 191 5. 
169 



i 7 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

With no light heart, assuredly, could such a step be con- 
templated. When discussion reached the point of decision, 
just five individuals in the group felt that the effort must 
be made. Fully conscious of their own deficiencies and 
shortcomings, but confident alike in one another's integrity, 
and in the righteousness of the cause they espoused, they 
launched their frail barque upon the troubled seas. 

Thus was conceived the Union of Democratic Control, 
in circumstances of painful difficulty, without organisation, 
without funds, without support. To-day, the Union is 
solidly entrenched. Its rapid expansion has astonished 
none more than its founders. Fifty 1 branches, directed by 
purely voluntary local endeavour, united to the parent body 
as to policy and common action, and represented on its 
councils, but otherwise conducting their propaganda in 
accordance with local conditions and wholly self-support- 
ing, are established throughout England, Scotland, Wales, 
and Ireland. The individuals forming the Committees of 
these auxiliary organisations are usually, and sometimes 
prominently, associated with the social life of the com- 
munity. Adherents daily swell the Union's ranks from 
all sections of society. As its name implies, the Union 
directs its appeal to the Democracy — to the people as a 
whole — and Labour organisations in considerable numbers 
have officially joined the Union, paying its affiliation fees 
and receiving and distributing its literature. The Indepen- 
dent Labour Party has virtually adopted the Union's four 
cardinal points of policy, and supports them actively and 
whole-heartedly. But the Independent Labour Party does 
not stand alone in this respect. Trades and Labour Coun- 
cils and Trade Unions are affiliating in increasing numbers, 
and the literature of the Union is gradually permeating 
the labour world. The public desire for information as to 
the Union's objects may be gathered from the fact that 
within the area of greater London alone between 300 and 
400 addresses and lectures have been delivered by Union 
speakers in the last five months to Adult Schools, Trade 
Unions, Brotherhoods, Co-operative Societies and Guilds, 
and various ethical societies. 2 The demands upon the 
Union are, moreover, continuously increasing, and the staff 
of 45 lecturers attached to the London branch — all of whose 
services are given free of charge — can with difficulty meet 
the calls upon their activities. This process is being dupli- 

1 Now eighty. 

2 These figures have since been enormously increased. 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 171 

cated in many provincial cities where the Union has an 
established branch. As for the Union's literature, it is 
more and more in request, alike in this country and in 
neutral States. 

It must be evident that a movement of this kind, which 
yesterday was not, and to-day is already becoming a power 
in the land despite the efforts of the London Press to boy- 
cott or misrepresent it; which is steadily forging- its way 
into the public mind, not in this country alone, but in other 
lands; which is already known in the five Continents, and 
which is only in its infancy and has nothing ephemeral 
about its programme and nothing secret about its methods 
— it must, I say, be evident to all reasonable human beings 
that this movement deserves at least to be understood. For 
its growth is so remarkable that if it be wisely guided it 
seems destined to become a factor in national politics and 
in international relations with which the reactionary 
elements in every Government will have to reckon, and 
from which the democratic elements in every Government 
may derive strength. 

What then are the convictions which inspire the Union 
of Democratic Control? What are its objects? By what 
means and by what methods is the Union prosecuting those 
objects ? We believe that the Ordeal by War as a method 
of determining disputes between civilised States has become 
an absurdity and a criminal absurdity, possessing even less 
relevance to the removal of the causes of the dispute and 
offering even less hope of obviating future disputes, than 
the Ordeal by Poison, or the Ordeal by Fire, by which both 
individuals and communities were wont, and in primitive 
society are still accustomed, to adjust their immediate dif- 
ferences. We believe that the Ordeal by War between 
civilised States is a criminal absurdity because we do not 
believe that it is able to provide a solution for any single 
problem, or combination of problems, which may give rise 
from time to time to international friction. The Union 
seeks to permeate the public mind with that belief by every 
means in its power — not as a theoretical proposition, but 
with the force of a living and practical truth for which 
humanity should labour, strive, and consent to sacrifice 
its thought, its energy, and its means. 

Concurrently with the presentation of the general 
argument, the Union urges that public opinion^ in this land 
primarily, and in so far as its example and teaching may 
be followed and shared by similar movements of opinion 



1 72 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

in other lands, throughout the world, should concentrate 
upon the main factors — mechanical, constitutional, tra- 
ditional, and so on — which lead Governments to force their 
peoples to have recourse to the Ordeal by War, and which 
lead the peoples to support the Governments in their action. 
It is of the essence of these aims that the Union's appeal 
to national and international sanity should be uttered and 
presented now, while the horrors of this desolating- war 
absorb us all. For the Union contends that if the peoples 
of the belligerent States are desirous — as we believe them 
to be — that their successors, the younger children not yet 
fit for cannon fodder, should not be immolated upon the 
same altar; the peoples must not leave the Settlement to 
be dictated by the rulers, the diplomatists, and the pro- 
fessional men of war in the higher command, whose clash- 
ing ambitions, incompatibilities of temper, incapacity of 
judgment, ignorance of national needs and aspirations, and 
whose secret manoeuvres have, in the opinion of the Union, 
brought the world to the present pass. For the 
peoples to give carte blanche to the diplomatists would be, 
in our view, to place a premium upon an international 
Settlement calculated to perpetuate the vicious errors of 
the past and to sow the seeds of future wars. 

To the extent in which it is possible to crystallise these 
convictions and objects in a number of formulce — and it is, 
of course, not possible to do so in a completely satisfactory 
manner — the Union of Democratic Control has adopted as 
the backbone of its constitution four cardinal points 1 em- 
bodying the policy which should inspire the future Settle- 
ment, and Which should dominate the national and inter- 
national situation after peace has been declared. I will deal 
with these points seriatim. The first clause in the charter 
— so to speak — of the Union reads as follows : — No pro- 
vince shall be transferred from one Government to another 
without the consent, by plebiscite or otherwise, of the 
population of such province. ' ' 

In postulating that no province shall be transferred from 
one Government to another without the inhabitants thereof 
being consulted, we formulate a desire which is essentially 
democratic and essentially just, but which, unfortunately, 
has not guided the Governments in previous post-bellum 

1 A fifth point has now been added, reading as follows : "The- 
European conflict shall not be continued by economic war after the 
military operations have ceased. British policy shall be directed 
towards promoting free commercial intercourse between all nations 
and the preservation and extension of the open door." 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 173 

Settlements. It has been wittily said that every war waged 
in the past century has been made ridiculous by the next, 
and the practice of diplomats to treat the peoples — in peace 
and in war — as pawns in a game of chess is largely account- 
able for the truism. Shortly after the present war broke 
out, several Ministers of the Liberal Cabinet placed a very 
different ideal before the public. I may cite, in particular, 
Mr. Churchill's utterances in this regard : — 

"Let us, whatever we do, fight for and work towards 
great and sound principles for the European system. The 
first of these principles which we should keep before us is 
the principle of nationality — that is to say, not the conquest 
or subjugation of any great community, or of any strong 
race of men, but the setting free of those races which have 
been subjugated and conquered. And if doubt arises about 
disputed areas of country, we should try and settle their 
ultimate destination in the reconstruction of Europe which 
must follow from this war, with a fair regard to the wishes 
and feelings of the people who live in them. 1 
And, again : — 

"We want this war to settle the map of Europe on 
national lines, and according to the true wishes of the 
people who dwell in the disputed areas. After all the 
blood that is being shed, we want a natural and harmonious 
settlement, which liberates races, restores the integrity of 
nations, subjugates no one, and permits a genuine and 
lasting relief from the waste and tension of armaments 
under which we have suffered so long." 2 

To enunciate such principles is one thing; to give prac- 
tical effect to them is a very different thing. It is useless 
disguising from ourselves that powerful influences are now 
at work, and will be exerted when the belligerents have 
severally laid down their arms, to settle the destinies of the 
inhabitants of "disputed areas" in accordance with the 
accidents of military conquest, and not in accordance with 
the principles enunciated by Mr. Churchill and others of 
his colleagues. The cases of Poland and Alsace-Lorraine 
are classic examples of the diplomatist's art in this respect. 
If the influence of Great Britain at the Settlement is to be 
exerted in favour of the principles so warmly endorsed by 

1 At the London Opera House, September 11. (Morning Post, 
September 12.) 

2 In the Giornale d'ltalia. — Text issued by the Official Press 
Bureau. September 25. 



174 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Mr. Churchill, the British people must face the facts in 
advance, and understand them. The future destinies of 
the Poles and of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine must 
be decided by themselves, and must not depend upon the 
military results of war. Machinery must be evolved not 
only by the belligerent States, but by the neutral States — 
whose interests in securing a stable Settlement are obvious 
— to ensure that the wishes of the people concerned shall 
be honestly ascertained and honestly recorded, and that 
their verdict, whatever it may be, shall be regarded as bind- 
ing upon the Governments affected. By our national atti- 
tude towards this problem will the professions, officially 
and unofficially made on behalf of Great Britain at the out- 
break of war, be tested. The restoration of Belgium to the 
Belgians is but one aspect of it. A Settlement based upon 
the recognition that the inhabitants of "disputed areas" 
are not movable goods, but human beings with traditions, 
aspirations, and economic interests of their own, is the 
only Settlement which offers any prospects of permanence, 
and it must be universally and impartially enforced. 

It would, for instance, be a bitter satire upon the 
generous impulses which have moved the people of Great 
Britain in this war, and upon the professions of British 
statesmen, if the struggle resulted in a Settlement under 
which the opportunities for national development of any 
section of the Polish population in Europe (which numbered 
23 millions in the opening years of the present century) 
fell short of those which, in increasing measure since 1866, 
the Galician Poles have enjoyed under the much-abused 
rule of the Dual Monarchy. This consideration applies 
equally to the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population of Eastern 
Galicia, which, with the support of the Polish democracy 
of the province, secured early last year many of the reforms 
for which it had been agitating, if, to quote Mr. Asquith, 
"room" is to be "found and kept for the independent 
existence and free development of the smaller nationalities 
— each with a corporate consciousness of its own. ' ' I will 
not on this occasion attempt to discuss the problem of 
Alsace-Lorraine in any detail. I will merely remark that 
the principle set forth by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Asquith, 
and embodied in Clause I. in the constitution of the Union 
of Democratic Control, applies with equal force to the in- 
habitants of those provinces, and can no more be honestly 
or safely departed from in their case than in the case of 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 175 

the Belgians, the Serbians, the Poles, and, for that matter, 
the Bulgars, the Finns, and the Persians. 

The second and third clauses in the constitution of the 
Union may be treated conjointly. They read as follows : — 

"No treaty, arrangement, or undertaking shall be 
entered into in the name of Great Britain without the 
sanction of Parliament. Adequate machinery for ensuring 
democratic control of foreign policy shall be created. 

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed 
at creating alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 
balance of power, but shall be directed to concerted action 
between the Powers, and the setting up of an International 
Council, whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, 
with such machinery for securing international agreement 
as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace. ' ' 

I suppose most people will concede that the present 
condition of Europe provides a conclusive demonstration 
that the machinery regulating the official intercourse 
between States has broken down. At this moment passions 
necessarily run high and judgment is obscured. But, even 
so, no man who preserves any sense of perspective at all 
but realises that the element of fear has been a powerful, 
if not the predominating, element in producing at once 
the moral atmosphere which has made this convulsion 
possible, and the material factors thereof in the shape of 
enormous and perfected armaments which are being used 
by the belligerents for one another's destruction. The 
last quarter of a century has witnessed an astonishing - 
advance in the arts of peace. Great forces, some measur- 
able, some intangible, have been operating to draw the 
civilised peoples closer to one another, to accentuate the 
mutuality of human needs, to reduce the significance of 
political frontiers as an obstacle to community of effort. 
The whole tendency of modern development emphasises 
the interdependence of civilised peoples. But over this 
natural and healthy growth a parasitic growth has flung 
its tentacles, stunting normal expansion. Side by side 
with the elements of co-operation have risen the elements 
of potential destruction. The fairer the promise the more 
over-shadowing the menace. While innumerable demon- 
strations have testified to the spread of the idea 
of human solidarity among the peoples, the Govern- 
ments have been steadily increasing their armaments, 



i 7 6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

applying the triumphs of human science over 
nature to preparations for the swift annihilation 
of man, levying increased toll upon the communally- 
earned wealth of the nations in order to perfect 
and multiply engines for their extermination. Fear, and 
a belief in the assurance of their governors that only by 
such means could national safety be secured and peace 
maintained, has induced the peoples to acquiesce; but, 
while acquiescing, the manifestations in favour of inter- 
national solidarity have multiplied, inspired by the pathetic 
hope that in due course they would succeed in purging fears 
and removing the burden of armaments which constituted 
the material expressions of those fears. But the odds were 
too heavy. The forces working for peace have lacked 
cohesion, organisation, and concentration of purpose. 

Now, the problem for humanity to-day and to-morrow 
is this. Have the peoples the will, the determination, the 
resolve to work constructively, each within its own 
frontiers and as far as possible in co-operation with one 
another, for the elimination of the fundamental causes 
conducive to the creation of mutual fears ; for the removal 
of the factors in the national life which occasion those 
fears and which attain supremacy over the destinies of 
countless millions as the outcome of those fears? If so, 
the peoples must organise. We must organise against 
war. We have been faced with a vast organisation for 
the promotion of war, not in one country only, but in all 
countries. If we imagine that the close of the present war 
will automatically destroy that organisation, we are pre- 
paring for ourselves the most bitter of delusions. The 
possibilities — nay, the probabilities — are that it will be 
stronger at the end of the war than it was at the beginning. 
However that may be, it will assuredly exist, and those 
who incarnate it will dominate the Governments. We must 
evolve a vaster organisation to oppose it. We can do 
so if we will, for the entire mechanism of war is of our 
own tolerating. If we ceased to tolerate it, it would cease 
to be. Our future is in our own hands. 

To achieve this end we must revolutionise the proceed- 
ings of diplomacy, and we must convert Mr. Asquith's 
verbal expression into a positive policy, a policy which 
shall substitute "for force, for the clash of competing am- 
bitions, for groupings and a precarious equipoise," a "real 
European partnership based on the recognition of equal 
right and established and enforced by the common will." 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 177 

In other words, we must get rid of secret diplomacy and 
the fetish of the "Balance of Power" which defies analysis 
and means precisely what the diplomats desire that it shall 
mean at a particular moment. And each people must 
begin at home. If each waits for the other to move, all 
will be equally helpless in the future, as they have been 
in the past. And the key-note to action must be Organise, 
still Organise, again Organise ! 

The Union of Democratic Control combines, in the 
clauses quoted further back, both the national and the 
international aim. Prominent personalities, differing so 
widely in their political ideals, as Lord Bryce, Lord Rose- 
bery, and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, have severally, within 
recent years, drawn attention to the secrecy of our own 
diplomacy, and to the almost unlimited powers of the 
Cabinet in determining our foreign policy. The report of 
the recent Royal Commission has partially lifted the veil 
from the totally undemocratic character of our diplomatic 
machinery. Some of the most respected names in French 
political life — M. Ribot, Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, 
Senator de Lamarzelle — protested in the French Legisla- 
ture against the secrecy of Anglo-French diplomacy 
in the Morocco affair. No one who has really studied the 
evidence available will deny that the last decade has wit- 
nessed a marked tendency towards increased secrecy in 
the handling of our foreign policy, together with a steady 
decrease in the facilities for Parliamentary and public dis- 
cussion. The virtual withdrawal of foreign affairs from 
national debate has, strangely enough, synchronised with 
the spread of educational opportunities among the great 
mass of the people. This state of affairs cannot continue 
in a community such as ours without the gravest danger 
to the British Commonwealth. A democracy upon whose 
shoulders reposes in the ultimate resort the burden of 
sustaining the greatest Empire the world has ever known, 
cannot be kept in perpetual ignorance of its Government's 
relations with foreign Powers — which we term foreign 
policy. The conduct of our foreign policy involves the most 
vital of all issues to the life of the nation, the issue of 
peace and war, which is the issue of individual and national 
life and death. The Union of Democratic Control labours 
under the deepest conviction that one of the greatest needs 
of the hour and of the future consists in a systematised effort 
to drive this elementary truth into the minds of the masses 



178 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

in this country — to demonstrate the indissoluble connection 
between the management of our foreign affairs and the 
daily life, the welfare, the happiness of every individual 
in the land. 

If it be right and proper — and none will gainsay it — 
that the self-governing Dominions should be consulted as 
to the terms of Settlement which will eventuate from this 
war, and should share in the counsels of the Mother 
Country with regard to the direction of our foreign policy 
in the future, a fortiori are the people of these islands 
entitled to be taken into the confidence of the Government. 
It is their right. They must be quickened in their apprecia- 
tion of it, and when they are so quickened that right can 
only be denied them at the risk of imperilling the safety 
of the State. 

But the necessity for fundamental reform goes far 
deeper than that, and in opposing it the pedagogues are, 
all unconsciously, playing with fire. For there is a new 
spirit abroad, and those who affect contemptuous indiffer- 
ence to it tread in dangerous paths. Tens of thousands of 
young men have flung themselves into the field of battle 
to-day, inspired by a double sentiment- — to help the weak 
and to assist in bringing wars to an end. Is the nation 
which accepts their sacrifice to treat them as unworthy of 
consultation on the causes, the events, the rivalries which 
lead to war? Again, do the politicians who during the 
past five years have been engaged in familiarising the 
masses with their just grievances, and bringing home to 
their understanding that those grievances are not necessary 
and ordained, but preventable — do they ever consider 
whether they will not one day be asked : "Who made this 
war What had we to do with it? Were we consulted? 
Did you tell us this and that?" It is no use pretending 
to believe that it will be for ever possible to persuade the 
nation that he war is explainable by the events of the six 
weeks which preceded it. More and more will it become 
apparent that the war has been the inevitable outcome of 
a universal system; that its true origins must be sought 
in that system, and that one of the most potential factors 
in that system is a Statecraft which, in all lands, in this 
land as in others, carries on its evolutions behind the 
peoples' backs and pursues ends remote from the "things 
that really matter" to the lives of the mass of the people. 
For those feelings a safety valve will have to be found, 
and the only possible safety valve is to prove to the people 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 179 

that henceforth the foreign policy of this country shall be 
a really national foreign policy; that the people shall be 
fully acquainted with the nature of their liabilities, and 
shall clearly perceive where they stand and whither they 
are being led. 

Among the organic reforms to ensure greater national 
control of foreign policy which the Union of Democratic 
Control advocates are these : The complete reform of our 
diplomatic service, carrying with it the abolition of the 
income test and the substitution of competition and merit 
for nomination, privilege, and class distinction. No 
Treaty, alliance, or understanding of any sort, contract, 
obligation, or liability involving national responsibilities 
to be entered upon without the consent of Parliament : 
Parliament to have the additional opportunity of discussing 
every treaty in detail before being asked formally to ratify 
it. The Foreign Office vote to be discussed annually in 
the House of Commons as a matter of regular procedure; 
the vote to occupy two days, and to be treated like the 
army and navy estimates. Periodical pronouncements on 
foreign policy in the country to be the recognised duty of 
a Foreign Secretary. A Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
House to be formed for purposes of deliberation on points 
of detail and with the object of further strengthening 
Parliamentary control, knowledge and sense of responsi- 
bility. All treaties to be periodically submitted to dis- 
cussion with a view to amendment, confirmation, or can- 
cellation. All these organic reforms can be secured without 
drastic constitutional changes. Indeed, they would go far 
to make of democratic government a reality, and not what 
it is at present, so far as the conduct of the foreign policy 
of the country is concerned, a sham. Taken in combina- 
tion they would operate in the direction of diminishing the 
autocratic position of the Foreign Secretary, who, to-day, 
owing to the congestion of Parliamentary business, to the 
enormous labours devolving upon Cabinet Ministers, the 
curtailment of Parliamentary privileges, and the ensuing 
decay of interest in the House on foreign affairs due to 
increasing lack of responsibility, escapes in practice all 
effective control, and is entirely dependent upon his per- 
manent officials, selected from one particular class in the 
State, and imbued with all the virtues, but also with all 
the prejudices and narrowness of outlook inherent in that 
class. 



180 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

But these organic reforms will not in themselves suffice 
to secure real national control of foreign policy. They 
will have to be accompanied and stimulated by an awaken- 
ing of the nation as a whole, both to its interests and to 
its rights. One will be the complement of the other. In 
advocating these reforms and in making of them a con- 
spicuous feature of its propaganda, the Union of Demo- 
cratic Control is chiefly concerned with the interests of the 
people of these Islands, as is natural. It maintains that 
the democracy of the United Kingdom may fairly lay claim 
to the sympathy and moral support of the democracies of 
the Self-governing Dominions in its efforts to strengthen 
the national control over foreign policy. But it would be 
idle to suggest that the democracies of the Self-governing 
Dominions are not also entitled to claim the sympathy and 
assistance of the British democracy in any attempt they 
may be led, severally or collectively, to put forward in 
favour of the wider problem of Imperial control. It is 
now clearly apparent that under the system obtaining it 
is possible not only for the Cabinet, but for a section of 
the Cabinet to contract obligations of honour towards 
foreign Powers involving the potential use, not only of the 
armed forces of these islands, but of the Empire. This 
is the second occasion within a comparatively short period 
that Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and South 
African blood has been shed as the result of policies in the 
formation of which none of the Self-governing Dominions 
have had a share. The situation is obviously an impossible 
one. Upon a solution being found for it — and the case 
of India is, in principle at least, analogous — depends the 
preservation of the British Empire. Personally, I find it 
difficult to apprehend how the national democratic claim 
and the Imperial democratic claim can be satisfied by a 
Legislature and a Government elected at the heart of the 
Empire on purely domestic issues, but responsible in fact 
for, and directing in practice, the conduct of foreign policy, 
the administration of the fighting services, and the 
administration of the vast tropical Dependencies of the 
Crown whose social and economic problems are inextricably 
interwoven with the destinies of European States. 

"For groupings and alliances and a precarious equi- 
poise" — a real European partnership." In those words is 
embodied the policy of the Union of Democratic Control. 
Mr. Asquith is not a sentimentalist. But that utterance 
is his. Neither are we sentimentalists, and whatever steps 



THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL 181 

Mr. Asquith and his colleagues, and their successors, who- 
ever they may be, intend to take in that connection, the 
Union of Democratic Control intends to work for the policy 
which that utterance embodies. We are doing - so. And 
in this case, again, the people of every State must con- 
centrate primarily upon instructing and impregnating the 
public mind within their particular State. Moreover, 
initiative must come from somewhere. Great Britain has 
led the world in so many reforms making for human 
liberties that she may well take the lead in an effort to rid 
humanity of a conception of Statecraft which no longer 
responds to the needs of civilised men. The pursuit of the 
"Balance of Power" is a diplomatic will-o'-the-wisp hover- 
ing over the graves of innumerable victims. By the 
statesmen of no country has it been erected into a cult to 
a greater extent than by our own. This is an additional 
reason 'why the attempt to substitute "a real European 
partnership" should come from us. The vagaries of the 
"Balance of Power" led us in 1854 to espouse the cause 
of the Turk in a quarrel which was not of Russia's seek- 
ing; in 1878 to regard national "honour" as compatible 
with reinstating Ottoman despotism over Christian popula- 
tions; in the 'seventies and 'eighties to see in what was 
then currently described as the German "hegemony" in 
Europe, a cause for eminent national satisfaction; in 1900 
to contemplate war with France over some West African 
jungle, Nilotic swamp, or Siamese river; in 1910 to regard 
Germany as the potential foe. And if, as the outcome of 
a complete victory of the Allies, it were considered desirable 
to inflict upon Germany one tithe of the pains and penalties 
recommended by the Morning Post school, by the dis- 
tinguished gentlemen who write letters to The Times, and 
by a notorious section of the press (which is able to com- 
mand an enormous publicity), it is absolutely certain that 
the Franco-Russian combination would be regarded on the 
morrow of the war as the disturber of the "Balance" and 
the future enemy. The pursuit of the "Balance" has now 
reached the apotheosis of its monstrous imbecility. It 
has conducted us to the most colossal failure of human 
wisdom in the history of the world. Is Armageddon to be 
followed by a renewal of the policy of the "Balance," or 
by some new conception of international policy and state- 
craft? 

The Union of Democratic Control believes that in all 
countries where public opinion is articulate there exists 



1 82 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

an intense desire for the creation of international machinery 
supported by the collective will of Europe, which would 
adjudicate upon disputes between States of a character not 
susceptible of treatment by the Hague Court, and which 
would be invested with the necessary power to enforce its 
decisions in the ultimate resort. We believe that the 
creation of such machinery is practicable and not Utopian 
if public opinion in favour of it in every land is organised. 

Among the vested interests concerned in keeping 
Europe in a condition of fear and apprehension, none per- 
haps are more insidious and more dangerous than the 
interests bound up with the armament industry; and in 
no country are they more powerful than in our own. The 
Union of Democratic Control puts forward, therefore, as 
its fourth desideratum that : "Great Britain shall propose 
as a part of the Peace Settlement a plan for the drastic 
reduction, by consent, of the armaments of all the belli- 
gerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt 
to secure the nationalisation of the manufacture of arma- 
ments and the control of the export of armaments by one 
country to another." 

It is a self-evident proposition that so long as the in- 
fluence of militarist ideas within each State is buttressed 
by the material factor, represented by gigantic armament, 
the organised growth of the forces of Pacifism will be 
faced with a formidable obstacle. The reduction of arma- 
ments must accompany any real change in the relationship 
between States, and that is why we ask that Great Britain 
should take the lead in making proposals, whose effective 
realisation, however, must depend upon the success of the 
other proposals which have been discussed above. The 
reduction of armaments involves, or should involve, the 
abolition of the internationalised private interest in the 
manufacture of armaments, which is, perhaps, the greatest 
of all scandals of our time. 

Such are the chief ends and aims of the Union of 
Democratic Control. Each part of the programme we 
put forward for the consideration of our fellow-country- 
men is linked up with the others. By the steady prosecu- 
tion of the whole we believe that a happier and a more 
secure Britain will result, and that the mutual fears and 
suspicions which have hung like a nightmare over the 
civilised peoples of Europe, finally culminating in this 
terrible catastrophe, can be removed and their repetition 
avoided, 



CHAPTER XX. 
A Plea for Sanity of Thought 1 

Peace, say we, by crushing Germany, since she is the only disturber 
of the peace. Peace, say the Germans, by crushing the Allies, since 
they are the only disturbers of the peace. But how does this view 
of the Germans look to us? Does it look like peace? Do we 
imagine ourselves lying down for ever, beaten, humbled, and 
repentant, under the protection of an armed Germany? Well, as we 
feel about the .German idea, so, we may be sure, do they feel about 
ours. That route does not and cannot lead to peace. . . . We can 
no more crush her (Germany) than she can crush us. And the 
attempt to do so can only lead to a new war. — Mr. G. Lowes 
Dickinson ("After the War," A. C. Fifield. 6d.). 

If you were to ask privately all those who do not provide 
implements of war, or edit patriotic papers, or belong to the 
intellectual victims of these papers, whether they would not gladly 
undo this war if they could, you would find it easy to accommodate 
in one single sanatorium the whole lot of those who would answer 

in the negative An invisible army will arise from the souls 

of the victims of this self-killing war, and with this army we shall 
conquer all the others that have gone so far astray." — Mr. von 
Tepper-Laski, President of the "New Fatherland League," in 
"Das Freie Wort." 

WHILE our gallant soldiers are laying down their lives 
in the marshes of Flanders, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, 
in the Persian Gulf, in the Cameroons, and in East Africa, 
ideas are fermenting, policies are in the making, elements 
are contending which will determine whether their collec- 
tive sacrifice will have been vain or fruitful. I say collective 
sacrifice, for sacrifice in the individual, whatever form it 
may take, can never be fruitless. But the outcome of 
collective sacrifice may be, and frequently has been, in 
war. Just as the present war commands an unprecedented 
collective sacrifice, so will its consequences be unpre- 
cedented. Does it mark the final convulsions ushering in 
the birth of a new era, setting free a new spirit which has 
been striving for light and utterance ? Or will the fetters 
that bind humanity be riveted but the tighter for it, the 
struggling masses flung back, the artificial barriers which 
separate the peoples from one another strengthened with 
1 The Labour Leader, August 26, 1915. 
183 



1 84 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

additional buttresses ? Are the peoples to mingle in peace- 
ful intercourse, knitting - closer links of mutual compre- 
hension; or will the frontiers still grin with countless 
cannon ; the ocean highways still be cleft with monsters of 
destruction above and beneath the depths; the sky still be 
polluted by whirring engines of death ? 

"Is it to be, hate?" as Mr. Harold Picton asks. 1 The 
people of this country have an enormous share in deter- 
mining these questions, which for them have not merely 
an ethical value, but a most practical and utilitarian signi- 
ficance, considered nationally and individually. There are 
some, it is true, to whom nationality makes but scant 
appeal. The sentiment for land of birth, for the body of 
history, custom, and tradition, which through the centuries 
has moulded certain types in a certain setting and produced 
broadly denned characteristics and ideals — that sentiment 
awakens little echo in some breasts. To their owners 
nationalism has had its day; for them the lamp of hope 
shines in a wider sphere, a more catholic outlook. They 
long for the time and anticipate it, when man shall have 
but one cradle and one country — the universe; shall own 
allegiance to none but Universal Law. In the internal 
unification of States, laboriously achieved, they see but the 
prelude to that comprehensive unification which shall 
abolish political frontiers and weld humanity into one uni- 
versal commonwealth. For them internationalism is the 
goal, and they find no place for nationalism within it. 
Theirs, intrinsically, the more splendid vision if the religion 
we profess has any significance at all. But all its per- 
spectives may not harmonise. Internationalism of a kind 
which shall bring the world at least measurably nearer the 
Christ philosophy may not of necessity involve the dis- 
appearance of nationalism, except in its aggressive and 
intolerant form. It is an obstacle to the growth of a great 
ideal to make its acceptance dependent upon the abandon- 
ment of an existing one, passionately clung to by the bulk 
of humanity, and not proven incompatible with the former. 
Moreover, the horizon open to the best of us is pitifully 
limited, and dogmatism on such a theme is worse than 
useless. 

For my part, I write as one who believes that the 
British commonwealth has evolved ideals in the art of 

1 By Harold Picton. London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd, 
Price, 3d, 



A PLEA FOR SANITY OF THOUGHT 185 

Imperial Government which have generated a greater 
measure of human liberty for a greater aggregate of the 
human race than any system which the Continent of 
Europe has created or could by any possibility have created, 
given geographical conditions; as one who believes that 
were the ideals of political freedom, which after much tra- 
vail the British genius has crystallised into definite institu- 
tions, to be overthrown, the world would be immeasurably 
the poorer. But I write, too, as one who believes that 
these achievements have been performed at the price of 
weakening the nerve centre of the Imperial edifice. The 
very virtues which have produced a race of Imperial states- 
men with large ideas marked by political sagacity have 
led here at home to an indifference towards and neglect 
of social problems and to a blind and partly unconscious 
selfishness which are undermining the whole structure, 
and constitute the flaw in the foundations of a very splendid 
edifice. That flaw the democracy, in my judgment, can 
alone remove. We stand to-day at the parting of the ways. 
We are in the grip of a conspiracy against truth in 
this country. To speak truth is to be unpatriotic. To bid 
the nation weigh carefully the outlook and think for itself 
is to be "pro-German. " And the misfortune is that a great 
many — a vast mass — of reasonable people, belonging to 
all classes, are allowing themselves to be hypnotised, do 
not realise the profound modifications of thought which 
this war is creating, and are, by their blindness, bringing 
down upon the British commonwealth those very dangers 
which they dread. Take, for instance, this vision of an 
internationalism which shall replace nationalism. The 
people who most declaim against it are doing most to 
spread it. Why? Because they see in it nought but the 
mutterings of a soulless proletariat. Do they ever ask 
themselves what the governing classes have done for the 
masses that the latter should be led to regard death and 
mutilation on the field of battle as the sublimest manifesta- 
tion of human worth, the supreme achievement of human 
duty ? Do they, ready as they have ever proved themselves 
to be to consent to such sacrifice when called upon — and 
none can justly dispute that claim — ever take the trouble 
to inquire why incentives to similar action may be lacking 
in the lives of millions of their countrymen? For them, 
"patriotism" has but one meaning. But for them country, 
home, history are tangible realities, fibres which permeate 
their being, cords responding instantly to the touch — and 



r86 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

with reason. But what are country, home, history to num- 
bers in those crowds they all uncomprehending^ jostle in 
the busy thoroughfares of life ? For them prowess in arms 
means a social halo; and often more material gains. But 
for those others — what ? In one case substance worth the 
risk; the risk itself framed in irridescent hues of excite- 
ment and glory. In the other sterility, the goal of risk; 
beyond the goal, submergence in the drudgery and pre- 
cariousness of the heretofore. What reward was meted out 
to the conquerors of Waterloo? The rulers whom they 
served completed the process of reducing them to the most 
pitiable of all situations to which a people can be reduced 
— the situation of a landless proletariat. The conquerors 
of Waterloo became the serfs of the aristocracy and landed 
gentry. The termination of a protracted struggle "for the 
liberties of Europe" found the mass of the people of Eng- 
land irremediably divorced from their land, degraded and 
poverty stricken. The degradation still subsists in our 
Poor Laws. Where in Europe will you see the like ? What 
benefit did the British people derive from the two and a 
half millions which Pitt presented to the King of Prussia, 
or from the million expended annually on the German 
legion in order to keep order in England ? What was 
given them in return for fertilising the mountains of Spain 
and Portugal with their blood? Did that particular war 
of liberation liberate them? It did usher in a notable era 
of improvement for the French and Prussian peasants. 
But the conquerors of Waterloo were bereft of all. Since 
then their descendants have been struggling hard and are 
still struggling to obtain a measure of justice under changed 
economic conditions. 

But they have never won back their heritage — the land. 
Our Junkers have clung fast to it. It can be legitimately 
said of the classes whose power is so largely based to-day 
upon that dispossession that if they are brave and fearless, 
as they have always been, their patriotism has, neverthe- 
less, a silver lining. To-day these same classes, slavishly 
adulated and emulated by a new-sprung hybrid type 
deficient in the virtues which characterised and still in some 
measure characterise those they ape and are, in part, sup- 
planting, but opulent and commanding publicity; take little 
trouble to conceal their hopes that the aftermath of this 
war of liberation will be conscription, Protection, and the 
final burial for this generation of urgent social reforms. 
And it is from them that emanate the counsel of a war of 



A PLEA FOR SANITY OF THOUGHT 187 

extermination and strangulation towards our present 
enemies — even though it last a decade and sweeps the very 
breath of liberty from our land. It is from them that came 
the arrogant "Thou shalt not grow," which is one of the 
root causes of this war. It is from their organs that come 
the epithets of "traitorous," levelled at those who bid the 
people think out the aftermath of such a policy in the light 
of what has gone before. Among' the vice-presidents of 
the Anti-German Union are a marquis and two belted earls, 
who between them own 300,000 acres of British soil, to 
say nothing of the proprietor of a certain London news- 
paper which is frankly Militarist, Conscriptionist, and 
Protectionist. 

When we are faced, as we are to-day, by the clatter 
of certain politicians and by the Tory Press (supported by 
a number of "intellectuals," who seem to have exchanged a 
certificate of lunacy with their German colleagues) in favour 
of a "war of attrition" which is to last three, five, ten 
years if need be; when we are faced with this, and when 
we realise the immense powers behind the appeal, it 
appears to me that some of us are bound to put the other 
side of the picture. And for this reason : that persistent 
neglect of the other side of the picture, the neglect involved 
in this proclaimed policy, will in the ultimate resort destroy 
the British Commonwealth. 

A few months before the war, statistics were placed 
before us. They apprised us, did these statistics, that in 
the majority of English counties our agricultural popula- 
tion was permanently underfed, and that 60 per cent, of 
our agricultural labourers between the ages of 20 and 65 
were receiving wages below the standard required to main- 
tain health. They told us that the housing conditions of 
our working classes in most of our great cities and in very 
many parts of rural England were a disgrace to a State 
calling itself enlightened ; that the slum areas of our cities 
alone sheltered between two and three million citizens of 
this proud Empire. They told us that here in wealthy 
England half a million people were dying yearly from pre- 
ventable disease; that infantile mortality in our manu- 
facturing centres marked a higher percentage than pre- 
vails among the primitive races we are so anxious to prose- 
lytise; that a vast host was living, through no fault of the 
units composing it, just on the poverty line, in the midst 
of the ostentatiously displayed wealth of the richest State 
in Christendom ; that the mass of the people were enjoying- 



1 88 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

but a fractional part of the national income — built up by 
their muscles and their sweat — and that half the acreage 
of the United Kingdom is held by 10,000 persons out of 
a population of 45 millions. 

Do those who have spread these facts before us in 
official documents; do the prelates, and the well-fed and 
comfortable (the battalions that possess reserves to stave 
off the pinch of economic stress), who fling up their hands 
in horror at the conception of political internationalism — 
do they ever contemplate, one wonders, that some day they 
may be faced, not merely by the sullen mutterings of the 
cowed and starved, but by questions clamoured from the 
throats of multitudes ? Questions they would find it hard 
to answer and to meet. Questions such as these :"What 
is the 'security' you offer me in exchange for my blood 
and that of my sons?" "What is the 'home' I am asked 
to defend?" "Where is my 'land' which you tell me is 
in peril?" 



CHAPTER XXI. 
The Interests of Belgium 1 

The a •priori refusal of the Allies to negotiate a general European 
settlement permitting a peaceful evacuation of Belgium would be for 
my country the equivalent of a death warrant. Such a refusal 
would also constitute a great crime — the greatest crime indeed which 
human history has ever known. — M. Henri Lambert (ex-Member of 
the Commission for the reform of the Belgian electoral laws, Member 
of the Societe d'economic politique, etc.), in the "U.D.C." for 
December, J915. 

BROADLY speaking, there are two alternate lines of 
policy upon which the people of this country have to 
make up their minds. If, and when, the opportunity pre- 
sents itself to discuss a termination of the war, either 
through the good offices of Neutral Powers, or in some 
other fashion, will they insist that it shall be taken? Or 
if that opportunity occurs will they actively approve of, or 
tacitly acquiesce in, its rejection? In other words, will 
they be disposed to consider a settlement not dishonour- 
able to them ; or will they decline, and if they decline, why 
will they decline? The answer to the question, one 
assumes, depends upon what the British people, not merely 
the British Government, not merely the British governing 
classes, but the British people, really want. 

Do they want to "crush" Germany, or do they want 
what Mr. Churchill said the Government wanted last Sep- 
tember? 2 

"We want a natural and harmonious settlement which 
liberates races, restores the integrity of nations, subjugates 
no one, and permits a genuine and lasting relief from the 
waste and tension of armaments under which we have suf- 
fered so long." 

That is what the British people have got to decide, and 
the sooner they set about making up their minds the better. 

It is true that Mr. Churchill has talked since about the 
"unconditional surrender" of Germany. It is for the Bri- 
tish people to choose whether the first or the second edition 

1 The Labour Leader, September 9, 1915. 

2 1914- 

189 



: 9 o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

of Mr. Churchill suits them best. There is an ethical side 
and a strictly utilitarian side. When we consider the 
ethical side, Belgium is naturally the chief figure in the 
picture. Let us, then, look at the ethical side a moment. 
No one will gainsay that what stirred the generous 
emotions of the mass of the British people was the in- 
famous invasion of Belgium, and her treatment by the in- 
vaders. If the invasion of Belgium had not occurred and 
the Government had decided to go to war with Germany 
because a state of war existed between Germany, France, 
and Russia, there would have been a complete split in the 
Cabinet, and an immediate "stop-the-war" movement 
would have been the outcome. It was Belgium that made 
the appeal to British hearts. It is of our duty towards 
Belgium that the British Government has continually 
spoken. "Remember Belgium" has been the main 
theme in recruiting propaganda. It is true that The Times 
and other papers, annoyed when Mr. Lloyd George recently 
declared that but for Belgium he would not have supported 
the war (or words to that effect), hastened to state that 
while Belgium's case was a sad one, we were really at 
war to maintain the "balance of power"; and it is true 
that The Times spoke the truth when it made that declara- 
tion. It spoke for the Tory Party as a whole, for the 
most influential section of the governing class, for the 
militarists and Jingoes; and it said quite accurately, so 
far as those forces in the nation are concerned, that we 
are at war for the "balance of power." 

To do it justice, The Times revealed the inner mind of 
the classes who have hitherto directed the foreign policy 
of this country quite early in the day, for on December 
4 1 it wrote : "We have always fought for the balance of 
power. We are fighting for it to-day." The then exist- 
ing interpretation of the "balance of power" by those 
classes was specified with blunt emphasis by the Spectator 
a few days afterwards, when it remarked : 

"If Germany had tried to invade France by the direct 
route instead of by way of "Belgium, we should still have 
been under a profound obligation to help France and 
Russia. It is useless to tell us that we were free to act 
as we pleased. . . All our dealings with France — our 
sanction of her line of policy, our military conversations 
with her Staff, our definite association with her acts abroad 
— had committed us to her cause as plainly as though we 

1 1914. 



THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 191 

had entered into a binding alliance with her. And what is 
true of our understanding with France is true in a scarcely 
less degree of our understanding with Russia. ' ' 

But the British people did not support the war, the 
bulk of the Cabinet did not support the war, and would 
not have supported the war, to fight the battle of France 
and Russia alone; in other words, for the "balance of 
power." The British people supported the war out of pity 
and indignation for Belgium. 

If the British people still feel pity and indignation for 
Belgium, then it is time they faced honestly what the effect 
upon Belgium would be of a refusal on our part to consider 
a settlement which would restore her territorial integrity 
and compensate her (so far as it is possible to compensate 
her) for the material damage she has suffered. I am assum- 
ing, for the purposes of the argument, that such a settle- 
ment may be, or may become, within the bounds of prac- 
tical politics. I will deal further with that assumption later 
on. What, then, would be the result for Belgium of a 
refusal on our part to discuss terms of peace of which the 
evacuation of Belgium would be an integral part? Well, 
the first and palpable result would be a prolongation of 
the German occupation of Belgium; a postponement of 
Belgium's liberation. What would ensue? Obviously, an 
intensified renewal of (a) the German attempt to break 
our line, (b) our attempt to break the German line. If the 
Germans succeeded in breaking our line, Belgium would 
cease to occupy much place in our thoughts, for obvious 
reasons. Simultaneously with a changed perspective of 
Belgium in our thoughts, the "annexation" party in Ger- 
many would be immensely strengthened. Belgium's 
future would be one of exceeding blackness from whatever 
standpoint examined. If we succeeded in breaking the 
German line, the Anglo-French armies would dispute with 
the German for every square yard of Belgian soil, destroy- 
ing with shell-fire, as they would be compelled to do for 
military reasons, every town, village, homestead, and 
public building which sheltered the German troops. What 
would remain of Belgium at the end? 

The man who does not face these questions is not being 
honest with himself; nor is he being honest towards Bel- 
gium. So far as Belgium's interests are concerned, her 
most vital interest is a settlement which shall, as speedily 
as may be, restore her integrity, enable her, with help, to 
build up once more her industrial and agricultural life, 



i 9 2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

and give her a greater measure of security for the future 
than she has had in the past. The latter can only come as 
the result of the destruction of the theory of the "balance 
of power," and with it the abandonment by the Govern- 
ments of the group system of international relationships. 
And that can only be achieved by a process of international 
reconstruction which it will be the task of every true demo- 
crat in every country to labour for unceasingly after the 
war. If we are to consider Belgium's interest, Belgium's 
interest clearly does not lie in having the whole of her 
territory converted into one vast ruin. 

But it may be said, "If Belgium's interest is as you 
set it forth, why does not the Belgian Government make 
some sort of statement in that sense?" A moment's con- 
sideration will show that it would be impossible for the 
Belgian Government to make any such statement. Bel- 
gium is, virtually, one of the Allies. She is the last of 
them that could put forth an independent wish at this 
moment. Her Government is enjoying the hospitality of 
French soil; hundreds of thousands of Belgian refugees 
are established in France and England. Well, if not the 
Belgian Government, then, at least, some Belgian news- 
paper or public man? How? I believe there are still 
papers published in Belgium. What they are saying I do 
not know, but we cannot accept as genuine Belgian opinion 
any printed expression of opinion in a Belgian newspaper 
which passes the German censors. Le Vingtieme Steele 
is printed at Havre, and the Independance Beige, I believe, 
in London. But these are merely Government organs so 
far as any expression of public policy is concerned. As for 
individuals — other than members of the Belgian Govern- 
ment — the only statements I have seen are those of M. 
Henri Lambert and M. Paul Otlet, and there is certainly 
nothing in what they have written which suggests that my 
view of Belgium's interests is not the right view. Both 
these distinguished Belgians have written with sound sense 
and a practical appreciation of the underlying issues of 
the war and of the fate of their country. M. Henri Lam- 
bert owns a big industrial establishment at Charleroi, and 
is an honorary member of the Society of Political Economy 
of Paris. He is an Economist of repute, a man of wide 
reading and much experience, of sterling honesty and strong 
character. His letter in the Nation the other day, his 
letters in the Westminster Gazette, and two remarkable 



THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 193 

pamphlets, one of which has been translated into English, 1 
are familiar, I dare say, to some of my readers. As a 
Belgian he might be excused for taking a view of the war 
which excludes sanity of judgment. I do not know, but I 
suppose he must be a great material loser from it, apart 
from his feelings of belonging to a small nationality shame- 
fully used. But he does not think, apparently, that true 
patriotism for a Belgian civilian consists in adding his 
voice to the sterile declamations against the enemy. He 
realises that the Germans are not naturally endowed with 
a double dose of original sin, and that the origin of the 
war did not start with the bombardment of Liege. 

"The international situation to-day — he writes — is due 
to a series of special circumstances affecting the interests 
of nationalities. National psychology is a factor which 
has played in it a part, the importance of which neither 
is, nor can be, contested. But the real 'causes,' the 
original and deep-seated causes, were of a far more 
general character, connected with the very nature and 
necessity of things. . . . 

"The war will of necessity be followed by a peace, but 
the universal and permanent peace that each of the belli- 
gerents declares to be the supreme result to be attained 
by this war will not be the achievement of superiority of 
arms, nor of skilful strategy, nor, alas ! of the bravery of 
soldiers : these forces will only be capable of imposing a 
temporary peace, consisting in the subjection and 
oppression of the conquered. A peace worthy of the name 
and worthy of true civilisation will be the achievement of 
the thought of those who shall succeed in furnishing a 
conception of the mutual rights of nations, in accordance 
with true justice." 

And for Henri Lambert — and I very largely agree with 
him — one of the fundamental "causes" of this war is the 
protectionist and monopolistic policy adopted in economic 
matters by many of the Governments; by all, in a certain 
measure, though by Britain herself, hitherto, least of all 
— since Bright and Cobden's great achievement. Free- 
dom of trade is for Henri Lambert the true road to a per- 
manent peace among the nations. He does not discard 
other avenues of approach, but he says, in effect, "Neglect 

1 "The Ethics of International Trade" (Oxford University Press, 
Price, 2d., June), 



i 9 4 TRUTH AMD THE WAR 

this one, and your efforts are vain." And here I am in 
complete accord with him. 

Here, then, is a well-known citizen of a country which 
has suffered much and grievously at German hands. You 
do not, however, find him demanding that Germany shall 
be crushed. He implores the European Governments to 
remove one of the most potent causes of international dis- 
putes, from which small countries like his own become, in 
the ultimate resort of war arising from those disputes, the 
victims, and freely admitting the "precarious position" of 
Germany, economically speaking, before the war. 

M. Paul Otlet is the director of the Bibliographical In- 
stitute of Brussels, and Secretary of the Union of Inter- 
national Associations. In his thoughtful paper published 
last month, "Les conditions de la paix et de la sauvegarde 
de l'humanite" (Les documents du Progres, Lausanne), he 
strikes the same note substantially as M. Henri Lambert. 
He does not see in this war Teutonic demonology triumph- 
ing over an international company of angels. He, too, 
goes to the root of things. 

"The present war — he writes — if not in its origin, at 
least in the actual condition of its development and in its 
continuation is due not to one cause alone, but to a number 
of causes, which can be classified in the following manner. ' ' 

He classifies his "causes" under seven heads, and to 
the economic cause he attributes primary importance. He 
thus defines it : 

"Obstacles to expansion owing to the lack of colonies, 
the closing of markets as the result of protectionist or pro- 
hibitionist measures, unfair competition, export rebates, 
and 'dumping,' brought about by trusts sheltered by 
customs tariffs. ' ' 

I do not propose to go into the arguments of these two 
Belgian gentlemen at any length at this moment. I shall, 
indeed, have myself to deal here with the enormously im- 
portant problem of which they treat. What it behoved to 
place on record was their opinion as Belgians considering 
first the welfare of their country and not their own in- 
dividual feelings of anger against its invaders. They see 
in a peace resulting from military victory on either side 
no future security for Belgium. They see in a negotiated 
settlement which shall take into account the national neces- 
sities of the various belligerents the only avenue through 



THE INTERESTS OF BELGIUM 195 

which security for Belgium can come. And that, needless 
to say, is the view of the Union of Democratic Control, 
of the Independent Labour Party, of all men who decline to 
let themselves be driven like cattle by newspaper bullies 
into approval of courses which would be fatal, not for 
Belgium only, but for Britain and for Europe as a whole. 



CHAPTER XXII. 
What is the War's Object? 1 

They (the people of England) might be misled for a time by passion, 
or duped by political intrigue ; but ere long the sound practical good 
sense of the nation re-asserted itself ; and he believed that a year 
would not pass before the country would ask with one voice : "Tell 
us for what we are fighting ; tell us, if we are victorious, what will 
be the results of victory ; tell us what recompense we may expect, 
except barren wreaths of glory, for a sacrifice of uncounted treasure 
and for mourning and misery in a hundred thousand English homes." 
— Lord Stanley on the Crimean War (Annual Register, 1855). 

PERHAPS the determined efforts of certain individuals 
and certain influences to establish a Caesarism in our 
midst and, as a short cut to this g"oal, to force Conscrip- 
tion upon us (not on the merits of the case, but as the result 
of an intrigue in which political and personal ambitions 
and great vested interests are leagued) ; perhaps this 
menace, which threatens dire consequences to our national 
efficiency, will prove to be a blessing in disguise. For it 
seems that only a momentous event will wrench the nation 
out of its mental lethargy, compel it to mobilise its brains, 
to think out clearly whither it is being led. In many 
respects the nation is living in a fool's paradise : in no 
respect more completely than in the surrender of its powers 
of constructive thought, in allowing its faculty of critical 
judgment to be atrophied, and in becoming the slave of 
phrases without inquiry as to their purport and significance. 
For what objects is the nation striving? What results 
does it hope to obtain from the "utter and complete defeat" 
of Germany? Is "utter and complete defeat" a realisable 
achievement in terms of modern warfare? Is a "war of 
attrition," upon which the nation is invited to pin its hopes, 
other than a mere collection of words devoid of practicable 
import? 

The people are not thinking out these questions for 
themselves. They are allowing the "Government" to do 
their thinking for them, and publicists, every one of whose 

1 The Labour Leader, September 23, 1915, 
196 



WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 197 

predictions have been falsified in the last twelve months. 

So long as the Government presented to the world a 
united front, "trust the Government" was at least an in- 
vocation which could reasonably be uttered. But what is 
there in the spectacle which the Government presents to- 
day to justify a demand for the continued paralysis of con- 
structive criticism, not only as regards the conduct of the 
war — and here criticism has not lacked — but as regards the 
infinitely graver problem of the ultimate objects with which 
the war is being waged? Is the surrender of the national 
judgment with regard to the Government's policy, or lack 
of policy, concerning that supreme issue wise or even safe, 
when the very Ministers who demand it are engaged in 
washing the national dirty linen in public for the enemy's 
edification, and by their intrigues and plots against one 
another are convulsing the nation in the face of the enemy ? 
Can the nation suffer itself to be led blindfold in respect of 
the war by Ministers who proclaim the profound ani- 
mosities and divergencies which separate them as to the 
methods of prosecuting the war, and who summon to the 
support of their contending ambitions the most powerful 
organs of the public Press? 

The time has come for asking some plain questions. 
The agitation for Conscription, violently thrust upon the 
country, raises the entire question of the ends for which 
the war, now thirteen months old, is being waged. For 
what ultimate purpose does an important section of the 
Government agitate for Conscription ? What is the goal at 
which Ministers — Conscriptionist and anti-Conscriptionist 
— are aiming? Do they aim at securing an honourable 
peace ; a peace which would liberate Belgium and Northern 
France from the invader; lead to the adjustment of the 
Alsace-Lorraine trouble on the basis of a plebiscite or of 
racial affinity; to the reconstitution of an independent 
Polish kingdom ; to a federated Austria ; to a Balkan settle- 
ment conceived as far as possible on the lines of nationality 
and a common tariff from which could evolve in the fulness 
of time a true Balkan Federation containing within itse(f 
sufficient vitality and coherence to make it independent of 
Austrian and Russian intrigue; to the "open door" for 
trade in over-sea possessions; to the abolition of the right 
of capture of private property at sea, and the recognition, 
by territorial readjustments in Africa and economic facili- 
ties in the near East, that the energies of a great nation 
of 65 millions, increasing at the rate of three-quarters of 

(i,5) 



198 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

a million per annum, represents an element in the world 
Avhich cannot be denied its fair share of opportunities in 
the development of the universe. Is it, as we were assured 
when it broke out, a war which, in the conscious purpose 
of those who direct our national policy, shall, out of the 
wreckage of human hopes and the desolation of human 
homes, give birth to international machinery for the future 
settlement of disputes between States, thus registering- this 
war as the final spasm of a perverted statecraft? 

Or is it a war of destruction and extermination that we 
are now waging ? A war to which those in authority refuse 
to contemplate any conceivable limit of time in the en- 
deavour to reduce the enemy to absolute impotence? A 
war in which those in authority decline to consider any 
negotiations for a settlement not preceded by an uncon- 
ditional surrender of the enemy? If it is not such a war 
as this, why does not the Government indicate in other 
than rhetorical language capable of sinister interpretation 
the policy it is in reality pursuing, and the national aims 
it has in view? If it is not a war of destruction and ex- 
termination, why does not the Government dissociate itself 
from the utterances which emanate day by day from 
organisations and individuals claiming to speak for the 
nation; utterances which thereby strengthen the 
reactionary elements in the enemy countries, proportion- 
ately weaken the elements favouring an honourable peace, 
and prolong the holocaust? 

"Some honourable gentlemen," Bright once remarked 
in a famous House of Commons speech, "talk as if Russia 
were a Power which you could take to Bow Street and 
bind over before some stipendiary magistrate to keep the 
peace for six months." Are we fighting to-day under the 
same delusion with regard to Germany? Are we fighting 
that British troops may march along the Unter den Linden 
in Berlin? If not, why cannot the Government say so? 
Are we fighting to seize and to retain all the German 
Colonies and to prevent Germany from ever holding over- 
sea possessions in the future? If not, why cannot the 
Government say so? Are we fighting to shatter the poli- 
tical unity of Germany and violently to split up the Ger- 
manic Federation? If not, why cannot the Government 
say so ? Are we fighting to dismember Germany, to reduce 
her territory in Europe by an extension of the Russian terri- 
torial area westwards, and the French and Belgian 



WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 199 

territorial area eastwards ? If not, why cannot the Govern- 
ment say so? Are we fighting to build up an economic 
fence round Germany in the future, to differentiate against 
her trade throughout one-fifth of the habitable globe over 
which flies our flag, and to induce our Allies to act 
similarly; permanently to cripple her industrial activities, 
her foreign trade and shipping; to make deserts of her 
ports? Is the blood of the most virile in our land being 
spilled for these purposes ? If not, why cannot the 
Government say so? 

For one and all of these objects are constantly pro- 
claimed by pen and voice in this country to be the firm 
purpose of the nation to achieve. And these statements 
are believed in Germany. Just as the British newspapers 
publish the ravings against England of incendiary 
publicists and tub-thumping politicians in Germany; just 
as those British newspapers who advocate the crushing 
policy towards Germany lay stress upon these ravings and 
conceal from us the counsels of moderation which are also 
printed on the other side of the North Sea; so do the 
German newspapers reproduce the alleged designs of the 
British Government and people, conveyed in the 
intentions advertised here, and not repudiated by the 
British Government. And as these utterances with us are 
numerous and incessant, so are the German people, from 
the bottom to the top, persuaded that the fixed and unalter- 
able purpose of the British nation is to shatter the German 
Empire, destroy the national integrity of Germany and 
reduce the German nation to political and economic 
paralysis. 

They are wrong, of course. The British nation wants 
none of these things. The British people, like the German 
people, like all the belligerent peoples, want security ; and 
it is only in the measure in which they refuse to think for 
themselves and listen to the voices of false prophets that 
they can be led to believe that security is obtainable by an 
"utter and complete" military defeat of the foe. Nor can 
any elements of sanity contained in the British Govern- 
ment desire these things. Such elements will intellectually 
reject them, not out of consideration for the German 
Government — the German methods of warfare are not 
conducive to rouse such sentiments — but from considera- 
tions of national self-interest. But no single member of 
the British Cabinet has publicly repudiated any of these 
proclaimed intentions. Why not? What could Britain 



2oo TRUTH AND THE WAR 

lose in power and prestige by an official repudiation of 
purposes attributed to her by irresponsible speakers and 
writers, whose utterances fan the flames of hate and fear, 
and assist to perpetuate the massacre of the innocent? 

For let us realise the truth. This war in its dominating 
and precipitating origin was a struggle for mastery 
between the Russian and Teutonic autocracies. To-day it 
has become an Anglo-German war. Mr. A. G. Gardiner 
is right when he says that without us the war would have 
been over long ago, in the sense, of course, that British 
gold and the command of the sea by the British fleet 
jointly enable our Allies to receive the cash sinews of war 
and an uninterrupted flow of American ammunition. It 
is equally true to say that if the ruling classes of Britain 
and of Germany would consent to negotiate, ten millions of 
men would escape the horrors of another winter campaign. 
I can fancy the Pan-German editor and the Tory Conscrip- 
tionist exclaiming as they read that sentence : "The people 
would not allow them to negotiate. " The people! What 
people? Who are they who talk so glibly of "the people" ? 
Do they mean the soldiers? Do they mean that the 
soldiers, the men living and dying daily in the Hell which 
the Statecraft of the great has brought upon them — that 
these men, involved in a common suffering, would prevent 
the Governments from negotiating? Do they mean that 
the workers in Germany and Britain would besiege the 
Reichstag and Westminster ... to prevent the Govern- 
ments from negotiating? Are they quite sure that tEe 
day may not come when, if the Governments will not 
negotiate, the democracies will compel them to do so? 

The peoples in every land may be as persuaded to-day 
as they were thirteen months ago that the cause of their 
respective countries is the just cause and the only just 
cause. How could they believe otherwise, seeing that the 
entire mechanism of the Governments has been working 
full time to persuade them in those beliefs, and when the 
stress of cruel bereavements and the tremors of 
apprehension for beloved ones in daily danger of death 
provide an unlimited supply of lubricant for that 
mechanism? Nevertheless, the peoples want peace. In 
millions of hearts throughout Europe to-day there beats 
a passionate desire for a cessation of this senseless 
slaughter. Millions of lips in Europe are framing to-day 
prayers for the deliverance of humanity from the fiend of 
war, from another winter campaign. Is there a home in 



WHAT IS THE WAR'S OBJECT? 201 

France, in Germany, in Belgium, in Russia, across whose 
threshold the angel of death has not passed ? 

When will the Parliaments come to the rescue of the 
peoples and force the Governments to negotiate? 

This war has become an Anglo-German war. The 
nature of the settlement which shall terminate the war will 
depend primarily upon the temper of Berlin and London. 
The delay within which the beginning of a settlement may 
be discussed depends primarily upon the temper of Berlin 
and London. Those who revile us for preaching the gospel 
of reason as opposed to the gospel of hate, point to France. 
"Go and preach it there," they sneer, "and see where you 
will find yourself." Little do they know of the French 
mind and soul outside Paris ! France is supporting with a 
heroism and a dignity beyond compare the adverse decrees 
of Fate. But France is slowly bleeding to death. For 
France, even more, perhaps, than for Belgium herself, 
peace, and an early peace, is essential — even from the 
point of view of those who believe in the future main- 
tenance of the policy of the "balance of power. " 

This war has become an Anglo-German war. In the 
Reichstag voices have been raised to protest against the 
policy of plunder and annexation on the Continent; to 
reject the doctrine of hate; to proclaim the true interests 
of Germany to lie in an honourable and just settlement. 

But in the British Parliament no voice has yet been 
raised in similar strains; no utterance has yet been heard 
in repudiation of the doctrine of destruction, colonial 
annexation, and economic strangulation. 

At a moment when a section of the Government is 
endeavouring to stampede the country into Conscription, 
there is the more urgent need for the note of statesmanship 
on the wider and fundamental issue — the policy and 
ultimate objects of the war — to be sounded. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 
Reactionaries in Germany and Britain 1 

The idea of conquering foreign lands must be discarded, since 
nowadays the incorporation of an entire people, or the mutilation of 
an ancient State, which is a pillar of cultural power, can only be 
undertaken if there be a firm intention in the near future to risk 
another general war to maintain such a conquest. . . .The 
independence and freedom of the European nations, the German as 
well as the others, is the -.indispensable condition, without which 
there can be no peace and no peaceful work. — Extract from pamphlet 
issued by the "Bund des Neues Vaterland" ("Society of the New 
Fatherland"). 

Even, therefore, if we assign to Germany a monopoly of the 
spirit of aggressive militarism, European peace is not secured by 
crushing Germany. — Mr. J. A. Hobson in "Towards International 
Government." (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.) 

IT is clear that a bitter struggle is now raging - in 
Germany, between the forces of reaction and of reason, 
on the subject of Belgium and the invaded portion of 
Northern France. With a brutal cynicism, the German 
militarists and Chauvinists are clamouring for the annexa- 
tion, absorption, and assimilation of these European areas. 
Their attitude is on all fours with the utterances of Russian 
reactionaries in connection with Galicia before the war and 
with their acts during the occupation of that country — as 
to which the British public is allowed to know nothing. 
These gentle Teutons proclaim their ideal of a predatory 
empire and seek to lure their countrymen to fatal courses 
in the name of national safety; in reality, on behalf of 
national vanity in its most detestable form, and on behalf 
of material interests of class, naked and unashamed. But 
they are confronted by powerful influences working against 
them; influences which include personalities in the closest 
touch with the throne (and, it is stated, by the Kaiser 
himself) and with the official world, as well as the Social- 
Democrats. In this struggle the future destinies not of 
Belgium only, but of Germany herself and of Civilisation 
are involved. 

1 The Labour Leader, September 30, 191 5. 
202 



REACTIONARIES IN GERMANY & BRITAIN 203 

A variety of circumstances will, no doubt, combine to 
determine which side shall eventually triumph. But 
among- those circumstances the attitude of Great Britain 
will count as one of great, and, perhaps, capital 
importance. We can assist the German party of reaction 
and embarrass the party of reason — in effect, the party 
which aims at an honourable settlement of the war — in two 
ways. We can refuse to entertain the very idea of peace 
negotiations until the Germans have been driven from 
French and Belgian soil manu militari. We can 
characterise all German feelers towards peace negotiations 
thrown out from German sources as "intrigues"; 
describing them at one moment as an acknowledgment of 
approaching collapse and calling, therefore, for scornful 
rejection, and the next moment as impossible of considera- 
tion, on the ground that consideration would be tantamount 
to an admission that Germany had not been and could not 
be "crushed." That is one method, and the policy which 
underlies it is, of course, the "crushing" policy, advocated 
by some in the genuine belief that the national safety 
demands a Germany crushed and dismembered, by others 
from much the same motives as animate the German 
reactionaries in their proposals with regard to Belgium 
and Northern France. The latter point needs emphasising. 

What are the elements in Germany which demand the 
subjugation and spoliation of Belgium and France? 
Possibly some of the Generals, although on that point we 
have no information; while from neutral sources it is 
rumoured that Von Moltke and Von Hindenburg (whose 
collective influence at this moment must be enormous) are 
averse to the annexationist policy. Setting the Generals 
on one side, we find in the annexationist camp the 
agrarians — i.e., the ultra-protectionists, the enemies of 
democracy and freedom not only beyond but, and 
especially, within the borders of their own country ; certain 
big industrial interests; certain "intellectuals" bemused 
with arrogance and suffering from that lack of a sense of 
modern perspective which appears to be an effect of a 
surfeit of historical reading; the type best described as 
the "civilian-militarists," of all types floating on the war- 
scum the most odious, "lip-heroes" as Professor Foerster 1 
dubs them; the colonial Chauvinists — i.e., the men who 
covet a large colonial empire by fair means or by foul ; the 

1 In the Forum of Munich. 



204 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Jingo journalist and, we may be sure, working in the back- 
ground, the armament interest. 

And what are the elements here at home corresponding 
to the above, our ' 'Prussians," so to speak (although, 
really it is becoming a little ridiculous to talk about 
"Prussian militarism," seeing that the King of Bavaria 
is the greatest Jingo of them all; "Bavarian militarism" 
would be a welcome change) ; the people who seek in every 
conceivable manner to assure the British public that the 
true voice of Germany is the voice of the German 
annexationist, tear a passion to tatters in their denuncia- 
tion of it and then go on to urge that precisely the same 
policy they condemn as "German" should be adopted 
towards Germany by the victorious Allies ! What our 
Generals are thinking the "man in the street" has no 
means of ascertaining. But in my experience, and in the 
experience of every one of my friends without exception, 
not a solitary military man of any standing at all, supports 
in private conversation the "crushing" of Germany — in 
the sense intended by our reactionaries — as either feasible 
or desirable. Setting, then, as in the case of Germany, 
military opinion aside, we find in the British reactionary 
camp the industrial and agrarian protectionists, many of 
the great landowners and monopolists, and the Conscrip- 
tionists, whom the Globe appropriately enough divides into 
two camps : — 

"Those who wish to use the war to secure military 
conscription; those who hope to secure compulsory labour 
by obtaining national military service." 1 

And, again, as in Germany, the intellectuals afflicted 
with historical gangrene, the "lip-heroes," the Jingo- 
journalist (much more powerful here), and the aggressive 
Imperialists corresponding to the German colonial 
Chauvinists, but differing somewhat from their Teutonic 
prototypes insomuch as they do not avow their intentions 
on the trombone, but utilise the more subtle strains of the 
harmonium to convey their sentiments. Their sentiments 
are that Germany's sins are such that we can only punish 
her adequately by adding her colonial domains to our own 
Imperial heritage; naturally in a spirit of pure altruism, 
as a duty laid upon our shoulders by Providence, accepted 
with patient humility and resignation. Lastly, the arma- 
ment interest keeping, for the nonce, discreetly in the 
background. 

1 Issue of August 30^ 



REACTIONARIES IN GERMANY & BRITAIN 205 

Such, then, is one method whereby Public Opinion is 
this country can play into the hands of the reactionaries in 
Germany, by playing the game of the reactionaries at 
home, between whom there is little to choose, save that the 
former are less cultured (for all their appeals to "Kultur") 
than the latter in the art of cloaking reaction in the garb 
of respectability; and who are, in both cases, working 
for ends identical in principle, antagonistic to the interests 
and rights of the mass of their countrymen respectively. 

The other method would consist in allowing the 
German reactionaries to imagine that those Englishmen 
and Scotsmen who are incurring the wrath of their own 
Jingoes by appealing to the national sense of judgment, 
fairness and reason, are imbued with anything but detesta- 
tion for their German prototypes, or are in the least degree 
less opposed to the predatory policy which the latter 
proclaim. No terms of settlement which included a 
German annexation of Belgium and of the invaded districts 
of France would find backers in this country. 
No section in Britain would acquiesce in a peace 
on those lines. Only a Britain utterly defeated, extenuated, 
and compelled to an unconditional abandonment of the 
struggle would consent to such a peace as that. And this 
calamity it is not within the power of Germany to inflict. 
Moreover, did it lie within her power, she would not secure 
peace thereby; but only a temporary cessation of hostilities. 
Those who are opposed to a policy which urges the 
prosecution of the war to the point of a German "uncon- 
ditional surrender" (I am not concerned with discussing 
the practicability of the idea) because they think it insane 
from the standpoint of the British national interest, 
morally wrong and fatal to all hopes of international 
reconstruction, would be among the first to declare that 
the adoption by official Germany of the policy of the 
"Plunder-Party" would blend every shade and section of 
British thought into a unity of uncompromising resistance. 

But at present there is no proof that the "Plunder- 
Party" has captured the German official machine, still less 
the majority of Public Opinion. There is good reason to 
suppose that it has done neither, and will do neither unless 
our reactionaries here persist in giving their German 
prototypes the chance of advancing the one and only card 
which might enable them, after all, to win the day — the 
card of a Germany whom the ruling class in Great Britain 
was implacably resolved to crush, despoil, pulverise 



206 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

economically, and reduce to a position of permanent 
inferiority in the councils of the nations. That, in effect, 
is what the British reactionaries are preaching - . Let us 
see to it that they do not capture our official machine. For 
if the reactionaries on the other side were able to show 
that their card was not a marked one, they would proceed 
to argue that a Germany thus threatened must in self- 
preservation disable at least one of her foes for genera- 
tions, and buttress her defences and powers of material 
recuperation by the annexation of territory, and the seizure 
of ports and coal and iron fields, evoking the spectre of 
fear by way of justification, which, in nations as in 
individuals, beckons along the road of savagery and 
stupidity. 

The question, then for the British and for the German 
people alike is whether their collective sacrifices and 
sufferings are to be exploited by the selfish ambitions or 
stupidity of certain classes; whether their collective 
sacrifices and sufferings are to lead them, not up the slopes 
of the mountain of hope, but into the marshes of the valley 
of despair; whether the end of this infernal slaughter is to 
be, not mutual security and opportunity to build up their 
shattered lives afresh and prepare a brighter heritage for 
their children, but a perpetuation of unrest and an 
immeasurable aggravation of economic and social evils, 
cursing the rising generation and generations yet unborn. 



CHAPTER XXIV. 
The Penal Policy 1 

"Before peace can come Germany must accept complete and utter 
destruction of her whole racial ideal and submit to be put into the 
tightest of leading strings. "—Mr. John Buchan, at the Bechstein 
Hall (Mr. Balfour in the chair). "The Times," April 27, IQ15. 

"From this consideration there follows the conclusion which 
many people, including ourselves, have been extremely reluctant to 
adopt, but which seems to be irresistible — namely, at the end of 
the war Germany must cease to exist. ... It is the State that must 

be destroyed Not only can we not grant ..such a State an 

honourable peace, we cannot grant it peace at all." — "New States- 
man, May 15, 1Q15. 

"The German must be broken to pieces before there can ever be 
peace or safety." — "Morning Post," May 12, 1915. 

"The Kaiser, his system, his sham culture, and the nation 
which follows him in reckless cruelties, must be crushed : the dynasty 
must be blotted out. — Sir W. B. Richmond, "Daily Mail," 
September 75, 1914. 

"Sweep away the whole of the over-sea possessions of Germany, 
and whatever the cost of this war may be to us in men and money 
we shall breathe freely for generations to come." — Sir R. 
Edgcumbe, "Daily News," August 25, 1914. 

"Territory must be taken from Germany to weaken her power." 
— Mr. J. M. Robertson, the then Parliamentary Secretary to Board of 
Trade. "Manchester Guardian," October 23, 1914. 

"It is necessary to humble and humiliate the German Empire." 
— Lord Charles Beresford, "Morning Post," November 5, 1914. 

"A steady war of attrition must be waged against German 
commerce, finance, credit and means of livelihood." — "Times" 
Military Correspondent, December 13, 1914. 

"But, however the world pretends to divide itself there are only 
two divisions in the world to-day — human beings and Germans. — 
Mr. Rudyard Kipling, "Morning Post," June 22, 1915. 

"Germany must be got out of France and Belgium by direct 
force of arms. Austria and the Balkans should be permanently with- 

1 The Labour Leader, October 14, 1915. 
207 



208 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

drawn from German influence and German soil must be occupied, 
and we must refuse to re-open the sea to German purposes until we 
have made the future secure." — Mr. J. L. Garvin, National Liberal 
Club: "Westminster Gazette," October 12, 1915. 

THE overpowering need of the moment is that the 
belligerent Governments should, in some form or 
another, become acquainted with the views entertained by 
each as to the terms upon which they would negotiate; 
that, in short, the first stage in the bargaining bout should 
begin. It matters little how the initiatory steps are taken. 
The most practicable method would consist in a declaration 
conveyed to mediatory Powers. [It is known that several 
of the neutral Powers are ready and anxious to mediate.] 
But it does matter that the peoples in each of the belligerent 
States should be taken into the confidence of the Govern- 
ments; that the Parliaments should be informed, at any 
rate of the broad lines of the settlement envisaged by the 
Governments as honourable and reasonable. For if in one 
sense this war is not, and never has been, the "Peoples' 
war" it is described as being hv. the apologists of 
diplomatic incompetence, in another, and a very grim 
sense, it is a Peoples' war, and the Peoples have the right 
to see that it shall be a Peoples' peace and not a 
diplomatists' juggle concluded behind the Peoples' backs. 
In that sense the war is for us particularly a Peoples' war, 
and the People are entitled to know the real and ultimate 
aims of their Government. These the people do not at 
present know. That is why I appealed the other day to 
those members of Parliament who have retained their civic 
courage, their independence of judgment, and their sense 
of perspective, to press, in effect, for a Ministerial 
declaration and a Ministerial repudiation of the "crush- 
ing" policy, pointing out that the party of reaction and 
conquest in Germany was proportionately strengthened, 
and the party favouring reasonable terms of settlement 
proportionately weakened, by the conviction — which the 
German papers of all shades reflect — that the British 
Government and nation are intent upon reducing Germany 
to political and economic impotence. 

No doubt it is legitimate to argue that Ministers have 
never said, in so many words, that their desire is to crush 
Germany; but only to crush "Prussian militarism," or to 
"destroy the military domination of Prussia." But these 
expressions, which Ministers have used, are either mere 
rhetoric — and rhetoric in such a case is a dangerous thing 



THE PENAL POLICY 209 

— or it is something even more mischievous. We cannot, 
therefore, understand too clearly that the rest of Germany 
stands or falls with Prussia. Many liberal-minded men in 
Britain think differently because they establish a correla- 
tion between "Prussianism" as a force in German normal 
political life, and "Prussianism" as a factor in a Germany 
struggling" against a world in arms. They are thinking all 
the time in terms of franchise and "bureaucracies," and 
such like. They, or many of them, are so temperamentally 
predisposed to crusades against reactionaries of the hearth 
that they are intellectually incapable at this moment of 
realising the profound abyss which separates the feelings 
of non-Prussian Germany towards Prussia in peace, and 
those feelings to-day. Apart from the fact that the 
domestic side of "Prussianism" is an issue which the 
German people themselves can alone work out, "Prussia" 
to-day, considered in terms of the war. now raging, is 
indistinguishable from the other States of the Germanic 
Federation; indeed, one might say, indistinguishable from 
the Teutonic race as a whole — the Bavarian, for example, 
being ethically and spiritually far more drawn towards 
Austria than towards Prussia, but just as great a 
"Prussian" (in the sense used by our coiners of catch- 
phrases) for the needs of this war as the most Prussian 
of Prussians. The vast amount of nonsense which centres 
round the phrase "Prussian militarism" is reinforced by 
quotations from the effusions lauding force as a sort of 
national cult, obligingly provided by certain German 
intellectuals and philosophers and even military men. I 
say "even" military men, for while we can argue with 
justice that the philosophers , so-called, are atrocious; we 
can only denounce the militarist as montrous by the 
exercise of an hypocrisy which, if it be unconscious, is a 
reflection upon our intelligence. Militarism per se IS the 
cult of force in human affairs, and the professional 
militarist must be a believer in that cult. That he should 
rush into print to proclaim the fact adds nothing to our 
knowledge. Allowing for crudity of expression and 
brutality of diction, which the stern physiography of 
Prussia and its sinister experiences at the hands of more 
favoured peoples have evolved, there is little substantial 
difference between the philosophy of Cramb or even of 
Carlyle (in some moods) and Kipling (in others) and the 
particular brand of Teutonic philosophy now held to single 
out the Germans as pertaining to a lower strata of 



aio TRUTH AND THE WAR 

humanity. As to the German professional militarists, the 
Keims, the Bernhardis, and the rest, if you read their pre- 
war writings otherwise than superficially and with the 
fixed determination to discover therein the "mark of the 
beast," you will not only find in them that glorification of 
war which — unless you are very simple — you would expect 
to find. You will also find running through them the 
conviction that sooner or later, and sooner rather than 
later, Germany would be called upon to fight for her life 
against a host of enemies. And when you bear in mind 
even the very limited selection of utterances from the lips 
and pens of British, French, and Russian politicians, 
military men, and journalists during the past ten years, 
which I have quoted in this volume, you cannot but 
recognise that these German "political Generals," as Dr. 
Nippold 1 calls them, had no difficulty whatever in making 
out a case for the consumption of the German public, what- 
ever their own motives may have been in doing so; and 
they were probably mixed, like the motives of most human 
beings. 

To call attention to these things is not to minimise the 
share of responsibility borne by these elements in the life 
of Germany in building the European powder magazine, 
and in helping to explode it; still less to palliate the German 
treatment of Belgium, which will ring down the ages to 
the detriment of the German name. But it is only by 
bringing to a proper focus this whole field of considera- 
tions, and keeping the focus, that such phrases as 
"crushing Prussian militarism" can be adjudged at their 
true worth. 

Neither must it be overlooked that since the war broke 
out events have been conspiring to fuse all sections from 
the Emperor to the working man. 

It is not merely the shedding of torrents of German 
blood and the plunge into mourning of all classes in 
Germany which is accountable for the fusing process. It 
is the belief which events arising out of the war have 
caused to become universal in Germany, that the German 
people were the predestined objects of coalesced attack; 
and that the motive thereof was their destruction. And 
this, not because they were more bellicose than their neigh- 
bours — that in the past forty-five years they had proved 

1 Op. cit. 



THE PENAL POLICY in 

themselves less bellicose in action than any of their great 
neighbours is a material tact absolutely conclusive on the 
point to any German — but because they were becoming 
steadily greater and more prosperous, more dreaded as 
competitors in art and crafts. What has occasioned that 
belief which we may deem erroneous, but which to-day is 
one of the dominating elements in the international 
situation ? It has been determined in chief by : (a) The 
British "blockade" policy; (b) the loudly-advertised 
intentions of powerful sections of the community here, in 
regard to Germany's economic and political future; (c) the 
reports of Belgian Ministers abroad to their Government, 
discovered in the archives of the Belgian Foreign Office 
and distributed broadcast throughout Germany by the 
Government. On the "blockade" policy, viewed from the 
standpoint of strategic necessity, or in relation to 
Germany's submarine policy, or as a legitimate act of war, 
I am not competent to pass an opinion. Moreover, I am 
concerned now only with its psychological effect upon the 
German mind. What that effect is may be judged, not 
from extraneous sources, but simply from what the Press 
here has published as to the confidently anticipated results 
which would ensue from the policy, viz., the restriction of 
a substantial portion of the necessary food supply of the 
German population. The anticipation may correspond 
with fact, or it may not — I do not know — but the 
psychological effect is bound up with the advertised 
intention. "England wants to starve us out; to strike at 
us through our women and children," could hardly be 
surpassed as a battle-cry creative of the cement of national 
unity. As to (b), it will be recalled that steel had hardly 
clashed when the most powerful newspaper Trust in this 
country started, with the warm approval of certain com- 
mercial and politico-commercial bodies, its "War on 
• German trade. ' ' While our soldiers were dying for a 
great ideal, these civilian patriots were manufacturing 
schemes for increasing their business profits. The 
agitation in. due course died down — in the particular 
form in which it was first manifested. But it has 
been revived and, as I shall show in my next 
article, exists among us now as an organised move- 
ment, with powerful financial and "high society" support. 
It is accompanied by incessant pronouncements by men 
prominent in the life of the nation, as to the "punishment" 
we purpose inflicting upon Germany when we have brought 



2id TRUTH AND THE WAR 

her to that "unconditional surrender," which the Govern- 
ment indirectly (except in the case of Mr. Churchill, who 
used the actual words) allows it to be assumed is the 
Government's penultimate object. The '"punishment" 
takes many forms, varying from territorial mutilation in 
Europe to economic strangulation, from political disinteg- 
ration to a permanent veto upon the holding of over-sea 
possessions. The last-named "punishment," which a 
completely victorious alliance could impose with greater 
facility than it could the other items in the programme, is 
now being endorsed by no less an authority than Sir Harry 
Johnston, whose name carries weight in Germany, and 
who pleads for it with almost fanatical passion in the 
columns of the New Statesman. 

As to (c), it would need a special study adequately to 
convey the impression which the reports from Belgian 
Ministers alluded to above must be making upon the 
psychology of the German people. The authenticity of 
these documents is not questioned. The time will come 
when they will be regarded as, perhaps the most important 
contribution to our knowledge of pre-war conditions, and 
a complete vindication of those who have condemned the 
secrecy of British diplomacy. A brief indication of the 
character and scope of these documents has already been 
given. They show, with a unanimity whose cumulative 
effect is staggering, that, in the eyes of all these 
Belgian diplomats stationed in the various capitals 
and charged with the duty of conveying to their 
Government the impressions the*- formed of the 
character and objects of the foreign policy pursued by 
the various Governments to which they were accredited, 
the policy pursued by the diplomacy of England and 
France, sustained by influential Press agitations, had every 
appearance of being directed to the isolation and discom- 
fiture of Germany; that it was, in short, aggressively and 
deliberately anti-German. It may not have been — all this 
will have to be threshed out later on. But that is what 
seemed to be its character to these trained observers [who, 
being neutral, may be assumed to have been impartial] 
noting its evolution from those inner sanctuaries where the 
fate of peoples is lightly decided in darkness and in 
secrecy. And if Anglo-French diplomacy seemed thus 
inspired to these neutral observers, what must it have 
seemed to the diplomatic representatives of Germany in 



THE PENAL POLICY 213 

foreign capitals and, consequently, to the German 
Government ? 

Possess yourself, then, of the mind of the average 
intelligent German citizen and you will find that, under 
the influence of these events, it must work like this : — 

"We are to be starved into surrender. After our 
surrender, which is to be unconditional, our trade is to be 
throttled by combinations and differentiations. That was 
the object of our enemies all along. They proclaimed it 
almost as soon as the war started. Our commercial access 
to foreign markets over-seas is to be hampered and 
restricted. Territorial areas over-seas are to be wrenched 
from us. We are not to be allowed to possess colonies or 
dependencies. As our industrial population must have raw 
material to be kept in employment, these concerted 
measures will mean for us economic paralysis. Britain 
means to stifle us and to use the French and Russian 
armies for the achievement of her purpose. That it has 
been her fixed intention is now made evident by this long 
series of Belgian diplomatic reports which our Govern- 
ment has found. We are the victims of a diabolical con- 
spiracy." 

I am not asserting that this frame of mind reflects the 
true facts of the case. But I do assert that the principal 
events I have examined must appear to the German mind 
to embody the true facts of the case. And I do assert that 
to talk of "Prussian militarism"and"Prussian domination" 
as factors which can be isolated and "destroyed," in 
connection with the ultimate aims of our policy towards 
Germany, is to display a superficial and even a frivolous 
mentality unworthy of the name of statesmanship, and 
calculated to lead the nation into a quagmire of political 
error — the same sort of intellectual mistake which lost us 
the American Colonies. To tell the average German that 
you intend to "crush Prussian militarism" is to tell him 
that you intend to crush Germany : her commerce, her 
shipping, her prosperity, her competition in the markets 
of the world, her colonial enterprise. 

I have said before that I am persuaded the British 
people have not this end in view, and that I do not believe 
the sane elements in the British Government have this end 
in view. But that powerful, organised forces in this 
country have this end in view, are endeavouring to super- 

(16) 



2i 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

impose it upon the national mind and, by the advertisement 
which is given to them in the Press, are strengthening the 
Germans in their conviction that this is, indeed, the fixed 
purpose of the British Government and nation, therebv 
prolonging the war, I shall now show. 



CHAPTER XXV. 
Hate as a Creed 1 

From henceforward the Germans are to the English an accursed race. 
We will not buy from them, sell to them, eat with them, drink with 
them, nor pray with them. — The Globe, October 7, 1915. 

"Everything German taboo." — Motto of the Anti-German 
League. 

"No German labour, no German goods, no German influence ; 
Britain for the British." — Motto of the Anti-German Union. 

"Germany under all." — Motto of the Imperial Maritime League. 

THE two most prominent organisations which devote 
their energies to the propagation of the policy which 
may be described as "crushing Germany" and which 
advocate it, in effect, as desirable in the national interest 
and as the supreme end and aim of the war, are the anti- 
German League and the Anti-German Union. The 
significance of such organisations is that they crystallise, 
as it were, all the looseness of thought which has gathered 
round the phrase "Prussian militarism," all the passions 
incidental to a state of war, all the natural bitterness, the 
unreason, the intolerance and unfairness which curse 
humanity in war time, into a perfectly definite and deliberate 
purpose. They seek to direct the piteous aberrations from 
which an afflicted humanity suffers in a period of war, for 
the pursuance of aims which in themselves are ignoble and 
sordid. They take advantage of the mental dislocation 
which war brings and, coldly, with calculation, trade upon 
hate and fear, orienting these elements towards-ends frankly 
material. They are the exploiters of hate, analogous to 
the ghouls of the battlefield. We shall see as we dissect 
their manifestoes that were this attempt to impregnate 
the national policy with the virus of an enduring hatred; 
were this appeal to the lowest human instincts to succeed 
in its objects, the nation in whose interest they are said 
to be put forward would lose by every test — ethical, 
economic, or political — which can be applied. Certain 
classes, certain, vested interests, would, however, gain, 

1 The Labour Leader, October 21, 1915. 
215 



2i6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

and gain largely — for a time at all events. The preposals 
set out by these organisations would hit the consumer all 
round — the poor especially — but they would put money 
into the pockets of certain kinds of producers. They would 
raise the value of his lands to the great landlord. They 
would impoverish the needy man still further and increase 
the revenues of the rich. Such is the species of spurious 
patriotism which flaunts itself in war time and seeks to 
identify itself with the spirit of self-sacrifice. All wars 
have produced it, and sometimes Governments and peoples 
have been led grievously astray by it. 

Both the Anti-German League and the Anti-German 
Union appear particularly desirous of capturing the 
working man. Curiously enough, they have neglected to 
include representatives of the working class among their 
patrons and committees. More curious still, these are 
exclusively drawn from a class which — as a class — 
abominates the claims of Labour, and in peace time, 
utilises the whole machinery at its disposal to counteract 
them. "Everything German taboo." That is the motto 
of the Anti-German League, whose committee is headed 
by the Marquis of Hertford (whom "Who's Who" 
indicates as former Captain in the Grenadier 
Guards and the proud possessor of 12,300 acres 
of British soil), and is under "the distinguished 
patronage" of Lord Frederick Fitzroy (also late 
of the Grenadier Guards) ; a number of ladies of 
title and a number of military and naval officers — 
presumably retired. The League desires, above all things, 
to "Smash the Germans commercially." Mark that. 
That amiable intention is in the forefront of the League's 
programme. Fighting for the "liberties of Europe"? 
Ah ! that is well enough for the men who are laying down 
their lives in Flanders, in the Gallipoli Peninsula, in the 
burning sands of Mesopotamia, in the jungles of West 
Africa. But your aristocratic patriot of the Anti-German 
League brand is much more utilitarian. It is the trade of 
the Teuton he is after, not the Teuton's blood. For this 
purpose — the purpose of smashing the Germans com- 
mercially — the League invites its adherents to take the 
pledge — I mean, of course, the Anti-German pledge. The 
Anti-German League promises, amongst other things : — 

"Not to purchase, use, or consume German or Austrian 
goods whatsoever. Not to employ a German for either 
domestic or commercial purposes. Not to place contracts 



HATE AS A CREED 217 

with any German-owned or controlled Company, Trust, 
or Corporation, or to send goods by, or travel in, German 
ships." 

No doubt German armament trusts are included in this 
interdict, but there is no special reference to them — a 
regrettable omission. Among the far-seeing objects the 
League has in view is to "legislate for a protective and, 
if necessary, a prohibitive tariff on all German and Austrian 
made goods." (One seems to detect here a far-off echo of 
the familiar Pipes of Pan !) In the document which 
accompanies its pledge form, and which is described as an 
"Introduction by the Founder," one reads such Tariff 
Reform, new style, as this : — 

"Thirty years ago we were miles ahead of all our 
competitors in manufacturing, in trade, in finance, and in 
labour, but what have we done to maintain that premier 
position among the great nations? We have, alas, 
permitted foreigners, particularly Germans, to dump their 
goods at the very gates of our great works, while our own 
men have starved or emigrated. We have to our own 
lasting disgrace readily purchased German produce to the 
detriment of our industries." 

And so on. It seems that the Germans have had the 
astounding impudence, without even a "By your leave," 
to increase their merchant shipping "from 500,000 tons 
to 5,000,000 tons" in the last thirty years. Clearly a 
nation that can act thus is past reforming. There is much 
talk about "Made in Germany, the mark of the Beast," 
the "Butcher of Berlin," and so forth. In short, the 
programme of the League is a repulsive and vulgar appeal 
to national cupidity. This precious society asks for a 
million subscribers at one shilling a head; in other words, 
for an income of ^50,000 a year, "not a large income 
certainly to exploit the aims we have in view." 

At first sight it may seem queer that there should be 
necessity for an Anti-German Union as well as an Anti- 
German League. Perhaps it is an illustration of the 
Quaker saying : "All the world is queer but thee and me, 
dear; and thou art a little bit queer." Anyway, "you 
pays your money and you takes your choice. " The Union 
is specially favoured by the Daily Express and the Morning 
Post. The Editor of the Daily Express is a celebrity who 
once wrote a book entitled "Exiled in England." His 



2i8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

name is Blumenfeld. It is a very patriotic paper, the 
Daily Express. That is why it thinks so highly of the 
Anti-German Union. As for the Morning Post, so 
attached is it to the Union that its proprietor figures among 
the Union's vice-presidents. The Morning Post preaches 
the Union's policy in its leading articles with punctilious 
regularity. It also makes a speciality of insinuating that 
those who combat its doctrines are rewarded for so doing 
with German gold. It opens its columns to the Secretary 
of the Union for the diffusion of similar insinuations, and 
declines to insert replies on the ground of insufficiency of 
space. I used to be a little puzzled as to why the directing 
minds of the Morning Post seemed so bent upon this 
particular style of public controversy. But I now under- 
stand that it must be a case of inherited mentality, on the 
"judge others by what you once were" attitude. I am 
indebted to a correspondent for the revelation. The 
correspondent obligingly forwarded me a copy of Lord 
Malmesbury's memoirs 1 the other day, and suggested that 
I should therein find the key to the Morning Post's men- 
tality. Now, Lord Malmesbury, you will remember — 
and if you don't remember you may be forgiven — was 
Foreign Minister in the Derby Cabinet (1852), and I very 
much regret to say that in those days the Morning Post 
was in the pay of a foreign Government — a Government 
with which we were on the worst of terms. That is 
vouched for by Britain's Foreign Minister of the day. Here 
is the passage : — 

"November 4. An article in the Morning Post from 
its correspondent in. Paris on the title of Napoleon III., 
retailing nearly every word of my last conversation with 
Walewski (the French Ambassador)." 

"November 5. Sent for Walewski. He confirms that 
the French Government paid the Morning Post, and that 
he saw Borthwick, the editor, every day." 2 

Very sad ! 

With these distinguished backers in the Press, the 
Anti-German Union fills the atmosphere with its patriotic 

1 "Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. " By the Earl of Malmesbury. 
(Longmans, Green and Co., 1884.) Vol. I., p. 362. 

2 See, too, passages in Vol. II., p. 107, as to the Post, which 
"obeys the orders of the Emperor to write one down." And (p. 151) : 
"The Morning Post has received orders from the French Emperor to 
attack me on every possible occasion. Mr. Borthwick, the editor, 
saw him at Paris and got his orders from himself." 



HATE AS A CREED 219 

vibrations. Its personnel, you will concede, is well fitt«d 
to make a special appeal to the intelligence of the working 1 
man, being so eminently qualified, by sympathy with the 
latter's aspirations, knowledge of his needs, and under- 
standing of his claims, to be his guide, counsellor, and 
familiar friend in these dark and troublous days. For 
is not its president the Earl of Euston, and do not its 
seventeen vice-presidents include the Marquis of Sligo, 
the Earls of Egmont, Kenmore, Kilmory, and Oxford, 
Lord Headley, Lord Leith of Fyvie, and a bevy of 
Peeresses? In fact, but for Mr. Ronald McNeill, M.P., 
and the Right Hon. Sir F. Milner, Bart, (at one time — 
horresco referens ! — on the General Council of the Anglo- 
German Friendship Society 1 ), the whole of the Union's 
seventeen vice-presidents are ornaments of the Peerage. 
The Union's motto is more ornate than the League's : — 

"No German labour, no German goods, no German 
influence. Britain for the British." 

In short, the Chinese wall within which the British 
people shall in future be cribbed, crabbed, and confined 
for the greater benefit of Tariff Reform manufacturers 
and rural landlords. 

From the Union's "Aims and Objects " and from its 
"Policy" I extract the following items : — 

"To defend British industry and British labour against 
German competition. To fight against German influence 
in our social, financial, industrial, and political life. To 
expel Germans from our industries and commerce. 'To 
explain the folly of granting peace on terms so easy as to 
make it possible for the Germans again to disturb the peace 
of Europe and the world.' " 

The world has, you observe, ever been a peaceful one 
until the wicked Teuton disturbed its blissful repose. The 
Union proposes to discourage the use of German shipping 
lines by English passengers and merchandise; to form a 
register of traders who will undertake not to buy or to sell 
German goods, and to take sundry other steps of a similar 
character. The Union, as I have remarked before, is 
being well boomed in the Press. But it is being advertised 
in other and more subtle ways. Its leaflets and subscrip- 
tion forms may be seen displayed on the counter of one 
at least of the best known of London Banks. 

1 Vide "Report of the Inaugural Meeting held at the Mansion 
House, May i, 1911." 



22o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

This glance at the chief hate-mongers and their ideals 
and methods would be incomplete without a passing refer- 
ence to the Imperial Maritime League, whose motto (these 
people cannot get along without mottoes) is, "Germany 
under all." It seems, according to the Imperial Maritime 
League that "we have got to smash them (the Germans) 
now once and for ever that they rise not again." The 
League has a partiality for the word "smash." It has 
issued a "Smashing the enemy declaration," which 
demands — after Mr. Churchill's and the New Statesman's 
own hearts — the "unconditional surrender" of the enemy : 

"Germany must be left at the close of this titanic 
struggle — so firmly fettered that she may never rise again 
in the panoply of war." 

All the other belligerents, apparently, may retain that 
panoply. But Germany, it appears, must not even wear 
the panoply of trade : 

"The sun. has got to set now, once and for all, either 
on the British or German Empires." 

Such is the articulated policy the working classes are 
asked to endorse by the "Prussians in our midst." These 
organisations and their organs in the Press are typical of 
the influences and forces in our social system which are 
fatally, necessarily, inevitably inimical to the interests of 
the workers — so long as our social system reposes upon 
its present bases. Yet they appeal to the working men 
of Britain to support them. They incarnate, do these 
elements, all that is intolerable and intolerant, selfish, and 
short-sighted in our national life. It is these elements 
which have controlled hitherto the entire course of our 
foreign policy; which compose to-day our diplomatic 
service, and which will go on doing both if we allow them. 
Do not, I beg of you, minimise their power for mischief. 
It is not for nothing that a man in this country sports a 
i coronet and flaunts armorial bearings. They can organise. 
They can lead. They have the governing instinct. They 
are wealthy. They are provided with keys which unlock 
the council chambers of the State. Through their power 
over the Press they can play a ponderating part in 
"national" decisions. They do not monopolise the spirit 
of hatred and revenge among us to-day, but they organise 
it. The more the workers fall under the spell of their 
doctrines, the bigger the price the latter will have to pay 



HATE AS A CREED 221 

in the end. For the policy they preach is — Death; 
physical death for multitudes, for it prolongs the war; 
social and economic death for multitudes, because the 
longer the war lasts the greater the social misery and 
suffering which will follow it. 

I now propose to examine some of the specific proposals 
which the policy of hate contains. The purpose which will 
inspire me in so doing will be the dual one of (a), demon- 
strating their ineptitude from the point of view of practical 
politics; (&), setting forth what I conceive to be the true 
national necessities of Britain, and Germany, from the 
standpoint of the future of Anglo-German relations. In 
this examination I shall be guided by the conviction that 
an understanding of their mutual needs by the British and 
German peoples is the keynote to any possible reconstruc- 
tion of Europe, of escape from a repetition of the armed 
peace of the last twenty years, and from a repetition of its 
inevitable sequel, attended by consequences even more 
cataclysmic for humanity. My conviction is based upon 
the incontestable fact that the British and German peoples 
have got to go on living on the same planet; that they 
cannot do so as permanent foes ; that they cannot suffer an 
indefinite prolongation of mutual hatred without mutual 
disaster, and hence that they must discover the way out, 
and, having discovered it, pursue it to their mutual 
salvation. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 
The "Trade War" 1 

It is no exaggeration to say that if this conflict goes on indefinitely, 
revolution and anarchy may well follow; and unless the collective 
common-sense of mankind prevents it before the worst comes, great 
portions of the Continent of Europe will be little better than a 
wilderness, peopled by old men, women, and children. — Lord 
Loreburn, in the House of Lords, November 8, 1915. 

I only wish to draw you to this conclusion, that the war has 
resulted in something like a deadlock of force and has operated to 
diminish the standard of our civilisation, to take away the guarantees 
of liberty, to diminish the trustworthiness of law, and to endanger 
the situation amongst nations, neutrals as well as combatants. If 
that is so, surely it is not surprising that one should begin to ask, 
Is any escape possible from this rake's progress upon which we have 
entered? Must we go on to witness a continually extending 
panorama of war? Is there no alternative? I believe there is. The 
passion of national independence is glorious and well worthy of any 
sacrifice. I recognise all its claims. But the passion of national 
independence must in some way be reconciled, if civilisation is to 
continue, with the possibility of international friendship, and unless 
you can see out of this war something which will lead to international 
friendship, coming into alliance with, and being supported by, 
national independence, you have nothing before you but a continued 
series of wars, hate after hate, extermination after extermination, 
from which, indeed, you may well recoil. — Lord Courtney of 
Penwith, in the House of Lords, November 8, 1915. 

We are told we are fighting for liberty and democracy against 
tyranny, but gradually we have seen the very system we abominate, 
whose very existence we detest, instituted in our midst, and in setting 
out to destroy it in the enemy, we are creating it at home. — Mr. 
Arthur Ponsonby, in the House of Commons, November 11, 191 5. 

I have been violently abused for using the word "peace." I 
am not going to allow myself to be charged with saying out of 
this House what I dare not say inside it. I have never, nor, so 
far as I know, have any of the friends who are associated with me, 
spoken of "peace at an)' price" or of "peace at any time." For my 
part, I have always said precisely and absolutely the opposite. I 
have said that I thought there were certain things that we ought 
to want and without which this war could not end. . . . But 
I have said . . . that there is nothing inherently disgraceful or 
humiliating in attaining these things by negotiation, and not by 
fighting. It is just as honourable, and it is less disastrous. It 
avoids incalculable human suffering, and it is more effective if what 
you want is a permanent peace. . . . — Mr. Charles Trevelyan, in 
the House of Commons, November n, 1915. 

1 The Labour Leader, October 28, 1915. 

222 



THE "TRADE WAR" 223 

UR national capacity to judge sanely of the present 
situation must be guided, as I have sought to 
emphasise throughout, by some clear conception of the 
ultimate aims we are pursuing in this war. At present we 
possess no such clear conception. The terrible events which 
are convulsing Europe and the confusion which reigns in 
our own national Councils alike militate against it, and 
there appears no constructive force, articulate in the nation 
at this moment, to visualise beyond the present and to 
detach the national mind from the mirage provoked by 
catch-phrases, such as come glibly to the lips of those who 
have spent most of their lives in talk. 

A monster styled "Prussian militarism" is enthroned 
before the national imagination; and that its overthrow 
alone is needed to re-establish peace and good-will on earth 
is so persistently taught, that to question it is denounced 
as virtual treason. That the German military machine is 
utterly ruthless and that some of its operators are deaf 
both to pity and to policy, is true enough — the odious 
tragedy perpetrated last week in Brussels is but an addi- 
tional proof. 1 But the myth which, because of this, 
portrays "Prussian militarism" as a sort of entity in itself, 
a something wholly exceptional and peculiar, is not less 
fabulous, or less calculated to distort the national sense 
of perspective in regard to the character of the European 
struggle, or to blind the national judgment to the nature of 
the elements which have been let loose by the rulers of the 
world. Those who reiterate incessantly that we are 
fignting "Prussian militarism" delude the nation. We 
are fighting a people of 65 millions, or, if you reckon in 
the Austro-Hungarians, of over 100 millions, who believe 
that we seek their destruction as a people. And it is the 
daily statements made by those who command the avenues 
of publicity among their foes, and who claim to represent 
the intentions of their foes; it is these, far more than any 
statements of their own Governors, which continually 
strengthen these people in that belief. That is the truth. 

The noblest utterance which this war has yet elicited 
has been given to the world by Miss Cavell herself : — "But 
this I would say, standing as I do before God and eternity, 
I realise that patriotism is not enough. I must have no 
hatred or bitterness towards anyone." To her, indeed, 
in that supreme hour there seems to have come a Divine 
message. Herself a victim to the barbarous insensibility 

1 The Execution of Miss Cavell. 



224 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

that war engenders, her dying words were not an incite- 
ment to hate and revenge, but an appeal to the Christ ideal 
which the statesmen of Europe are trampling in the blood 
of the peoples, calling the while upon some Pagan deitv to 
justify their hideous work. 

I have said that the Parliaments are guilty, although 
in a lesser degree. Parliament here is ready to debate the 
details of a Budget, to listen to platitudes about the 
Balkans, to wrangle fiercely over conscription, to make 
unkind remarks about the censorship. It is capable of 
becoming annoyed over a variety of matters connected 
with the management of the war. But so far it has shown 
no sign of grappling with the fundamental issue — the 
object and purpose with which the war is now being waged. 
From Parliament has come hitherto no lead, no guidance, 
no ray of light sweeping aside the comparative unessentials 
and throwing the essentials into bold relief. Some organs 
of the Press are beginning to clamour for the "truth." 
But the truths for which thev agitate are the lesser truths, 
and when Ministers have been driven to speak more openly 
of the military outlook in the various theatres of war; 
when, perchance, this or that Minister has paid the penalty 
attaching to a foolish boast, or has succumbed to the 
personal animosities which this demand for "truth," in 
part at least, conceals; or when some strategical success 
comes to relieve the monotony of gloom, all this insistence 
upon the "truth" will fade away, to be presently renewed 
when, and if, a further period of military ill-success sets in. 

For those who would say to the nation : — "The truth 
which you- need to apprehend lies not there, but in the 
interminable march of your youth to the shambles, in the 
mortgaging of your children's patrimony, in the growing 
irritation of neutral Powers at your maritime policy, 
casting, as it does, new and sinister shadows upon the 
international screen, in the increasingly alarming inroads 
upon your financial stability, in the fearful future preparing 
for your posterity; it is in these portents, whose cumula- 
tive significance escapes you, that reside the truths you 
must realise; it is that you incur these ills with no distinct 
conception of the goal you seek, without measuring the 
consequences by a conscious effort of the will" : for those 
who would say this to the nation, the Legislature has, 
apparently, no liking. So, in the absence of Governmental 
and Parliamentary leadership and in the functional abdi- 
cation of the Press, are we reduced to pursue the search 



THE "TRADE WAR" 225 

for truth by such lights as we individually possess, and to 
proclaim it in. the measure of our understanding- and our 
opportunities. 

And our vision, I think, will be contained within the 
boundary of the verities if it be inspired by the conviction 
that the essential problems peculiar to the belligerent States 
before the war, and which affected their mutual relations, 
will survive the war. The working out of these problems 
may be modified by the war, but their constituent factors 
will remain unaltered. Fundamentally the war is an 
attempt to solve these problems by the stupidest and most 
inconclusive of all means. But they will not and cannot 
yield to that treatment, because that treatment ignores 
growth, and growth is indestructible. The essential 
problems, then, which confronted the nations in their 
international relationships before the war will confront 
them at the settlement, and after the settlement. The war 
will not solve them, and the antiquated mechanism in vogue 
before the war will not solve them. A new mechanism 
must be created, and the peoples themselves must create 
it. The lubricant of that mechanism must be mutual com- 
prehension. There must be, on the part of each belligerent 
people, a conscious and sustained effort of the will to 
understand the nature of these problems as they affect its 
own destinies, and as they affect the destinies of its neigh- 
bours. And the starting point of that intellectual process 
must be a firm grasp of the first principle in the life of 
the modern State, viz., the common interests which unite 
the people of each belligerent State to its neighbours. 
When that principle is clearly apprehended war is seen in 
its true perspective — an outrage perpetrated upon the 
community by a restricted section thereof, an outrage 
rendered possible only through the intellectual failure of 
the community as a whole to appreciate the truth of that 
first principle. 

Let us apply this first principle to the problem of Anglo- 
German relations, upon whose future adjustment on a 
basis of mutual comprehension depends the realisation of 
that "New Europe" for which the belligerent peoples are 
told by their Governments they are striving, and for 
which the mass of them believe, more or less 
vaguely, themselves to be so striving. And let us 
apply it first to the problem of commercial intercourse, 
which is at once the most visible test of those common 
interests of which I have spoken and the most powerful 



22* TRUTH AND THE WAR 

medium to heal the wounds and bitterness engendered by 
war. And here we are faced immediately with the 
trail of the exploiters of war. To follow that trail, to 
expose the exploiter in his haunts, must be our purpose. 
He calls himself a German, a Briton, an Italian, a French- 
man, a Russian, according- to the community to which 
he belongs. In reality he is neither one nor the other 
and he is all in one. He is just an exploiter. His 
purposes are selfish, and his selfishness is cosmopolitan. 
To him the buying- and selling of commodities between 
peoples is beneficial to the extent in which he profits by it. 
If his competitors in other lands, by better organisation 
or ingenuity reduce his profits, trade to him becomes a 
"war," his competitors become enemies, and as he is 
extremely noisy, and often, influential, bitterness arises 
through his laments between the mass of consumers and 
producers in the country in which he lives, and in the 
country whence proceeds the competition to which he 
objects. We have seen that the proclaimed object of the 
organisations for the stereotyping of Anglo-German hatred 
and the newspapers which support them is to destroy 
German trade. The Morning Post puts the matter quite 
baldly :— 

"Our aims should be to destroy German trade because 
by trade a nation lives." 

This scheme to destroy German trade is to be all- 
embracing'. Sixty-five millions of Germans are, hence- 
forth, to be artificially forbidden to sell goods to the British 
Empire, the French and Russian Empires, and Japan, with 
Italy and the smaller fry thrown in. This is the "trade 
war" for which the Morning Post and other papers and 
numerous influential bodies here are preparing, and which 
they are urging shall follow the holocaust of human life. 
Hatred must survive in. the counting-house. 

Now a "trade war" is, intrinsically, as great an outrage 
upon the peoples as a war of armaments and a war of men, 
of which latter it is, indeed, often the forerunner and 
contributor, as Mr. Brailsford has so powerfully portrayed 
in his "War of Steel and Gold." 1 It is an outrage 
upon the peoples on that account ; and also because it seeks 
to interfere violently with the first principle of international 
relationship, the common interest between peoples. The 
influences which would impose this new form of warfare 

1 G. Bell and Son. 



THE "TRADE WAR" 227 

upon humanity at the close of a desolating- war are the 
most dangerous enemies of the peoples among whom they 
are established. To prevent the Germans from selling to 
us by the erection of "penal tariffs" is to lay plans for the 
further impoverishment of the British people when the 
latter, after the war, are struggling with unemployment, 
lowered wages, immense rise in the cost of living, depre- 
ciation, of monetary values, and the hundred vicissitudes 
war brings in its train. It involves and necessitates its com- 
plement. If the Germans cannot sell to us neither can they 
buy from us, and the exclusion of 65 millions of people 
from active commercial intercourse with their neighbours 
means a penalisation, not of them alone, but of their 
neighbours too. This advertised war upon the German 
producer and consumer is, therefore, the intimation of a 
coming war upon all British consumers, and upon a very 
considerable proportion of British producers; and, 
obviously, the section of the community which will be 
hardest hit by that war is the British working class. The 
employment, and, therefore, the means of livelihood which 
the British workers enjoyed through the labours of German 
workers will disappear : by restricting competition in the 
production of manufactured goods, and by narrowing the 
market, the British working man will be called upon to 
pay more for what he uses. Every restriction placed upon 
the free circulation of produce and manufactures, even in 
normal times, is really an invasion of the rights of mankind 
in the interests of private individuals connected with some 
particular branch of production or manufacture. The 
interest of the overwhelming mass of peoples in the 
freedom of commercial intercourse is common and 
universal. It holds good in the case of the relationship 
between civilised (so-called) peoples and between civilised 
peoples and uncivilised (so-called). Deliberately under 
cover of the passions of war, to prepare a future in which 
65 millions of people in Central Europe are to be debarred 
from trading with their neighbours is in itself a crime. 
It is doubly a crime, because it is also to prepare the way 
for future wars, of the sort we are experiencing to-day. 
The British Empire, grandiloquently exclaims the Morning 
Post, Can do without Germany, but Germany cannot do 
without the British Empire. 
Let us see. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 
German Competition 1 

"Here is a low political economy, plotting to cut the throat of foreign 
competition, and establish our own ; excluding others by force or 
making war on them ; or, by cunning tariffs, giving preference to 
worse wares of ours. But the real and lasting victories are those 
of peace and not of war. The way to conquer the foreign artisan 
is not to kill him, but to beat his work." — Emerson. 

"The trade which we can only capture by throttling Germany 
with the aid of the British Fleet will not long be ours when normal 
conditions recur ; and then what will become of the capital which 
we are adjured to put into it? How did Germany originally secure 
this trade? She won it fairly by science, intelligence, hard work, 
and adaptability. Only by those qualities can we recover and keep 
it." — The Times (September 24, 1914). 

STATISTICS are never stimulating-. But it is 
only by a reference to statistics that we can 
appreciate the importance to the British people 
of the labour and enterprise of the people of 
Germany and vice-versa. In 191 1 the total value 
of the direct trade between the British Empire and 
Germany amounted to ^16^0,640,000. In the list of 
foreign countries and British possessions from which we 
imported and retained merchandise in 1912, Germany 
figures second. The net value of that merchandise 
amounted in that year to ^65,841,000. We bought 
^25,000,000 more from Germany than from France, 
^27,000,000 more from Germany than from Russia, and 
^25,000,000 more from Germany than from India. We 
sold Germany ^"40,362,000 of produce and manufactures; 
^10,000,000 more than we sold to the United States, 
;£i 5,000,000 more than we sold to France, and 
^27,000,000 more than we sold to Russia. Germany 
supplied us with 10.4 per cent, of our total imports, and 
she absorbed a greater proportion of our total exports 
(8.2 per cent.) than any country in the world except India. 
How can an attempt to "destroy" a commercial connec- 

1 The Labour Leader, November 4, 1915. 
228 



GERMAN COMPETITION 229 

tion of that kind be undertaken without causing- an 
immense amount of distress to the people of these Islands ? 

From whatever aspect this problem of Anglo-German 
commercial relationship is examined, the more inimical to 
the interests of the masses of the British people, and the 
more inherently fallacious does the policy propounded by 
the Anti-German organisations and the so-called Imperial 
newspapers appear. To read their outpourings you would 
imagine that all we have to do is to replace the 
^70,000,000 of goods which Germany and Austria sent 
us anually before the war, by producing the articles at 
home, and that in so doing we should not only be as well 
off, but even better off. This calculation, of course, over- 
looks the fact that even if we could perform this miracle 
we should not be as well off or better off, for the very 
simple reason that the disappearance of that import trade 
would involve the corresponding disappearance of an 
export of British produce, manufactures, and services to 
pay for it. Again, to close our markets to German trade 
after the war would not merely involve the direct loss of 
the national transactions with Germany; for the policy, it 
seems, is to be a sort of joint combination on the part of 
the Allies. It would, thus, involve a further loss for the 
British people in the decreased purchasing power of the 
Allied States, consequent upon the self-inflicted loss 
imposed upon them by their rulers arising out of the disap- 
pearance of the volume of trade carried on between those 
States and Germany before the war. No State can shut 
out its people from so immense a market as that Avhich 
the Central European Powers provide without inflicting 
grievous disabilities upon its own people. No commercial 
firm can suddenly strike off a large proportion of its 
clientele without heavy loss resulting from the inevitably 
ensuing restriction of transactions. And the same thing 
holds good with nations. The people of each State are 
the clients of their neighbours. These, if you like, are 
commonplace truisms. But when we see how they are 
overlooked in the collapse of the reasoning faculty which 
is to be observed all around us, it may not be inappropriate 
to call attention to them. 

The same absence of rudimentary common-sense can 
be noted in other branches of the professional hate- 
monger's business. Germany, as we have seen, is to be 
faced at the close of the war with a trade boycott extending 
ibrough five-sixths of Europe, the whole of Africa, and 

(17) 



230 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

virtually the whole of Asia if, as is firmly hoped, Japanese 
political pressure can forcibly close the Chinese market 
to her 1 : in any case, a good half of Asia. And this same 
Germany, paralysed in her foreign trade and in her indus- 
trial development, is to pay a huge war indemnity to 
her conquerors ! But how? She could do so only by 
manufacturing and selling goods, and those who purpose 
imposing the war indemnity also purpose to withhold from 
her as much of the raw material with which to manufacture 
as they can manage, and to do all in their power to prevent 
her selling such goods as she may, nevertheless, succeed 
in manufacturing ! Then, where is she to get the money 
from wherewith to pay the war indemnity? 

Another thing which seems to be equally lost sight of, 
although not quite on the same plane of thought, is this : 
The woes of the world to-day are held, and rightly if we 
consider visible effects and ignore profound causes, which 
seems the popular procedure just now, to be in large 
measure attributable to the existence of huge conscript 
armies, which means huge armaments . . . and the rest. 
And Germany is regarded, erroneously from the historical 
standpoint, as the initiatory culprit. Well, were we to 
succeed, as the result of this war, in forcing Germany to 
abolish her conscript army without a corresponding 
measure on the part of the Continental States now 
opposed to Germany, what would be the upshot? We 
should be thereby releasing for commercial and industrial 
pursuits the whole of the able-bodied population of 
Germany for the whole period of the year. Having done 
so, should we impose a veto upon that population carrying 
on those pursuits? One might imagine that the 
ludicrousness of the impasse would appeal even to the 
titled patrons of the Anti-German Union. 

Hardly less absurd is the policy of dismembering 
Germany in order to remove Germany's trade competition. 
I say, in order to remove Germany's trade competition. 

1 Unexpected results sometimes ensue from clumsy attempts to 
dam up a river. Jf Germany is forcibly excluded from Africa her 
obvious policy will be to support Japan in the inevitable conflict which 
would arise between that Power and Great Britain and the United 
States should Japan seek special privileges on a large scale in the 
Chinese markets. Naturally, she would exact her price. But it 
would be a price which Japan might, under quite conceivable circum- 
stances, be prepared to pay. Of all the follies of which those who 
direct the policy of this country could be guilty, none could have 
more enduring and fatal results, than the policy of attempting to 
stifle the industrial development of Germany in the neutral markets. 



GERMAN COMPETITION 23 r 

because the political disruption of Germany is recom- 
mended by the same parties that want to "smash" 
German trade, although it does not usually figure on their 
printed programmes. Germany, as we now know her, 
is to be mutilated by large accessions of territory to France 
and to Belgium (which does not want them) on the West, 
to Russia on the East. This, of course, would involve the 
transference of millions of Germans to the French, 
Russian, and Belgian States. What would be the 
consequence from the point of view of human production ? 
It would be that these millions of transferred Germans 
would continue to produce just the same, the only 
difference being that the merchandise they produced to 
compete with ours in the world's markets would be made 
in France, Russia, and Belgium respectively, instead of in 
Germany. And what difference would that make to the 
competition? Absolutely none. We should merely have 
shifted a political frontier, which, incidentally, is becoming 
a factor of steadily dwindling importance in the life of 
peoples. We should not, in so doing, have affected trade 
competition one iota. And in arbitrarily shifting that 
frontier, thereby violating in flagrant fashion one of the 
main principles for the upholding of which we are officially 
stated to be at war, we should, without gaining any 
compensating advantage, have planted in the breasts of 
these millions of transferred Germans the determination 
to strain every nerve to become politically reunited to the 
bulk of their countrymen. Ag-ain, what sort of Europe 
is this which our hatemongers would create? The sort 
of Europe that would saddle the British working classes 
with a permanent war expenditure in peace, from which 
emigration en masse or revolution would be the only 
means of escape. 

Moreover, these short-sighted persons have not 
seemingly grasped the rudiments of what would be 
involved, in all sorts of ways, by a policy aiming at the 
penalisation of one of the most numerous and industrious 
peoples on the face of the globe. They talk and write as 
though the Teutonic race were confined to Central Europe, 
or could be confined thereto to-morrow ; increasing as it is 
far more rapidly than the British and, of course, than the 
French, which was actually decreasing before the war. 
Have they ever taken into account the millions of Germans 
scattered throughout our Empire ; in the neutral States ; 
in America? What kind of ferment should we be setting 



232 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

up against us throughout the world by such a policy of 
permanent repression? What interminable intrigues we 
should be inviting, a constant source of disquietude and 
embarrassment; intrigues ready to mature when, later on, 
the era of mutual recrimination begins between the Powers 
now allied, a process which has invariably succeeded 
alliances between Governments for the purpose of waging 
war, and which is even more certain and will be even more 
than usually rapid in this particular case, owing to the 
secret diplomatic manoeuvres which involved potential 
belligerency without the knowledge of some of the peoples 
engaged. 

And the mention of America induces me to touch 
upon one more aspect of the creed of hate. We 
are not, it appears, to ship goods or passengers 
in German vessels. We are even to cut off German 
ships from British ports — in order to kill German 
shipping, which is a branch of German trade competition. 
Very well. Now those who at this moment can see 
further than the distinguished personages presiding over 
the Anti-German Union and its contemporaries must be 
fully aware of two factors in this connection. First, that 
whatever we may do, or may induce our Allies to do in 
the direction of penalising Germany, America is not going 
to follow us one step in that direction. This war has 
taught America many things, and although consanguinity, 
some similar ideals, and detestation of German methods 
of warfare have powerfully influenced American opinion 
on our side, we have struck a heavy blow at American 
trade interests, and we have raised, in a form which here- 
after will become acute, that problem of the future of 
international commerce as it affects the greatest White 
community in the world, which the Germans loosely call 
the "freedom of the seas." America will not forget this, 
and is, indeed, already taking out insurances for the 
future. The other factor is this. Anyone who knows 
anything at all about the world's shipping problems knows 
that the backbone of German shipping is the North 
Atlantic trade, and that this, far and away the most 
important section of German shipping, has never received, 
because it has never needed, Government assistance. 
The traffic between Continental Europe and the United 
States has increased enormously during the past twenty 
years. The ostracising of German shipping by Britain 
would but intensify its activities with American trade, and 



, 



GERMAN COMPETITION 233 

one can imagine the tempting" offers Germany, if she were 
excluded from British ports, would make to America, 
which is ready to move heaven and earth to create a 
mercantile marine of some consequence, of her own. 

This survey, inadequate as it is, shows how essentially 
antagonistic to the interests of the British people, and 
especially to the British working classes, any "trade-war" 
against Germany would be. It has also contributed, I 
hope, to prove the impracticability and suicidal tendency 
of such a policy. A great deal might be said as to the 
causes of Germany's extraordinarily rapid commercial 
development, and as to our failure to maintain our former, 
lead in certain markets. A profitable field of inquiry also 
lies open in the direction of demonstrating that com- 
munities do not buy from other communities for love, but 
because they desire the goods those other communities 
produce. This element in international intercourse must 
survive the war as it has survived other wars, and must 
render nugatory any artificial efforts to restrain its 
influence. Enough has been said to show that in so far 
as the destruction of German commerce, for the greater 
benefit of the British people, may be represented to the 
British nation as an argument in favour of prosecuting 
the war to the "bitter end"; the destruction of German 
commerce is, in fact, impossible, and the attempt to ensure 
its destruction would redound, not to the benefit, but to the 
disadvantage of the British people. 

In the domain of trade interests ^ritain stands to gain 
nothing from a prolongation of the war ; and a parade of 
the Allied troops in the Unter den Linden would not lighten 
by one groat the bill which the prolongation of the war to 
that point — assuming the feasibility — would create, and 
which the British people would in the largest measure 
(they are paying to-day for the maintenance of some three 
million British troops and some three million Allied troops 
in the field !) be called upon to foot. The plea for a 
prolongation of the war on the ground that Germany must 
be punished by the destruction of her trade, and because, 
unless she is reduced to "unconditional surrender," and 
to the acceptance of any terms the Allies choose to impose, 
British trade would suffer from a renewed period of 
German trade competition is, therefore, both dishonest 
and fallacious. 

German trade competition is inevitable. There is only 
one means of removing it : to kill off the German people. 



234 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

German trade competition is not in itself an evil, because 
the greater the purchasing powers of the German people, 
the greater the volume of business our people can transact 
with them. The mass of the people in both countries are 
partners in one another's prosperity and in one another's 
misfortunes. Where German competition hits particular 
British manufacturers, the remedy is to be sought, not in 
the elimination of the competitor, but in an increase in 
efficiency ; in maintaining a higher and more universal 
standard of technical knowledge, in perfecting educa- 
tionary systems, in revising methods, in cultivating foreig'n 
markets with greater assiduity, in creating machinery 
for the co-ordination and classification of effort, in 
converting consular functions into intelligence bureaux. 

In all these branches of the commercial art we lag far 
behind because a long undisputed supremacy in every 
market (which in the nature of things could not, and 
cannot, be eternalised) has made us careless, and because 
we suffer from the incompetence of a diplomatic service 
wholly composed of men of aristocratic connections and 
wealth, whose upbringing and traditions cause them to 
look upon the national requirements of trade and 
commerce as vulgar unessentials, except when some 
particular commercial or financial combination can be 
used as a pawn in the diplomatic game of "checking the 
other fellow. ' ' 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

Our National and Imperial Problem 1 

What the open door is for trade, the open window is for politics, 
and a people is wise if it distrusts men who tell them that they can 
only conduct the public business in the dark. The first requirement 
of popular control of foreign policy, therefore, is a reasonable 
publicity. The people must have full opportunity of knowing what is 
being done and why it is being dene, before it has actually been done. 
Without this provision there is no safety. For a people to grant an 
unlimited control of their lives and their money to little knots of 
unrepresentative supermen, who tell them that the arts they practise 
are too important and too delicate for disclosure, is a monumental 
act of folly. — "Towards International Government." By J. A. 
Hobson (George Allen and Unwin.) 

"At present the control of foreign affairs is centralised in the 
British Isles. There is in London a group of men who do in fact 
determine the issues of peace and war for upwards of four hundred 
and thirty millions of human beings." — X. 

N considering the great task of national and inter- 
national reconstruction which is laid upon other peoples 
and upon ourselves, what is the fact which stands out above 
all the rest? 

It is surely this : — 

The ignorance in which the population is left as to the 
policy which its rulers are pursuing, in .its name, towards 
other States. 

I propose very briefly to examine our own case, and 
to give some specific illustrations. Our case is not excep- 
tional. It is typical, although more striking than some 
others, because we entertain in peculiar degree the illusion 
that we enjoy a truly democratic constitution. Fifty- 
seven years ago, speaking in. this city of Glasgow, one of 
the most able, the most honest, and, in the real sense of 
the word, one of the greatest statesmen Britain has 
produced — John Bright — said this : — 

"When you come to our foreign policy, you are no 
longer Englishmen, you are no longer free; you are 
recommended not to inquire. You are told you cannot 

1 A speech to the Glasgow Branch of the Union of Democratic 
Control, at Glasgow, November 23, 1915. 

235 



236 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

understand; you are snubbed; you are hustled aside. We 
are told that the matter is too deep for common under- 
standings like ours." 

That was the situation obtaining at the time we fought 
our last great war upon the Continent of Europe. That 
was the situation obtaining in the years which immediately 
preceded the present war. That is the situation obtaining 
to-day. Now, as then, when it comes to matters of 
foreign policy we are not free men. We are, indeed, less 
free, if possible, than we were in 1858, because of late 
years — during the past twelve years especially — the strings 
of secrecy have been drawn tighter and tighter round the 
operations of our foreign policy, with the natural result 
that Parliamentary sense of responsibility for foreign 
policy has weakened and public interest in foreign policy 
has waned. 

And yet what are the issues which our foreign policy 
decides? They are issues which affect every one of us 
more nearly than any national issue can conceivable do. 
They are the issues of life and death hanging in the scale 
for multitudes. 

Those issues, nevertheless, are determined without our 
cognisance and without our control. When we inquire 
into them, we are snubbed, we are hustled aside. 

I enumerate the following facts by way of illustrating 
the applicability of John Bright's words to existing condi- 
tions, and when I say existing conditions I mean the 
conditions which preceded the war and the conditions of 
to-day. I make no charges against individuals. I shall 
offer no opinion on the merits of the policy itself which the 
facts affect. I shall merely give the facts themselves, and 
follow them by the briefest of comments. 

My first illustration is this. It will be well within your 
recollection that in 1905, and again in 191 1, this nation 
stood on the brink of war in connection with the contro- 
versy over Morocco. 

Now, for seven years — from 1904 to 191 1 — the people 
of this country were kept in ignorance of the fact that 
attached to the published Anglo-French Treaty over 
Morocco in. 1904 there were secret clauses and a secret 
Treaty — the complement of those secret clauses ; that these 
secret arrangement provided (when the Powers benefiting 



OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 237 

under them 1 considered the time was ripe) for the political 
and economic partition in their favour of Morocco, in which 
country another European Power 2 had interests formally 
recognised in one 3 , and subsequently in two 4 international 
conventions, to both of which the British Government was 
signatory, and the second of which solemnly pledged the 
signatories to uphold the independence and integrity of 
Morocco. 

Of these secret arrangements it can be said with incon- 
trovertible accuracy, and without raising points of 
controversy : First, that they weighed upon, and affected 
in constant fashion, the whole direction of our foreign 
policy in the ensuing years. Secondly, that the ignorance 
in which the nation was kept of their existence affected 
fundamentally the national judgment in regard to the 
friction, almost resulting in war, to which the Morocco 
controversy gave rise. 

My second illustration is this : For eight years — from 
1906 to 1 91 4 — the people of this country were kept in 
ignorance of the fact that the Cabinet, or a section of it, 
had authorised periodic consultations and preparations for 
combined action upon the Continent between the nation's 
military advisers and the military advisers of the French 
Republic; and that, arising out of these consultations, this 
nation was held to have contracted obligations of honour 
towards that Continental Power. 

My third illustration is this : — 

For three years — 1912 to 1915 — the people of this 
country were kept in ignorance of the fact that, after a 
protracted effort to find a formula of words which should 
define with nice exactitude what they conceived their 
official relations towards one another to be, our Govern- 
ment and the Government of Germany had failed to find 
that formula — a failure which, in the circumstances of the 
case, was invested with the utmost gravity for the future 
of the peoples for whom these Governments were trustees. 

Of the two sets of facts which provide my second and 
third illustrations, it may be said with truth, without 
entering upon a discussion of events not yet ripe for 
discussion : — First, that the ignorance in which the nation 
was kept of them prevented a due appreciation of the 

1 France and Spain. 
3 Germany. 

3 The Madrid Convention, 1880. 

4 The Algeciras Act, 1906. 



238 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

perils which lay ahead of it; secondly, that these facts 
necessitated, and must have occasioned, had the nation 
been made aware of them, either a cpmplete and timely 
alteration in the accepted conception of national strategy 
(which would admittedly have avoided many of the diffi- 
culties and dangers with which we are now confronted), 
or such a full Parliamentary and national discussion of the 
international situation affecting the national policy and 
the national interests as might quite conceivably have 
averted these threatened perils. 

Finally — and this is my last illustration — the nation is 
entirely ignorant to-day of the ultimate purposes which 
the States with which it is allied — the personnel of whose 
Governments has been largely changed since the war broke 
out — are pursuing in this war. 1 The nation knows that 
there is a quadruple arrangement between its Government 
and the Governments of three of its Allies not to conclude 
a separate peace. But it has no clear notion of the ideas 
entertained by any one of those Governments as to the sort 
of settlement it would be prepared to accept, or whether 
those views, whatever they may be, are considered by this 
Government to be binding upon this nation. Meantime 
this 1 nation has already advanced sums to those Govern- 
ments, sufficient, so we are officially informed, to maintain 
three millions of their soldiers in the field, and is pledged, 
apparently, to further advances before the end of the 
financial year. 

I know that I am expressing the conviction of a rapidly 
increasing number of thoughtful men, not confined to any 
particular school of domestic politics, when I say that to 
conduct foreign policy behind the back of the nation in this 
way constitutes one of the greatest possible dangers to the 
security of the State. 

And I know I am expressing the views of a very much 
greater number of citizens, who are beginning to realise 
that every detail of their lives — the condition of their 
homes, the well-being of their families, their employment, 
their wages, their food — are intimately connected with the 

1 It has been affirmed since this speech was delivered, by such 
high authorities on Balkan affairs as Mr. Seton Watson and Sir 
Arthur Evans, that a secret understanding has been arrived at 
between the Allies whereby the Slav population of Dalmatia is made 
over to Italy as part of Italy's price for entering the war. It has 
also been affirmed by M. Miluikoff and Dr. Dillon that.Great Britain 
has agreed to a Russian possession of Constantinople. Neither of 
these affirmations has been denied. 



OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 239 

conduct and direction of their foreign policy : when I say 
that the present methods constitute a flagrant injustice to 
the people at large, and must be abandoned. 

The U.D.C. has formulated a series of urgently needed 
reforms, and there can be no doubt that were these reforms 
to be loyally and integrally applied they would go a very 
long way indeed to remove the present anomalies, injustice, 
and dangers. They would undoubtedly abolish that 
secrecy, which is the greatest danger— and which should 
be the chief object of reform. 

But I feel personally convinced that we shall have to 
accustom ourselves to the idea of contemplating far more 
drastic changes than any of these, which, in the main, 
are changes merely of custom and procedure. 

When we talk of democracy and democratic control 
of British foreign policy we have to remember that, while 
the claim of the democracy of this country to control the 
issues of national life and death must come first, because 
they are incomparably greater and because the burden laid 
upon the democracy of this country is incomparably 
heavier, there are four other democracies sharing that 
burden with this democracy, and that the claims of these 
other democracies cannot be ignored. 

It appears to me that it will be quite impossible when 
the war is over to stave off any longer the demand of our 
self-governing Dominions, which they have so clearly 
earned the right to press, for a share, and a full share, in 
the formation and in the character, control, and discussion 
of foreign policy. 

With the conclusion of peace, and probably before it, 
we shall find ourselves confronted with this problem. 

Even before the war, when the Canadian contribution 
to the Fleet was carried through the Dominion Parliament, 
Sir Robert Borden — then, as now, Canadian Premier — 
was emphatic on the point. Speaking on December 15, 
1912, he said :— 

When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsibility for 
defence upon the high seas she can no longer undertake to assume 
responsibility for, and sole control of, foreign policy, which is closely, 
vitally, and constantly associated with that defence in which the 
Doninious participate. It has been declared in the past, and even 
during recent years, that responsibility for foreign policy would not 
be shared by Great Britain with the Dominions. In my humble 
opinion, adherence to such a position would have but one, and that 
a most disastrous, result. 



240 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Since the war another of Canada's leading men, who 
enjoys peculiar authority, has used much the same 
language. Sir Clifford Sifton, at the Canadian Club, 
Montreal, delivered himself of the following unanswerable 
proposition last January : — 

Bound by no constitution, bound by no rule or law, equity, or 
obligation, Canada has decided as a nation to make war. We have 
levied an army ; we have sent the greatest army to England that has 
ever crossed the Atlantic to take part in the battles of England. We 
have placed ourselves in opposition to great world Powers. We are 
now training and equipping an army greater than the combined 
forces of Wellington and Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo, and 
so I say to you that Canada must now stand as a nation. It will 
no longer do for Canada to play the part of a minor. The nations 
will say : "If you can levy armies to make war you can attend to 
your own business, and we will not be referred to the head of the 
Empire; we want you to answer our questions directly." 

What holds good for Canada holds good for Australia 
and New Zealand — whose sons have earned imperishable 
fame in Gallipoli — and for the Union of South Africa, 
which is even now engaged, at our Government's request, 
in raising a large force for operations against the Germans 
in German East Africa. 

We cannot evade the problem. But its solution will 
necessitate profound and far-reaching changes in our 
Constitution, changes which, imperfectly understood by 
the public and badly handled by a Government distrustful 
of public opinion, might well shake the British Common- 
wealth to its foundations. 

There is only one way by which the ship of State can 
be steered through the many shoals and rapids with which 
the chart of our future is marked — for our own people, for 
the institutions they have built up, for the principles for 
which we have long stood, for the faiths which we hold — 
and that way is for the Government of this realm to take 
the people into its confidence, fully and completely. 

Hitherto the nation in all these matters has been 
treated — the nation has allowed itself to be treated — as an 
infant in swaddling clothes. Its rulers have committed it, 
have been allowed to commit it, to unknown courses for 
ends obscure, even to themselves. They have whittled 
away the prerogatives of Parliament until that once proud 
assembly is in danger of sinking to the level of a second- 
class debating academy as regards these vital issues. 
They have tried, and they have been permitted to try, to 
govern without the nation, relying more and more upon 



OUR NATIONAL & IMPERIAL PROBLEM 241 

cheap and nasty newspaper associations to give the lead 
they desired the nation to follow, with the not unnatural 
result that the chosen instruments now call the tune to 
which Ministers are fain reluctantly to dance. 

All this is bad, unwholesome, perilous. 

The key to its explanation and the key to its remedy 
lies here. 

Something may be said in favour of a despotic form of 
government. A good deal, we think, can be said in 
favour of a democratic form of government. But no 
State can manage its affairs for long upon a mixture of 
both without inviting consequences fatal to its stability. 

And that is what this State is trying to do, and has 
been trying to do, in all matters which affect the issues 
of national life and death. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

The Alleged "Conflict of Ideals" 1 

HAVE said that the essential problems which confront 
the nations in their international relationship before the 
war will not be changed by the war, but will confront the 
negotiators at the settlement and the peoples after the 
settlement; and that there must be on the part of each 
belligerent people a conscious and sustained effort of the 
will to understand the nature of these problems as their 
own destinies and the destinies of their neighbours are 
affected by them. This effort is particularly incumbent 
upon the people of Great Britain, since, as I have already 
remarked, the war to-day is to all intents and purposes 
an Anglo-German war, and Anglo-German enmity alone 
prevents its collapse. If, therefore, the war is not to be 
prolonged to the stage when ordered government itself 
becomes impossible, and if the war is not to be followed 
by a renewed period of armed peace, with a series of fresh 
wars in prospect, a real intellectual effort is needed here 
at home to understand what is the paramount necessity 
laid upon Germany by the factor of growth. And when I 
use that word, I mean it as applying to Germany's own 
growth in population and in industry, and also to the all- 
round growth in the demands of modern industry for the 
raw materials of the tropics and subtropics on the one hand 
and the all-round growth in the cost of foodstuffs on the 
other — both outstanding phenomena of the past two 
decades. 

Among the tragic failures — of prescience, temper, 
common sense — which have led Europe to its present pass, 
there is none, after making every allowance for German 
mistakes and the arrogance peculiar to the nouveau riche 
(in individuals as in nations), more tragic, and none which 
has been more intimately responsible for this world-war 
than the unwillingness or the incapacity — probably, in 
major degree, the incapacity — of the British ruling class 

1 The Labour Leader, November 25, 1915. 
242 



THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 243 

to grasp Germany's economic problem, which during the 
past quarter of a century has, in increasing measure, 
governed and determined the character of her international 
relationships. The blunders of German diplomacy, the 
crass ignorance of British psychology and British institu- 
tions exhibited by the ordinary German official, the appre- 
hensions excited over here by the development of the 
German Navy, and the unbridled licence of the mischief- 
making Press in both countries — these have had their full 
share in obscuring the vital issues beneath a fog of miscon- 
ception. But the absence in British governing circles of 
a broad-minded and comprehending grip of Germany's 
economic situation arising from her automatic growth 
and the ineA r itable effect of that situation in creating and 
justifying her Weltpolitik; the absence, in short, of that 
political insight and discrimination which goes under the 
name of statesmanship, among those who have directed 
our foreign policy in recent years, has been (combined with 
the general secrecy of diplomatic methods everywhere) 
one of the chief elements in producing that state of tension 
in Anglo-German relations, thanks to which, and thanks 
to which alone, an Austro-Russian squabble in the Balkans 
has lit a European conflagration where seven millions of 
the flower of European manhood have already been 
consumed. 

The attempt to throw the bridge of reason across the 
) torrent of human passion which is hurrying the British and 
I German peoples along the road to bankruptcy is the more 
difficult to-day, when even those who take the sanest view 
of our own grave national and Imperial problems endorse 
the postulate that this war is fundamentally a war between 
two ideals, the ideal of liberty incarnated in the British 
Constitution, and the ideal of tyrannous reaction incar- 
nated in the German Confederation. We have advanced 
so far in that error that the public accepts without a 
murmur the open threats of violence to Greece indulged 
in by powerful London newspapers in the event of Greece 
not doing our bidding; so far, that organs of the Press 
which used to be "Liberal" complacently envisage, in the 
name of liberty, a future Europe in which the present 
Allies, armed to the teeth, shall "permanently hold down" 
a forcibly disarmed Germany ! 

What, then, is the nature and significance of Germany's 
economic problem, arising inexorably from her own growth 
and the growth of world phenomena affecting her national 



244 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

future ? I denned it myself in the last chapter of "Morocco 
in Diplomacy," published in the spring of 1912, as 
follows : — 

"The guiding motive of German foreign policy to-day 
is to secure for the German people unfettered access to 
markets over-seas, as large a share as possible in the 
development of these markets, and a voice in the acquisi- 
tion of over-sea territories which may pass, through the 
course of events, into the International melting pot. It 
is not land hunger, but trade hunger, which inspires her, 
and trade hunger responds to the fundamental demand of 
her national existence." 

To every word then written I adhere, and if you 
want the statistical proof of their truth, you will find it in 
the fact that more than half of Germany's imports is 
composed of raw material for manufacture. German 
"World-policy," that Weltpolitik which the political mind 
has associated with aggression, because the political mind 
has regarded it exclusively from a political point of view, 
and which the Jingo Press has dinned into our ears 
morning and evening, must be aggressive from its very 
title (although Weltpolitik has been the breath of our own 
national nostrils since Elisabeth), is the product, not of 
political design, but of sheer economic necessity, outcome 
of growth. No doubt it has been expressed, often enough, 
in a manner calculated to offend susceptibilities, although 
I hardly think that any German utterance has exceeded 
the erstwhile performances of Mr. Grover Cleveland. But 
it is the business of statesmen to discover and appreciate 
the motive forces lying beneath the surface of diplomatic 
or royal demonstrations. 

Let us consider this economic problem of Germany, 
whence it springs, and how it has revolutionised the condi- 
tions of her national existence — for the problem is not a 
thing of yesterday, but of to-day and to-morrow. It 
governs the future as well as the present. In the last 
forty-five years the population of Germany has more than 
half doubled itself. It has risen from 40,000,000 to 
65,000,000, and before the war it was increasing from 
three-quarters of a million to a million per annum. To 
find food and work for an immense natural growth of this 
kind must ever be the primary obligation laid upon the 
Government of a community so prolific. As Mr. Dawson 
pointed out with irrefutable truth some years ago : — 



THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 245 

"The position of Germany is that of a prolific nation 
which is growing beyond the physical conditions of its 
surroundings." 

And Germany alone among the nations of Europe has 
been faced with the tremendous perplexities incidental to 
a problem of this kind. Her Government had either to 
sustain this population at home, or encourage its emigra- 
tion to foreign countries. Now, so long as the spirit 
of national entity exists, no Government and no national 
organism will be satisfied that foreign countries should 
benefit exclusively from the surplusage of its population. 
Germany possessed no over-sea territories affording the 
necessary climatic requirements for the expansion of a 
White people. The policy of her statesmen was, there- 
fore, bound to be centripetal and not centrifugal. In 
other words, they had to meet their problem by centralisa- 
tion and not by decentralisation. They had to concentrate 
and not disseminate their human material. 

Two points have to be noted, first, the necessity ; 
secondly, the decision. The centrifugal policy, the policy 
of radiation from the centre, was impracticable, because 
the means were not available : no temperate zones were 
in the market. The centripetal policy, the policy of con- 
centration of national effort within the boundaries of the 
State, was, therefore, deliberately adopted, and has been 
deliberately and scientifically pursued and systematised. 
Both food and work were found for the population at home. / 
Emigration dwindled, virtually to vanishing point. An 
immense industrial system was built up. While other 
Powers — the lambs of the international picture as painted 
to-day — were waging war here, there, and everywhere, 
in Manchuria, South Africa, Tripoli, Abyssinia, Morocco, 
the Sudan ; Germany, while fully prepared for war, did not 
wage it, but devoted the national energy to consolidating, 
perfecting, and training her population in industrial 
pursuits, calling upon all the inventive genius and 
laborious, painstaking, hardworking qualities of the race ; 
improving her hygienic and municipal undertakings to a 
degree which caused other nations to seek her counsels; 
penetrating every foreign market accessible, rivalling and 
outpacing old-established competitors by sheer application 
of intellect and system to commercial and industrial 
development. Two years before the war broke out 
Germany's foreign trade stood at ^"982,615,000; in 1888 
(18) 



H 6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

her foreign trade only amounted to ^323,585,000. In 
24 years it had trebled itself, showing an annual average 
rate of increase of 8.5 per cent., compared with Great 
Britain's 4.1 per cent. 

And it is precisely when we contemplate these facts 
that the fallacy of so much that is now being written about 
the divergence between British "Imperial" ideals and 
German "Imperial" ideals becomes so apparent. German 
professors and publicists may rave to-day about "destroy- 
ing" the British Empire, just as British professors and 
publicists rave about "destroying" Germany and 
' 'grinding her to powder. ' ' But the policy actually followed 
by Germany's rulers — imposed upon Germany's rulers by 
accomplished facts — during the past quarter of a century, 
has been a policy moving in a direction absolutely con- 
trary to the forcible wresting of temperate zones over-seas 
from the peoples which inhabit those zones . in order to 
create therein German-speaking communities. The belief 
which attributes to the rulers of Germany a deep-laid plot, 
hatched for years past, to acquire Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa ("destroy the British Empire," in 
other words), is a belief founded in ignorance of the whole 
trend of German policy and of the economic necessities 
dictating it, and also upon a radically faulty concept of the 
relationship existing between Great Britain and her self- 
governing Dominions. The British self-governing 
Dominions are inhabited by a white population of 14 
millions invested with complete control over their own 
affairs, except (and it is a big exception which cannot 
be perpetuated without wrecking the Empire), in so far 
as their own affairs are affected by the foreign policy of 
Downing Street. The Germans would not "possess" 
these countries even if they could conquer them, any more 
than we possess them ; and, in practice, Germany, having 
conquered these countries, would be no more able to coerce 
and control them than we are, without coming to grief, 
even as we came to grief when we tried that procedure in 
the case of the American Colonies. 

And when we are gravely told, as we are to-day, that 
this war is a struggle between irreconcilable British and 
German "Imperial" ideals, between two "opposing 
systems," and so forth, meaning thereby the fundamental 
divergence between the British and German notions of the 
relationship which should exist between the Central 
Authority and over-sea communities of the same stock on 



THE ALLEGED "CONFLICT OF IDEALS" 247 

the one hand, and between the Central Authority and 
communities of alien stock, but incorporated within the 
boundaries of the Central State, on the other hand; when 
we are told these things, what is our reply ? Our reply 
is this. The similitude implied, in order to point a moral 
from the divergence, is non-existent. There is no material 
for comparison, for the simple reason that Germany has 
never had to face an Imperial problem involving the 
creation of any kind of relationship between the Mother 
Country and over-sea communities of German stock ; and, 
secondly, because we have never had to face the German 
Imperial problem of determining the character of the 
relationship which should prevail between the 
Central Authority and alien communities within the 
territorial boundaries of the State subject to that 
Central Authority. Our nearest approach to the 
German Imperial problem is the case of Ireland, and our 
record in Ireland should make us chary of using the sort of 
arguments current to-day, because the very faults com- 
mitted by Germany in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, 
covering a few decades in the matter of time, have been 
committed by us in Ireland for centuries, and an influential 
Party in the State is still bitterly opposed to our correcting 
them. 

All this talk about a conflict of ideals being the rock 
bottom of the war, a conflict so deep-seated and racial that 
it can only be settled by the "complete overthrow" of 
either Britain or Germany, is, therefore, as applied to the 
domain of actual facts, an extraordinary hallucination, 
typical of that looseness of thought which catch-phrases 
engender. There is no such conflict, because Germany 
has never had the opportunity of demonstrating whether 
she possesses or does not possess the political sagacity 
to treat great white communities of her own stock over- 
seas as we have learned by bitter experience is the right 
way to treat them. There is no such conflict, because we 
have not been called upon to handle the problem of the 
government of vast agglomerations of alien peoples within 
our territorial boundaries, the case of the Irish — 
separated from us by sea, but at our doors — approximating 
most nearly to the German problem, and our dealings with 
the Irish not having been of a character such as to entitle 
us to declare that our regard for alien communities sub- 
jected to our immediate control places us upon a moral 
pedestal compared with the Germans. There is no such 



248 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

conflict, because the part Britain and Germany have had 
to play in the world has been utterly different; permitting 
of no possible political analogy. 

If the war is indefinitely prolonged, a direct or subsi- 
dised attack upon any portion of the British Empire, 
territorially accessible to Germany or her Allies, is probable 
enough. But that will be part of the strategy of war, 
and not of any supposed conflict of political ideals respon- 
sible for the war itself. 



CHAPTER XXX. 
Germany's Human and Economic Problem 1 

A people which increases fifty per cent, in a generation must be a 
colonising people, must have a great over-seas commerce, must, there- 
fore, have a great navy. — /. Holland Rose, in "Germany in the 
Nineteenth Century." 

Germany has a population to-day of over 65,000,000 of people, 
who are confronted with problems at home as well as abroad. They 
are the best clients of the United Kingdom ; they also do a very large 
trade with France (buying more from her than they sell), and an 
enormous trade — an average of ^90,000,000 annually — with Russia. 
Therefore, if the Governments of the Powers who form the Triple 
Understanding are business men, they will desire that Germany may 
solve not only her foreign difficulties, but her anomalies in home 
administration, as well as the social and fiscal questions in dispute, 
so that her toiling millions may increase in numbers and in wealth, 
and require larger and larger supplies of foreign products for their 
manufactures and their bodily consumption. — Sir Harry Johnston, in 
"Views and Reviews." (Williams and Nor gate. 19 12.) 

F I return to Germany's economic problem, resulting 
.from the growth in her population, it is because there can 
be no "New Europe" if that problem, and its effect upon 
international relations, is not understood; and, above all, 
by the people of this country. It is one of the capital 
issues underlying the condition of Europe to-day, and it is 
one of the capital issues inseparably bound up with the 
sort of future which is reserved for Europe after the war. 
The problem will subsist substantially unimpaired in its 
essentials by the war. If the settlement does not take 
it into account, the settlement cannot in the nature of 
things be a permanent one. A few years, at the most a 
decade or two, and the problem re-asserts itself automati- 
cally. Its solution can be sought, however, by action 
which would not only relieve the arterial pressure in Ger- 
many, but at one and the same time confer lasting benefit 
upon humanity at large. That action would consist in the 
establishment, by common consent, of freedom of com- 
merce and the "open door" for all commercial transactions 
(i.e., unrestricted by differential tariffs and exclusive privi- 

1 The Labour Leader, December 2, 1915. 
249 



250 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

leges) by the nationals of every European State in the 
dependencies which have been, or may be, acquired 
by those States outside Europe. It would mean 
ridding Africa and Asia of the curse of the 
monopolist, the protectionist, and the concessionaire, 
whose selfish interests provide the Chancelleries of 
Europe with most of their recriminating matter and with 
the raw material of their intrigues. It would make for 
peace in Europe, in Asia, 1 and in Africa. It would make 
for commercial and political honesty and international 
decency. It would not benefit Germany at the expense of 
other nations. It would ensure a fair field and no favour 
for all nations, and prove an inestimable boon to the 
"coloured" subjects of colonising States. 

So far as Germany is concerned, let us glance at her 
problem once more. We have seen that her rulers were 
compelled, in the absence of colonisable areas suitable for 
white settlement, to concentrate the tremendous elemental 
force with which Nature was endowing their country, within 
the boundaries of the State, which necessitated providing 
that force with sustenance and with labour. Now, despite 
artificial fiscal efforts the agricultural resources of the State 
were insufficient to supply foodstuffs in adequate quantity 
for the increased population. Germany's position has been 
steadily approximating to our own. She has become more 
and more dependent upon imported food. But to buy food 
from abroad you must pay for it, and, in the ultimate 
resort, you can only pay for it in goods. Put otherwise, 
a population unable to sustain itself with the necessaries 
of life from its own territory must be in a position to 
purchase its requirements by producing articles to sell to 
foreign food-producers in exchange. Similarly, a popula- 
tion increasing prodigiously, but concentrated at home by 
force of circumstances, must be kept employed. To 
furnish these articles and to provide this employment the 
raw material from which goods can be manufactured must 
be available in abundance. To sell these articles to the 
best advantage in the face of a universal competition 
entails not only access to existing markets in Europe, 
where in most cases discriminating tariffs have to be 
reckoned with; it entails unhampered access to new 
markets overseas of vast potentiality in raw material, 

1 I am assuming that the "open-door" in China is not closed by 
Japan as the outcome of an attempt on the latter's part to exercise 
complete control over China's internal and external policy. 



GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEM 251 

both for trade and for the employment of capital designed 
to intensify the flow of that raw material towards the 
centres of home manufacture. In the measure in which 
access to these new markets is hampered by discriminating 
tariffs, set up by those who control these new markets 
and by other restrictive measures, the problem confronting 
a Power in Germany's unique position must be rendered 
more complex and more difficult to solve. Free and 
expanding markets have become for Germany an indis- 
pensable necessity of her people's livelihood. As Mr. 
Dawson, writing at a time when men's judgments were 
not obscured by the passions of war, has put it : "To the 
nation collectively extended markets are a condition of 
life." 

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, the well-known German economist, 
quoted by the same writer, states the case with admirable 
lucidity : — 

"The number of those who must live on foreign corn 
increase, and the increases will soon be a million a year. 
Whoever cannot get rid of this million is bound to answer 
the question how otherwise he will feed them than by the 
produce of our industry — in the manufacture of raw 
material brought from abroad and the sale of our products 
to foreign nations, or the produce of the capital created 
here and invested abroad. If that is so, then for Germany 
all questions of foreign politics 1 must be viewed from 
the standpoint of the creation and maintenance of markets 
abroad, and especially in trans-oceanic countries. For 
good or ill, we must accustom ourselves in our political 
thinking to the application of the same principles as the 
English. In England the determination of foreign policy 
according to the requirements of trade, and, therefore, 
of industry, is an axiom of the national consciousness 
which no one any longer disputes. If the possibility of 
disposing of its industrial products abroad were one day to 
cease or to be limited for England, the immediate result 
would be, not merely the economic ruin of millions of 
industrial existences on both sides of the ocean, but the 
political collapse of Britain as a Great Power. Yet the 
position is not materially different for ourselves." 

Now, if we can lay hold of this pivotal fact and get it 
firmly fixed in our minds, we shall be able not only to 
understand how utterly impossible it is to expect that a 
durable peace in Europe can be secured by any of the 



<2$z TRUTH AND THE WAR 

nostrums for penalising Germany which are being dangled 
before the national vision, but how impossible it is to 
suppose that a permanent cure for Europe's ills is to be 
found if enormous regions in Africa and Asia continue to 
be treated by the States which administer them as privi- 
leged preserves for their own. nationals, especially when 
the States which so administer them are free from the 
internal problems which press upon Germany; and, too, 
if an area of the world's surface one quarter larger than 
Europe, inhabited by a population only 33 millions less 
than that of Europe, is liable to become a privileged area 
for British nationals by the accident of a British General 
Election. 

The three great Imperial colonising Powers (excluding 
Germany), are Britain, France, and Russia. Excluding 
the self-governing Dominions of the Empire, which are, 
of course, in all fiscal matters independent States, the 
British Government can determine the fiscal policy of an 
area covering one-tenth of the world's surface and 
inhabited by a little more than one-fourth of the world's 
total inhabitants. 1 Britain has hitherto discriminated 
against none of her commercial rivals throughout this 
gigantic area, and that is one of the reasons why, as 
Britons, we are justified in asserting that the British 
administration of those vast tracts is unselfishly exercised 
so far as other European nations are concerned. Were a 
strong Protectionist Party, however, to come into power 
at the end of this war and carry out its long threatened 
programme, the whole world, and especially the nation 
which comes next to our own in productive capacity, would 
suffer, and international relations would again become 
poisoned in consequence. For us, the result would be 
that we should have to build against the whole world, and 
maintain a permanent army on a large scale to prepare for 
the Continental coalition which would infallibly come about 
sooner or later. 

The case of France and Russia is different. France 
now owns very nearly half Africa and over 300,000 miles 
in Asia. In Asia the Russian Empire extends over just 
under one-third of that continent; and both France and 
Russia discriminate to the uttermost practicable extent 
against foreign merchandise and foreign enterprise, except 
where restricted from doing so — and the restrictions are 

1 The area of the British dependencies is 5,091,000 square miles, 
and the population is 369,000,000. 



GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEM 253 

confined to a few areas in French West Africa, and these 
only for a term of years which has nearly expired — by inter- 
national agreement. 1 

The case of France and Germany respectively may be 
taken, by way of illustration of the impossible situation 
which is created in the world so long - as great colonial 
Powers use their privileges to create for themselves and 
their nationals exclusive advantages, to the detriment of 
other Powers, for whom the need of free markets over- 
seas is a national necessity. This can best be shown in 
a table : — 

Population :--- 

France " 39,601,509 

Germany 64,925,993 

Excess of deaths over births : — 

France 34,869 

Excess of births over deaths : — 

Germany 740,431 

Foreign trade (1912) : — 

France ^"583,488,000 

Germany ^"982,615,000 

That was the situation before the war. 2 It is, it would 
seem, to be further aggravated after the war. France and 
England are to drive Germany from the African Continent 
altogether. They are to seize and retain her dependencies 
therein, and they are to combine for the purpose of 
"smashing" her over-seas trade. Yet Germany is driven 
by the immutable laws which govern the existence of 
States either to secure free markets over-seas or to secure 
over-sea territory which she can develop free from the 
unfair competition of hostile tariffs, or perish ! Of course, 
if you can really "destroy" Germany the problem is solved. 
Personally, I do not regard that operation as within the 
range of possibility. 

The Government of every nation engaged in this war 
has repeatedly declared that it is waging war in order to 
secure a durable peace at the end of it. A durable peace 
cannot be secured from the military results of the war. It 
can only be secured by a joint effort to recognise the 

1 I assume, of course, that the Franco-German Convention in 
Morocco has gone by the board. 

3 In the decade preceding the last census, which in France was 
taken in 1911, and in Germany in 1912, the population of Germany 
increased by 8| millions, and the population of France by 639,564. 



254 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

peculiar needs of each nation, and by the admission, 
expressed in political acts, that natural growth must find 
an outlet and cannot be artificially stifled. The following 
table illustrates a further aspect of the problem we have 
been, here considering, and, like the preceding one, crystal- 
lises a series of facts which can only be disregarded by 
the expedient the ostrich is said to adopt when pursued. 
The States of Europe are being pursued to-day by the 
nemesis of their own past follies, and they cannot find 
salvation by imitating the ostrich. 

Population : — 

United Kingdom 45,369,090 

Germany °4>9 2 5>993 

Increase in last decade : — 

United Kingdom 3,392,263 

Germany 8,558,815 

Foreign trade : — 

United Kingdom ^"1,344,168,421 

Germany ^943,050,000 

Growth of foreign trade in last 25 years : — 

United Kingdom 100.7 P er cent. 

Germany 204 per cent. 

Actual increase in. aggregate value of foreign trade in 
last 25 years : — 

United Kingdom ^562,025,000 

Germany ^659,030,000 

I shall now show that the enormous importance which 
attaches to the future colonial policy of European States in 
determining what the future of Europe is to be, is fully 
apprehended by representative men belonging to neutral 
and even to belligerent States. 



CHAPTER XXXI. 
The Eternal International Irritant 1 

If you think that, not being able to sell freely, we should mend 
ourselves by giving up the power to buy freely, I must leave you to 
that opinion, only expressing my wonder at it. But you will perhaps 
say that we can force other nations to reduce their tariffs if we impose 
a tariff against them. You forget, probably, that we have tried 
that in past times, and that it has wholly failed. — John Bright. 

THE war of to-morrow will be a war, not between 
nations, but between influences and forces within 
nations divided into two opposing camps, those upholding 
the conception that force must be the ultimate Court of 
Appeal for conflicts between nations, and those determined 
that other means must be found. If we are to equip our- 
selves efficiently for this struggle we must look out upon 
the world as it is and frame our action in conformity there- 
with. We must not act and argue as though the world 
were what we wished it to be, and what, no doubt, it 
ought to be. Nor shall we achieve our ends by supposing | 
that it is within our power to start right away fashioning 
a new world. The new world will grow out of the reformed I 
world. But first the existing world has to be reformed. \| 
The struggle for the internal reform of nations, i.e.^ fairer 
adjustment of nationally earned wealth, equality of oppor- 
tunity, the obligation upon the State to find work for all 
and to exact work from all, and so forth, can proceed side 
by side with the struggle for the reform of international 
relationships. But so long as the latter problem is not 
solved, the former proceeds under a perpetual menace. For 
what measure, not merely of finality, but even of assured 
and cumulative progress, can be achieved within a State 
when the whole internal economy of that State is open to 
violent dislocation at any moment by war — by war which 
diverts the national resources from the amelioration of 
internal conditions to the destruction of the nation's clients 
in neighbouring States, thus in a double sense hampering 
the nation's advance? The utmost precariousness and 
1 The Labour Leader, December 23, 1915. 
255 



256 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

perennial delay must of necessity characterise the internal 
improvement of States until the wider problem is solved. 

And when we look out upon the world as it is, what 
is the irritant we observe everywhere at work poisoning 
the relationship between nations? The tariff. And it is 
a poison which increases in virulence with the growth of 
population. The closer the intercommunication between 
peoples, the greater the facilities for the exchange of com- 
modities, the nearer the peoples are drawn to one another 
by mutual needs. How singular is it to reflect that while 
the operation of natural forces tends more and more to the 
abolition of frontiers as obstacles to human intercourse 
and to a fusing and commingring of human interests, a 
restricted section of every community is permitted by the 
Governments to interpose artificial barriers thereto, and 
how grimly ironic that the very influences which ought to 
make for increasingly harmonious relations become 
charged, owing to these artificial barriers, with matter 
making for bitterness, jealousy, and discord. Tariffs pro- 
duced the tension which in the middle of last century 
almost determined war between France and England. 
Within the present generation France and Italy have nearly 
come to blows over tariffs. In the last twenty-five years 
tariffs have over and again embittered the relations of 
Britain and France, and France and Germany. The Tariff 
Reform campaign, here gathered copious harvests of inter- 
national ill-will from the home tariffs of Germany, and the 
threat of constructing a tariff wall round the British Empire 
provoked German anger and alarm. The decision of 
the Russian Government in March of last year to impose 
heavy tariffs upon German rye and flour helped to precipi- 
tate the events of August. And to-day our tariff 
worshippers are busy laying plans to sow the seeds of 
future hatreds when this war is over. 

The opening up of new vast markets over-seas, 
primarily due to the rapid development of European indus- 
tries and consequent demand for increased quantities of 
raw material, has intensified the friction and quadrupled 
the dangers arising out of it. For to tariffs pure and 
simple have been added special forms of monopolies and 
privileges of an exclusive character. True, neither Britain 
nor Germany has been guilty in this respect. Germany 
has not imported her home tariffs into her colonial posses- 
sions. She has preserved therein the open door. Britain 
has maintained her home traditions in all her dependencies, 



THE INTERNATIONAL IRRITANT 257 

although she has accepted preferential treatment from the 
Dominions. But while British fiscal policy has remained 
sound, British foreign policy has for the past twelve years 
been identified with the political interests of Colonial 
Protectionist Powers, and against the interest of the only 
other Colonial Free Trade Power 1 except Britain. This 
association has led on the one hand to the present topsy 
turvydom — Free-Trade Britain helping Protectionist France 
and Russia in their extra-European interests against Free- 
Trade Germany — and, on the other, has undoubtedly 
strengthened the tariff elements in Britain in their agitation 
for Imperial Protection, an agitation promoted by the 
immense increase in. German trade, and assisted, in its 
popular appeal, by the Protectionism of Germany at home. 
The part this fatal economic policy has played in shaping 
the events which led to the war is beyond question, and 
here lies, perhaps, the most vital of all the reforms which 
clamour for broad and far-seeing international statesman- 
ship, if the "New Europe" of the future is to emerge from 
the region of hope to the region of fact. Cobden's vision 
not only went to the root of the actual, it pierced the future. 
We read his utterances with reverence, for if they embodied 
the truth in his time, they apply with tenfold significance 
to the world of to-day. Unhampered commercial inter- 
course, the right of all peoples to exchange their produce 
and their merchandise on a basis of mutual equality — this 
still remains the greatest of all reforms to be accom- 
plished in the relationship of States. The evil needs 
attacking all along the line, both in. its actual manifesta- 
tions and in its potential threats. It can be attacked more 
effectively where its establishment is recent and where, 
for a multiplicity of reasons, it is more easily approached — 
i.e., in the Colonial field. 

This is realised by the able and distinguished men who 
have drawn, up the "Minimum Programme for a Durable 
Peace," and who before many months — perhaps weeks — 
will assemble at Berne to discuss it. Twenty-six countries 
are represented upon the Council of the coming conference, 
including the United States, the Argentine, Austria- 
Hungary, Belgium, Britain, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Greece, Holland, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, 
Italy, Spain, and Roumania. One of the resolutions reads 
as follows : — 

1 I.e., among the Great Powers. Holland pursues a Free Trade 
Colonial policy. 



258 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

"The Powers shall agree to introduce freedom of trade, 
or, at least, equality of treatment for all nations, into their 
colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence." 

Here are some notable passages from the statement 
issued in support of the resolution : — 

"The opinion is universally entertained that economic 
rivalry has contributed more than has any other motive 
to the present war; it is evident in any case that the 
commercial competition between Germany and Great 
Britain profoundly troubled the relations of the two 
countries; thus a conflict was created which became one 
of the principal causes of the world war." 

Were the friends of peace of the last century mistaken, 
then, the document asks, when in urging freedom of trade, 
which implies the most widespread competition, they 
argued that the unrestricted exchange of goods between 
peoples was symbolic of human solidarity? Obviously 
not. For it is not international competition in the 
purchase and sale of merchandise which leads to armed 
conflict between States. What does so is the action of 
Governments in seeking to create, in specific cases, privi- 
leged conditions for their nationals at the expense of other 
nations. 

"German, trade" and "British trade" are often spoken 
of as though these two Empires were joint-stock 
companies, one and indivisible in their interests and 
pursuing commercial enterprises under the direction of 
their Governments. Everyone knows that nothing of the 
kind exists, and that, in point of fact, commercial competi- 
tion in regular trade and in the exchange of ordinary goods 
is much more intense between two British merchants or 
between two German merchants than between English and 
German merchants; and, on the other hand, that the 
majority of the citizens of both countries have common 
and identical interests." 

After pointing out that the Protectionism adopted by 
many States at home will only perish by degrees as a 
democracy, growing in enlightenment and in power, is 
able more and more to impose its will upon selfish interests, 
the document contends that collective international action 
in regard to Colonial Dependencies is perfectly feasible 
and urgently necessary, and is the only policy compatible 



THE INTERNATIONAL IRRITANT 259 

with the duties of civilised nations towards races in a more 
backward state. The document lays stress upon the fact 
that : — 

"Exclusivism in the Colonial field has become more 
and more a fertile source of conflicts between States. It 
is in the Colonial field that commercial competition tends 
to assume a political complexion, and, consequently, to be 
provocative of war. ' ' 

Britain, Germany, and Holland have adopted the policy 
of the "open-door" in their Colonial Dependencies. Why 
should not other countries ? The remedy is simple, and 
would consist "in an undertaking between all colonising 
States to put an end to a system of Colonial privilege, 
preference, and favouritism." The compilers of the 
Minimum Programme rightly insist that "freedom of 
commerce" must mean more than mere "freedom of 
exchange." Freedom of navigation, of employment of 
capital, of the location of commercial undertakings, of 
mineral enterprises — these must be free for all nations in 
all Colonial Dependencies, i.e., the enterprise of all nations 
must be on a footing of equality. If Customs dues are 
imposed for revenue purposes, they must not be differential 
dues, but applied to all goods, whatever their origin. 

The document stigmatises as an illusion the idea that 
national interests are really concerned in the international 
friction to which the policy of the "shut door" in Colonial 
Dependencies gives rise. It is individual interests which 
are at stake, and these, by the influence they are able to 
bring to bear upon Governments and in the Press, create 
among the masses the illusion that national interests are 
at stake. 

It is cheering to read so lucid and truthful a statement 
drawn up by well-known men from so many different 
countries, and to find distinguished Belgians like M. Henri 
Lambert and M. Paul Otlet devoting themselves, the 
former especially, 1 to the spread of the truth. It 
encourages the hope that the immense movement which 
will everywhere arise after the war against war as a 
medium for the solution of international disputes, will 

1 I would earnestly commend to those who may not have read it, 
Lambert's "The Ethics of International Trade," published by 
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press (London, Edinburgh, 
and Glasgow), and printed at the price of 2d. by Frederick Hall, 
Oxford. 



260 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

concentrate upon the removal of positive factors in inter- 
national relations which, so long as they exist, render a 
durable peace utterly impossible. 

It must come as a shock to those evil or ignorant 
advisers of the British nation, who go on dinning into our 
ears that the inherent wickedness and vile ambitions of 
Germany were alone responsible for this war, and that a 
durable peace can only come as the result of her destruction 
as a first-class Power ; it must come as a shock to them to 
find, after fifteen months of declamation, that they can 
impose less and less upon international intelligence, and 
to find that men of eminence, belonging to neutral, and 
even Allied nations, are preparing for a rational solution. 
But let us face the truth quite frankly. The stumbling 
block to a Colonial understanding between the three great 
Colonial Powers which are articulate — Britain, France, 
and Germany — is the Colonial policy hitherto pursued by 
France. Let us see whether, by the exercise of states- 
manship in all three countries, that stumbling block cannot 
be removed, and whether its removal, if practicable, might 
not be the first step to the breaking down of the tariff 
barriers which play such havoc with the interests of 
European peoples. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 
The Way Out 1 

AN arrangement for the internationalisation of 
commercial activity in the extra-European 
Dependencies 3 of the Colonial Powers and for the 
neutralisation of the Dependencies themselves would 
remove three-fifths, possibly four-fifths, of the cause of 
potential conflicts between States. It would be a self- 
denying ordinance on the part of the Governments, but 
the peoples would be the material gainers thereby, apart 
altogether from the immense gain derivable by them from 
the elimination of the chief irritant in international 
relations. And if the European Governments could be 
induced to go thus far, it would be comparatively easy to 
extend the principle to China, Persia, and other parts of 
Asia and Africa ruled over by indigenous Governments 
free from direct European tutelage, but necessarily 
accessible to and swayed by European influence. In other 
words, if agreement were possible in regard to the 
Dependencies, there could be agreement to refrain from 
pursuing exclusive commercial or political advantages 
(which are usually the cloak to cover the former) in 
independent Asiatic and African territories. There is 
nothing Utopian or visionary in these suggestions. They 
are eminently practicable. Their execution would involve 
no diminution of commercial activity and business enter- 
prise on the part of the nationals of any European State. 

1 Written on December 24, 1915, i.e., before Mr. Runciman's 
pronouncement in the House of Commons (January 10, 1916) : 
published in the Labour Leader, January 20, 1916. 

2 In using the term "Dependencies," instead of "Colonies," I 
desire to avoid that confusion in ideas which leads to so much 
muddled thinking on this subject. The term "Colony" is not 
applicable to the vast tropical and sub-tropical areas which have been 
drawn into the vortex of European political ambitions owing to 
Europe's economic need for the raw material these areas produce. 
They are not colonisable by white peoples. At the present time these 
non-colonisable areas and the self-governing Dominions of the British 
Empire are all lumped together as "Colonies." 

261 
(19) 



262 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

But all would compete on equal terms. Acumen, 
applicability to local conditions, up-to-date methods, hard 
work — these would be the criterions of success. 

I mean by the expression, "internationalisation of 
commercial activities" in the Dependencies of the Powers, 
tnat the nationals of all European States shall compete 
on an equal footing in the Colonial Dependencies of each, 
whether in commerce, industry, banking, mining, shipping, 
or any other form of legitimate enterprise. I mean that a 
Frenchman, an Italian, a Russian, a Dutchman, a 
German, a Belgian, an Englishman, shall carry on his 
business on equal terms in a French, British, German, 
Italian, Russian, Dutch, or Belgian Dependency as the 
case may be. I mean that representatives of all 
nationalities that care to do so shall have equal rights of 
tendering for the construction of public works, and a share, 
if they desire it, in enterprises necessitating large capital 
outlay, in the Dependencies of the various Powers. I do 
not mean that the local administration of a Dependency 
should not impose taxes on European enterprises in order 
to raise revenue, but that such taxes, whatever form they 
take, should be imposed without differentiation. Neither 
do I suggest that the administration itself should be 
internationalised, although the creation of international 
Boards for the discussion and adjustment of local 
difficulties, upon which commercial representatives of the 
nations interested would sit, might suggest itself as a 
feasible development in course of time. 

The subject has another side to it, superficially 
irrelevant, but to those who look beneath the surface 
indissolubly connected, viz., the treatment of the native 
races. If economic rivalry between the colonising Powers 
in the undeveloped or partly developed areas of the world's 
surface could be done away with, the rights and the wrongs 
of the native races would receive closer and more 
sympathetic consideration by the Governments. At 
present the native races are callously sacrificed to rivalries 
between the Governments — perfectly futile rivalries for the 
most part; and the Governments have not yet realised 
that the perpetration of, or the acquiescence in, moral 
wrongs inflicted upon the natives, affect in the most 
detrimental fashion those very economic interests for which 
these Governments intrigue and agitate. So long as the 
European Governments look upon these vast African and 
Asiatic territories as areas for the pursuit of privileges 



THE WAY OUT. 263 

and monopolies, carried on behind closed doors, in favour 
of a microscopic fraction of their respective nationals, so 
long will these territories continue to be one of the prime 
causes of European unrest and European armaments, and 
so long will their inhabitants be sacrificed — and sacrificed 
not only immorally but stupidly, without the slightest 
advantage to the European peoples, and for the sake of 
purely ephemeral and exclusively selfish interests. 

By the "neutralisation" of the Dependencies them- 
selves, the writer means the removal of these over- 
over-sea areas from the operations of European war. 
This was intended by the Berlin and Brussels Acts 
to apply to a considerable part of the African 
Continent. But that provision, like everything else, 
has gone by the board. What chance, then, the 
sceptic will exclaim, of extending that principle on a 
vaster and, indeed, universal scale after the war, or by the 
terms of settlement? Every chance, if public opinion will 
but apply itself to the problem in the meantime; and, 
intrinsically, a very good chance, for a multiplicity of 
reasons. The Berlin and Brussels Acts laying down the 
neutralisation of the Congo Basin had been so frequently 
violated both in the letter and spirit before the war, that it 
may have been said to have been a dead letter from the 
start. The war itself has produced many weighty 
arguments in favour of the neutralisation of African and 
Asiatic Dependencies. When passions have cooled down 
and a sense of perspective reasserts itself, I do not 
suppose the British or French Governments will feel 
particularly proud, or particularly easy in their minds as 
to the ultimate effects of their action — at having imported 
Asiatics 1 and Africans to fight their battles upon the plains 
of Europe. Experience will suggest to them the doubtful 
wisdom of consecrating that policy. 

It would be idle to deny that the neutralisation of the 
European Dependencies over-seas would entail a sacrifice 
on Britain's part; while, on the other hand, the inter- 
nationalisation of commercial activities within them would 
be to her advantage, because of her commercial experience. 
For it is evident, of course, that in time of war the 
Dependencies of every European State are at the mercy, 

1 The tribute to the general character of our Indian administra- 
tion involved in the generous support Indian potentates have given us 
is gratifying and deserved. It is the wisdom of having profited by it 
that is doubtful. 



264 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

virtually speaking, of the Power which commands the seas. 
Their neutralisation would, therefore, involve on the part 
of Britain the loss of an advantage which her sea power 
gives to her. Let us face the fact frankly. But let us 
also ask ourselves, with an equal desire to deal honestly 
with ourselves, whether the voluntary surrender of that 
advantage would really injure the vital interests of the 
British people; and, too, whether, in the long run, the 
Powers of Europe can be expected to acquiesce in a 
situation which makes all their over-seas enterprise subject 
to British sufferance in time of war. To-day, no doubt, 
this is a German grievance. But yesterday it was a French 
grievance. To-morrow it may be a grievance collectively 
urged. The way to envisage the problem is not in terms 
of the grievance of this or that particular State at a 
particular moment; but in terms of the future of Europe, 
humanity, and of Britain herself. Continental Powers 
can. never be expected to disarm on land, even approxi- 
mately, still less to abandon the idea of challenging us on 
the seas, so long as their policy over-seas is carried out 
subject to our good will and pleasure. The safety of an 
island-Empire whose nerve-centres depend upon sustenance 
from abroad can never be jeopardised without a radical 
elimination of the causes which might place that safety in 
jeopardy. But neither can an island-Empire in a future 
world of man's increasing mastery over air arrogate with 
safety to itself the right to maintain a perpetual mortgage 
over the extra-European activities — the Imperial policy — 
of Europe. But that has been, and is, the attitude of 
British statesmanship. We say, in effect, to the Powers 
of Europe : "You can have an over-seas policy if you wish. 
You can acquire Dependencies, spend money on them, 
build up a big trade with them. But if you are so foolish 
as to fall foul of us, understand that we shall promptly seize 
them." Most Englishmen believe to-day that this war 
was caused by the German Government's desire to dictate 
to Europe, in Europe. Assuredly some Germans have put 
forward views which, logically interpreted, mean nothing 
else. But in our own case we quite deliberately, and as 
the most natural thing in the world, claim to dictate, by 
virtue of our overwhelming sea power, the policy of 
European Powers outside Europe. To me it appears 
utterly impossible, either that a better Europe can arise 
from the ashes of the old while that claim remains the 
bed-rock of our foreign policy, or that we can continue 



THE WAY OUT 265 

indefinitely to exercise it with safety to our own country 
or Empire. The neutralisation of the overseas 
Dependencies of all Powers offers a just and feasible way 
of escape from the accumulation of fresh hatreds and of 
fresh rivalries ; and from a position, which, ultimately, must 
in the very nature of things become impracticable to 
sustain. 

Britain is in a position to take the lead in the matter of 
the neutralisation of the Dependencies ; quite obviously 
this great reform could not be consummated without, 
her consent. In the matter of the internationalisation 
of commercial activities in the Dependencies, on 
the lines here laid down, the word rests primarily 
with France, which, after Britain, possesses the 
largest over-seas Empire and treats it as a protectionist 
reserve. But Germany, too, would have to consent to 
make sacrifices, for there must be a German quid pro quo. 
The internationalisation of "colonial" trade would be the 
first step towards undermining the tariff in Europe itself. 
Both in her over-seas policy and in her home policy Europe 
must gravitate towards freedom of trade, or continue to 
nurse within her bosom the asp of international strife. At 
present her ruling classes, pushed forward by vested 
interests and at their wits' ends to conciliate the most 
superficially powerful elements in their public opinion for 
the horrors and losses of the war, would seem to be busily 
preparing for renewed economic conflicts, rendered the 
more bitter by pumping into them the passions of the time; 
and hence preparing for fresh political conflicts and 
increased armaments. For let this incontestable truth 
sink into the minds of all the peoples. If, when the 
cannon cease to boom, the blight of the tariff war ensues, 
the hopes of humanity, which centre in this frightful 
catastrophe being the last of its kind, are blasted. Were 
European frontiers remodelled, as the result of this war, 
upon the most approved lines of national boundaries and 
political consciousness, and the tariff and the colonial 
monopoly not only remained in being but were aggravated 
by a further strengthening of the artificial barriers between 
peoples, the most fundamental of all causes of international 
friction would subsist. When, one reads about this 
plotting and counter-plotting on the part of the British, 
German, French, Austrian, Russian, and Italian Govern- 
ments to hamper Britons, Germans, Frenchmen, Austrians, 
Russians, and Italians in the exchange of commodities, 



266 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

one is tempted to ask whether statesmanship has not 
become utterly bankrupt in ideas. While its spokesmen 
declare that a durable peace is their one end and aim, they 
are deliberately engineering war under the spur of a 
spurious patriotism. They are arranging to plunge 
Europe back into the morass. 

Imagine a draught of pure, wholesome air sweeping 
through the musty atmosphere of the Chancelleries, and 
you might picture to yourself these men, appalled at the 
consequences of their own past incompetence, concocting 
no more poisonous brews, but some healing balsam to 
cure the wounds they have inflicted. You might perceive 
a germ of common-sense expanding into some such 
constructive set of proposals as these. For a period of, 
say, twenty-five years — no agreement should be unlimited 
in time — the British Government would pledge itself to the 
continued maintenance of the open-door throughout the 
British Dependencies. It would surrender for that period 
the preference granted by the Dominions. The French 
Government would initiate the policy of the open-door 
throughout the French Dependencies, and would undertake 
to maintain it for that period. The German Government 
would pledge itself to maintain the policy of the open-door 
throughout the Dependencies remaining to Germany as 
the outcome of the general settlement; and would further 
take the first stride towards European free trade by 
lowering its home tariff towards all countries alike — a 
measure which would benefit the Allies primarily, since it 
is the Allies which do the greatest volume of business with 
her. Substantially the British Government would say to 
the German : — 

"We guarantee to you a continuance of that equality 
of commercial treatment in the United Kingdom and in 
the British Dependencies which you have always enjoyed. 
For a quarter of a century you would thus be freed from 
the fear of a tariff wall round the British Empire. As a 
proof of the sincerity of our intentions, we are even willing 
to forego the preference accorded to us by our self- 
governing Dominions. In return, we ask for reciprocity 
both in your Dependencies and in your home market. So 
far as your home market is concerned, we recognise that 
you cannot immediately abolish your tariff, but it should 
be substantially lowered. In. stipulating this we are 
demanding from you considerably less than we have 



THE WAY OUT 267 

ourselves always accorded you, and what we are prepared, 
under these conditions, to go on according you. But we 
realise the economic problem you have to face, and we feel 
that the British people and the British Empire are 
sufficiently great and powerful to give this earnest of their 
desire to eliminate future international friction." In so 
acting the British Government would be laying the 
foundations of international concord, saving its own people 
from the disabilities and restrictions inherent in Protection 
receiving in return a substantial concession from Germany. 
Instead of maturing further impediments to human inter- 
course, elaborating further schemes for the manufacture 
of human bitterness — the prospect of consolidating an 
existent freedom of human intercourse where such freedom 
prevails, of undermining the ramparts of existing 
Protection where such prevails, of making the first serious 
effort to ensure the ultimate economic freedom of the 
nations. Which alternative offers most to humanity? 
Which is the wisest? 

What of France ? What advantages would she derive 
from the establishment of commercial freedom in her 
African and Asiatic Empire? What disadvantage would 
she suffer? "France" would suffer no disadvantage. 
"France" would gain priceless advantages. A few 
specific French interests would be affected. A certain 
pestilent type of politician, journalist, and financier who 
has been the curse of the Third Republic, and who thrives 
on colonial jobberies, would find his occupation gone, to 
the lasting benefit of political purity at home and 
administrative decency in the French Dependencies. On 
the other hand, it is a fact that nearly all the great 
exporting French firms are in favour of "colonial" free 
trade, and many of the most experienced French colonial 
administrators also. Notably is this the case in French 
West Africa, where the most considerable colonial effort 
of France has been exercised, and where the greatest 
volume of French colonial trade has been attained. The 
French West African merchants are dead against 
Protection, and always resist an increase in differential 
taxation. The French Dependencies themselves would 
grow richer and more prosperous with the disappearance 
of the differential tariff. Their trade would increase by 
leaps and bounds, and as the natural result there would 
be more revenue to spend on public works, sanitation, 
agricultural development, and native affairs. The whole 



268 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

character of French over-seas activity would be affected 
for the good. 

What of Germany? As already stated, Germany, like 
ourselves and Holland, has kept the open door in her 
Dependencies. But what of the quid pro quo in the shape 
of a lowering of the home tariff ? Observe, first of all, the 
justice of the standpoint. A British open-door policy 
throughout the Empire is of enormous value to Germany. 
Granted that we have not kept the open door all these 
years from altruistic motives. The fact remains that our 
action in so doing has benefited Germany in the measure 
of her commercial ability, and as her commercial 
ability is very considerable, the advantage has been 
very considerable Why should she not begin to 
reciprocate in her own market ? She is surrounded 
by Protectionist Powers. True. But a very little 
actual experience would show her rulers that the 
German people as a whole would benefit if the German 
tariff were lowered to all comers. And if Germany once 
took this step, reciprocity would undoubtedly eventuate. 
The mass of the German people would be unquestionably 
favourable to such a course of action, and were Britain to 
put forward a policy such as this, instead of indulging in 
tall talk about crushing, dismembering, overthrowing, and 
so forth, the peace and anti-militarist party in Germany 
would be enormously strengthened. The vested interests, 
the agrarians, the "Junkers" would be up in arms. But 
it would be a square fight between them and the German 
masses. Who can doubt the ultimate result? Here is a 
true democratic policy for Britain to follow, a policy which 
would automatically and inevitably cut away the props 
which sustain Continental militarism. 

Will the British people think it out for themselves? 
Will the leaders of British Labour look ahead, or continue 
dully to acquiesce in being swept away by a torrent of 
loose thought, faulty economics, and sterile passions ? Is 
it possible that at least the North of England and Scotland 
does not even now contain sufficient elements impregnated 
with Cobden's teaching to evolve a counter-programme to 
that tariff war which the Government in power, the North- 
cliffe Press, which is its insolent master, and the selfish 
interests represented by Leagues and combines, are 
undoubtedly hatching? If so, these various forces in our 
national life must rouse themselves to action before it is 
too late 



THE WAY OUT 269 

Since the above article appeared a great many 
statements have been made in the Press, not only by Jingo 
editors and contributors of no particular importance to 
Jingo newspapers, but by personages who certainly ought 
to know better, concerning the future division of the 
African and Asiatic tropics between Britain and France to 
the exclusion of Germany. Nobody has argued this case 
more fiercely than Sir Harry Johnston, whose notable 
contributions to our geographical and ethnological 
knowledge of Africa it would savour almost of impertinence 
for me to praise. And it is with genuine regret that I find 
myself in diametrical opposition on this matter with one 
who rendered valuable help at critical moments to the 
movement for the reform of the Congo, and to whom I 
am personally indebted for much generous appreciation 
and support of my African work. 

Having said so much, I am bound to state that Sir 
Harry Johnston's proposal to exclude Germany from any 
share in African territorial sovereignty appears to me bad 
and impracticable. From the point of view of the 
interests of the native population it would be justifiable if 
German rule in Africa had shown itself very much worse 
than that of other Powers who have exercised, or who 
exercise, African territorial rights. But it has not. There 
has been nothing comparable in German administration 
with the hideous tragedies of the Congo Free State and 
French Congo — the latter in such marked contrast to 
French administrative rule north of the Bights. The 
guerilla warfare against the Hottentots in South-West 
Africa was characterised by many atrocious incidents, but 
so have other African campaigns waged by other Powers, 
as Sir Harry Johnston would be the first to admit. A 
European administration in Africa is not to be fairly judged 
by what occurs in a state of war ; else whose records would 
be clean? German rule in Africa has had certain patent 
defects. But it was steadily improving. The last two 
German Colonial Secretaries were sincere reformers. The 
last one had personally visited the British West African 
Dependencies (which is more than any British Colonial 
Secretary has ever done), and had openly expressed his 
admiration for our policy in Nigeria. He was engaged in 
orienting German policy in the same direction when the 
war broke out. A powerful school of thought had arisen 
in Germany under the leadership of Westermann and 
Vohsen in favour of a native policy similar to that which 



270 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

we have pursued with success in Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast. The administration of native races was quite a 
new problem to Germany. She was learning and profiting 
by her mistakes. One decided point to her credit as 
against the other European Powers, Britain excepted, was 
her maintenance of the open door for international trade, 
and this has an important indirect bearing upon native 
interests. From the point of view of the natives a policy 
aimed at excluding Germany from Africa would not, 
therefore, be justified. 

From the wider point of view it would be very short- 
sighted. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
Allies are eventually in a position to "dictate" peace-terms 
to Germany and to impose, as part of those peace-terms, 
Germany's exclusion from the Colonial field; they would, 
if they so acted, be sowing the seeds, not of a lasting peace, 
but of a renewed conflict. It is a moral, physical and 
strategic impossibility to bottle up an elemental force such 
as that which the German people incarnate. It simply 
cannot be done. I suppose no Englishman living has 
written more, or more eulogistically, than I have done of 
many aspects of France's rule in her vast African Empire 
(except where her true policy became deflected for a time 
through Leopoldianism). But it is only necessary to 
consider the problem of, for instance, the future of French 
and German territorial sovereignty in Africa in the hard, 
cold light of figures to realise how futile is the idea that any 
permanent peace among the nations can. be looked for 
under a settlement which, while changing nothing in the 
fiscal policy of France in Africa, would extend still further 
French sovereign, rights and exclude Germany from Africa 
entirely. 

When the war broke out France's Dependencies in 
Africa covered an area of 4,421,934 square miles, including 
the African Islands, but minus Morocco (if you throw 
Morocco in, the total is increased by 219,000 square miles). 
In other words, France's African possessions were nearly 
1,000,000 square miles larger than the area of the United 
States. Throughout this area, except where restricted 
by Treaties, France differentiated heavily against foreign 
merchandise. Before the war France's foreign trade 
amounted to ^"583,488,000; her population (191 1) was 
39,601,509; her surplusage of deaths over births being 
(191 1) 34,869. Germany's Dependencies in Africa covered 
931,460 square miles; her foreign trade amounted to 



THE WAY OUT. 271 

^982,615,000, having increased by 204 per cent, in 22 
years (double the ratio of increase of even Britain's foreign 
trade). Her population was (1910) 64,925,993, and her 
surplusage of births over deaths (1910) 740,431. Now 
these figures do not suggest that a nation with a large and 
expanding population and a phenomenally developing 
foreign trade, a nation more and more dependent, 
therefore, upon imported raw materials for the employment 
of its industrial population, should dispossess another 
nation with a much smaller and a stationary population 
and far less dependent upon imported raw material, of the 
latter's footing in the tropical world acquired by the blood 
and treasure of its sons. But they do suggest the folly of 
expecting that any rational scheme of international 
reconstruction in Europe can evolve from a policy which 
purposely intends to exclude the more numerous, 
industrially powerful and expanding unit from a footing 
in that same tropical world. If the Allies succeed in 
reducing Germany to an unconditional surrender, it is clear 
they will be in a position to impose such terms as they 
choose. But they cannot destroy the German people or 
that people's industrial capacities. Hence I fear that the 
sort of "punishment" which Sir Harry Johnston would 
like to see inflicted upon Germany would be a punishment 
inflicted, not only upon the German people, but upon the 
British and French people as well. 

The essential condition of Germany's industrial 
requirements is, and has been for the past two decades, 
free markets over-seas. If she cannot obtain free markets 
over-seas under foreign flags, she must acquire over-sea 
territories for herself. Short of destroying the German 
nation, which is impossible, and undesirable if it were 
possible, I fail to see how the problem can be disposed of. 
It certainly cannot be by ignoring it. No doubt it would 
in the long run be to the advantage of the German people 
if they could obtain over-sea free markets without 
territorial responsibility. But, putting that consideration 
aside, on what logical grounds could "France" be made 
to say to "Germany" : "I, with my forty millions of 
people, claim the right to possess four and a-half million 
square miles of territory in Africa, where I differentiate 
against your goods, and I claim the right to increase my 
possessions still further. But I deny you, with your 
sixty-five millions of people and expanding birth rate and 
foreign trade, the right to hold a single inch of African 



272 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

soil" ? Or on what grounds of reason could "Britain" be 
made to say to "Germany" : "My flag flies over one-fifth 
of the world's surface, but although your population is 
greater than mine and increasing more rapidly, as is your 
trade, than mine, I deny to you, not only the right to 
possess an inch of African territory, but I also claim the 
right, whenever it may suit me, to encircle the whole of 
my enormous domain, with a tariff wall against you"? 
That way lies, not peace, but endless strife; not states- 
manship, but madness; not relief for the peoples of France, 
Britain, and Germany, but added burdens. 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 
The Betrayal of the Nation, 1906-1911 

The honour of a country depends much more on removing its faults 
than on boasting of its qualities. — Mazzini. 

The great danger of England is the Foreign Office — and much 
more the Foreign Office than the Foreign Minister. — The Candid 
Quarterly Review. November, 7975. (Conducted by Mr. Thomas 
Gibson Bowles.) 

When war was decided upon, it was not decided upon by the 
House of Commons or by the electorate, but by the concurrence of 
Ministers and ex-Ministers. — Lord Hugh Cecil in "The Times," 
April 2Q, 191b. 

In practice the Foreign Office and the Chief Ministers of the 
Crown direct our foreign policy. There is, it is true, a modern and 
fashionable doctrine that Parliament has usurped this control ; but 
no sensible man believes it. Sir Edward Grey made a show of con- 
sulting Parliament when the country had already been committed to 
the Entente policy and, indeed, to the war. — "Morning Post," 
May 24, 1916. 

Allied armies have usually had difficulties in the field, for 
different national modes of thought are not harmonised in a moment. 
But in the case of France and Britain the union of arms began under 
fortunate auspices. For some years the two General Staffs hsvd 
been in the habit of considering certain problems together, and 
British officers had been regular guests at the French manoeuvres. — 
Mr. John Buchan, in "Nelson's History of the War." (Thomas 
Nelson and Sons.) 

I AM profoundly convinced, and I believe the great mass 
of Englishmen will be convinced within a very few years, 
that if our foreign policy in the last decade had been 
controlled by the nation, the situation which has involved 
all the great European Powers, ourselves included, in a 
general war, would never have arisen. 

I am convinced that if the nation had been treated 
honestly and fairly by the Liberal Government, the 
national future would have been infinitely more secure to- 
day than it is; and that hundreds of thousands of the 
flower of British manhood, now dead or crippled, would 
have been alive and well. 

I am convinced that if British foreign policy had been 
an open, unshackled policy, the influence of Great 
Britain in the councils of the nations would have saved 

273 



274 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Western Europe assuredly, and quite possibly, all Europe, 
from the catastrophe which mutual fears and jealousies 
were preparing - . 

I am convinced that at no period in our history had 
such an opportunity been given to Liberal statesmen to 
lead the world along the road of international sanity as was 
provided in the decade preceding the war; that the 
opportunity was not taken because they allowed themselves 
to become implicated almost immediately after they 
assumed the reins of power in the Continental maze of 
groupings and alliances, and that their implication therein 
would never have occurred had the nation enjoyed real 
democratic control. What was required was high and 
honest statesmanship, not bad and furtive diplomacy. 

I hold that the supreme national issue which this war 
compels us to confront, is the secrecy with which our 
foreign policy has been conducted since 1904, the 
consequences which have arisen from it, and the appalling 
dangers inherent in such a system. 

To slur over that issue, lest in facing it with candour 
and in our own most obvious interest, we be forced to shed 
the mantle of impeccability in all that touches the origins 
of this war, and our part therein, which our rulers have 
cast about their shoulders, would be unworthy of our 
greatness as a people, and would be to inflict a grave 
injustice upon our sons. 



It is a misfortune that criticism of our foreign policy 
should be interpreted by its apologists merely, or chiefly, 
as evidence of a desire on the part of the critic to attack 
the particular Minister nominally responsible for its 
direction. Inevitably the Minister is comprised in the 
criticism. But the trouble from which this country 
suffers, the trouble which is its greatest danger, and will, 
if unremedied, bring it to ruin, lies much deeper than the 
mistakes of a Minister who, like all human beings, is liable 
to err, and to err with the best of motives. The trouble 
is, that the system this nation tolerates as regards its 
foreign policy is a system which suffers from a funda- 
mental contradiction. It is a system which in reality 
allows to that Minister, and to such of his colleagues 
as he may choose to consult, a power, virtually 
uncontrolled, to compromise the national destinies; 
while professedly allowing him no such power. The 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 275 

result of this conflict between practice and theory is 
to create, in the management of our foreign affairs, an 
autocracy more complete than that wielded by Tsar or 
Kaiser, but unlike the latter, ineffective, because 
unaccompanied by executive functions. Thus its Foreign 
Minister can — without putting his signature to any 
particular document, which would require Cabinet and 
ultimately Parliamentary sanction. — commit this country 
to a line of action involving war under certain con- 
tingencies, without informing the Cabinet or Parliament. 
But he cannot, without informing the Cabinet and 
Parliament, carry out the measures necessary to give 
practical effect, should occasion require it, to the policy 
he is pursuing. If he informs the Cabinet, he may split it. 
If he succeeds in carrying the Cabinet, the difficulty is not 
overcome. There is Parliament and the country to be dealt 
with. He is, therefore, at once responsible and 
irresponsible. A system of this kind is a sword of 
Damocles continuously suspended over the head of the 
nation. It has all the disadvantages of an autocracy 
without any of its advantages. It makes "democratic" 
government quite impossible, and is hideously unjust to 
the democracy. The wound this system has inflicted upon 
the country is deep. If it is not to prove mortal, the nation 
must bring itself to realise how the system has operated 
and how the wound has been inflicted. "My country, 
right or wrong," is an expression replete with good 
intentions. The road to Hell, it has been said, is paved 
with good intentions. It was, I think, one of Lincoln's 
advisers who supplied the complementary corrective : 
"My country, right or wrong ! If right, to be kept right. 
If wrong, to be set right." 

When the Unionist Administration left office in 
December, 1905, it had succeeded in the task of 
rehabilitating the credit of this country, which had found 
itself during the Boer War without a single well-wisher in 
Europe. It had settled a series of long outstanding 
disputes with France, and it had slightly improved 
our relations with Russia. On the other hand, 
Anglo-German relations had become marked by 
mutual suspicion and ill-feeling. The Kaiser's telegram 
to President Kruger; Germany's determination to 
build a powerful navy, and her manner of announcing 
it; Mr. Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign, in 



276 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

which the growth of German trade figured so 
prominently ; the personal| friction between King Edward 
and his nephew, the Kaiser; Germany's ostensible 
exclusion, from the international agreements over China; 1 
Britain's opposition to the Bagdad railway scheme — these 
things were probably the chief contributory causes for the 
change, with one exception. That exception was 
Morocco. I shall not discuss Morocco again here, beyond 
remarking that the year 1906, which opened with the 
advent of a Liberal Government in. England, ushered in a 
second International Conference (at Algeciras) over 
Moroccan affairs, a Conference demanded by Germany, 
invited by the Sultan, and resisted until the last moment by 
the British and French Foreign Offices. It is at this stage, 
the specific starting point leading to Britain's eventual 
participation in the world-war, that the system under 
which the British nation permits its foreign affairs to be 
conducted becomes capable of illustration. The illustration 
can, I think, be given more fittingly in the form of a brief 
chronological precis. 

First Stage, 1906 (First Morocco Crisis). 

Sir E. Grey expresses to the French and German 
Ambassadors his personal belief that in the event of a war 
between France and Germany over Morocco, British 
public opinion would rally to the "material support" of 
France. 3 

The French Ambassador urges that the potential 
military and naval co-operation of Britain and France shall 
be facilitated, and for this purpose that the military and 
naval staffs of the two countries shall be authorised to 
meet in periodic consultation. 3 

Sir E. Grey consults Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, 4 
Lord Haldane, and Mr. Asquith, and consents to the 

1 "These three agreements practically closed the ring round China 
for the exclusive benefit of what has been described as the China 
Pooling Syndicate. This consisted of Great Britain, Japan, Russia, 
and France, and excluded Germany and the United States." — 
(Editorial note to Baron Hayashi's "Memoirs.") 

2 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on 
August 3, 1914. 

3 Ditto. 

4 It seems incredible that the information can have been conveyed 
to Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman in a way which enabled him to 
grasp its full significance. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 277 

French Ambassador's proposal, 1 which, however, is to 
leave the hands of the Government free. 

The Cabinet is not informed of this step until "much 
later on." 2 There is presumptive evidence that the 
Cabinet was not informed until the advent of the second 
Morocco crisis in the summer of 191 1 — five years and a-half 
later. 

Parliament is not, of course, informed at all. 

There is presumptive evidence that the official leaders 
of the Opposition were given at least a hint of what had 
been done; whether in 191 1 or earlier must be a matter at 
present of conjecture. There is presumptive evidence that 
the consultation of the military and naval staffs became 
thenceforth a permanent feature of our secret relations 
with France. 

Second Stage, 191 i (Second Morocco Crisis). 

Sir E. Grey takes "precisely the same line" as he had 
taken in 1906. 3 

Mr. Lloyd George makes, obviously by agreement with 
the Foreign Office, a threatening speech against Germany 
at the Mansion House; punctuated as such by The Times 
the next morning. 4 

Towards the end of the year, when the crisis is over, it 
becomes a matter of common knowledge in political, 
military and naval circles in Britain, France, and Germany, 
that in the event of a Franco-German rupture, British aid 
would have been given to France. 

Third Stage, 191 2. 

Spring. — Anglo-German negotiations on the subject of 
Britain's neutrality in the event of a European war break 
down. 5 

November 22. — As the result of Cabinet discussions, 
Sir E. Grey writes an "unofficial" letter to the French 
Ambassador, to the effect that consultations between the 

1 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on 
August 3, 1914. 
* Ditto. 
8 Ditto. 

4 "Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy" (p. 144). 

5 Partially revealed for the first time by Mr. Asquith in 
October, 1914. Negotiations of a similar character, apparently at 
Germany's suggestion, had taken place in 1909, and again in 1910 — 
without result. 



278 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

British and French military and naval staffs "does not 
restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any 
future time whether or not to assist the other by armed 
force." 1 

Fourth Stage, 191 3. 

March 10. — Lord Hugh Cecil asks the Prime Minister 
whether there is foundation for the general belief that the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, "have entered 
into an arrangement, or, to speak more accurately, have 
given assurances which, in the contingency of a great 
European war, would involve heavy military obligations on 
this country?"; and states that, "there is a very general 
belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty 
obligation, but an obligation arising owing to an assurance 
given by the Ministry in the course of diplomatic negotia- 
tions, to send a very large armed force out of this country 
to operate in Europe. This is the general belief." 

Mr. Asquith replies : "I ought to say it is not true." 
Similar denials by the Prime Minister follow questions of 
a similar tendency asked in Parliament on March 24, 1913, 
and April 28 and June 11, 1914. 



Let us explore this record. 

In the spring of 1906 the Minister in charge of our 
foreign relations, with the concurrence of three of his 
colleagues, takes a step involving the nation in the issues 
of life and death. He authorises the military and naval 
advisers of this country to work out a plan of campaign 
in the event of war arising in Europe, with the military 
and naval advisers of a Power which forms part of one 
of the two great rival Groups into which Europe is divided. 
In so doing he stipulates that he is not pledging the 
Government, of which he is, next to the Prime Minister, 
the most important member, to take part in such a war 
on the side of the Power with whose military and naval 
advisers the military and naval advisers of this country 
are henceforth collaborating, and which is itself formally 
pledged in a military alliance with another Great Power. 
This is literally true, inasmuch as there is no written bond. 
But the mere setting out of the fact in other than 
diplomatic language shows that the reserve then made (and 
confirmed in writing six years later) is in the very nature 

1 Revealed by Sir E. Grey to the House of Commons on 
August 3, 1914. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 279 

of the case precarious, and must become more and more 
so the longer the collaboration exists. This becomes at 
once apparent when the circumstances are examined. 

The fact of such an authorisation being- given 
constitutes an unwritten bond of a moral, and also of a 
material and positive kind, which involves the personality 
of the Minister who sanctions it and of the colleagues 
whom he consults. Henceforth the whole war mechanism 
of the two Powers is linked together : a community of 
professional interest and professional thought is created 
among the influential national elements connected with the 
profession of arms on both sides of the Channel. Those 
elements are themselves and of necessity closely related 
with the organisations concerned in the manufacture of 
engines of war. Between the latter and the world of 
politics and Press and finance there are a hundred 
filaments. Time alone must tend to strengthen the link 
thus originally created. Time will give additional potency 
to the unwritten bond in influencing political events. Time 
will commit the Ministers responsible more and more 
deeply to the logical sequence of their initial action, should 
the events which their action contemplated actually occur. 
Moreover, contemporary happenings themselves are bound 
to be affected by the existence of this secret and unwritten 
bond. Its existence will, and must, mould those happen- 
ings consciously, or unconsciously, and give them a 
particular tendency and a particular direction. To question 
all this is surely puerile? We know that the existence of 
this unwritten bond had these effects, and we know it from 
the Minister chiefly responsible. 

Eight years later (August 3, 191 4) Sir E. Grey was to 
make the operative force of the unwritten bond, both in its 
moral and material aspects, quite clear to the nation. He 
told the House in effect that, in his opinion, its existence, 
although unknown to the House until that moment, had 
placed us under a moral obligation to assist the French. 
And he also told the House that on the strength of that 
unwritten bond, as part of her share in the authorised plan 
of campaign, France had concentrated her fleet in the 
Mediterranean, and had left her western and northern 
coast-line undefended, and at the complete mercy of the 
German fleet. 1 

1 It is astonishing that the suspicions of the House of Commons 
were not aroused earlier in the year, when Mr. Churchill brought in 



2 8o TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Let us carry our exploration a step further. 

The years that follow the crisis of 1906 are troubled 
years. The ill-feeling between Britain and Germany 
remains an increasingly menacing portent upon the 
horizon. Two efforts to define their respective relations 
fail to mature. A naval panic, engineered by interested 
parties in this country upon, as it eventually transpires, 
inaccurate information, intensifies the prevailing bitter- 
ness. The reactionary Press on both sides plays its sinister 
rdle. Graver than aught else, from the point of view of 
the liabilities contracted in. the unwritten bond, of which 
three men in England are now the sole legatees — Sir 
Henry Campbell Bannerman having passed away — the 
Morocco clouds gather steadily in volume. In France, 
Cabinet succeeds Cabinet, and each fresh Ministry sees 
its capacity to control the militarists and colonial 
Chauvinists, who are bent upon the conquest of Morocco 
over the ashes of the Algeciras Act, becoming weaker and 
weaker. In vain the Chamber ignorant, as our Parlia- 
ment is ignorant, of the secret clauses to the Anglo- 
Franco-Spanish Treaties, repeatedly asserts its intention 
of safeguarding the independence and integrity of 
Morocco. While the Chamber talks, the militarists act. 
Germany watches with an impatience which grows as 
negotiations begun with one French Cabinet are upset by 
another. 

And all the while, unknown to the Cabinet, unknown 
to Parliament, unknown to the nation, British and 
French military and naval experts are carrying out their 
instructions, and with devoted zeal are discussing and 
arranging all the larger problems of strategy, and all the 

his Navy Estimates, and made his statement about the Mediterranean. 
The estimates were contested by the Unionists on the 
ground of reduction, and a resolution was moved on the 
subject of the political and strategic position in the Mediterranean. 
In a speech he made on that occasion Sir Edward Grey said he 
would "pass very lightly over the question of naval strength in the 
Mediterranean." He further said that the policy contested could not 
"fairly be called abandoning the Mediterranean." No one, except 
Lord Charles Beresford, seems to have realised that such a 
re-arrangement must have been the result of some strategic quid pro 
quo with France. He indeed remarked : — 

"They (the French) are to look after our enormous interests 
in the Mediterranean, because we cannot have a fleet there. 
What are we going to do for France? It may be very disagree- 
able, but we are liable with these Ententes and Alliances." 
But apparently the House paid no attention. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 281 

details of organisation incidental to a great campaign 
waged in common against a common potential foe. 

And now the storm bursts. The Algeciras Act has 
become in the eyes of all men merely a "scrap of paper." 
The secret Treaties have come to fruition, although their 
existence is still undisclosed. Germany bangs her fist 
upon the diplomatic table. At the request of the Foreign 
Office, the Minister in the Cabinet who enjoys the greatest 
popular following speaks to Germany in diplomatic 
language of open menace. 

A long smouldering hostility has come to a head. 
Britain and Germany are on the brink of open rupture. 
But this time the storm passes, and with its passing, some- 
thing akin to consternation at the imminence of the peril 
infects political circles in this country. Once again 
negotiations to reach a modus vivendi are attempted. 
Once again they fail. 



Let us now consider the situation reached at this period, 
i.e., the summer of 191 2, after the failure of the Anglo- 
German negotiations following the Franco-German 
settlement over Morocco. 1 

Let us consider it from the point of view of the terrible 
injustice and perils inflicted upon the people of this 
country by the system under which the nation's foreign 
relations are carried on. Three members of the Cabinet 
have authorised military and naval consultations based 
upon the assumption that the armed forces of the Crown 
will, in the event of a general European war, co-operate 
on land and sea with one of the Continental Groups, whose 
rivalry keeps Europe permanently under arms. I say, 
with one of the two Groups advisedly, because 
co-operation with France must mean co-operation 
with her partner Russia, and involves us, therefore, in 
contingent liabilities to Russia. Obviously these 
consultations have led to the adoption by the responsible 
experts on either side of strategic measures designed to 
give practical effect thereto; otherwise the consultations 
would be farcical. Here, then, is a positive factor in 
actual being which must needs exercise a dominating 
influence over our whole international relationships. It 
constitutes, on our side, a definite preparation for war. 
In the summer of 191 1 its significance is increased tenfold, 

1 The failure was not admitted then ; on the contrary — vide 
Chapter XXXIV. 



282 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

owing to the fact that our diplomacy has openly taken the 
side of the Power with which we have been carrying on 
these professional consultations — even to the point of a 
veiled threat of war upon that Power's rival if the quarrel 
should end in armed collision. But until that event, until, 
i.e., the summer of 191 1, knowledge of this portentous 
step has not only been concealed by the three responsible 
Ministers from Parliament, but from their colleagues in 
the Cabinet. What has been the consequence of this? 

The consequence has been that other members of the 
Cabinet have delivered speeches in the country during the 
period covered by these consultations, of a kind calculated 
to make the nation believe that its relations with Germany 
are not really dangerous ; whereas, in point of fact and in 
the event of a European war, the nation's relations with 
Germany have become compromised in advance, virtually 
beyond redemption, and, short of a miracle, the nation's 
participation in such a war has become a foregone 
conclusion. Not only have the other members of the 
Cabinet been permitted to speak in this optimistic strain by 
their three colleagues, but the latter have themselves made 
exactly the same kind of speeches. 

In 1908 we find Mr. Asquith stating in the House of 
Commons that Britain and Germany "are every year 
advancing nearer and nearer to a complete under- 
standing"; 1 Mr. Churchill asserting that "there is no real 
cause of difference" between them, that they "have nothing 
to fight about, have no prize to fight for, and have no place 
to fight in"; 2 Mr. Harcourt declaring, "with knowledge 
and a sense of deep responsibility," that their relations, 
"commercial, colonial, political, and dynastic," have at no 
period in the last ten or fifteen years been on a firmer and 
more friendly footing than they are to-day," denouncing 
those who seek to set them at variance as "footpads of 
politics and enemies of the human race," as "pariah curs 
who foul the kennel in which they live. " 3 More interesting 
still, we discover Mr. Lloyd George emphasising 
Germany's precarious strategic position in Europe, 
explaining the anxieties incidental thereto, and the 
necessity for her to increase and perfect her army; 
proclaiming, in other words, as natural^ right and proper, 
for Germany to do that which, for having done, she is 

1 March 2, 1908. 

2 August 15, 1908, to a demonstration of Miners at Swansea. 

3 October 2, 1908, in a speech to his constituents. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 283 

denounced six years later by the same speaker. In 1909 
Sir Rufus Isaacs, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Robertson, Colonel 
Seely, Mr. Birrell, and Lord (then Mr.) Haldane, all speak 
in language identical in tendency. Lord Haldane 
asseverates that he has many friends in Germany, and that 
the Germans are much misunderstood. 1 Mr. Churchill is 
most emphatic as to there being between the two countries, 
no "racial, territorial, dynastic, or religious causes of 
quarrels which have in the past set the world on edge," 
while the "foundations of European peace are laid more 
broadly every year," 2 and, again, declaiming that it is a 
"monstrous error" to speak of a "profound antagonism of 
interests between the British and German nations which 
can only be resolved by a supreme trial of strength, 
towards which the tides of destiny are irresistibly bearing 
us. ... If a serious antagonism is gradually created 
between the two peoples, it will not be because of the 
workings of any natural or impersonal forces, but through 
the vicious activity of a comparatively small number of 
individuals in both countries and the culpable credulity of 
M larger classes." In 1910, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Lloyd George, 
and Mr. McKenna, figure on the public boards; 
"unhesitatingly" does Mr. Asquith assert that there is 
no single Power, "basing its calculations upon the 
assumption that war between Great Britain and Germany 
is inevitable or even possible," in no quarter of the 
political horizon is there "any cause of quarrel, direct or 
indirect, between us and that great and friendly nation." 3 
Mr. Lloyd George scorns the very idea of an "inevitable" 
war with Germany. 4 Mr. McKenna ridicules the scare- 
mongers. 5 

The nation has not only been led to believe that an 
Anglo-German collision is unthinkable, the while its 
military and naval experts are silently preparing for that 
very contingency with their French colleagues. The 
nation has been warned off any further military expenditure 
both by members of the Cabinet who are not "in the 
know," and this is natural enough; but incredible as it 

1 December 14, 1909, speaking in the Town Hall, Tranent, East 
Lothian. 

2 April 14, 1909, letter to the Chairman of the Liberal Association 
at Dundee. 

3 January 6, 1910, speech at Bath. 

4 January 6, 1910, speech at Peckham. 

5 October 20, 1910, speech in Wales. 



284 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

may seem, by the Ministers who have authorised the 
secret military and naval consultations. 

At the very moment these consultations are initiated, 
Lord Haldane, 1 then in charge of the War Office, we see, 
is adopting measures to reduce expenditure on the Army. 
"My Government" — King Edward states on July 28, 1906, 
in addressing the 3rd Battalion of the Scots Guards — "has 
considered it necessary to reduce the expenses of the Army, 
in consequence of which there is to be a reduction both of 
our artillery and infantry, and in this reduction your 
battalion is included." Mr. Harcourt, in October, has 
expressed great satisfaction at "notable retrenchments" 
in the Army. 2 On a later occasion he has prayed God we 
shall never "be organised as a great military nation with 
a people in arms." 3 Mr. Runciman has congratulated 
the country upon a steadily dwindling expenditure on the 
Army, and has looked forward to further reductions. 4 In 
1910, Lord Haldane has gone so far as to declare : "In 
naval and military defence we are absolutely and com- 
pletely equipped to meet all emergencies and situations. 
The person who says we are not is in a blue funk." 5 These 
words are uttered by one of the Ministers who is cognisant 
of the fact that a decisive step has been taken on the road 
to commit this country, with an expeditionary force of 
under 200,000 men, to participation in a land war against 
a State then perfectly well known to be the most formid- 
ably equipped and organised for war of any on the 
Continent, capable of placing several millions of men in 
the field. 



Thus for the five years 1 906-191 1 was the nation 
permitted to live in a fool's paradise, not as Ministers have 
since induced the nation to believe, because they, and, 
therefore, the nation, were innocent victims of 
Machiavellian cunning on the part of Germany; but 
because Ministers were steering a secret course which 
reduced all these fine utterances of theirs and of their 

1 1 pass no opinion upon the value or otherwise of Lord Haldane 's 
Army reforms. I know nothing about it. I am here merely 
recording facts in the light of the unwritten bond with France. 

2 October 17, 1906, speech to Rossendale Liberal Council. 

s October 2, 1908, speech to his constituents. 

*■ October 8 and November 18, 1907. 

s December 28, 1910, speech at Grimsby. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 285 

colleagues to so much gibberish, a secret course which 
demanded, not reductions in Army expenditure, but a 
complete revolution in the whole character of the military 
strategy of the Empire, including the adoption of national 
service. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 
The Betrayal of the Nation, 19124914 

The story in brief is one of action — hidden from all and especially 
from the Cabinet, secretly taken by the Three from 1906 to 191 1, and 
bringing England to unavoidable war in 1914. The Three had all 
the time been preparing for the war, which they believed was so 
probable that it needed a detailed plan of operations beforehand, yet 
all the time concealing all from their confidential colleagues in the 
Cabinet. The point and the appalling significance of the story lie in 
the proof it affords that we live under a political system which leaves 
the greatest of all issues in the absolutely uncontrolled hands of one, 
or two, or three, acting secretly and without the knowledge of what 
they are doing being shared by any of those on whom the real burden 
must fall, or even by their own most confidential and trusting 
colleagues. For the Wisdom of the many we have substituted the 
Conspiracy of the few. — "The Candid Quarterly." May, 1915. 

We were all caught 'unprepared. — Mr. Lloyd George : interview 
with the Editor of "II Secolo." (Sunderland "Daily Echo," 
January 29, 1916.) 

SO far the terrible story, for terrible posterity will 
deem it. But there is much yet left to explore, and 
I shall attempt it in this chapter. 



The year 191 2 was marked by two notable events. 
Public opinion here (and also in Germany) had given 
unmistakable proof of its desire to heal the breach. Among 
the political supporters of the Ministry the feeling was 
strong and emphatically expressed. Nor were there 
lacking voices on the other side of British politics. Sundry 
unofficial bodies sprang, just about this time, into exist- 
ence on both sides of the North Sea having reconciliation 
and understanding as their aim. The Government sent 
Lord Haldane over to Berlin. It was an unfortunate 
selection, although at the time public opinion — knowing 
nothing of the unwritten bond — regarded the Govern- 
ment's choice as a particularly happy one. For Lord 
Haldane was well known to the Kaiser and to Germany's 
leading statesmen. But Lord Haldane was also one of 
the triumvirate responsible for the unwritten bond, and he 

286 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 287 

was, moreover, the head of the Department which was 
supervising the execution of the bond. In other words, 
he was head of the Department which was working out a 
combined plan of action with the analogous Department 
in France, a combined plan of action in the event of a 
European war, i.e., a combined plan of action against 
Germany, the country with which he proposed to negotiate. 
And the analogous Department in France was working at 
the same plan with the analogous Department in Russia — 
Russia's hypothetical intentions being at that moment the 
object of German fears and suspicions. No Minister 
placed in such a false position could possibly have 
succeeded in bridging the gulf of Anglo-German misunder- 
standing. But the public knew nothing of all this. And, 
when Lord Haldane returned, the public was once again 
deceived. It was led to believe that Lord Haldane had 
smoothed matters over and brought about a permanent 
improvement, whereas the smoothing process could only 
be superficial and evanescent, by reason of the unwritten 
bond. Nevertheless, everything that could be done to 
convey the belief that Lord Haldane's mission had been 
highly successful was done. Lord Haldane's own florid 
references thereto may be set aside, in view of the Prime 
Minister's clear and emphatic pronouncement. 

Speaking in the House of Commons on July 25 (1912) 
Mr. Asquith said : — 

"Our relations with the great German Empire are, I 
am glad to say, at this moment, and, I feel sure, are likely 
to remain, relations of amity and goodwill. Lord Haldane 
paid a visit to Berlin early in the year; he entered upon 
conversations and an interchange of views, which have 
been continued since in a spirit of perfect frankness and 
friendship, both on one side and the other." 

Thus Mr. Asquith on the Haldane negotiations in 191 2. 
Now listen to Mr. Asquith on those same Haldane negotia- 
tions two years later. (October 3, 191 4.) 

"They (the German Government) wanted us to pledge 
ourselves absolutely to neutrality in the event of Germany 
being engaged in war, and this, mind you, at a time when 
Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive 
and defensive resources, and especially upon the sea. 
They asked us — to put it quite plainly — they asked us 



288 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

for a free hand so far as we were concerned, if, and when, 
they selected the opportunity to overbear, to dominate, the 
European world." 

Thus, in 1912, the Prime Minister of Great Britain 
despatches one of his most intimate colleagues on a delicate 
mission to the Sovereign and Government of one of the 
most powerful States in Christendom, a State united to 
our own by ties of Royal blood and by centuries of 
co-operation, but over whose relations with our own a 
sinister shadow of distrust and suspicion has recently been 
cast. This mission is of enormous importance to the 
people of both States. For, bearing in view the events 
of the year preceding it, and the general condition of 
Europe, that mission constitutes the touchstone of the 
future. If it succeeds, both nations can breathe freely 
once more. If it fails, this nation is confronted with one 
of the most momentous crises in its history. Even to the 
"man in the street" this is dimly apparent. To the Prime 
Minister of Britain, who knows how deeply the nation 
is committed in ties of honourable obligation towards the 
potential foes of that State to which this confidential 
emissary has proceeded, realisation of all that hangs upon 
the mission must be acute. The emissary returns, and the 
negotiations begun by him are continued after his return. 
The public mind is full of contradictory rumours. Finally, 
the Prime Minister deems the time has come to enlighten 
the nation. He solemnly informs Parliament that the 
negotiations have been marked throughout by "a spirit 
of perfect frankness and friendship" on both sides, and 
that our relations with our powerful neighbour are not 
merely excellent at the moment, but, he feels sure, are 
likely to remain so. . . . Two years pass. For the 
first time in a thousand years the British and Germanic 
peoples are at war. And how does the Prime Minister of 
Great Britain then refer to the proceedings which he had 
precedently characterised in the manner stated ? He now 
indignantly asseverates that they disclosed an attempt on 
the part of the German Government to bind Great Britain 
to a shameful neutrality. The "perfect frankness and 
friendship" have become transmuted into a species of 
bullying blackmail. This State, with which, he assured 
the nation, we were likely to retain "relations of amity 
and goodwill," had, nevertheless, made clear to us with 
a cynicism as indiscreet as it was brutal, that it proposed, 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 289 

when the time had come, to "dominate the European 
world." 

Comment would be superfluous. 



Whether Mr. Asquith's second version of the Haldane 
negotiations — substantially endorsed by Sir E. Grey in 
May, 1916 — is a fair and accurate account of the German 
attitude on that occasion, is a matter upon which students 
of the published British and German versions must form 
their own judgment. Mr. Lowes Dickinson has put the 
matter with great judiciousness and penetration 1 : — 

"The Triple Alliance was confronting the Triple 
Entente. On both sides were fear and suspicion. Each 
believed in the possibility of the others springing a war 
upon them. Each suspected the others of wanting to 
lull them into a false security, and then take them unpre- 
pared. In that atmosphere what hope was there of 
successful negotiations? The essential condition — mutual 
confidence — was lacking. What, accordingly, do we 
find ? The Germans offer to reduce their naval programme, 
first, if England will promise an unconditional neutrality; 
secondly, when that was rejected, if England will promise 
neutrality in a war which should be 'forced upon' 
Germany. Thereupon the British Foreign Office scents a 
snare. Germany will get Austria to provoke a war, while 
making it appear that the war was provoked by Russia, 
and she will then come in under the terms of her alliance 
with Austria, smash France, and claim that England must 
look on passively under the neutrality agreement ! 'No, 
thank you ! ' Sir Edward Grey accordingly makes a 
counter proposal. England will neither make nor partici- 
pate in an 'unprovoked' attack upon Germany. This time 
it is the Chancellor's turn to hang back. 'Unprovoked! 
H'm ! What does that mean? Russia, let us suppose, 
makes war upon Austria, while making it appear that 
Austria is the aggressor. France comes in on the side of 
Russia. And England ? Will she admit that the war was 
'unprovoked,' and remain neutral? Hardly, we think!' 
The Chancellor, therefore, proposes this addition : 
'England, of course, will remain neutral if war is forced 
upon Germany? That follows, I presume?' 'No!' 
1 "The European Anarchy"; op. cit. 



290 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

from the British Foreign Office. Reason as before. And 
the negotiations fall through. How should they not under 
the conditions? There could be no understanding, 
because there was no confidence. There could be no 
confidence because there was mutual fear. There was 
mutual fear because the Triple Alliance stood in arms 
against the Triple Entente. What was wrong ? Germany ? 
England? No. The European tradition and system." 

It is an admirable passage, and a tribute to the equable- 
ness of judgment and the sanity of mind which one of our 
very few distinguished intellectuals has succeeded in 
retaining amid the general declension. 

But I cannot altogether subscribe to it. It would, I 
think, have been more accurate to say : The Teutonic 
combination and the Franco-Russian combination con- 
fronted one another — for the Triple Alliance by that time 
was a myth : Italy stood apart, and was rapidly gravitating 
towards the Franco-Russian combination. These two 
combinations, then, confronted one another. But where 
did England come in ? Her statesmen denied that she was 
bound to the Franco-Russian combination. Yet, only the 
previous year, she had clearly intimated that she would 
support France, even to the lengths of going to war with 
the Teutonic combination, in a quarrel over Morocco where 
Germany's case rested upon international law and the case 
of France upon the violation of international law on behalf 
of French interests. What was the real situation? Would 
England lay her cards on the table? Was England's 
support of France on that occasion due to the particular 
circumstances of the case, or was her support permanent 
and unconditional ? Would England say what she would do 
if Russia dragged in France over a Near-Eastern struggle 
on the strength of her alliance with that country? 



The negotiations of 191 2 failed, and were bound to 
fail, not because either side desired war. They failed 
because, while the commitments on one side were avowed, 
the commitments on the other side were concealed. The 
primary cause of their failure was not the lack of desire, 
but the impossibility in which the British Ministers, in 
whose hands the negotiations rested, found themselves 
to devise any formula of neutrality which could be made 
to square with the obligations they had contracted. The 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 291 

plain fact was that British neutrality, in the event of war 
involving the Teutonic combination and the Franco- 
Russian combination, had been morally bartered away. 
British neutrality in such an event, which was the only 
event at issue, was a non-existent quantity at the time 
these negotiations took place. It had, morally speaking, 
vanished, with the initiation, early in 1906, of the secret 
Anglo-French military and naval consultations. It had 
disappeared in esse when, on the basis of those consulta- 
tions, continued from 1906 onwards, and the accumulating 
moral obligations they set up, the British Government had, 
in the summer of 191 1, announced its intention, through 
Mr. Lloyd George and The Times, of giving material aid 
to France in trampling upon the Algeciras Act. It was 
with the latter fact overshadowing their deliberations that 
the negotiators met. Under such circumstances the 
negotiations were foredoomed to sterility. This country 
was ignorantly and rapidly drifting into a potential land 
war, for which Ministers could make no adequate prepara- 
tion without informing the country what they had done 
and without disclosing the position into which the country 
had been manoeuvred. This Ministers did not dare to do, 
for it would have split the Liberal Party from top to 
bottom, and probably have sent them individually into the 
wilderness. No doubt they honestly believed that such a 
double event would be bad for the country. But in every 
denunciation of the "preparedness" of the German 
Government before the war, which they have uttered since 
the war, they pass condemnation upon themselves and 
upon the system of which they form part. 

For they knew of that preparedness. They knew its 
efficiency, its scale, its thoroughness. They proclaimed 
their knowledge. 



Did not Lord Haldane, for instance, speak on one 
occasion of the "great advantage" he had experienced 
from frequent visits to Berlin, "and there studying the 
German War Office and the German Army system" ? Did 
he not express his gratitude for the opportunities freely 
given him for studying "the wonderful system, dating 
from the days of Moltke and Bismarck, with its lessons 
of clear thinking and its instruction of how to produce 
definiteness in organisation"? 



292 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Moreover, Ministers testified to the inevitableness of, 
and the justification for, that preparedness down to the 
very eve of the war. 

Did not Mr. Lloyd George, for instance, thus unburden 
himself to a London newspaper on January i, 1914 : — 

"The German Army is vital, not merely to the exist- 
ence of the German Empire, but to the very life and 
independence of the nation itself, surrounded, as Germany 
is, by other nations, each of which possesses armies almost 
as powerful as her own." 

Did he not point out, as he had already pointed out in 
1908, that Germany was compelled by her geographical 
and strategic position, to be the strong man armed ? Did 
he not insist that while we demanded for our own national 
security a 60 per cent, superiority in ships, Germany had 
nothing like that military superiority over France alone? 
And did he not remind the nation that Germany had, "of 
course, in addition, to reckon with Russia on her Eastern 
frontier"? Did he not acknowledge, and defend as 
natural and inevitable, in view of "recent events" (the 
increasing tension between Austria and Russia in the 
Balkans) Germany's immense army increases? 



Similarly, Ministers condemn themselves when, to 
cover up their own conduct towards the nation, they spread 
the legend of a Germany desirous of "subjugating 
Europe," and of having laboured to that end for forty 
years — a statement which at any time but the present 
would be held to qualify the maker of it for a lunatic 
asylum. If this was the Germany which displayed its 
hand to Lord Haldane, why was Mr. Asquith so confident, 
in 191 2, of remaining on terms of amity and goodwill with 
so detestable a neighbour? 

This sort of garment, in which to clothe their failures 
and inconsistencies, has been worn threadbare on previous 
occasions by other Ministers, with more justification, 
perhaps. Was not the Crimean War attributed to 
Russia's aims at "universal dominion," to her "arrogant 
attitude," to the existence in Russia of a "threatening 
military autocracy"? 1 Was not Russia then described as 

1 "The Life of Lord Granville." Lord E. Fitzmaurice. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION. 293 

"a Power which has violated the faith of Treaties and 
defies the opinion of the civilised world"? 1 But the people 
swallowed it all in 1854 as they swallow it all to-day. For 
war psychology, it would seem, never changes. 

There were Russians then (and there are Russians 
now) who thus insensately boasted, re-echoing in their 
fashion the testamentary effusions of Peter the Great. 
There have been Germans (and there are Germans to-day) 
who have raved to the same purpose. It is always easy 
t>- select matter of that kind from the Chauvinistic litera- 
ture of every nation, in order to hypnotise the masses with 
a fixed idea. But never has the practice been systematised 
as it has been in the present war with the sanction of 
those for whom the rooting of that legend in the public 
mind was essential to their political salvation. Never 
before has officialdom stooped to such grotesque falsifica- 
tion of history in order to clean its own historical 
records. Never before have a few books, written by a 
handful of Jingoes, and scarcely read in the enemy country, 
been poured upon the station bookstalls in cheap editions, 
in order to prove that a people whose blood has fertilised 
our own institutions, which has given us our reigning line, 
and many of those most eminently concerned in building up 
our own Empire — is putrid to the core. Never before has 
the inculcation of hate, the advertisement given to the 
brutal acts of a maddened soldiery, the appeal to the 
passions of revenge and unreason been pursued, in this 
country, at all events, as a fine art, with Governmental 
support. Never before have our leading men given their 
patronage to such vulgar declamation against a foe who 
has committed many brutalities, but to whom our soldiers, 
at least, do not deny the gift of bravery or the perpetration 
of many acts of kindliness and chivalry. Never before 
have our newspapers stooped — again with encouragement 
from above — to such odious vituperation of a monarch 
whose faults, doubtless, are conspicuous but who, as the 
ruling classes of every country in Europe, not least our 
own, know full well has stood out during the greater part 
of his reign as a bulwark of European peace; a monarch 
who could have unchained war, and successful war from 
the militarist point of view, half a dozen times over in the 
past twenty years if he had so willed. We used to pride 
ourselves upon being above this sort of thing-. 

1 Royal declaration. March 28, 1854. 

(21) 



294 TRUTH AND THE WAR. 

And those who protest against these aberrations, which 
have done us incalculable harm among all neutral peoples, 
are denounced as "unpatriotic." Unpatriotic, forsooth! 
It is "patriotic" to pitchfork your country into a general 
European war with a military equipment adequate for 
dealing with a few thousand South African Dutchmen. 
But it is unpatriotic, after nearly two years' slaughter and 
waste, to recommend that your country should be extracted 
with honour from the shambles. 



It is, then, beyond dispute that the Haldane negotia- 
tions in the spring of 191 2, while they improved the general 
atmospheric conditions, left untouched the crux of the 
difficulty between Britain and Germany — i.e., the true 
character of the relations between the British Government 
and the Franco-Russian Alliance. They paved the way 
for minor accommodations, for the re-opening under more 
favourable conditions of certain African and Asiatic 
problems which had already formed the subject of mutual 
discussion, such as the future of the Portuguese 
possessions, the Bagdad railway, the oil deposits of 
Mesopotamia, and so on. They must also have influenced 
very considerably the collaboration which prevailed in the 
critical situation arising out of the Balkan War of 191 2, 
and its sequel the following year. 

But, fundamentally, the situation remained exactly 
what it was, what it had been since the unwritten bond in 
1906. The perils of that situation had increased 
enormously. The Pan-Slavists, whose High-Priest in the 
Balkans was M. de Hartwig, 1 and whose inspirer in the 
background was M. Isvolski, 2 were in full cry against 
Russian official diplomacy for its alleged lack of vigour, 
and were rapidly acquiring ascendency in the councils of 
the Empire. The Pan-Slavists had with them all the forces 
of reactionary officialdom. Their prototypes in Austria- 
Hungary were stirring up the same sort of trouble. The 
growth of the latter's influence was assisted by the 
incessant anti-Austrian propaganda in Bosnia directed from 
Belgrade and fostered by de Hartwig, and by the con- 
tinuous intriguing in Galicia through the instrumentality 

1 Russian Minister at Belgrade. 

2 The predecessor of M. Sazonoff. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 295 

of unofficial Russian agents. All this was common know- 
ledge. An explosion had been averted in 191 2 owing to 
French and British pressure upon Russia on the one hand, 
and to German pressure upon Austria on the other. But 
Austro-Russian relations had become stretched to cracking 
point. They were at the mercy of any untoward incident. 
And if they snapped, the divisions of Europe at once came 
into play — with Austria stood Germany, with Russia 
France : and between France and Britain was the unwritten 
bond, constituting, as Lord Lansdowne afterwards 
described it in the House of Lords, "obligations not less 
sacred, because they are not embodied in a signed and 
sealed document." 1 

Britain's equivocal position was thus infinitely more 
dangerous to herself in 191 2 than in 1906, or even in 
191 1. The British people went gaily about their business, 
believing that their Government was free and untrammelled. 



It was in these circumstances that the most distinguished 
of living British soldiers came into the open. He knew 
the facts. He knew that his country had become so far 
involved by its governing statesmen, but without its know- 
ledge, on the side of one of the two great combinations of 
potential belligerents that it stood morally committed, with 
ludicrously inadequate material, to participation in the 
most terrific land war ever waged. He flung himself 
personally, at an advanced age, into a public campaign on 
behalf of universal military training, which he had 
advocated for several years previously. The campaign 
failed, just as the Anglo-German negotiations of 191 2 
failed, and substantially for the same reason. It failed 
because the truth could not be disclosed. British traditions 
of public life precluded Lord Roberts from saying what he 
knew. All that he could do was to try and avert the danger 
by the only means open to him. That he should have been 
supported by the militarist and jingo elements in the nation 
was natural enough. That he should have been opposed 
by those whose conception of the international duties and 
national interests of Britain differed from theirs, was also 
natural. But that he should have been opposed, and not 
only opposed, but attacked, by the very men who had 
secretly placed the British people in a position where their 
national and Imperial future was imperilled without their 
cognisance, and, therefore, without adequate preparation 

1 August 6, 1914. 



296 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

— that, surely, will be regarded by future historians as one 
of the most amazing incidents in our national annals. 

Is it necessary to recall how Lord Haldane in particular 
strenuously opposed Lord Roberts' campaign all over the 
country, both on the ground of policy — i.e., absence of 
necessity — and on the ground of economy? The thing 
would be incredible were it not recorded in black and 
white. 



All through 191 3 and in the spring of 191 4 "the drums 
of Armageddon — as Mr. Walton Newbold expresses it in 
that remarkable book of his, which may be particularly 
recommended to those who place the blame for Europe's 
follies upon the shoulders of Germany alone 1 — were rolling 
more insistently for a struggle now not long to be 
deferred." The Teutonic combination and the Franco- 
Russian combination were arming to the teeth, each 
accusing the other of being the cause of their doing so. 
The international armament ring, in which British capital 
and many personalities of influence in British official and 
• professional life were interested, was making enormous 
profits. Our armament firms were turning out with frantic 
haste and with sublime impartiality every kind of killing 
machine for potential friend and potential foe alike. The 
incendiary Press in Germany, France, Russia, Austria, 
and Britain was inflaming and exacerbating public opinion 
— none playing a more sinister and influential part than 
the Northcliffe papers. 

Yet all through this period, during which the storm 
clouds were gathering, the British people were allowed to 
remain in the same fools' paradise in which they had dwelt 
since 1906. By this time, as it has been well said 2 "we 
were tied to France inextricably, tied by countless invisible 
threads such as fastened down Gulliver while he slumbered 
in the land of little men." The analogy is a doubly perfect 
one. And as we were tied to France, so France was tied 
to Russia. But in her case the threads were all too visible ! 
But the Ministers who had so tied us, and such of their 
colleagues and prominent personalities among the Opposi- 
tion leaders, who must by then have become acquainted 
with the facts, persisted in their immoral course of keeping 
the truth from the country. 

1 How Europe Armed for War." (Blackfriars Press Ltd.) 

2 The Candid Review. May, 1915. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 297 

Ministers denied point blank in Parliament that the 
country was in any sense committed. 

They denied it on the public platform. 

They insisted that our relations with Germany were 
satisfactory and improving. 

They insisted that our Army was fully sufficient to meet 
the requirements of our foreign policy and of our national 
strategy founded thereon. 

They urged a reduction of our naval expenditure up to 
within a fortnight of the outbreak of war. 



Then the blow fell. The bullet which put an end to the 
life of the Archduke Ferdinand penetrated the magazine 
which both the European Groups had been so long and so 
diligently filling with explosives. Into that magazine a 
dozen middle-aged and elderly gentlemen, half in blind 
panic, half in criminal disarray of mind, let fall the torch 
which, in falling, lit the funeral pyre of Europe's youth. 

But at least the peoples they governed were fore-armed. 

Our people were not. 

The Nemesis of their own secret acts gripped our 
Ministers by the throat. It paralysed their sincere and 
desperate efforts to maintain peace. It cast dissension 
among them. They could steer no clear or consistent 
course. They were unable to take up a definite attitude 
towards either party in the quarrel. They could afford to 
be honest neither to the British people nor to the world. 
They could not hold in check the elements making for war 
in Germany by a timely declaration of solidarity with 
France and Russia, although morally committed to France, 
and, therefore, to Russia; lest by a premature acknowledg- 
ment to Parliament of their long course of secret negotia- 
tions they should plunge the country into utter confusion 
and bring disaster upon themselves. They could not hold 
in check the elements making for war in Russia and France 
because their military and naval staffs had long since made 
all arrangements, with their authority, for common action 
with those of France, and, therefore, contingently, with 
those of Russia. In vain the Russians and French 
implored them to make a pronouncement of British policy 
while there was yet time. The Cabinet, as a Cabinet, 
could make no such pronouncement, for the Cabinet, as a 
Cabinet, declined to admit that it and the country were 
committed to the Franco-Russian combination. To the 
Cabinet as a whole the character and significance which 



298 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

the eight years' secret military and naval collaboration had 
gradually assumed in the eyes of those members of the 
Cabinet who had originally sanctioned it, came as a 
staggering and appalling prospect. 

The critical days rushed by. The struggle between 
contending factions in the Cabinet became acute. Finally 
the section which contended that war, having now become 
inevitable, we must enter it, being bound in honour to 
France and Russia, carried the day. It was materially 
assisted by the leaders of the Official Opposition, who, on 
August 2, expressed in a letter to the Premier — which 
contains no allusion, however distant, to Belgium — their 
opinion that "it would be fatal to the honour and security 
of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France 
and Russia at the present juncture." 

Whereupon a number of members of the Cabinet 
resigned. 

All but Mr. Burns and Lord Morley reconsidered their 
decision when Germany invaded Belgium. 



Mr. Lloyd George has since asserted 1 that if Belgium 
had not been invaded he would not have been a party to a 
declaration of war upon Germany. And he added this 
very positive statement : — 

"If Germany had been wise she would not have set 
foot on Belgian soil. The Liberal Government, then, 
would not have intervened." 

It will not do. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has been over- 
whelmed with abuse because he has from the first resisted 
the dishonest plea that the Liberal Cabinet determined upon 
war because of Belgium. Mr. Lloyd George's statement 
is a legend. That the invasion of Belgium was the chief 
factor which inspired the bulk of our people to the greatest 
voluntary effort in arms which any people has ever made 
in the history of the world (by way of reward, it has been 
conscripted !) is unquestionable. That it was the invasion 
of Belgium which gave the war its popular backing — that, 
too, is unquestionable. That it was the invasion of 
Belgium which fired the self-governing Dominions is 
equally true. But that the invasion of Belgium determined 
our official entry into the war is simply untrue. And its 
untruth is conclusively demonstrable. Thus : — 

July 31, igi4- Sir E. Grey informs the German 
Ambassador that if France and Germany become involved 

1 Pearson's Magazine. March, 1915. 



BETRAYAL OF THE NATION 299 

in war, Britain will be drawn in. (White Book No. 119 : 
Yellow Book No. no.) 

August 1, 1914. Sir E. Grey refuses to say that Britain 
will remain neutral if Germany undertakes not to violate 
Belgian neutrality, and refuses, when further pressed by 
the German Ambassador, to name any terms upon which 
Britain will remain neutral. (White Book No. 123.) 

August 2, 1914. Sir E. Grey definitely pledges British 
naval aid to France if Germany attacks the French coasts or 
shipping. 

August j, 1914. (Afternoon.) Sir E. Grey informs the 
House of Commons that this definite commitment has been 
made to France; that our national honour, in his opinion, is 
involved in supporting France; he reveals the military and 
naval consultations which have been going on since 1906, 
and states that France has, by agreement with us, concen- 
trated her fleet in the Mediterranean and left her other 
coasts undefended. 

August j, 1914. (Evening.) Sir E. Grey informs the 
House of Commons of Germany's threat to invade Belgium 
(dated 7 p.m., August 2), and adds that he did not possess 
that information when he made his statement to the House 
in the afternoon. 

The final and irrevocable act had, therefore, taken 
place before Germany had invaded Belgium ; before she had 
threatened to invade Belgium ; and before the Cabinet was 
in possession of the information that she had issued that 
threat. 

And the final and irrevocable act was the fatal and 
necessary consequence of the unwritten bond. 



A few days later, without any notification to Parlia- 
ment, the small British Expeditionary Force was being 
despatched to the Continent, there to be extricated only 
by consummate generalship and consummate valour from 
absolute annihilation. 

Where is the original Expeditionary Force to-day? 



Such is the story of how the British people were 
committed, in blissful ignorance of the fact, step by step, 
to support one of the two great rival Groups of the 
Continent of Europe, and to a land war on an unprece- 
dented scale, with an available Expeditionary Force 
(sufficient, they had precedently been informed, for all 
their needs) of under 200,000 men; of how, being 



300 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

gradually, imperceptibly, and furtively so committed, the 
British people were, nevertheless, lulled into a sense of 
false security by those who had so committed them; of 
how those who so committed them repeatedly assured them 
that their relations with Germany were excellent; of how 
those who so committed them concealed from the British 
people that the negotiations of 19 12 with Germany had 
failed to establish an accord between the two Governments, 
but led the British people, on the contrary, to believe that 
they had been successful; of how those who had so com- 
mitted the British people opposed every attempt to 
increase the military forces of the Crown, and took credit 
for reducing the expenditure upon those forces; of how 
those who so committed the British people constantly held 
out hopes of a reduction on naval expenditure, and even 
urged publicly that such reduction should be effected; of 
how those who so committed the British people, having 
also borne witness on numerous occasions to the efficiency, 
preparedness, and magnitude of German military 
resources, and having explained and justified the same in 
view of Germany's geographical and strategic situation, 
proceeded, when war broke out, to describe this efficiency, 
preparedness and magnitude of the German military 
resources, as conveying proof that the rulers of Germany 
had plotted in secret for a treacherous assault upon 
uninformed and unsuspecting neighbours, for the purpose 
of dominating Europe. 



The moral is clear; the lesson plain. No Democracy 
which tolerates a system capable of producing such results 
can live. 



CHAPTER XXXV 
The Two Roads 

Let us listen only to the experience that urges us on. It is always 
higher than that which keeps us back. Let us reject all the counsels 
of the past that do not turn toward the future. — Maeterlinck. 

THE ruling classes in every belligerent State advise 
their peoples not to be content with an "inconclusive 
peace." And there are not wanting professional men of 
God who echo that advice in the name of the merciful 
Christ. By an "inconclusive peace" the ruling classes in 
each belligerent State mean, although they take care not 
to avow it, a settlement of the war which shall deprive 
them of the sweet triumph of standing on the necks of the 
ruling classes opposed to them. 

For this world-war was made possible by personal 
friction between a very few individuals among the ruling 
castes in the respective countries engaged in it. These 
people now feel their personal prestige to be at stake. 
They feel it so much that the horrors of the war take a 
secondary place in their minds. They keep away from 
the actual battlefields. They live well, feed well; their 
ears are deaf to the wailing of the women. If this were 
not so the" war would have ended long ago. If this were 
not so every individual who had had a share in promoting 
this war would either have committed suicide or lost his 
reason. The war could end to-morrow if these people 
would think less about themselves and more about the 
dead. 

It is a staggering thought, is it not, that this war 
might end to-morrow but for the stiff-necked pride of a 
few — a very, very few — middle-aged and elderly gentle- 
men, whose incompatibility of temper, unlimited capacity 
for intrigue, and traditional notions of dignity brought 
the war about? But it is God's truth. A turn of the 
wrist; the touching of a lever in the obedient journalistic 
machine, and the soldiers would rest in their trenches, 
the cannon would cease to growl, and the diplomatists 
would be packing their traps to assemble at the appointed 

301 



302 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

meeting place ... to talk together instead of at 
each other. Yes, it is God's truth, for these middle-aged 
and elderly gentlemen are the principals in this gigantic 
duel. The people are their seconds. But the parts are 
reversed, for it is the seconds that fight while the principals 
look on and extol the peoples' virtues aloud, while musing 
in silence upon their gullibility. 

When a man has given you advice which you followed, 
and which has turned out to be wholly bad, you are a 
very foolish person if you grant him your blind confidence 
again. The ruling classes in every belligerent State have 
been telling the democracy for years that while they them- 
selves were extremely anxious to keep the peace, the 
fellows next door were a quarrelsome lot, and that the only 
way to keep them quiet was to arm to the teeth. "If 
you want peace — they said — you must spend and go on 
spending your substance on battleships and guns, on 
explosives and air-craft; then you will maintain peace, 
but not otherwise." Now that advice was hopelessly 
wrong. But, undeterred, the very same people who gave 
it, now come along with equal assurance and amazing 
effrontery with another piece of advice. "If you want 
peace — they say — you must go on fighting until the fellows 
next door own themselves in the wrong." Now, this is 
arrant nonsense. Moreover, this arrant nonsense is 
preached to every belligerent people, and, do not forget, 
every belligerent people is persuaded, more than ever 
persuaded after a two years' war, that the fellows next 
door were the cause of all the trouble. So, a complete 
impasse is reached. 

Well, we must reject that advice, and every people 
must reject it 

The only compensation possible for the miseries which 
this war has inflicted upon the present generation and for 
the burdens it has laid upon the next, is that it shall be 
militarily inconclusive, and that it shall be brought to a 
speedy end by general consent. 

A conclusive war, i.e., a war which enables one side to 
impose its unfettered will upon the other, means an 
inconclusive peace. 

A war closing amid universal exhaustion, followed by 
a sullen peace, holding out no prospect of international 
reconstruction on a different basis of motive and outlook, 
means an inconclusive peace. 



THE TWO ROADS 303 

A militarily inconclusive war, so recognised by general 
consent, offers the only prospect of a conclusive peace. 

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will the 
nations concerned perceive that the philosophy of war has 
become unsound. 

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will the 
nations be led collectively to repudiate the doctrines 
regulating the intercourse of peoples which their respec- 
tive Governments inherited, and which they have main- 
tained in an age when these doctrines present no permanent 
advantage to be reaped nor true glory to be gained. 

Only if the war be militarily inconclusive will each 
belligerent nation be inducted to examine both the origins 
and the lessons of the war with the determination to seek, 
and to find, a road which all nations can tread henceforth 
with safety and without dishonour. 

A militarily inconclusive termination of the war is the 
defeat of "Prussian militarism." It is the defeat of the 
French school of La Revanche. It is the defeat of Pan- 
Slavism. It opens the door to a Balkan Confederation, 
the one constructive policy for that tumultuous area. It 
compels a more equitable distribution of political power 
in that political mosaic, the Dual-Monarchy. It opens the 
eyes of the British people to the injustices, the dangers, 
and the ineffectiveness of their political system. 

At present the articulate elements in each belligerent 
State are busily engaged in distracting attention from 
national perplexities, by emphasising the perplexities of 
the enemy. 

But the national attention everywhere would be better 
employed in focusing its own problems, which are 
numerous. 

In what light does our own national and Imperial 
future appear, assuming what I have termed a "sullen" 
peace, the result of universal exhaustion; a peace laying 
foundations for no real change in the mechanism and 
procedure of international intercourse, effecting no settle- 
ment of those international problems of economics and of 
race distribution which, in the blundering grasp of 
so-called statesmen, have produced this war : a peace, 
therefore, which will be nominal and ephemeral, little 
more than an armistice, which the belligerents will employ 
in recuperation and in preparation for another attempt 
to solve these problems by another war? 



3o 4 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

That is what concerns our people primarily. 

There is much which must give food for grave reflec- 
tion in the .actual and potential changes which this war 
has created in the strategic conditions of our country, 
when we consider those changes in connection with the 
great racial movements now in process, and our relation 
thereto. 



Let us glance, first of all, at a capital factor in the life 
of States, the factor of population, and the light which it 
throws upon our national and Imperial future. The great 
commercial, industrial, and expanding peoples of the 
world are the American, the British, the German, and the 
Russian. Of the four the British people are now numeri- 
cally by far the weakest. This can be seen at a glance. 
The totals given are in round figures : — 

United States (white population, 1910 census) 82 millions. 

United Kingdom (191 1 census) 45 millions. 

Germany (19 10 census) 65 millions. 

European Russia (191 1 census) 121 millions. 

Moreover, of the four the people of the United 
Kingdom are increasing at a much less rapid rate, largely 
owing to the mishandling of the Irish problem, the popula- 
tion of Ireland to-day being less by more than a million 
than it was in the opening years of the nineteenth century. 
The reliability of the Russian census of 1897 is open to 
doubt. If it be accepted, then the population of European 
Russia has increased 27 millions in fourteen years. In 
any case, the rate of increase is admittedly very large. 
The figures for the other countries are as follows : — 

The white population of the United States in the 
40 years preceding the last census increased by 47 millions. 

The population of Germany in the 39 years preceding 
the last census increased by 23 millions. 

The population of the United Kingdom in the 40 years 
preceding the last census increased by 14 millions. 

These comparative rates of increase are even more 
striking if we take the respective increases in the decade 
preceding the last census (the figures for Russia are not 
available). We then find that : — 

In ten years (1900-10) the white population of the 
United States increased 14,832,552. 

In ten years (1900-10) the population of Germany 
increased 8,558,825. 



THE TWO ROADS 305 

In ten years (1901-11) the population of the United 
Kingdom increased 3,392,263. 

If that ratio of increase is maintained during the 50 
years following the last census, the result will be as follows, 
in round numbers : — 

In 1965 the white population of the United States will 
be 156 millions. 

In 1965 the population of Germany will be 108 millions. 

In 1965 the population of the United Kingdom will 
be 68 millions. 



The above figures, and the lessons they convey, must 
be continually in mind when we discuss the problem of 
Britain's future in the event of a "settlement" of the war 
which leaves its deep seated origins unconfronted, and, 
therefore, without prospect of remedy; a "settlement" 
which leaves legitimate ambitions unsatisfied, economic 
needs disregarded, open sores still festering; a settlement 
under which Europe, with a forced temporary respite due 
to financial drain, will begin once more to arm. 

The first consequence for the United Kingdom 
(henceforth dragged into the Continental system) of 
such a "settlement" must be a double burden upon the 
back of the people of these Islands. For to the burden 
of maintaining a supreme Navy would need to be added 
the burden of a conscript Army. That Army might in 
the early stages be moderate in size, but it would increase 
as the recuperative forces of the Continental States re- 
asserted themselves. Is this double burden one which 
the people of the United Kingdom can bear? 

Before the war the single burden was proving heavy 
enough. It was absorbing large sums urgently required 
for domestic purposes, lacking which millions of our 
people were suffering severely from preventible poverty, 
from preventible disease, and from preventible educational 
and other kindred handicaps. It may be said : "You are 
reckoning without the Empire. The Empire will hence- 
forth share that burden." Yes, the self-governing 
Dominions will share it, and gladly share it, provided you 
allow them to share in the direction and control of your 
foreign policy. But whatever their contribution may 
amount to, it cannot cover the difference between the 
single and the double burden. The white population of 
the Dominions, it may be noted, is not more than fourteen 



3 o6 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

millions. On the other hand, the burden of existing 
taxation upon India cannot be wisely or justly increased. 

In considering the future military requirements of the 
United Kingdom under the foreshadowed conditions, the 
position of France cannot be disregarded. France will 
emerge from the war more exhausted than at the close 
of the Napoleonic wars. She has already lost — lost defi- 
nitely in dead — more than a million of her most virile 
elements, and, perhaps, as many more permanently 
disabled. What this loss means for France can only be 
understood when it is borne in mind that her population 
was only 39^ millions at the last census (191 1); that its 
increase in the preceding 30 years had been under two 
millions, and that before the war she, unlike Germany, 
had enrolled every unit into military service, and that the 
utmost limit of her military man-power had, therefore, 
been reached. France will be in no position to take any 
but a secondary part in another great European war. And 
her willingness to do even that may well be doubted. 
The course the rulers of France have pursued during the 
past decade they have pursued with their eyes open. They 
at least cannot shift the blame upon others. But it 
remains true, nevertheless, that a malign fate has caused 
the French people to be ground between the upper and 
nether millstones of Russian exigencies and Anglo- 
German rivalry. This they will clearly perceive at the 
end of the war, and a great reaction is sure. Only the 
bitterest enemy of France would wish to see her involved 
in another European war. Her only chance of surviving 
this one is generations of peace, and this she cannot have 
unless she establishes a modus vivendi with her Eastern 
neighbour. That she will do so may be taken as one of 
the certainties of the future. Her most enlightened sons 
had been working along those lines for the past twenty 
years, and if France had been free from external commit- 
ments they would have succeeded. 

But would this assumption by the people of the United 
Kingdom of a double burden be sufficient, under the fore- 
shadowed conditions, to meet the potential modifications 
this war has occasioned in offensive strategy? Assuredly 
not. 

We have had a long start in sea supremacy, and we 
have maintained it. For a thousand years the sea has 



THE TWO ROADS 307 

saved us from the invader. We have been immune from 
the desolation which has ravaged the Continent, and in 
which our own legions have often participated. But the 
future holds for us none of the security which the past 
has held. That security was threatened when we went 
to war. At the present moment it is still our rampart. 
But the days that it will be so are numbered. And this 
for two reasons. In the first place, we cannot build 
against the world, and after this war the world will never 
consent that one Power — even though that Power may 
justly claim not to have abused its strength in time of 
peace — shall hold undisputed sway over the natural high- 
ways of the globe in time of war, and so arrogate to 
itself the right of regulating, according to its strategic 
interests, the sea-borne traffic of all nations. Had our 
situation been other than it is we should have done our 
utmost to dispute such a claim. After the experiences 
of the war the world cannot be expected to tolerate it. 
In itself the claim is far more comprehensive than would 
be a claim on the part of a Continental Power to exercise 
a military dictatorship in Europe. And for either claim 
the future can hold no place. 

We might for some years, by a desperate effort which 
would wear us to the bone, succeed in building against 
a Continental coalition. But we cannot build against a 
Continental coalition and against America as well. And 
America appears firmly resolved that if she cannot obtain 
by diplomatic action at the settlement, freedom for the 
exercise of her sea-borne trade in time of war, and the 
abolition of the British claim to capture private property 
at sea other than contraband, and to convert into contra- 
band, at British pleasure, any article whatsoever; she will 
do so by other means. And as she has long contended 
for the abolition of the right of capture, she will be 
consistent. What other means can she adopt? She can 
construct a battle fleet of such dimensions that even the 
most powerful maritime State must respect her wishes. 
This she will do if we do not abate our claim, and in this 
her position is identical with that of Germany. The 
community of interest is there; patent, irrefutable. No 
consideration of sentiment or of historical connection; no 
passing indignation at the ruthlessness of German 
methods of warfare; not even a rupture of relations can 
permanently remove it. And sooner or later — sooner 
rather than later — it must prove a decisive factor in inter- 



3 o8 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

national relationships if the old system of international 
intercourse is to continue. 

This acknowledgment of an unpalatable truth per- 
meates Mr. Balfour's recent pronouncement to the 
American journalist, Mr. Edward Marshall (May 18, 
1916). For if that statement be carefully read, it will 
be observed to be, in substance, a bid for joint Anglo- 
American control of the high seas. "Give up — says Mr. 
Balfour in effect — the demand for the immunity from 
capture of private property which you have persistently 
urged at the Hague, and which Britain has as persistently 
opposed, and we will take you into partnership as con- 
trollers of the high seas." The scheme contains the flaw 
common to all proposals which have as their object the 
concentration in the hands of a limited number of States, 
of a power to dictate the destinies of all nations. On 
these lines there can be no permanent solution of the 
naval problem or of the military problem. It has no moral 
sanction behind it. The true solution, which must, how- 
ever, be bracketed with an analogous solution for 
Continental militarism, has been well and tersely put by 
Sir Charles Bruce : — 

"The only way seems to be for the Powers to recognise 
that the interests of one are the interests of all; that the 
world's commerce can only be protected by a world's 
navy, and that, accordingly, the policy of the open-door 
must be supplemented by the policy of an open path, 
under the protection of an International Naval Police 
Force, to be composed of ships of all nations in propor- 
tion to the interests of individual States. Such a force 
would dispel the anxieties of those States which possess 
fleets inferior in power, but which are becoming increas- 
ingly dependent upon over-sea commerce for their means 
of existence. It would put an end to the perpetual 
unrest arising out of the apprehension of a sudden attack 
by one sea-Power on another, without a declaration of 
war, and insure for international commerce the security 
now enjoyed by national trade." 1 

That is one of the reasons why the future holds for 
us none of the security that the past has held. More 
and more does commerce claim, and rightly claim, to be 
immune from the effects of the madness and selfishness 
of contending rulers and castes. More and more does 

1 "The English Navy and the Peace of the World." By Sir 
Charles Bruce, in The Statist. July 13, 1912. 



THE TWO ROADS 309 

the sea belong to all men, and not only to some men. 1 
'But there is another reason. Even were we able by 
our own unaided efforts, or in conjunction with America, 
to retain a monopoly of sea power — and this would 
assume a corresponding ability to cope with any possible 
development of submarine power — sufficiently compre- 
hensive for our war needs, we should not have solved our 
difficulties. For another and rival element has allowed 
itself to be partly subjugated by the genius of man, and 
his complete triumph over it is only a matter of time. 
Sea power alone can no longer assure our security, even 
though we maintain directly, or in part by proxy, our 
mastery upon it. Air power has circumvented it. And 
in air power we do not even compete on equal terms with 
some at least of the great States of the Continent. 
Germany notably has the start of us, and although Fleet 
Street affects to laugh at the Zeppelins, you will not find 
naval, or military men, or air men doing so. A decade, 
maybe two decades, may pass before air power is suffi- 
ciently developed to permit of anything like a serious 
military invasion. But we must reckon upon air power 
attaining within a comparatively short time such a degree 
of perfection that our vulnerable centres will be open to 
accurately directed attack, and upon chemistry devising 
some further devilish ingredients in the destructive pro- 
perties of projectiles. 

Moreover, the events of the past two years have shown 
that modern warfare will henceforth be waged with 
increasing implacability, not against the armies and 
navies of the contending Powers alone, but against the 
civilian population, which by its monetary contributions, 
by its manufacture of the fuel of slaughter, by its agricul- 
tural and industrial labours, and by its sanction, maintain 
those armies and navies in being. It will become less and 
less possible for belligerent States, and more and more 
futile for international lawyers, to draw any distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. It is flying in 
the face of logic to maintain that the man (or woman) 
who fashions the projectiles or the explosive which another 
man discharges with deadly effect, is a non-combatant. 

1 This Chapter was written before Mr. Wilson's speech at 
Washington, on May 27, in which he outlined the kind of Settlement 
which would meet with America's support, postulating inter alia. 

A universal association of nations to maintain inviolate the 

security of the highway of the seas for the common, unhindered 

use of all the nations of the world, 

(«) 



310 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

Germany has deliberately adopted the practice of treating 
civilian life as of no account when civilian life interferes 
with military exigencies — or merely gets in the way. But 
is our own procedure different, except in the character of 
its manifestation? What does a "war of attrition" 
involve? What do our efforts to stop food supplies from 
reaching our enemies involve? We know full well what 
they involve. By those measures we seek, with equal 
deliberation, to inflict such hardships upon the civilian 
population of Germany as will result in sufficient pressure 
being placed upon the German Government by that civilian 
population as will, in turn, compel the German Govern- 
ment to sue for peace and to accept the terms we and 
our Allies see fit to impose. When the Germans say that 
we are making war upon their women and children, they 
are but giving rhetorical expression to what is true in 
substance and in fact. 1 

In their respective ways, therefore, both Germany and 
England have, by their actual practices in this war, 
admitted that, in order to be fully effective, modern war- 
fare must be waged against the civilian population. 

The effect of this admission upon air power and its 
perfectibility and upon our national position in relation 
thereto, is obvious. In any future war the population of 
our cities and towns will be at least equally exposed to 
wholesale slaughter as the population of the cities and 
towns of the Continent — unless we all take to living under- 
ground. 

Our strategical situation has, therefore, undergone a 
complete revolution. Formerly the Continent could not 
get at us. Our officials, well-to-do City men, and Fleet 
Street heroes could afford to be intensely patriotic at the 
expense of the soldiers and sailors whom they sent to fight 
and whom (incidentally) they paid (and pay) very meanly, 
and to whom they denied (and deny) full political rights. 
The Continent can now get at us sufficiently to make us 
feel uncomfortable at nights. But to-morrow it will be 

1 Hardly a day passes that our Press does not express jubilation 
at the thought of a starving civilian population in Germany. One 
wonders whether the anonymous persons who are responsible for these 
effusions ever bear in mind that Germany claims nearly two million 
Allied prisoners, and whether they ever ask themselves what the 
fate of these prisoners is likely to be if the time really comes when 
the German Government is unable to feed its civilian population? 
The levity, to say nothing of other aspects, with which the matter 
is treated in the British Press is as staggering as it is revolting. 



THE TWO ROADS 311 

air fleets, not nocturnal visitors in twos or threes, that 
we must contemplate. 

In a word, we have ceased, strategically speaking, to 
be an Island. 

And this revolution in our strategic situation, occa- 
sioned by the new aspect of the exercise of sea power 
which this war has projected upon the international screen; 
by the double burden resulting from our entry into the 
Continental system, and by the development of air power, 
must needs modify very profoundly our ability to sustain 
what has been for several centuries the chief purpose of 
our traditional foreign policy. We need not here discuss 
whether, in endeavouring throughout the centuries to 
prevent any one Power or combination of Powers from 
acquiring a leading position on the Continent [however 
fitted to exercise such it or they might be, through the 
possession of the same kind of qualities which we think 
justify us in controlling one-fifth of the habitable globe], 
our policy has been dictated by a desire to preserve the 
liberties of Europe; or whether that policy has been due 
to a perfectly intelligible ambition to minister to our 
own security and to increase the boundaries of our over- 
seas Empire. It is enough to point out that whatever 
the guiding inspiration may have been, the conditions 
which ensured the successful prosecution of the policy have 
passed away. This war will bring many revelations as 
well as many revolutions. It will reveal to the peoples 
of Europe that their divisions are not fundamental, but 
superficial. This process of revelation was, indeed, 
making rapid headway when the war came. As its 
natural complement is the growth of democratic tendencies 
within States, which makes for a corresponding weaken- 
ing of autocracy, monopoly, and militarism— the triple 
demons which curse humanity — it is more than probable 
that resistance to the process by the latter played its part 
in precipitating the conflict. Be that as it may, the 
Europe of Pitt and Palmerston is a thing of the past, and 
can never be revived. Alike through the growth of popu- 
lation, the centralisation of authority, the ramifications of 
commerce and finance, and the realisation of a basic 
solidarity among the peoples — which in the fullness of 
time will rise, phcenix-like, from these ashes — British 
traditional foreign policy is no longer practicable. We 
cannot now prevent the Power or Powers most qualified, 



3 i2 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

from acquiring- a leading position on the Continent of 
Europe. We can, however, materially influence that 
Power, or those Powers, towards liberalism or towards 
reaction, by the course our statesmen steer during the next 
few years, which will be crucial ones in casting the mould 
of the new Europe. For example, the future of the 
European peoples — of the whole world, indeed — depends 
for many generations to come upon whether reaction in 
Russia and Germany joins hands against Democracy in 
Germany and Russia — or the other way about. We can 
turn the hopes of the German people towards the more 
liberal West or towards the reactionary East in the 
measure in which we attempt — or do not attempt — to 
make this war an excuse for interference in their constitu- 
tional and domestic affairs; and in the measure in which 
we either ignore their economic needs, and endeavour to 
stifle their legitimate expansion, or recognise that there is 
room in the world for them and for us, and that "if you 
press down the lid upon an industrial and commercial 
country that lid will infallibly be blown off." 1 Far- 
reaching consequences will ensue from the choice we 
make. 

But, having made that choice, we shall no longer be 
able to control the issue. We can always influence, for 
good or ill : we can no longer control the destinies of 
Europe. The sooner we recognise it the better for our- 
selves, and the better for Europe. 



Having these various factors in consideration, I am 
led to conclude that events have brought — more speedily 
than might a few years ago have been anticipated — the 
British Empire to a point whence two roads diverge. One 
leads straight to eventual decay and disruption. The 
other leads to the only safe and tolerable future, alike for 
the British people and their kitrf and kin across the seas, 
for the peoples of the Continent, and for the races whom 
Europe, in her arrogance, calls "coloured." The funda- 
mental interests of all these people are common. Injustice 
to either is injustice to all. 

If we wish to direct our footsteps along the former 
road, all that we have to do is to adopt the policy so voci- 
ferously commended by the Jingo and ultra-Imperialist 

1 "Peace with Honour." By Vernon Lee. (The Union of 
Democratic Control : Price 3d.) 



THE TWO ROADS 313 

section of the official and political classes, and their 
following in all classes. It looks the easiest road 
to tread. Probably it is, for it requires little or 
no mental effort and allows of plenty of cheerful 
shouting in the approved "patriotic" style. Facilis 
descensus averni. If we select it, we shall make up our 
minds to prolong the war as long as our Allies can do so. 
We shall even urge them to prolong it, in the hope of 
"bringing Germany to her knees." We might conceiv- 
ably succeed in doing that, and, assuredly, quarrel with 
our present Allies as the outcome. But, whether or no, 
we shall, in any case, resolve to make it as difficult as 
possible for the Central Powers to make peace. We shaM 
do our utmost permanently to cripple the States of Central 
Europe, whose divisions and accessibility to invasion were 
the bane of Europe for five centuries. We shall welcome 
a large increase of Russian territory in Europe at the 
expense of Austria-Hungary. We shall decline to coun- 
tenance any solution of the Polish problem which does not 
put back the greater part of the Poles under the Tsar. 
In defiance of our claim to be fighting for the liberties 
of the smaller peoples and for the rights of nationality, we 
shall agree to an Italian protectorate over a considerable 
proportion of the Southern Slavs, and we shall restore 
Macedonia to Serbia. We shall insist either upon 
retaining for ourselves, and the Dominions, all the over- 
seas possessions we have taken from Germany, or make 
a present of them to France, and we shall obstruct any 
combination by which Germany can obtain compensation 
for their loss in other directions. We shall encourage the 
French to maintain their monopolistic and differential 
fiscal systems in the French dependencies. We shall 
exclude Germany from any share in the economic develop- 
ment of Asia-Minor. 

Having gone thus far, we shall proceed to erect a 
tariff barrier against the trade of the Central Powers, both 
in our home market and in our dependencies, as a first step 
towards that Protectionist and self-contained Empire which 
is the dream of Mr. Hughes. Having thus invited the 
world to ask itself how long 59 million white people are 
to be permitted to monopolise the natural resources and 
the labour of one-fifth of the habitable globe, we shall 
continue to direct our foreign policy on the cherished 
principle of the "Balance of Power." Having thus defi- 
nitely consecrated the British Empire to an aggressive 



314 TRUTH AND THE WAR 

policy, we shall jealously observe any signs of recupera- 
tion in Germany. We shall watch with equal suspicion 
the enormous accretion of Russia's power which our 
policy will have given her. And, whenever the "Balance" 
seems to us endangered we shall be as ready to shift our 
friendships and to promote fresh combinations as we have 
been in the past, recalling with complacency that we have 
fought now against, now in alliance with, almost every 
State in Europe, and have come out top every time. We 
shall refuse to modify the advantage which our para- 
mountcy at sea gives to us to superimpose our will in time 
of peace upon the over-sea expansion of Continental 
Powers; and, in time of war, to sweep enemy merchant- 
men from the seas, confiscate our enemy's trade, and seize 
our enemy colonies — if he has any. If America objects 
we will be hectoring at first, but as a pis alter we will 
grumblingly endeavour to buy her off and probably quarrel 
with her irremediably. 

In our domestic concerns we shall continue to mis- 
manage the affairs of the nation and Empire within the 
portals of a single Legislature. We shall continue to 
make the health and education of the proletariat a matter 
of Party controversy, wasting the time of our legislators 
in fantastic discussions while the nation perishes. And, 
of course, we shall preserve in all its essential features 
a land system as ridiculous as it is iniquitous. 

Our ruling classes will have finally elected to present 
the spectacle of a class perishing through sheer lack of 
intellectuality and, through its own invincible repugnance 
to learn, leading the nation to suicide. 



Or we can follow the other road. 

The goal at the end of it is an Internationalism, which, 
while asking no people to part with the institutions and the 
body of tradition which have made them one; while asking 
no people to surrender one iota of their pride in the land 
of their birth, in the social customs, the ideals and associa- 
tions clinging about it : will demand of every people, in 
the interests of all peoples, some sacrifice of accepted 
sentiment, some surrender of national vanity, some aban- 
donment of a philosophy largely rooted in arrogance and 
largely founded upon phrases meaning very little in them- 
selves, but which long familiarity has invested with an 



THE TWO ROADS 315 

artificial significance. That Internationalism will be 
directed to ensuring the interests of all States, not merely 
the most powerful in size, in the number of their inhabi- 
tants, and in their financial resources. 

It will be directed to the preservation of the welfare 
of the peoples, not the white peoples alone, but the non- 
white peoples whose evolution has not yet reached the 
point where they can stand alone and confront, single- 
handed, the powerful economic and financial forces of 
modern civilisation. 

It will be creative of the spirit by which alone the 
motive inspiring the relationship of nations shall respond 
to the real needs and aspirations of humanity, and through 
whose operating force the monstrous doctrine of defensive 
and offensive armaments shall be extirpated finally and 
for all time. 

That Internationalism must embrace all States : none 
must be excluded from its beneficent operations. It must 
be directed by a Council to whose judgment in inter-State 
disputes all States must give allegiance, and whose 
deliberations and decisions shall be public. 

Behind its sanction every State must feel secure. 
Every State must feel that there is advantage to 
itself in entering it. And for the false concep- 
tion of the word "State," which rulers and 
small privileged castes, politicians, and militarists have 
imposed upon the world to its undoing, must be substituted 
the true conception which shall enable the people at last 
to come into their own and to be the conscious, controlling 
guides of their destiny. 



The indispensable preliminary to an advance upon that 
road must be a speedy settlement of this war, marked by 
mutual concessions. 

If that be attained, progress along it will be rapid or 
slow, according to the sincerity of the statesmen and the 
capacity of the democracies to select the right men and to 
keep them to their mandate. 

For British statesmanship the opportunity is unique 
and will not recur. 

Is British statesmanship capable of rising to it? 

Is British democracy sufficiently determined to will that 
the opportunity shall be taken? 



EPILOGUE 

To the Belligerent Governments 



Wider and wider the spread of your devastations. 

Higher and higher the mountains of the dead — the dead 
because of you. 

Ever more extensive the boundaries of the cemetery you 
fashion. 

All the wars and all the plagues were as nought to the 
madness of your doings. 

Like unto the breath of a pestilence this madness sweeps 
through the plains and valleys of Europe, destroying 
in multitudes the children of men. 

The weeping of women is unceasing ; their tears mingle 
with the blood which flows continuously at your 
bidding. 



What have the people done to you that you should treat 
them so ? 

Have they not sweated for you? 

Have they not grovelled to you and licked the hand that 
smote them? 

Have they not stocked your Treasuries ? 

Have they not lacked that you might be filled? 

Have not great masses of them submissively endured 
poverty, squalor and want while you prated to them 
of Liberty and Equality, of Patriotism and Empire? 



And, in return, what have you done for the peoples? 

316 



You have abandoned them in their need, neglected their 
interests, mishandled the substance their labours 
brought you, abused the powers their loyalty and 
trustfulness gave you. 

You have cheated them and laughed at their bewilderment. 

You have kept them asunder and traded on the prejudices 
you fostered in them. 

You have humiliated and pauperised them and waxed 
strong on their weaknesses. 

You have left them ignorant, the better to hold them sub- 
servient to your purposes. 

You have taught them a false ideal of national honour and 
national greatness. 

You have pumped fear into their hearts in order to uphold 
that militarism you use to crush and drain them. 

You have encircled them with chains which, with grim 
irony, you have lured them to fashion and fasten upon 
themselves. 

Continuously, cynically, deliberately you have sacrificed 
them to your secret manoeuvres and your sordid 
' quarrels. 



Your armies, dead-locked in foul embrace, sway backwards 
and forwards advancing here a little, there a little — but 
at immense cost. 

Long and weary months they have grappled thus, the 
while your coffers run dry and the peoples murmur. 

At this spectacle apprehension and rage possess you. For 
you have staked all on ''Victory," and if "Victory" is 
for none of you, therein your common doom is writ; 
the doom of your systems, your caste-privileges, your 
monopoly of the sources of production, your unfettered 
command of the labour of millions of men — aye and of 
women and children too. 

Baffled, you order the death and mutilation of multitudes, 
you rain death upon sleeping cities, you decree the 
slow starvation of whole communities, you strew the 
floor of the sea with the bodies of the helpless. 

And the scribes and Pharisees you pay with this intent, 
dupe and mystify the peoples. 

3i7 



Your hireling Priests call upon the Deity to sanctify your 
deeds, and nail once more the Christ upon the Cross. 



Constantly you seek to involve more peoples in the 
general ruin of which you are the architects. 

From the uttermost ends of the earth you conduct fresh 
contingents to the slaughter, men with brown skins 
and yellow; black men of whom you boasted awhile ago 
that you had rescued them from barbarism. 

For your lust is insatiable and your hypocrisy measureless. 



You sow the world with lies, with malice and with un- 
charitableness. 

You ingeminate the cancer of unreason. 

You invent and trick, distort and vilify. 

Under your moulding Humanity becomes misshapen, 
ghoulish, revolting. 

You murder the body and you putrefy the mind. 

An' you were able, you would kill the soul. 



You hope to mitigate your crimes against the day of 
reckoning by repudiating an initial responsibility which 
is collective. 

For you are all guilty — every one. 

One and all you prepared for this saturnalia of massacre. 

One and all you squandered the communally earned wealth 
of your peoples in engines of destruction, and gave high 
awards for the most potent. 

One and all you lied and plotted and spied, span webs of 
intrigue, dug pits, laid traps, contrived ambushes for 
your neighbours. 

One and all you betrayed your peoples. 



" Victory I" 

What means this "Victory" you proclaim to be your goal? 

The victory you seek is a victory which shall perpetuate 
your empire over mankind; keep Humanity bound in 
fetters to your cruel and senseless systems; maintain 

318 



your castes and your monopolies; strengthen your 
embargo upon the peoples' liberties; leave your heel 
firmly planted on the peoples' necks. 

Profiting by the passions you have loosed, you hope to 
blind men for ever to your designs. 

They will be richer, you say, if more territory be added to 
your demesnes which, you falsely tell them, are their 
demesnes. 

They will be more secure, you say, if you can crush, 
humiliate and dictate terms to your rivals who, you 
falsely state, are their rivals. 

They will prosper, you say, from the ruin of their neigh- 
bours, with whom they must henceforth neither buy 
nor sell. 

All this is false, and you know that it is false. 

It is false, because if you rob, the robbed will not rest until 
they have won back what you stole from them, and your 
people must once more bear the burden of your pre- 
datory instincts. 

It is false, because dictation, humiliation and crushing 
bring no security to those who inflict them, but only 
breed, hatred and revenge against which the perpetrators 
must be ever on their guard. 

It is false, because the more impoverished your neighbours, 
the less they have to spend, and your people who supply 
their wants and whose wants are supplied by them, will 
suffer from their lessened ability to perform these 
human functions. 

Thus your notion of " Victory" means for the peoples 
increased poverty and a renewal of fears and hatreds 
upon which you have thriven, by which you retain 
them in subjection to your will and through which they 
perish. 

For the peoples, your "Victory" means Death. 

There is but one victory which can bring salvation to the 
peoples and heal the wounds which your disorderly 
ambitions and monumental selfishness have inflicted 
upon them; and which can create a fairer world for 
their descendants. 

3*9 



That victory is the victory which shall prove, finally and 
for all time, that warfare between great nations can 
yield no decisive residts, can achieve nothing but 
disaster and misery for all concerned. 

It is a victory which shall secure the practical demonstra- 
tion of the futility as well as the vileness of your 
practices, expel your philosophy from the councils of 
mankind, shatter your systems and sweep them, and 
you along with them, into oblivion. 

It is the victory which shall precipitate a great awakening 
in the hearts and minds of men, causing the scales to 
fall from their eyes, and the jungle of error in which 
they have so long wandered to be clearly revealed. 

It is the victory which shall turn the nations in loathing 
from you and from the idols of power and greed, and 
jealousy you have bidden them worship to their 
undoing and to your profit; which shall open out to 
them the road to Peace and good-will towards all men, 
domination over none, co-operation and partnership 
with all in the common tasks of social service which 
know no frontiers; and in the concentration of human 
effort upon honourable rivalry in arts and crafts, and 
all branches of constructive knowledge. 

It is the victory which out of this chaos of desolation will 
lead to Understanding. 

For none but YOU does that victory spell defeat. 

And without your defeat, utter and complete, Understand- 
ing is hidden from the peoples. 



So, in praying that the kind of victory you one and all 
desire shall not be yours, we pray for the victory of 
justice over injustice, of truth over falsehood, of liberty 
over thraldom, of understanding over ignorance — that 
ignorance wherein lie the seeds of every sin against 
the light. 

May, 1916. 



INDEX 



Aerenthal (see Austria). 
Alsace-Lorraine : 

French invasion of, 18 (foot-note). 

French desire to regain, 24, 25, 98, 
99, 148 (see also under Boucher 
and Sembat), 173, 174, 197. 
Anglo-German Relations, speeches on : 

Mr. Asquith : March 2, 1908, 282 ; 
January 6, 1910, 283 ; July 25, 1912, 
287; October 3, 1914, 287. 

Mr. Churchill : August 15, 1908, 282 ; 
April 14, 1909, 283. 

Mr. Lloyd George, July 28, 1908, 95, 
96, 282 ; January, 1910, 283 

Lord Haldane : December 14, 1909, 
283 ; December 28, 1910, 284. 

Mr. Harcourt : October 2, 1908, 282, 
284; October 17, 1906, 284. 

Mr. McKenna : October 20, 1910, 283. 

Mr. Runciman : October and Novem- 
ber, 1907, 284. 
Anti-German League, the, Ch. XXV. 
Anti-German Union, the, 187, Ch. XXV. 
Armaments, private industry of, 182. 
Asquith, Right Hon. H. W. : 

Assents to Anglo-French military 
and naval consultations, 276. 

Reply to Sir William Byles, March 24, 
1913. 36, 278. 

Reply to Lord Hugh Cecil, March 10, 
1913. 35. 278. 

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, March 
24. i9 I 3, 36, 278. 

Speech in Dublin : 112, 174, 176, 180. 

Speech on Anglo-German relations, 
March 2, 1908, 282 ; January 6, 
rgio, 283. 

Version of Anglo-German, 1912, nego- 
tiations (July 25, 1912), 287-88, 292. 

Version of Anglo-German, 1912, nego- 
tiations (October 3, 1914), 287-88. 
Austria- Hungary : 

Acceptance of Anglo-German pro- 
posal to stop at Belgrade, 134. 

Date of mobilisation against Russia, 
29, 31 (foot-note). 

Date of mobilisation against Serbia, 
2 9. 31 (foot-note). 

Effect of Archduke's murder, 132. 

Military expenditure and prepara- 
tions, Ch. X. and note : 97, 144 ; 
Ch. XVIII. 

Naval Expenditure, Ch. XVII., XVIII. 

Note to Serbia, 146 (and foot-note). 

Relations with Germany, 29-33, 56-7, 
69, _i29-34,_ 140. 

Relations with Russia, 124, 127, 129, 
i3i._ 132, 139, 145, 162. 

Relations with Serbia, 131, 132, 139, 
140 

Treatment of Poles and Ukrainians, 
174. 
Author : 

Extracts from speeches, 1912-13, 1-2. 

Letter of resignation to Birkenhead 
Liberal Association, 1-13. 

Public work of, personal foreword. 
Avebury, Lord, 88. 

B 

Bagdad Railway, 276, 294. 

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., 308. 

Balkans, problem of, 197. 

Belloc, M. Hilaire, 15. 

Benedetti, M., 15. 

Beyens, Baron (Belgian Minister at Ber- 
lin), 131. 

Beresford, Lord Charles, 207, 280 (foot- 
note). 

Berne, conference at, 257-9. 



Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor (see under 
Germany). 
Bismarck, Count, 17, 18, 129. 
Bonar Law, Right Hon., 14. 
Borden, Sir Robert, 239. 
Bosnia, 71, 127, 129, 139. 
Botha, General, 69, 70. 
Boucher, Colonel, 15, 18, 24-25, 47, 98-100. 
Bourdon, M. Georges, 149. 
Buchanan, Sir Ceorge, 30, 34, 135-6. 
Buchan, Mr. John, 14, 207, 273. 
Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, 29, 30, 33, 146-7 

(foot-note). 
Burns, Right Hon. John, 8 (foot-note), 

298. 
Buxton, Mrs. C. R., personal foreword. 
Buxton, the Brothers, 130. 
Brailsford, Mr. H. N., 7 (foot-note), 21 

(foot-note), 139, 226. 
Byles, Sir William, 35 (see also under 

Asquith). 
Bright, John (on Russia), 198 ; (on Pro- 
tection), 255 ; (on secret diplo- 
macy), 235. 
Bruce, Sir Charles, 308. 
Belgium : 

Despatches from diplomatic repre- 
sentatives abroad, personal fore- 
word and under Beyens, Cartier, 
Grootven, Greindl, Guillaume, 

Lalaing, Leghait ; France and 
Morocco. 
Future of, Ch. XXL, 194-5. 
Invasion of, 119-20, 190-1 (see also 
under Germany and British Foreign 
Policy). 
Neutrality of, 3 and 4 (foot-note), 14- 
27 (Palmerston on) 21 (foot-note) ; 
British attitude towards (in 1871), 
15 ; (in 1887) 20, 21 ; (in July- 
August, 1914), 13 ; (French attitude 
towards in 1866), 15. 
Position in event of general war, 10, 

n, 14, 26-27, 162. 
Relations with Entente, 3 (foot-note). 
Sacrifice of by Perpetuation of war, 
120, 191 (see also under Lambert 
and British Foreign Policy). 
Britain : 

British Foreign Policy (see also under 

Grey, Morocco, and Foreign Office). 

Affected by condition of France after 

the war, 305. 
Attitude towards Franco-German re- 
conciliation, 149, 151. 
Attitude towards Belgium, Ch. I., 

190. 
Blockade policy, 211, 309. 
British Commonwealth, 184-5, l8 7. 
Characteristics of, 55, 181, 264, 273. 
Condition of working-classes, 187, 

305- 
Fettered by understanding with 
France and Russia, 9, 10, 12, 191, 
281, 282, 296, 297. 
Fiscal policy, 252, 256. 
Fundamental contradiction of, 274. 
Growth of population and trade com- 
pared with Germany, 254. 
Imperialism and domestic policy, 185, 

186, 188. 
Imperialism and International rela- 
tions, 252, 256. 
In Morocco affair, Ch. IX., 89, 236 
(see also under Morocco and 
Grey). 
Judged by Belgian diplomatists, 81- 
8 3. 87-90 (see also under Beyens, 
Guillaume, etc.) 
Land problem, 188. 
Military and naval burdens, 305. 



Military and naval consultations with 

France, 3-4 (foot-note), 5-9, Ch. 

IV., 237, Ch. XXXIIL, XXXIV. 
Naval preparedness for war, 63. 
Naval expenditure, Ch. XVlI. and 

XVIII. 
Negotiations with Germany in 1912, 

237. 277. 286, 28 7. 288, 289, 290, 

291, 294 (see also under Asquith, 

Grey, and Haldane). 
Objects of, Ch. XXII., 203, 207, 

224, 253, 311-12- 
Population, extent and growth com- 
pared with other States, 304. 
Relations with Dominions, 178, 180, 

239, 240, 315. 
Relations with Ireland, 247, 304. 
Relations with India, 180, 263 (and 

foot-note). 
Relations with United States, 232, 

307, 308. 
Sea-power and international relations, 

264, 306-09. 
Secrecy of, 26, 37-40, 79, 80, Ch. 

XII., 177, 180, 235-8, Ch. XXXIIL, 

XXXIV. 
Strategic position after the war, 264, 

Ch. XXXV. 
Trade with Germany, 228-9. 
Uncertainty of, 26. 
War on German trade, 211, Ch. 

XXV., XXVI., 265. 

c 

Cartier, M. (Belgian Charge d'Affaires in 

London), 88. 
Gavel), Miss, 223. 
Caillaux, M., 84, 149. 
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 35, 273, 278. 
Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, n, 12, 14, 63, 
172, 173-4, J 89, 2ii, 279-80 (foot- 
note), 282. 
Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, 104. 
Campbell-Sannerman, Sir Henry, 279 (and 

foot-note), 280. 
Clarendon, Lord, 52. 
Clemenceau, M. Georges, 152, 153. 
Colonial policy of France, 252, 269, 270. 
Great Britain, 252, 269. 
Germany, 253, 269, 270. 
Monoplies and European peace, 
personal foreword, 258-9. 
Conway, Professor, 36, 38. 
Congo Question, personal foreword, 22, 

72, in, 263, 269. 
Courtney of Penwith, Lord, 105, 222. 

D 
Dardanelles, Austro-Russian policy in re- 
gard to, 139. 
Dicey, Professor Edward, 64. 
Dickinson, G. Lowes, 7 (foot-note), 104, 

155. 183, 289, 290. 
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W., 17, 18. 
Diplomacy, secret, personal foreword, Ch. 
XII., 165, 175, 177, Ch. XXVIII. 
Walter Bagehot, 105. 
John Bright on, 235. 
Carlyle on, 105. 

Mr. Austen Chamberlain on, 104. 
Lord Courtney of Penwith on, 105. 
Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson on, 104. 
Mr. J. A. Hobson on, 235. 
Mr. Arthur Ponsonby on, 104. 
(See also under Britain, Grey, 
Foreign Office, etc.) 
Delaisi, Francis, 7 (foot-note). 
Deicasse, M., 56, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 153, 

154 



Economic problems and the war, 193-4, 

226-7, Ch. XXX., 257-9. 
Edgcumbe, Sir Robert, 207. 



Edward, H.M. King, speech to Scots 

Guards, 284. 
Expenditure upon preparing for war, by 

belligerent Powers, Ch. XVIL, 

XVIII. 



Fear, relation of to war, Ch. XVIII. , 175- 

6 (see also under Germany). 
Fisher, Lord, 61. 
Foreign Office (see also under Britain). 

Composition and powers, 107-112. 

Reforms required, 179, 180, 239. 

Danger to Britain, 273-5. 
France : 

Attitude towards Germany 47, 69, 98- 
100, 148-9, 306. 

Belgian diplomatists' views of, 81-3, 
87-9. 153-5- 

Colonial wars, 63. 

Colonial possessions, 252, 253, 256, 
260, 267-8, 270. 

Effect of war upon, personal fore- 
word, 201, 305. 

Foreign policy : 

Influenced by Russia, personal fore- 
word, 7, 9, 128, Ch. XVI. 

Foreign trade, 253, 270. 

Imperialism and international rela- 
tions, 253, 270-2. 

In Morocco, Ch. IX. 

Jaures' view of, 71. 

Militarism, Ch. XVI. (see also under 
Boucher, Grouard, Sembat, Jaures). 

Military expenditure and prepara- 
tions, Ch. X., 97, 101, 144, Ch. 
XVIII. 

Military relations with Russia, 142-3. 

Naval expenditure, Ch. XVIL, XVIII 

Population before the war, 253 (foot- 
note), 270. 

Position in event of a General Euro- 
pean war, personal foreword. 

Rivalry with Britain, 68, 75, 181, 256. 

Strategy, 17, 18, 23-5, 47-8, 99-101. 

Three years military law, 143, Ch. 
XVI. 

G 
Gardiner, Mr. A. G., 200. 
Germany (see also under British Foreign 
policy, Grey, Belgium, France, 
Morocco, Kaiser, etc.) 

Alleged refusal to combine against 
Britain, 68-70, 164. 

Alleged plot to " subjugate Europe," 
49. 53. 58, 60, 64, 96, 97, 103, 121, 
126, 160-4, 3 00 - 

Attitude over Austro-Serbian crisis in 
i9 I 3. 130-2- 

Attitude over Morocco, 71-90 (see 
also under Morocco). 

Belief she is fighting a defensive 

- war, 28, 49, 213. 

Colonial possessions and policy, 122, 
123, 204, 212, 270, 271. 

Economic problems of, 197, 227, 243- 
6, Ch. XXX., 271-2. 

Effect of Morocco affair upon, 66, 69, 
72, 86, 87. 

Effect of Belgian diplomatic des- 
patches upon, 212. 

Effect of Russian General mobilisa- 
tion upon (see under Russia). 

Efforts to avoid conflict with France, 
23, 58. 81-2. 

Fear of Russia, 24, 25, 56, 97-9, 102-3, 
128, 135, 140, 141, 143, 164 (see also 
under Repington, Lloyd George, 
Boucher, etc.). 

Fiscal policy in Germany and Ger- 
man colonies, 256-7, 268. 

Foreign trade, 245, 254, 271. 



French view of character and policy, 
47, 98 (foot-note), 102-03. 

Future policy of, 121-2, 251. 
271, 304. 

Invasion of Belgium, 3 (and foot- 
note), 12, 14-27, 48-50, 120. 

Militarism, 2, 5, 60, 61, 62, 122, 135, 
141, 163, 204, 208, 210, 213, 223. 

Military preparations and expendi- 
ture, 22, 56, 61, 62, 67, 91-4, 97, 103, 
144, 163, Ch. XVIII. 

Naval preparations and expenditure, 
Ch. XVII., XVIII., 291. 

Neglected opportunities for waging 
war in Europe, 64, 122, 164. 

Population problem, 244-6, Ch. XXX., 

Probable demand for right of way 
through Belgium, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 
162. 

Reactionaries in, 202, 205. 

Relations with Austria (see under 
Austria). 

Relations with United States, 232. 

Responsibility for the war, 28-34, 48, 
Si. 53, 54. 60, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 99, 
103, 126, 129, 132-6, 140, 141, 155, 
164, 260. 

Strategic position in Europe before 
war, 17, 49, 50, 54-7, 127, 128, Ch. 
XVIII. 

Views of Colonel Repington (15, 
16, 18, 58, 141), views of Colonel 
Boucher (15, 18, 98, 99, 100), views 
of Sir Charles Dilke (17), views of 
Dr. Holland Rose (97), views of 
"An Islander" (97), views of Mr. 
Lloyd George (95-7, 103), views of 
M. Marcel Sembat (101-3). 

Strategic railways on Belgian fron- 
tier, 21-22. 

Trade development and competition, 
217, Ch. XXVII., 233-4, 276. 
Qioiitti, Signer, 131. 

Codart, M. Justin de (French Under- 
Secretary for War), 153. 
Granville, Lord, 15. 

Greindl, Baron (Belgian Minister in Ber- 
lin), 81, 82, 87, 88. 
Grey, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward (see also 
under British Foreign Policy, Mor- 
occo, etc.). 

And German Ambassador, 26 (and 
foot-note), 27. 

Assents to Anglo-French military and 
naval consultations, 276, 278 ; in- 
terprets their significance, 279. 

Assurance of material support to 
France in rgo6, 276. 

Attitude after Algeciras, 79, 80, 276, 
277. 

Attitude after Agadir, 83-5, 128, 277. 

Despatch to British Ambassador at 
Berlin, July, 29, 33. 

His " unofficial " letter to French 
Ambassador, Nov. 22, 1912, 277. 

Misunderstanding with German Am- 
bassador, 23. 

Pledge to French Ambassador, 
August 2, 1914, 49, 299. 

Prediction of popular revolt against 
war-taxation, 164. 

Proposed assurance to Germany, 120. 

Reply to Sir William Byles, June n, 
1914, 36. 

Reply to Mr. F. W. Jowett, M.P., 48, 
49. 57, 58. 

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, M.P., 
April 28, 1914, 36. 

Reply to Mr. Joseph King, M.P., 
June n, 1914, 36. 

Speech to House on August 3, 1914, 
39, 2 76, 277, 299. 



Speech on March 22, 1915, 60, 92. 
Speech on Mediterranean situation, 

280 (foot-note). 
Speech in May, 1916, 289. 
Statement to German Ambassador on 
July 31, 1914, 298 ; August 1, 1914, 
299. 
Suggestion that Austria should stop 
at Belgrade, 133-4- 
Grootven, M. van (Belgian Charge d' 

Affaires in London), 87. 
Grouard, Lieut. -Colonel, 24, 101. 
Cuiilaume, Baron (Belgian Minister in 
Paris), 89, 90, IS3-S- 
H 
Haldane, Lord: 

Attacks upon Lord Roberts, 296. 
Mission to Germany, 286, 287, 292. 
On Anglo-German relations, 283. 
On the Kaiser's responsibility, 60, 65, 

91. 94- 
Reduces army expenditure, 284. 
On German preparedness, 291. 
Hartwig, M. de, 124, 294. 
Hate, as a creed, Ch. XXV. 
Hayward, Charles, 7 (footnote), 71. 
Heath, Mr, Carl, 96. 
Hirst, Mr. F. W., 157. 
Hobson, Mr. J. A., 202, 235. 
Holland, Colonial fiscal policy of, 257 

(foot-note), 259. 
I 
India (see under Britain). 
International Council, 120, 182, 198, 225. 
International problems, insolvable by war, 

225. 
Internationalism, 184, 314-15. 
Iswolski, Mr., 124, 294. 
Italy: 

Negotiations with Austria and Ger- 
many over Serbia in 1913, 131. 
Tariff friction with France, 256. 
International irritant, the tariff as, Ch. 

XXXI., 265. 
Internationalisation of Colonial trade, 261- 

S (see also under neutralisation of 

dependencies). 

J 

Japan, and China, 230 (and foot-note), 

250 (foot-note). 
Jaures, M. Jean, 71, 149. 
Johnston, Sir Harry, 212, 249, 269. 
Jowett, F. W., M.P., 48, 49, 57, 58. 

K 

Kaiser, telegram to King George, 23, 58. 

Abuse of, 293. 

Advice to Archduke Ferdinand, 131. 

Alleged conversation with von Moltke, 
100. 

And Viennese Court, 130. 

Attitude in the Boer War, 68, 69, 70. 

Daily Mail's opinion of, 64. 

Factor making for peace, 65, 66, 91, 
98 (and foot-note), 101. 

French Ambassador's opinion of, 65. 

Telegram to President Kruger, 275. 

Visit to Tangier, 77. 
King, Mr. Joseph, M.P., 35, 36. 
Kipling, Mr. Rudyard, 207. 

L 
Langlois, General, 14. 
Lalaing, Comte de (Belgian Minister in 

London), 82, 87, 88, 89. 
Lambert, M. Henri, 1S9, 192, 193, 194, 259 

(and foot-note). 
Lansdowne, Lord, 295. 
Lascelles, Sir Frank, 88. 
Lee, Vernon, 312. 
Leghait, M. (Belgian Minister in Paris), 

87, 88. 



Leopold, King (see under Congo). 
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David, 25 (foot- 
note). 
Mansion House speech, 84, 86, 89, 

277, 291. 
Opinion of German Army, 91, 292. 
Opinion on Germany's strategic posi- 
tion, 95, 96, 97, 103, 143/292. 
On Anglo-German relations, 282, 283. 
On British unpreparedness, 286. 
On invasion of Belgium, 2-98. 
Long, Mr. Crozier, 32, 33. 
Loreburn, Lord, 222. 

M 

Macdonald, Mr. J. Ramsay, M.P., 72 208 
Maguire, Dr. Miller, 62. 
Malmesbury, Lord, 52, 218 (and foot- 
notes). 
Maude, Colonel, 62. 

Militarism, 61, 62, 63, 68, Ch. X., 120 (and 
Sea-power), 265 (German), see 
under Germany (French), see under 
France (Russian), see under Rus- 
sia. 
Morley, Lord, 8 (foot-note), 84, 298 
Morocco: personal foreword- 
Attitude o*f British Government in 
i9°5, 79- 

Attitude of British Government after 
Algeciras, 80, 83-4, 87-8, 141. 

Attitude of German Government after 
Algeciras, 81-3, 280. 

Attitude of Spanish Government 
after Algeciras, 80. 

British interests in, 73-76. 

Effect of 1911 crisis in France, 86 
12S. 

Effect of 1911 crisis in Germany, 66 
86, 128. 

First International Conference, 74. 

French bargain with Britain, 75. 

French bargain with Italy, 75. 

French interests in, 73-76. 

French policy after Algeciras, 80, 83 

French offer to Spain, 75. 

German interests in, 73-4, 78. 

Germany's first intervention, 77-8 

Inaugurated era of Treaty-breaking 
in Europe, 71, 72. 

Influence in producing the great 
war, 71, 72, 86, 280. 

Position when the Panther anchored 
off Agadir, 83. 

Revelations in French Chamber, 85 
(see also under Grey, Britain, Ger- 
many, etc.). 

Second International Conference, 78 
276. 

Spanish interests in, 73. 

Starting point of Anglo-French mili- 
tary and naval consultations, 72, 79, 
276. 

The Secret Agreements, 6, 9, 76, 80, 
177, 236, 281. 

Views of Belgian diplomatists, 87-90. 
Murray, Major Stewart, 62. 

N 

Nationality, Principle of, 174. 

Native races, treatment of by Europe, per- 
sonal foreword, 252, 261-3, 3 r 5- 

Navalism, European (see under Sea- 
power). 

Neutralisation of dependencies, 263-4. 

Newbold, Mr. Walton, 296. 

Nippold, Professor 0., 4. 

Nogi, General, 14. 



Otlet, Mr. Paul, 192, 194, 



259. 



Perris, Mr. G. H., 52, 57. 
Picton, Mr. Harold, 184. 
Pigou, Professor, 51. 
Poincare, President, 143, 145, 146, 145 
152-5- 



Poland, the problem of, 173, 174, 197 
Ponsonby, Mr. Arthur, M.P., persona! fore- 
word, 104, 169, 222. 
Price, Mr. Phillips, 28, 31 (foot-note), 130, 

135- 
Prussia, East, first invasion of by Russian 
armies, 31 (foot-note), 136. 
R 
Rankin, Lieut. -Colonel, 130. 
Repington, Colonel, 15, 16, 18, 58, 141 (see 

also under Germany). 
Richmond. Sir W. B., 207. 
Roberts, Lord, 295-6. 
Robertson, Mr. J. M., 207. 
Rose, Dr. Holland, 249. 
Rouvier, M., 84. 

Runciman. Rt. Hon. Walter, 37, 38. 
Russell, Hon. Bertrand, 7 (foot-note), 71. 
Russia: 

Date of partial mobilisation, 31. 
Date of General mobilisation, 31, 134. 
Effect of alliance with France upon 
European equilibrium, personal 
foreword, 16-20, 25-6, 47-56. 
Influence upon French foreign policy 

(see under France). 
Effect of general mobilisation, 30, 

130, 133-36, 137- 
Reply to Sir E. Grey's proposal that 
Austria should stop at Belgrade, 
134- 
Militarism, 126, 135, 136, Ch. XV. 
Military expenditure and prepara- 
tions, Ch. X., 97, 138, Ch. XV., 
XVIII. 
Naval expenditure and preparations, 

Ch. XVII., XVIII. 
Policy, 55, 63-4, 6g (note), 99-100, 

i58._ 
Relations with Serbia, 131-2, 139 (and 

foot-note). 
Rivalry with Germanic Powers, 9, 12, 
99-100, 124-127, 145, 162. 
S 
Sazanoff, M., 10, 30, 34, 159. 
Scott, Sir Percy, 61. 
Sea-power, 121, Ch. XVII., 264, 306-09. 
Sembat, M. Marcel, 47, 54, 98 (foot-note), 

101-103, 149. 
Serbia, relations with Russia (see under 
Russia). 
Objects of Serbian policy, 139. 
Relations with Austria (see under 
Austria). 
Sifton, Sir Clifford, 240. 
Stanley, Lord, on Crimean War, 196. 
Stepankowsky, M., 139 (foot-note). 

T 
Tariff Reform campaign, 275. 
Tariffs, and international relations (see 
under Internationalism), Ch. XXX. 
Trade, proposed war on German trade 

(see under Britain). 
Trevelyan, Charles, M.P., 8 (foot-note), 

222. 
Tsar, the late: 

Note to Powers of Aug. 24, 1898, 68. 

U 

Union, the, of democratic control, origin, 
formation, objects, Ch. XIX., 239. 
United States of America : 

And Sea-power, 307-09. 

Population, 304. 

Relations with Britain (see under 

Britain). 
Trade with Germany, 232. 

V 

Van Faulkenhausen, General, 22. 
Vickers, Ltd., 159. 
Von Tschirsky, 124. 
W 

Warfare, modern warfare and civilian 

population, 309-10. 
Wilson, President, appeal to, Ch. XIII. 




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